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Abstract 
This thesis exammes the interaction of law and medico-psychology in 
homicide cases, where the defences of insanity and diminished responsibility in 
particular are raised. If the defendant's mental state is subject to scrutiny 
through the defences, then expert medico-psychological evidence is required, 
yet law and medico-psychology have very different understandings on the 
mind and very different roles with regard to assessing individuals. Expert 
medico-psychological evidence can be submitted in the consideration of 
criminal responsibility, when sentencing is concerned with whether prison or 
hospital is most appropriate, and for release decisions involving judgments 
about the defendant's potential risk and dangerousness. 
The examination of the interaction between law and medico-psychology 
incorporated three dimensions. First, an exposition of the respective theoretical 
positions of the two disciplines on the mind, detailing the pertinent legislative 
and common law rules. The second analysed the judicial interpretations of the 
medico-psychological terms and concepts contained in the substantive law, and 
in addition, the controls developed through judicial reasoning on the procedural 
role of the expert and the admission of expert testimony. Finally, the 
practitioners' perspective is explicated, which was obtained by conducting 
interviews with lawyers and medico-psychological expert witnesses. 
There are two facets to the research conclusions, which simplistically stated 
are: first, in terms of the interaction between law and medico-psychology, the 
law uses medico-psychological concepts and evidence in a symbolic manner to 
facilitate legal objectives. Secondly, the examination of the nature of the 
interaction through the three dimensions exposed the fundamental difference 
between the theoretical legal debates and the practitioners' perspective. 
Although the former normally informs legislative and reform discussions, it 
seems from this research that consideration needs to be given to all the 
dimensions in future reform debates. 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The thesis examines the determination of criminal responsibility when there are 
questions as to whether the defendant's mental state at the time of the offence 
can meet the objective standard required by law. Whilst the nature of criminal 
culpability varies between offences, it usually requires that the defendant have 
the requisite guilty mind, meaning that they intended the act, which is referred 
to as mens rea. 1 The law recognises that individuals with disordered mental 
states are not always wholly criminally responsible and the defences of insanity 
and diminished responsibility allow a subjective evaluation of a defendant's 
mental state. As diminished responsibility can only be invoked in respect of 
homicide, the remit of the thesis is restricted to murder cases. Both defences 
require expert evidence regarding the state of the defendant's mind at the time 
of the offence. For ease of reference throughout the thesis the term medico-
psychology is used when referring to the experts that may come from 
psychiatry and/or psychology. However, this does not overlook the fact that 
there are distinctions between the two disciplines, outlined in chapter two, and 
theoretical divisions within each profession. For example, the Royal College of 
Psychiatry and the British Psychological Society, which constitute the main 
organisational bodies for each respective profession, contain numerous sub-
divisions to represent the distinct theoretical positions.2 
Significantly, whilst the focus within cases is the defendant's mental state, the 
disciplines of law and medico-psychology have different normative 
frameworks underpinning their conceptions of the mind. However, as this is an 
established area of law the initial research interest was premised on the 
assumption that there was an interaction between the law and medico-
psychology in this context, and therefore the research would ascertain whether 
or not developments in the neuroscientific understanding of the mind had had 
an impact on the nature of the interaction between the two disciplines. The 
ensuing exploration of the evidence of the interaction in case law and through 
interviewing practitioners showed that the character of the interface was far 
more complex than had originally been anticipated, challenging the envisaged 
I See chapter one 
2 The website for each organization is ordered around the different divisions. 
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perception of the relationship between the disciplines and therefore the 
anticipated research focus. 
There are two analytical themes in the examination of the interaction between 
law and medico-psychology in the context of these cases. The first relates to 
the role, social significance of the legal and medical discourses to categorise 
individuals as mad or bad, and their ability for their particular discourse to 
prevail within the interaction. This thesis explores the implications from the 
current nature of the interface. Theoretically significant to this aspect of the 
analysis is Foucault's (1973; 1977; 1980) premise of the disciplinary society, 
which deals extensively with the involvement of the 'psy' professions in the 
legal system. Integral to his philosophy is the contention that knowledge is 
power (1980), an important factor in light of the dominant social position held 
by law and medicine. Foucault also asserted that power is the result of a 
"multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate 
and which constitute their own organisation" because he wanted to resist 
adopting a structuralist position (1978: 92). However, it cannot be overlooked 
that institutional relationships have an impact on secondary relations between 
individuals and particular social contexts created by the discourses (Freundlieb 
1994: 165). 
With regard to the era of the disciplinary society, Foucault maintained that the 
emergence of disciplines concerned with the body constituted a new form of 
regulation less overt than that of the juridico-sovereign era. Thus this thesis 
examines the interface between law and medico-psychology in the 
categorization process that occurs in the application of the law, as "juridical 
systems define juridical subjects according to universal norms, [and] the 
disciplines characterise, classify, specialise ... "(Foucault 1977: 223). Foucault 
argued that medicine, through diagnostic categories, generated 'truths' about 
normality and abnormality, and also created mechanisms to deal with the 
anomalies (1973: 53; 68: 1980). Crucially the inception of the relationship 
between law and psychiatry is, according to Foucault, not predicated on 
psychiatry seeking to annex crime, but its need to secure a basis for 
interventions by gaining recognition for itself. and the outstanding public 
disease that needed to be dealt with was mental disorder and the dangers 
presented by madness (1980: 20). As a result a need for experts to identify 
homicidal mania emerged, or was constructed. Chapter four discusses how 
medico-psychological evidence has become integral to the legal assessment 
process because of the importance placed by society on the claims of science to 
speak the truth about aberrations (Foucault 1978: 53). 
Foucault asserts that a consequence of incorporating medico-psychological 
professionals and their language into the legal process is that legal discourse is 
annexed to 'neutral' diagnostic categories, thereby precluding the use of overt 
force to meet social policy needs to ensure social order and public protection 
(1978: 41; 1977: 187). Similarly King and Piper allege that "legal concerns, in 
all their different varieties, tend increasingly to submerge policy objectives 
beneath a mass of codes, statutes, cases and procedures ... " (1995: 3). This 
hypothesis is examined in chapter three. The research identifies normative and 
policy preferences incorporated into the legal practices that result in the 
application of labels to essentially feared sections of society, labels that appear 
in principle to be utilized universally (Foucault 1977: 273-6). 
Notwithstanding this line of argument, Foucault also states that a consequence 
of moving to a disciplinary society is that the legal system now defers to 
medicine, which is particularly pertinent to this area of research (1978: 41). His 
dismissal of law's importance in the new disciplinary society is not 
unanimously accepted, for example Hunt and Wickham (1994: 22) maintain 
that medicine and law supplement each other, which reflects Hacking's claim 
that a matrix, an interactive process, develops around categories (1999: 29-30). 
However, Teubner argues that law is an autopoietic, a self-referential system 
that remains unaffected by the other disciplines that become part of the legal 
process (King & Piper: 10). "Each discourse or communicative network, 
according to Teubner, therefore, has its own procedures for generating and 
assessing the truthfulness of any statement" (ibid: 23). The research focus of 
the thesis enables an examination of the nature of the interaction to test the 
veracity of these competing positions in this particular legal context. An 
analysis of the relationship and the nature of the legal use of medico-
psychological professionals and their incumbent diagnostic categories, as 
evident through case law is addressed in chapters three and four. This has 
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consequences for reform debates, which is a matter of discussion in chapter 
eight. 
Within the cases under examination the verdict and sentence stages in the case 
process are distinguished as they give rise to different considerations. The first 
is the verdict stage, where the law distinguishes between those to be held fully 
responsible, and those considered either not guilty, or only partially 
responsible, based on evaluations of mental states. The second relates to the 
framing of risk and dangerousness with regard to mental disorders at the 
sentencing stage, which is so integral to the operation and application of the 
defences because of the legal necessity to take into account matters of social 
order and public protection. The decision regarding culpability has implications 
for decisions about whether or not the defendant should be detained, and if so 
should that be in prison or hospital. Thus the law is an important social 
institution in terms of the consequences of the normative framework 
underpinning decisions on mental states for the attribution of responsibility, 
labels regarding risk and dangerousness, which in tum affects detention 
decisions. As stated, essential to the operation of the defences is medico-
psychological evidence, which extends the usual Doctor-patient relationship 
into this important social evaluation process. 
The second, and related dimension is the application of the discourses in 
individual cases by the professionals from both disciplines. The analysis of the 
interaction of law and medico-psychological professionals is conducted 
through examining judicial precedent within reported case law, and through 
data obtained from qualitative interviews with practitioners from both 
disciplines. This enables an exploration of how practitioners manage the 
broader social institutional factors, the theoretical incongruences between the 
disciplines, the moral dimensions inherent within cases, and inter-professional 
relationships. However, it needs to be appreciated that just as the medico-
psychologists who act as expert witnesses are not a homogenous group, 
likewise with the legal profession. Cases involve the police, solicitors, 
barristers and the judiciary, with each having their own professional concerns 
and responsibilities within the case. Thus case decisions result from an 
interaction between facets of the professions of law and medico-psychology as 
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well as the two institutions. Again, the analysis reflects on the different nature 
of the categorisation and practical concerns present at the yerdict and 
sentencing stage of the case. 
Furthennore, the assessment of the interface between the professions III 
applying the law considers the capacity to step outside the matrices of 
professional discourses (Foucault 1978: 95-7; Hollis 1994; Freundlieb 1994: 
162; 168; 174-7; Hunt & Wickham 1994: 28). The two professions have 
different objectives, roles and perspectives on the mind. An important factor is 
the legal context fonning jUdgments about criminal culpability and 
responsibility, and thereafter regulating the consequences for those held to 
have disordered mental states requires a fundamentally different social role to 
be undertaken by the medico-psychological professional. Critically their 
mental health concerns are drawn into legal responsibilities and provisions 
relating to matters of social order and public protection. Medico-psychological 
diagnostic categories are nonnally used to detennine the most appropriate 
treatment. The Doctor-patient relationship is fundamentally altered in the 
context of a legal case because the practitioner has to link their diagnostic 
opinion with specified legal rules concerned with assessing responsibility. 
Their evidence is also likely to fonn the basis to detention and treatment 
considerations at the sentencing stage. Thus despite the fact that medico-
psychology is concerned with descriptions of the natural world, of mental 
states, while the law establishes moral and ethical standards, the infonnation on 
a defendant's state of mind is used in the regulation of behaviour in line with 
these legal standards. The thesis examines the proposition suggested by 
Foucault (1977) that it is hard to operate outside one's professional discipline 
because the training inculcates individuals into the profession's perspective and 
language. 
Taylor and White's investigation of practitioner reflexivity claims that the 
"process is not dependent on the assessment of facts alone, but depends also on 
the complex practice processes by which plausibility, persuasiveness and 
morality are woven into the story presented to the professional and 
subsequently by the professional" (2000: 11). The nonnative foundations of a 
discipline influence what questions are asked to ascertain facts, which in tum 
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are negotiated and interpreted in light of personal perspectives and social 
constructs (ibid: 107). For example, there are identifiable legal tactics and 
considerations pertinent to the fulfilment of the roles of the police, prosecution 
and defence solicitors, barristers, and jUdiciary. Likewise, mental health labels 
used by experts are not objective descriptions of particular symptoms untainted 
by social and professional considerations. Consequently, the application of 
labels by both professions is not a precision exercise, as the interview 
respondents concede and the responses demonstrate. 
In order to examme both the broader structural aspects and practitioners 
responses to the issues present in homicide cases where the defences of 
insanity and diminished responsibility are raised the analysis within the thesis 
is undertaken at three levels. First, the philosophical and normative foundations 
to legal and medico-psychological discourses on the mind are examined in 
chapters one and two. Within this aspect of the analysis the pertinent 
substantive law is elucidated. Chapter one outlines the philosophical and 
theoretical basis to the legal view of the mind and how this underpins the 
principle of mens rea, and the defences of insanity and diminished 
responsibility. This establishes the normative basis to the legal framework 
investigated throughout this thesis. Chapter two describes the latest 
neuroscientific thinking on the mind, explaining the basis to the medico-
psychological perspective, which contrasts starkly with the legal perspective. 
Secondly, because the thesis explores the negotiation between the different 
'truths', investigating the power of the two professions to construct case 
narratives and formulate judgments about the defendant's mental state, the 
focus turns to the interpretation of the substantive law contained in case 
reports. A critical aspect of this dimension of the research is the role of judges. 
Judges in the House of Lords and Court of Appeal establish precedent through 
the interpretations they apply to legislation and common law rules. A 
significant feature of the legal deliberations has been the limitations developed 
to control the admission of expert evidence. The nature of these reported 
judicial arguments informs all related legal interactions. An illustration of the 
effect the judiciary can have on the legal landscape is evident in relation to the 
operation of the defence of provocation since Smith [2001]. discussed in 
6 
chapter one. The decision was significant because of the extension of 
subjective mental considerations to an objective defence, which is increasingly 
being pleaded in conjunction with diminished responsibility. The second level 
of the investigation is contained in chapters three and four. Chapter three deals 
with the judicial interpretation of the defences, with particular attention to the 
conundrums presented by psychopathy, intoxication and biological 
explanations of behaviour. Chapter four examines the development of the 
medico-psychological expert's role in the legal system, and the judicial rules 
controlling the admission of evidence. 
The third level of the study into the nature of the interaction between law and 
medico-psychology concerns the practitioner's translation and application of 
the law, which is explored through qualitative interview data. Cases pass 
through a number of significant stages and legal processes that permit different 
options. Understanding the nature of the interaction through the different 
dimensions, which includes practical procedures as well as theory, means that 
the "political and ethical conclusions which we would be able to draw from 
such theory . . . more complicated and indeed uncertain than seem the 
prescriptions generated by normative philosophical theories which do not 
concern themselves closely with the actuality of criminal practices" are also 
highlighted (Lacey 1998: 49). Chapter five details the methodological issues 
relevant to the research, in particular those related to the interviews. Chapter 
six expounds the legal responses while chapter seven reviews the medico-
psychological statements. The interviewees' responses are explored by 
dividing their remarks into commentary on the law and subsequently the 
various procedural phases of a case. 
Thus the legal definitions of individual agency, responsibility and culpability 
that are negotiated within a particular framework of social concerns, incumbent 
legal and medico-psychological discourses and developed practices are 
comprehensively examined. Finally, chapter eight evaluates each of the three 
dimensions, illustrating the differences in the two professional perspectives, 
and briefly addresses the impact of the arguments for possible reform 
discussions. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: LEGAL APPROACHES TO 
THE MIND 
Introduction 
This chapter fonns part of the first dimension to the analysis of the interaction 
of law and medico-psychology. It examines the legal, philosophical and 
substantive framework that is the concern of academic debates and that founds 
the use of mental health discourse to support derogations from the usual 
standard of criminal responsibility, which in tum has implications for 
sentencing decisions. The law has developed a standard of rationality that is 
necessary for the attribution of culpability and apportionment of punishment, 
which is premised on a particular view of the mind. Essentially, mens rea 
constitutes a legal factor whereby that the defendant has the necessary guilty 
mind, by intending to commit the offence in question.3 Whilst mens rea is 
presumed to be an essential ingredient of all criminal offences, it is not an 
abstract phenomena, a particular statutory or common law requirement 
accompanies specific crimes (Dine & Gobert 1993: Ch.3). In the context of this 
research it is the mens rea for homicide, whereby murder requires the 
subjective specific intention to cause death or bodily hann. In addition the 
focus is further narrowed to the considerations raised through the defences of 
insanity and diminished responsibility. 
Critically, the legal position and incumbent substantive law does not emerge in 
a social vacuum; particular political and philosophical positions are upheld 
through them. However, it is considered that there is a moral requirement for 
exceptions to the rule to allow for defendants whose mental state does not meet 
the objective standard of criminal responsibility. The defences of insanity and 
diminished responsibility have developed to address this need, with limited 
admission of evidence on the defendant's mental state now pennitted in respect 
of provocation since Smith [2001].4 This shift, and the fact that diminished 
responsibility and provocation are increasingly being pleaded together, has 
3 See Mackay (1995: 76) and Lynch [1975] at 933-4 and Cane (2002: Ch.3) as verification of this 
principle. 
4 Dyzenhaus (2004) looks at the split in the legal process of developing law between legislation and the 
judiciary. 
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required the inclusion of provocation at some junctures In the debates to 
illustrate particular arguments. The chapter provides a review of the current 
legal position and proposed reforms to detail the basis of the law's attribution 
of responsibility, although insanity is not addressed in as much depth as 
diminished responsibility throughout the thesis because of the limited use made 
of the defence,5 supported by the fact that no respondent in the study had 
undertaken such a case. In addition, in line with the second dimension of the 
legal and medico-psychological interface referred to in the introduction, 
sentencing and detention priorities are addressed. 6 
The Philosophical Underpinnings of Legal Responsibility 
Introduction 
Theoretical perspectives emerge In particular social and historical 
circumstances, informing social norms and practices.7 The foundations to the 
current legal standpoint developed during the 18 th and 19th centuries, as society 
moved from operating on the basis of customary norms to more centralised 
political control. 8 Of significance was the shift to the secular study of science 
and humanism, marking the beginning of the positivist approach (Lloyd 1964: 
95). Fundamental to legal positivism, elucidated by Austin, was the emergence 
of legal authority, and a differentiation between the laws of the physical 
universe and the normative, prescriptive laws governing human conduct. There 
are two aspects to the following section in line with the dual dimensions to the 
intersection of law and medico-psychology addressed throughout the thesis: the 
legal view of the mind, which underpins the approach to criminal responsibility 
and punishment, and is linked to the political philosophies of the state; and the 
rule of law. An important strand through both is morality. In the context of this 
work these complex debates cannot be developed in any substantial depth, but 
the significant themes will be identified as they underpin the legal approach.9 
5 This is the case elsewhere too, for example when Lymburner & Roesch (1999) discuss the U.S. position. 
6 See the government's current views on the operation of the Criminal Justice System (CJS), Justice for 
All (2002). 
7 A useful summary of the teachings of the great philosophers, on the state. and mind and matter, can be 
found in Honderich (ed.) (1999) and Frost (1942). 
8 Cotterell discusses the importance of understanding the institutions and concepts of law in relation to the 
social conditions that gave rise to them (1984: 26). 
9 Norrie (1997) provides a good overview of the principles underpinning the criminal law and the moral 
dimensions inherent in them. 
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The Legal View of the Mind 
The foundations to the legal view of the mind can be identified in the French 
Enlightenment ideology of the 1 i h century, encapsulated in Descartes's theory 
of dualism. The standpoint is that individuals are rational actors who have the 
capacity to choose their actions. lOAn important dimension of this theory is 
Descartes's and Galileo' s assertion that there is a sharp distinction between 
physical reality that can be described by science, which includes the body, and 
the mental reality of the mind that is beyond the province of science. I I 
Descartes based this claim on the fact the mind is indivisible compared with 
the body. Therefore, as the mind is distinct from the physical it is not subject to 
the laws of nature. Dualism assigns an inferior status to the body compared 
with the mind and rational intellect (Trusted 1984: 35). The mind is self-
moved, having no constraints. The immaterial mind interacts with the material 
body through activating the pineal gland (Gross 1995: 263). Additionally 
feelings were also believed to be thoughts, which is an important issue in 
chapter two (Dilman 1999: 125). Significantly for the law's assessment of the 
mental state of the defendant, whilst the mind was considered to be private, 
Descartes argued the mental state of another can be inferred from physical 
factors, so "a defendant's intentions must, therefore, always be inferred from 
'external' or 'circumstantial' evidence" (Duff 1990: 117). 
Inherent in this theoretical position is the premise that individuals have free 
will and therefore the ability to choose based on rational thought alone. Ginet 
describes incompatibilism (free will) as free action that is undetermined, which 
means the individual has the ability to choose other than they did, because their 
decision is not nomically necessitated by the state of the world at that time 
(1995: 69).12 However, as Nozick (1995) argues, this does not mean that the 
individual has no agency, because the opposite of determinism does not mean 
chance, as Hobart (1966) suggests. This perspective of the mind informed the 
10 His works are translated by Anscombe & Geach (1976), and discussed in Oilman (1999). Doney (ed.) 
(1968). Kenny (1968) and Ryle (1949). . . . 
II There were religious reasons behind this too, arguably because of the concerns about sCience mtrudmg 
into matters of the mind and soul (Searle 1997: 6; Damasio 1994: 249). 
12 If something is nomically necessitated then the antecedent state, and the laws of nature, determine the 
event in question will occur, rather than any other. 
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legal perspective as it developed, hence the supposition that individuals can be 
held responsible. However, there are exceptions where decisions are affected 
by external factors, as Ginet concedes, which is a problem faced by this school 
of thought and therefore the legal system. 
There have been extensive philosophical debates on the matter of agency in 
making choices centred on the possible factors that may influence decision-
making. 13 There are debates centring on the mind/body relationship. The legal 
viewpoint has just been discussed in relation to dualism and the issue is re-
visited in chapter two in relation to the medico-psychological position. 
Alternatively there are those that question such an abstract ability to reason and 
reflect on whether evaluations of agency, the self, need to take into account 
such factors as character, desire and motive as influences on the reasoning 
process. 14 Frequently the debate becomes one of free will versus determinism, 
which is a simplistic debate that forces the argument into dichotomous choices. 
Yet, as chapter two will demonstrate, having a view that does not consider the 
mind as an abstract entity does not necessarily imply strict causal determinism 
that undermines the capacity to exert a choice between alternatives. For 
example, Campbell describes an effort of will as working against our desires 
, 
when there is a conflict between desire and obligation (1 966a: 358-360; 
1996b). He states that making an effort of will requires an author, a self, 
whereby, although the self is related to the emotions and desires, it is still 
possible to choose to adhere to obligations such as those imposed by law, 
through an effort of will. As individuals we are the conscious originators of 
efforts of will and we can make conscious decisions to exert our will. 15 These 
issues are followed up in chapter two. Interestingly Kant considered that there 
were two forms of will, the autonomous will can freely choose to act according 
to the moral law (Trusted: 64). The heteronomous will, determined by desire, is 
not free, so moral conflict will develop, which is the battle between these two 
fonns of will, and is what someone makes of themselves. The second form of 
will enables the introduction of a moral dimension that permits a judgment to 
13 Honderich (ed.) (1973); this perspective is developed in chapter 2 in relation to the medico-
psychological approach. 
14 The notion of the selfis developed in chapter 2. . . 
15 Loewenstein (2000) discusses the importance of willpower as an overlooked aspect of deCISlon-
making. 
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be made of an individual's choices, which is an important dimension to the 
legal process that is revisited in the following section on the rule of law. 
The legal VIew on free will is represented by the standpoint of the choice 
theorists who argue that choice and causation are incompatible, which is 
challenged by the medico-psychological perspective outlined in chapter two. 
On the other hand the character school of thought challenges the legal 
position, maintaining that as our characters are not chosen individuals should 
not be held responsible for them. Mackay asserts that this argument means no 
one would be held responsible for their actions (1995: 86).16 Furthermore, he 
contends that even if it is the case that we do not choose our characters, it does 
not mean that we cannot be held responsible for actions that are in character. 
Duff suggests that the best way forward may be to combine the premises of 
choice, capacity and character (1993: 379). 
Therefore, there are two aspects to the legal standpoint on criminal 
responsibility that are fundamental to the operation of the law. The cognitive 
focus related to the abstract view of the mind, which implies free will, and 
volition, the ability to exercise choice. The law also expects that an individual 
will have given thought to the consequences of their actions, which is 
enshrined in the mens rea principle through a forseeability component. 17 So the 
law distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary acts. The Austinian 
doctrine on the philosophy of will is used to distinguish between the two types 
of act in law. The law also needs to acknowledge certain factors that might 
have affected the mind on moral grounds and the theory of the mind, and 
criminal responsibility becomes blurred. The law only permits limited 
exceptions, for example by adopting a cognitive focus the law is not concerned 
with the motivations of the defendant,18 or physical causal factors (Dilman: 
141-162), although subsequent chapters show in practice the exceptions deviate 
from the theoretical position identified in this chapter. 
16 The arguments on genetic causes of behaviour discussed in chapter three have overtones of this debate. 
17 Burr [1969] 
IR See HYOln [1975] 
12 
The Rule of Law 
The other crucial component of the legal position concerns the philosophical 
and normative standards against which our choices are judged, and the 
processes developed to assess culpability and the level of punishment. 19 The 
political basis to the rule of law is the individualist liberal and utilitarian 
philosophies of Kant, Bentham, Mill and Hobbes.2o The fundamental 
operational principles are harm and fault, whereby the conduct should haye 
caused some harm and the individual deserves blame and punishment because 
they are sufficiently at fault. The legitimacy of the law invokes an obligation to 
obey the legal rules,21 and punishment can be administered to those who 
transgress them.22 Consequently the position with the legal perspective on the 
mind is that responsibility is attributed to individuals for their actions and 
choices because they have free will, linked into Bentham's utilitarian view that 
"the purpose and justification of punishment is deterrence, but it is only 
intentional actions that people can be deterred from performing, so it is only 
these that it can be rational to punish" (Mackie 1977: 209).23 
As intimated in the previous section, morality is a significant factor. Although 
the development of the law took place at a time of shifts towards secular 
thinking Christian beliefs relating to good and evil still existed. Consequent! y 
the moral overtones of the Christian prevailed in that where there is a conflict 
between one's desire and what one morally ought to do, choices should favour 
the latter. Furthermore, it is only morally appropriate to punish if the act is 
morally wrong and there has been some fault on the part of the individual. This 
perspective influenced the development of political and legal thinking about 
responsibility and punishment, and the resulting institutional structures. 
Significantly, this line of reasoning allows for the developments of defences 
based on excuse and justification, and law has an important symbolic role on 
moral issues (Van der Burg 2001). 
19 See Honderich (1988) and Christman (2004) for a review of detenninism in state and political 
philosophies. 
20 Dyzenhaus (2001) re-examines the interpretation of Hobbes theory of the rule of law. Kramer (2004) 
examines the moral status of the rule oflaw. 
21 May (1997) analyses Raz's ideas on the obligation to obey the law. 
22 See Rawls (1999) Theory of Justice & Duff & Garland (eds.). 
23 Different theories of utilitarianism have emerged. such as rule and act utilitarianism discussed by Hare 
( 1963). 
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The moral dimension to the law provides an important aspect to the process of 
judging individuals and their actions, supporting the reinforcement of particular 
normative values and the social construction of permissible and proscribed 
behaviour through the rule of law. The incorporation of a moral aspect to 
choices about behaviour adds force by affecting individuals' perceptions of 
their actions; transgressing socially prescribed rules has implications for their 
character (Mackie: 209). However, it generates difficulties for the judgment 
role of the law because of the problems in establishing the degree of moral 
responsibility, and as a result Lloyd considers it should be concerned with the 
social purpose of protecting society and reforming the prisoner (pp.64-67). 
Lloyd's concerns are supported by Schopp, who, in the context of 
distinguishing justificatory defences from excuses, discusses the difficulties in 
identifying the precise nature and focus of moral condemnation in legislative 
codes, the scope of possible punishments, and the specific application of the 
law (1998: 22_4).24 This dual nature of law dealing with individual normative 
standards and more general social objectives is a central theme in the operation 
of the defences that are focused on in the thesis. But Lloyd also concedes that 
the authority of the law is reinforced by linking guilt in criminal law to the idea 
of moral responsibility. Furthermore, as noted, it allows the possibility of 
introducing an excuse, which can affect the nature of the verdict and 
punishment. Morality demands and permits flexibility in the application of the 
law, and it is a very important aspect of the operation of the defences under 
scrutiny in this project, and the interface between law and medico-psychology. 
These fundamental strands to the legal perspective on the mind and criminal 
responsibility, with overtones for the basis for punishments, which had 
emerged by the 19th century, have given rise to a number of debates (Lacey 
2001). One that is central to the thesis is the fact that the concept of mens rea, 
the mental aspect of criminal responsibility, is a legal construct that is based on 
outmoded dualist assumptions (Duff 1990) and is altered to suit the law with 
respect to different offences (Katz 1987). There are those that have argued for 
its abolition (Hart 1968: Ch. 8). The foundations to the mens rea standard also 
influence the formation and application of the permitted exceptions. for 
~ 4 4 See also Schopp (1991) for an evaluation of the moral status of the U.S. Model Penal Code in respect 
of insanity and automatism. McSherry (1998) compares dissociation and automatism in Australia and 
Canada. 
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example the M'Naghten rules of insanity ...... [MJens rea is an element in 
criminal responsibility designed to secure that those who offend without 
carelessness, unwittingly, or in conditions in which they lacked the bodily or 
mental capacity to conform to the law, should be excused" (Hart: 173). 
However, with the emphasis on the distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary actions the law has practical difficulties in distinguishing between 
them, which can generate uncertainty and mistakes in law enforcement, 
(Mackie: 210), as will be seen in chapter three. Consideration will be given to 
how the legal perspective affects the operation of legal assessments of 
CUlpability, attitudes to mental disorders in relation to debates on risk and 
dangerousness through sentencing decisions, and the nature of medico-
psychological involvement in both aspects of the legal process. The dialectical 
challenge to the current legal approach founds the subsequent examination of 
the substantive law. 
The Dialectical Challenge to Kantian Individualism 
An important aspect of this project, particularly in light of the different 
perspectives on the mind underpinning law and medico-psychology, is the 
dichotomous philosophical debate between the incompatibilists (free will) and 
compatibilists (determinists), along with the social role of the law. 25 Norrie 
takes issue with the Kantian alignment of legal and moral individualism, and 
the alternative compatibilist position from the dialectic standpoint (2000: 2-
3).26 He asserts that the debate results in a false dichotomy, one which favours 
the free will proponent, because if determinists argue that the experience of 
choice is illusory this excludes much of what it is to be human, and in the 
process, disproves or trivialises itself (pp.1 06: 229-32). 
Norrie develops the moral psychological approach of Bhaskar and Harre to 
steer between the false alternatives, asserting individuals are part of a social 
context, and they are also active agents (pp.229-32). He maintains that the 
impact of the social context on individuals' capacity for moral agency should 
not be overlooked. Accordingly the possibility of individual agency, and the 
25 See chapter two for a discussion on this perspective, and Gilbert (1999) develops a less individualistic 
and more pluralistic account than Hart's. 
26 A succinct o\cr\'iew of his arguments can be found in \;orrie (1998). Franck (1999) dlscusscs 
individualism and political structures. emphasizing the social context of individual rights. 
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resultant nature of responsibility, IS an ambiguous and ambivalent 
phenomenon. "This is a non-abstract, non individualistic, individual agent, and 
the conflict between (free) individual and (determining) context is replaced by 
a concept of shared responsibility between agent and context" (p.230). This 
reflects explanations of agency described in chapter two. The consequence of 
this perspective is that there has to be 'blaming in relation' because of 'being in 
relation'. Therefore for the law to reflect moral thinking it needs to reflect and 
refract moral issues. 
Significantly, "rights to make moral reproaches are very unevenly distributed 
and differ from context to context and situation to situation" (Norrie 2000: 
216). Vocabularies of right and wrong have a social and historical context and 
the development of the use of medico-psychological evidence in respect of 
homicide is an example of this, which is discussed in chapter four. Norrie 
claims "[i]n Britain, we are torn between an 'ethic of excusing' (seeing 
individuals in context) and an 'ethic of blaming' (seeing individuals as 
responsible agents)" (p.219). In terms of how the law assesses the individual. 
the current objectivist stance, as an idealist position, ignores the social context 
and the individual in question. However, although separating out the individual 
from their social context gives the appearance of a neutral system of social 
control, the relational realities of individual and social life cut across and 
undermine both theory and practice (pp.227-8). Norrie concedes that there is a 
need for individualism within the legal system because "liberalism's ideal 
individualism represents individuals as well as excludes them" (1998: 150). 
But dialectical philosophy is concerned with the internal relatedness of the 
personal and social, so Norrie advocates a relational dimension whereby the 
individual is viewed in context (2000: 4).27 
Norrie differentiates the dialectical approach from postmodernism and 
poststructuralism, by arguing that "[ f]orms of responsibility need to be taken 
seriously, so the question is how best to understand them, not to reduce them to 
an effect of something else" (p.14). Dialecticism accepts that responsibility is 
an attribute of human agents, but it "exists both in and beyond individual moral 
agents in the same moment" (ibid). Thus, moral accountability rests not just 
27 This stance reflects that of the medico-psychological field discussed in chapter two. 
16 
with the individual, but the community too, as blame is also a social issue 
because individuals do not exist in a vacuum. Through the theories of Gergen 
and Lamiell, Norrie argues that human action lies between personal agency and 
social relationality (p.205). Significantly, in terms of this project, concepts of 
individual responsibility that permeate the current social context influence the 
perception of the sense of self and agency, which is central to issues discussed 
in chapter two. The legal and medico-psychological perspectives are both key 
institutional discourses in society, with different normative positions. The 
defendant, members of the jury, and professionals in the cases under scrutiny 
are all part of this cultural and social milieu. 
The central dimension of this project is about the attribution of responsibility 
for those with mental disorders, which is part of the moral discussion on 
permissible exceptions to the objective standard of responsibility, and how this 
is linked to debates on risk and dangerousness. The defences of insanity and 
diminished responsibility form part of an important feature of the legal system 
and the dichotomous options of having either to blame or excuse. Norrie argues 
neither alternative is morally adequate with horrible crimes resulting from 
terrible circumstances (p.220). He maintains a fully moral account would have 
to recognise that social and structural factors were also effective in causing the 
crime, in addition to the agency of the defendant. This reflects the dialectical 
nature of the understanding of medico-psychology with regard to the 
interaction of nature and nurture in the construction of an individual's identity, 
sense of self and resulting agency, which is discussed in chapter two. 
Thus, Norrie argues responsibility is attributable to the individual and the 
society of which he is a part. This is a more comprehensive view of 
responsibility than the Kantian position, which avoids acknowledging the 
relationship through the false separation inherent in the current legal stance on 
responsibility, which generates conflicts and limited legal logic. Therefore, 
Norrie claims that in order to understand law you need to examine the "inter-
relationship between an 'internal' (the forms of law/legal phenomena) and an 
'external' (their structurallhistorical foundations), to locate legal phenomena in 
a socio-political context, and to embark thereby upon a critical phenomenology 
of law" (p.229). Cane makes a similar point, arguing that a result of human 
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agency being the primary focus is the obscuring of the particular ethical, social 
and economic functions supported by the criminal law choices about which 
conduct attracts liability, and the entitlements and responsibilities established 
as a consequence (2002: 56: 187-8). Moreover, the law does not expand on the 
ontological function of responsibility, which is important for linking 
responsibility to identity (p.283). Thus the way that responsibility is ascribed 
and justice is distributed is not an abstract process but socially constructed, 
forming part of a complex set of social practices (pAl: 190: 279). Additionally, 
Villa (1997) develops a constructionist theory to facilitate the appreciation of 
the values inherent in legal knowledge, paying attention to the artificial 
distinction made between fact and value judgements. 
This project examines the moral legal approach to responsibility in cases where 
the mental state of the defendant is evaluated. The process involves the 
medico-psychological profession who support a dialectical perspective, in 
contrast to the law. The research reveals that the interaction of the two 
disciplines is essentially constrained by the social norms and policy 
considerations fundamental to this area of law, and that moral derogations from 
the objective standard are deployed pragmatically. 
Mens Rea 
Introduction 
Criminal responsibility is established through the common law principles of 
actus reus, that the accused did the act in question, and mens rea, that it was 
done intentionally.28 The role of the judiciary in developing the law is an 
important consideration within the thesis because of the impact they have on 
the scope and operation of the law. Although the project is primarily focusing 
on the exceptions to the objective standard of mens rea because the research is 
concerned with the interaction of law and medico-psychology in respect of the 
defences of insanity and diminished responsibility, a brief analysis of the 
current position is necessary. 
2& Basic texts on this aspect of the law are Simester & Sullivan (2003); Card (2001). 
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There are two issues, the definition of intention and proving it. The scope of 
intention has been deliberated extensively because it affects the distinction 
between murder and manslaughter. 29 The law has developed a legal 
interpretation of intention that includes a prOVISIOn about assuming an 
appreciation of the consequences of the intention, forseeability, from which 
intention can be implied, which is referred to as oblique intention. In Hyam 
[1975] intent was held to be "knowledge that the act in question would 
probably produce certain consequences, so that the intention to do the act was 
the same as the intention to produce the result" (p.662). The court also held it is 
not concerned with purpose or motive (p.665), although the law has not always 
adopted this view on motive (Heeson 1878: 44). The scope of intent was 
subsequently revisited in the cases of Maloney [1985], Hancock and Shankland 
[1986], Nedrick [1986] and Wool/in [1999]. The debate centred on the phrasing 
of the standard and how to include forseeability. The Wool/in direction is the 
current standard, which approved the definition by Lord Lane CJ in Nedrick 
except for one modification, the word 'infer' being changed to 'find'. Thus: 
"if the jury are satisfied that at the material time the defendant recognised that death or serious 
harm would be virtually certain30 (barring some unforeseen intervention) to result from his 
voluntary act, then that is a fact from which they may find it easy to find that he intended to kill 
or do serious bodily harm, even though he may not have had any desire to achieve that 
result ... where the charge is murder and in the rare cases where the simple direction is not 
enough. the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to find the necessary intention 
unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some 
unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant's actions and that the defendant 
appreciated that such was the case" (emphasis added)?1 
Mens rea, intention, is approached as an abstract legal principle. Norrie argues 
the current stance ensures the form of law is not subject to "overt normative -
moral and political - questions" (1997: 20; 1999), because the "cognitivist, 
subjectivist, factual or descriptive" language does not capture the moral 
distinctions that the criminal process is involved in (1999: 543). Yet the 
objective rules do not absolve the judiciary, or jury for that matter. from 
dealing with the moral issues. This arises because there is a tension between 
the concept of the free and moral individual and the need to ensure stability in 
society through safeguarding law and order. Thus the indiyidual ideology 
~ 9 9 See the Irish Consultation paper on Homicide: The Mental Element in Murder (200 1:4-5). 
30 The phrase virtual certainty has replaced substantial risk. because it was argued it would blur the line 
between intention and recklessness. 
31 Norrie (1999) identifies problems he considers still exist after Wool/in. Also see Simester & Shute 
(2000). 
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underpinning mens rea is undermined by political ideology of social contro1.32 
Likewise Lacey argues that by seeing the criminal law as a social practice, 
rather than just a body of doctrine, the contradictions within cases can be re-
conceptualised and appreciated for the role that they play (1993: 640-641). 
Thus, by including oblique intention the principle of responsibility, as an 
ideological tool, is breached because of ethical and political choices (2001: 
355). Significantly, the scope of intent affects whether individuals can be tried 
for manslaughter or murder.33 In terms of the judicial perspective, Lord Goff 
(1988) states that the most powerful influence on the court when formulating 
legal principles is the desired result in the case, a matter also discussed by 
Williams (1989). Lord Goff argues for extending the mental element in 
murder.34 Norrie cites this in support of his view that the judiciary are trying to 
resolve political tensions in an area that is supposed to be about individual 
responsibility and culpability, a recurrent theme through the thesis. The diverse 
range of opinions and possibilities are evident in the Irish Law Reform 
Commission's (2001) review of 'The Mental Element in Murder', which 
outlines the legal position in a large number of jurisdictions. Lacey maintains 
that clarifying the concepts underpinning the law enables lawmakers to be 
clearer about the behaviour that falls within the ambit of a particular law 
(p.624), which is a factor in the analysis undertaken in this project. 
Jury 
The jury are a significant aspect of the decision-making process. It is difficult 
to prove intention (McSherry 2003) but it is a question for the jury whether or 
not the defendant is held to have possessed the necessary mens rea. 35 The 
outline of the mens rea principle has shown that intention is given a legal 
meaning, which includes oblique intention. It is a legal matter, which provides 
an insight into the decision in the case of Chard (1972),36 which held that if no 
3: Norrie analyses the inconsistencies this has given rise to through analysing the cases of Maloney. 
Hancock & Shankland. & Nedrick (1989: 800 - 807). 
33 See the Irish Law Refonn Commission's Report (2001) on this point and the comments of legal 
respondents in chapter 6. 
34 Williams (1989) disputes Lord Gotrs arguments on the matter. 
35 Dine & Gobert argue that the distinction is not that clear because juries are likely to assess the state of 
the defendant's mind in tenns of what they think is reasonable. This introduces an objective element, as 
the exercise of logical reasoning in inferring the defendant's subjective state of mind is an objective 
process (1993: 94). 
~ 6 6 This is in line with Descartes's idea that whilst you cannot know someone's mind. it can be inferred 
from their behaviour. 
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medico-psychological evidence is being presented in support of a defence such 
as insanity or diminished responsibility, then the jury cannot hear such 
evidence on the issue of intention, and they have to decide the matter in line 
with the legal framing of the concept. 37 Lacey states the judiciary undertake a 
limited conceptual analysis of intent and foresight,38 and then rely on ordinary 
usage to avoid settling the matter.39 Notably though, in the cases of Maloney, 
Hancock, and Nedrick, the jury returned to ask for further clarification on the 
meaning of intention because of difficulties understanding it.4o Lacey argues 
the rationale behind this judicial practice is that it provides legitimacy through 
appearing to represent commonly held beliefs, rather than verdicts being the 
result of the exercise of power. But the focus is developed to reflect legal needs 
and, as will be argued in subsequent chapters, the jury are an important 
rhetorical device regarding legal decisions, although it may not always be an 
accurate representation. 
The Reform Debate 
What follows is an overview of the reform debate to illustrate the theoretical 
concerns at the legislative stage of the legal process. As stated, the judiciary 
have developed the current definition of intention, but there have been 
numerous English Law Commission (LC)41 debates on developing an 
acceptable and comprehensible legislative definition, although it has proved 
difficult securing agreement. For example, the LC Draft Criminal Code (1989: 
No.177) was criticised for being ambiguous,42 resulting in the most recent 
definition, found in the LC report on Non-Fatal Offences (1993: No.218). The 
amended clause 18 states that: 
"a person acts intentionally with respect to a result when (i) it is .his purpose to ~ a u s e e it; ~ r r (ii) 
although it is not his purpose to cause that result, he knows that It would occur m the ordmary 
course of events if he were to succeed in his purpose of causing some other result". 
Oblique intention is also retained. 
37 See also Reynolds (1989) 
38 See the comments by the Judge in chapter 6 and the difficulties still experienced by the judiciary using 
Woollin in Matthews & Alleyne [2003] 
39 See chapters 4 and 8 for further discussions on the symbolic use of the jury role. 
40 See the Judge's comments in Chapter 6. 
41 Law Commission No. 10, 31, 89, 143, 177, 218 & Cmnd. No. nl4-+ & 6244. 
42 For example lC. Smith () 990). Interestingly the) 989 report rejected the definition that most closely 
resembles the current Woollin definition. 
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"If [the accused] acts in order to achieve a particular purpose, knowing that that cannot be done 
without causing another result, he must be held to cause that other result." 
Two matters are in contrast to the current common law position. First the 
choice of the word purpose, which in Hyam was held not to be of concern to 
the law, and was also rejected in the 1989 report. Furthermore the definition 
does not include the term virtual certainty contained in the Woollin directions. 
However, there are no fundamental changes to the nature of the definition. 
The Irish Law Commission (ILC) has undertaken the most recent review of 
mens rea in relation to murder (2001). In the development of their 
recommendations they compare the English and Irish positions, and also 
provide information on the legal position and reform proposals in other 
countries (pp.l 0-17). In terms of their justification for reform, they concur with 
the English LC that a legislative definition is needed, on the basis that it is such 
an important term in relation to such a serious crime, which can result in severe 
consequences. They also welcome the ability of the legislature to debate the 
policy issues, which are not technically meant to be a matter for the judiciary, 
when considering a suitable definition. Another of the ILC' s concerns relates to 
the role of the jury. It is argued that without a definition juries may impose 
their own meaning, which could include factors that the law does not want 
considered, such as premeditation. It is stated that intention has a more 
restrictive meaning in the legal context than it has in common usage, which 
contrasts with the arguments of Lacey, who maintains recourse to jury 
decisions on the basis of common usage is an important part of the operation of 
this aspect of the law. Furthermore, evidence from recent cases suggests that by 
trying to provide a guide that restricts the focus, the jury are left unsure. 
In terms of the definition developed by the LC, the ILC criticise the use of the 
phrase would occur in the ordinary course of events, claiming that it is 
'somewhat ambiguous'. They refer to the phrase developed by Smith and 
Hogan, 'will occur in the ordinary course of events'. There is also criticism of 
the word purpose, as the accused may have other purposes, and suggest the 
phrase conscious object or purpose. They also state that oblique intention 
should be foresight of a virtual certainty, reflecting the wording in Woollin. 
The debate is further muddied by the inclusion of serious injury, which the ILC 
usefully review (pp.24-27). 
Lacey maintains that having a legislative definition would be more democratic. 
but as stated previously, there are those that argue for the abolition of mens rea 
because of the difficulties in knowing the mental state of offenders, especially 
with regard to distinguishing between the mad and bad. Reznek examines these 
points of view, arguing against them (1997: 295-310). Additionally Schopp and 
Patry (2003) suggest a basis for having psychological input on mens rea, 
related to the fact that having a 'guilty mind' underpins the imposition of 
punishment. Malle and Nelson (2003) examine how a systematic folk 
conceptual approach based on social psychology could clarify the mens rea 
concept. 
The Defences of Insanity, Diminished Responsibility and 
Provocation: Morality and Determinism 
Introduction 
It seems to be a universal, whether one's stance is determinist, or premised on 
free will, that those suffering from mental illness should be excused from 
criminal liability (Mackay 1995). As noted before, the moral overtones to the 
operation of the law are a significant factor. There are degrees of responsibility 
and moral heinousness, as is highlighted in Wilson's (2000) discussion of 
murder and the structure of homicide.43 Therefore, even though the objective 
mens rea test does not invite, or permit, an exploration of the actual capacity of 
the individual to act as a 'normal/reasonable' person, culpability does not 
necessarily mean that the individual will be considered morally blameworthy. 44 
But there are practical difficulties in establishing the distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary actions.45 
The following analysis is concerned with the theory informing the substantive 
law. It is an examination of how the defences are influenced by moral grounds 
and the legal perspective on the mind, namely the requirement that to be 
43 See Ch. 2 of Ashworth & Mitchell. 
44 Kingston [1995] focused on the issue of mens rea when the accused is involuntarily intoxicated. 
45 This was evident in Byrne [1960]. which dealt with the matter of irresistible impulse. See also Yeo 
(2002) on automatism. 
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responsible the individual has to have the capacity for free wilL which is then 
linked to the utilitarian idea that people can only be deterred from performing 
intentional actions, so it is only rational to punish voluntary actions. An 
important aspect of the defences, therefore, is the opportunities they pro\'ide 
for alternative sentencing options. Thus, the focus of the discussion will be on 
the manner in which the law concentrates on the defendant's mental state, and 
how it manages the exceptions in terms of the theories on responsibility and 
punishment. These defences question the responsibility and ability of the 
accused to comply with normative standards, but the problem is assessing 
where the line should be drawn around what qualifies as a sufficient degree of 
mental disorder (Ashworth & Mitchell 2000: 18). The operation of this area of 
law involves expert evidence from medico-psychological professionals.46 
Interpretation of the terms by the judiciary is addressed in chapter three. 
Insanity 
General 
The insane offender is not deemed morally blameworthy as they lack the 
rationality for autonomous free will that the law requires. The availability of an 
insanity defence on the grounds of humaneness was developed through 
common law in the 19th century.47 Although there are now an insignificant 
number of cases it does raise profound issues for the criminallaw.48 Tables one 
and two provide an indication of the number of insanity and diminished 
responsibility homicide cases that have recently been recorded on the Home 
Office Index. 
Table 1: Diminished Responsibility and Insanity Cases 2000-2003 
Diminished Insanity 
R e s ~ o n s i b i l i t y y
2000-2001 * 15/20 1/5 
2001-2002* 10115 0/2 
2002-2003** 6 0 
46 In fact it is mandatory for the insanity defence, where reports are required from 2 practitioners. one of 
whom has to be Home Office approved. The need for medical reports in cases involving diminished 
responsibility was established in Dix (1981) . 
47 See Walker Yol. I (1968) & Yol.2 (1973); Report o/the Royal Commission on Capital PUnishment 
(1953); Butler Report (1975) para.18.2 . ... 
4R See Walker (1968) for an erudite histoncal perspectIve on Insamty. 
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* The first. figure is b ~ s e d d on statistics supplied directly for the research by the Home 
~ : f i c e , , . w ~ t l s t t the .latter IS from the ~ e p o r t t on ~ ~ m i c i d e e and Gun Crime (Cotton 2004: 1 0). 
StatIstIcs obtamed from the NatIonal StatIstIcs report on Homicide and Gun Crime 49 
These are not complete statistics for the year; they are accurate as at November 2003. 
Table 2: Diminished Responsibility and Insanity Cases 1993 - 2003 
Diminished Responsibility Insanity 
1993 66 1 
1994 75 4 
1995 58 3 
1996 50 1 
1997 47 4 
1997/98 50 6 
1998/99 40 6 
1999/00 26 6 
2000/01 20 5 
2001/02 15 2 
2002/03 6 0 
This table is a comparison of diminished responsibility and insanity cases for the last 10 years, 
based on statistics provided by the National Statistics report on Homicide and Gun Crime 
(2004). 
Again, the insanity rule was developed through common law and it was 
defined in the M'Naghten case of 1843, which states: 
that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time 
of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, 
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if 
he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong (emphasis added).5o 
It is not denied that the defendant did the act,51 the issue is that they lacked the 
necessary mens rea. The following discussion explores the legal approach to 
mental states and responsibility. 
Mental States and Responsibility 
In line with the dualist view of the mind, the law focuses on cognitive function, 
which restricts the scope of the defence. Thus in law irrationality is about 'an 
aberration of normal mental functioning', whereby the lack of capacity for 
rational choice excuses on the basis that the person is mad, and therefore 
49 The statistics in row three of the table were taken from p.l 0, although there appears to be a difference 
on p.18, where it is said there were five s2 convictions. 
50 p.2l O. The Law Commission (2003) provides an historical overview in Part VI of their review of the 
partial defences of diminished responsibility and provocation. 
51 See Attorney-General 's Reference (No.3 of /998) [2000] 
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unable to obey the rules laid down by the law (Mackay 1995: 77-79).5:' The 
M'Naghten rules require a connection between the defect of reason and disease 
of the mind,53 although this may be difficult to ascertain as some mental 
illnesses are not a continuing state of affairs. Morse makes the point that as all 
behaviour is caused, causation is not the issue in these cases. but non-culpable 
lack of rationality is (1985: 789). Expert testimony is provided on the matter, 
which constitutes the first dimension of medico-psychological involvement. 
Mackay believes expert evidence has overshadowed debates on the theoretical 
grounds for excusing the insane. However, the jury are the final arbiters. 
Procedural Issues - Status or Excuse Defence? 
The defence is concerned with the moral stance to be adopted towards those 
held insane.54 Whilst they have caused harm, are they at fault? There is 
disagreement, with the debates focusing on whether it should be an automatic 
status defence, or an excuse. Should the defence provide an excuse after it has 
been established that the defendant's actions were wrong, or operate as a status 
defence, whereby evidence of insanity automatically results in diversion from 
the criminal system (Mackay 1995: 83-92)? Moore argues it should be a status 
defence because it is recognising that the person is so irrational they cannot be 
considered responsible for their actions (1984: 245; 1985: 1137-1139). With 
causality implied there would be no attempt to establish moral agency. Morse 
(1985: 788) and Schopp (1991: 16) take a similar approach. However, because 
a connection is required between the disease of the mind and the defect in 
reason, a matter examined in chapter three, currently M'Naghten operates as an 
excuse, with all the inherent problems of proving the connection that that 
involves. The requirement that there is a connection, which will be founded on 
expert evidence as to the link, may explain Mackay's claim that expert 
testimony is so important, as is the case with diminished responsibility 
discussed below. 
52 Hart's Concept oj Law is a classic text on jurisprudence. Wasserstrom (1999) comments on his 
approach. Tamanaha (200 I) develops Hart's theory of law to incorporate a socio-Iegal point of view. 
5. Sullivan [1984] p.677 
54 See Morse (I 999a) on this principle in terms of the U.S. constitution. 
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Disposal Options 
The other significant legal consideration concerns the consequences of a 
finding of insanity. Although the utilitarian idea of punishment is important, a 
major issue in such cases is the state's duty to protect society if the individual 
represents a danger, which according to Lord Diplock in Sullivan [1984] has 
been the basis of the defence since 1800. The person is held not guilty, but by 
reason of insanity; this does not result in an acquittal, and they are under the 
control of the court. A finding of insanity in homicide cases automatically 
results in a hospital order of indeterminate length. A consequence of it being a 
status defence, with no moral overtones, would be a focus solely on treatment 
rather than punishment, as a result of diversion from the criminal justice 
system. The inter-relationship between punishment and treatment is a complex 
matter in cases where the defendant's mental state is at issue, as evidenced 
throughout this thesis. This is the second dimension to medico-psychological 
involvement. Detention decisions have political implications as indicated by 
Mitchell's study of public opinion on the matter, which found that the majority 
view is that those found not guilty of murder by reason of insanity should be 
taken 'out of circulation' for the protection of society (2000: 820). 
Reform Debates on Status or Excuse 
As with mens rea, the M'Naghten rule has arisen through common law, and 
reform would require the development of a legislative foundation. Whilst the 
defence is not used frequently, especially in murder because of the mandatory 
hospital disposal, the defence is still fundamental to debates on criminal 
responsibility and the defendant's mental state. The Butler Report (1975) 
recommended that insanity be made a status defence, as opposed to an excuse, 
and that the special verdict should be returned if it is proved that at the time of 
the offence the accused was suffering from a severe mental illness or severe 
sub-normality (para. 18.17). The report recommended that it be established 
which abnormal mental phenomena arise with each mental illness, and then 
which ones, when present, would constitute evidence of severity (para. 18.34) 
Symptomatology would become the defining factor and the list would include 
the phenomena associated with impairing cognition. However, making the 
insanity defence into one of status rather than excuse would remove the 
question of causality, and although medical opinion would not be deciding the 
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issue of criminal responsibility, it is arguable that diagnostic categories would. 
Mackay argues this is not an acceptable way to resolve an ethico-Iegal question 
because criminal responsibility would no longer be linked with moral guilt 
(1995: 88-89; 137). However, Hart believes that more satisfactory results 
would be produced (1968: 229). This illustrates that the disagreements centre 
on the matter of moral culpability with regard to the seriously mentally ill, and 
the significance to be assigned to medico-psychological evidence evaluating a 
defendant's mental state as a foundation to culpability. 
The subsequent 1989 LC reform proposals, contained in clauses 34-36 of the 
Draft Criminal Code, advocate a verdict of 'not guilty on evidence of mental 
disorder' (para. 11.17).55 Critically they argued there would need to be some 
measure of causality to avoid people being excused for acts that are not 
influenced by their mental state (para. 11.16). Mitchell's study found that the 
unanimous response was that the killer should not be subject to criminal 
prosecution if he would not have killed but for his mental illness (2000: 820). 
Thus, public opinion is that there does not need to be a direct link, it can be a 
status-based defence. Mackay, a leading expert in this area of law, has made 
reform suggestions (2000:83; 1995:141). Significantly he retains a cognitive 
orientation and also preserves the need for a link between the mental state and 
the incident. What stands out is the different form of words he proposes; in 
particular he recommends the word aberrant. It is an unusual word, and it 
would seem that the crucial issue would be the interpretations that would be 
applied. Notably, in the second option that he provides there is potentially the 
introduction of an objective standard with the incorporation of the term 
ordinary, reasonable people, unless this is qualified as it has been in 
provocation, which is discussed below. 
The most recent consideration of the insanity defence has been conducted by 
the SLC (2003).56 Although the Scottish position is different, their discussion 
of the issues is undertaken on a comparative basis with the English situation, 
and illustrates current thinking. Of major concern is the archaic language, and 
SS No. 177: Vol. 2 
S6 The government has claimed that it \\111 redraw the test as part of re!"orming m e n t ~ 1 1 health law. 
although nothing has been drawn up as yet (DoH & HO 2002: para 4.3). Mills (2003) renews the latest 
Irish reform discussions. 
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the fact that medico-psychological thinking is not adequately reflected in the 
legal interpretation of the terms, which is said to be creating problems both for 
expert witnesses providing evidence for the legal test, and the jury. However, 
they also make the point that insanity is a legal device that serves a different 
function from medical approaches to mental disorders (p.14). They suggest 
using the term mental disorder instead of insanity. The term would not be 
defined, although exclusions would be listed, such as psychopathy. This 
indicates recognition of the outdated state of the wording and operation of the 
defence in relation to current mental health knowledge. However, as 
subsequent chapters demonstrate, there is a fundamental philosophical 
divergence between the two disciplines' view of the mind, and it is not 
suggested that there should be a wholehearted embracing of the medico-
psychological perspective because it is also made clear that the defence is 
serving legal ends. 
The SLC support the excuse basis to the defence, advocating a link between the 
mental disorder and the event, focusing on the effect the mental disorder has 
had. However, they criticize the current restrictive cognitive focus, suggesting 
a wider approach, concentrating on the defendant's appreciation of his 
conduct. They argue, "appreciation is a wide enough term to cover all aspects 
of the conduct - its nature, its consequences, its moral value, and its legal 
effect" (p.24). They propose a number of versions, on which they invite 
comment. Currently there is no volitional dimension to insanity. The SLC 
maintain that as their reform suggestion would provide a wide test, there would 
be no need to introduce a specific volitional element, although they are aware 
that this is a vital aspect to medico-psychological thinking on the matter. 
However, they do provide an example of a possible volitional test for 
comment. The approach of the SLC is much simpler, which may augur well for 
jury comprehension. Additionally there is recognition of the need to reflect the 
medico-psychological understanding, which may also provide more coherence 
. 57 
III cases. 
It would seem the consensus is that insanity should continue to be an excuse 
rather than status based defence. There are suggestions for changes in language 
57 McSherry (1997) discusses the problems that have accompanied Australian refomls. 
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to reflect more modem terminology, but judicial interpretation is the critical 
matter, as it is conceded the terms remain legal ones that do not necessarily 
reflect the medico-psychological perspective, which is explored in chapter 
three in relation to the current defences of insanity and diminished 
responsibility. There are those, such as Morris (1999) and Spring (1998), 
however, who argue for the abolition of the insanity defence. The proposition 
is that it would be more accurate to say that the defendant did not have the 
necessary mens rea and acquit, and leave detention matters to be dealt with 
under civil provisions. However, Morse (1999b) and Bartlett and Sandland 
(2003: 275) challenge this proposal. The latter two argue for a distinct insanity 
defence because other defences focusing on mental states are not concerned 
with the same issues. 
Mandatory Insanity Disposal in Homicide Cases 
Despite the previous discussion, it would seem that the most pressing issue 
with insanity in homicide cases is the fact it is rarely used because of the 
mandatory sentence, leading to defendants pleading guilty and trying to sustain 
the diminished responsibility defence.58 Thus, any proposed change to the 
format of the defence may be an important one symbolically, but it may not 
have much of an impact procedurally if this aspect of the operation of the 
defence is not changed. Yet the pleas of diminished responsibility and insanity 
are separate and distinct (Mackay 2000: 82-83). Mackay proposes that the jury 
should be required to consider if the accused is legally insane, regardless of 
whether this has been raised by the accused or the prosecution, because it is 
"unacceptable to allow potentially irresponsible defendants to continue to plead 
guilty to manslaughter". 59 If the prosecution or defence do not raise it then the 
responsibility would fall to the judge. Yet if the judge invokes the matter the 
experts would not have reported the necessary evidence, nor have been 
questioned appropriately. If the judge has raised the defence would he also 
question the experts? Moreover, it has to be asked whether the jury would 
cope, as different evidence would be presented for the two defences, which is 
seen as a problem in respect of pleading diminished responsibility and 
5R Although the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) 1991 Act allows more flexible 
disposals this does not apply to eases of murder. . 
59 The present defence of insanity must always come before a Jury. Maidstone Crown Court. ex p. 
HarrowLBC 
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provocation together. Mackay also suggests abolishing the mandatory disposal 
related to insanity. The SLC discuss how the detention provisions are not in 
line with the European Convention on Human Rights 1998 (ECHR),6o which 
may provide a basis for reform of this aspect of insanity sooner rather than later 
(pp.30-3l; Magalhaes Pereira v Portugal (2003)). 
Diminished Responsibility 
General 
The defence of diminished responsibility, found in s2(1) of the Homicide Act 
1957 states that: 
where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder if 
he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested 
or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as 
substantially impaired his mental responsibility in doing or being a party to the killing 
(emphasis added).61 
Diminished responsibility only applies to the offence of murder.62 It is an 
optional defence, raised by the accused,63 of a plea of guilty-to-manslaughter 
on the basis of their mental responsibility being substantially diminished owing 
to an abnormality of mind. The manslaughter verdict avoids the mandatory life 
sentence that accompanies a finding of murder. Symbolically it is important 
that whilst the mental state of the defendant affects the verdict in that the 
defendant is convicted of manslaughter rather than murder, they are still 
admitting guilt and the mitigating mental health matters are dealt with at the 
sentencing stage (Eastman 2000: 94). 
Responsibility 
This defence contains a cognitive and volitional element. There has been 
extensive debate on the way mental responsibility, which is acknowledged to 
be a legal matter, is defined, particularly in light of s2(1) being considered 
"elliptical almost to the point of nonsense" (Griew 1988: 18). The defence 
60 Which the Jersey court held in Attorney General v Prior (2001), discussed by Mackay & Gearty 
(200 I), but in an appeal on another matter in the case it was stated that this needs to be revisited (Mackay 
2002). 
61 The background to the introduction of this defence is outlined in Part VI of the LC report (2003) on the 
partial defences of diminished responsibility and provocation. 
62 This is also supposed to the case in Scotland, established in HM Advocate \. Cunningham (1963). 
However in HM Advocate v. Blake (1996) a diminished responsibility plea succeeded in reducing an 
offence of attempted murder to an 'assault to severe injury'. See Mackay (2000: 66). 
63 Dunbar [1958] 
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covers those suffering from a mental abnormality rather than disease of the 
mind, which has been interpreted widely, because the defence does still impose 
partial responsibility on the defendant. Problems have arisen because the 
defence encompasses mental disorders as well as mental illnesses, and in 
particular because of the requirement in s2( 1) that the accused has to be 
experiencing substantially greater difficulty in controlling their behaviour than 
someone without the mental abnormality.64 Morse argues that if both elements 
of murder, the actus reus and the mens rea are present then defendants deserve 
to be convicted and punished (1985: 30-1). He claims that as it takes so little 
self-control and rationality to obey the law only the legally insane should have 
their criminal liability negated. However, he concedes it is difficult to measure 
the difficulty that someone has had exercising their willpower in order to 
control their actions, a debate that arises in respect of irresistible impulse.65 The 
majority of attention in this project is centred on examining how the law has 
interpreted the terms and approaches the determination that someone has 
established the defence, as it is the most commonly used defence, as Tables 1 
and 2 show. 
Procedural Issues 
In terms of the verdict, it is an excuse because it is established that the 
defendant did the act in question, but they are not held completely morally 
blameworthy because of their impaired mental state, which provides mitigation 
for the sentencing decision. "The policy behind these developments has been to 
shift the emphasis in criminal proceedings from a consideration of the 
exculpatory nature of mental disorder to one where the primary role of mental 
disorder is one relating to the sentencing process" (Mackay 1995: 79).66 
There are a number of important aspects to the operation of the defence that 
involve the admission and role of expert evidence, and the role of the jury. The 
expert establishes if their clinical diagnosis falls within one of the legally 
defined aetiological categories and gives an opinion on whether the 
abnormality of mind is such that it substantially impairs the defendant's mental 
64 Smith & Hogan (1999: 214) 
6S This point was raised in Byrne. 403. 
66 For an elaboration of this historical shift see Walker (1968; 1973). 
32 
responsibility. Since the 1968 case of Cox it is possible, if the medical evidence 
on both sides supports the requirements of the diminished responsibility plea, 
for the prosecution to accept a plea, and the case need not go to trial. This is 
now the most common practice, because judges rarely contest the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) decision, although they did in the Sutcliffe (1981) 
case.
67 
This means that expert evidence and opinion is forming the basis of the 
assessment of the defendant's criminal responsibility, which is being evaluated 
by CPS lawyers. Thus the nature of expert evidence in relation to what are 
considered to be the ill-defined categories contained in s2 is very important. 
Yet as the 1975 Butler Report noted, mental responsibility may be a moral or 
legal concept, but it is not a clinical fact (para. 19.5). Furthermore, expert 
opinion is a value judgment, not a clinical one and there was concern about the 
implication that the ability to conform to the law can be scientifically 
measured, as they considered it is not. However, in theory the jury are still the 
ultimate arbiters. 
In Byrne [1960] it was held that the jury are responsible for deciding if the 
accused had established the defence. It has just been noted that few cases go to 
trial. Another factor that impacts on the jury role is the requirement for the 
experts to give an opinion on whether or not they consider the defendant's 
mental responsibility is substantially impaired.68 The Butler committee 
expressed surprise that experts were asked to comment on the matter of legal 
and moral responsibility, and that the court was happy to hear the testimony. 
Now jury decisions are being made in the shadow of expert opinion on the 
issue. This demonstrates procedural shifts are having significant implications 
for the operation of the defence. As subsequent chapters show, the defence is 
operating in a liberal way, enabling the law to secure moral outcomes, without 
much public scrutiny.69 The nature of the interaction between law and medico-
psychology is fundamental to the operation of the process. 
The Reform Debate 
Reform of the diminished responsibility defence has been discussed 
extensively in, for example, the Butler Report, the Criminal Law Revision 
67 There are no specific figures in the Home Office statistics. 
6R Stock"well (1993) discusses accepting expert opinion when it is considered it will be helpful. 
69 See discussion in subsequent chapters. but in particular chapter 8. 
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Committee (CLRC) report, and more recently the LC report on Partial 
Defences (2003). The debates usually include deliberations on the mandatory 
sentence for murder, because the defence arose in order to provide justice in 
particular cases as a result of the mandatory sentence. The Butler Report 
argued for the abolition of the diminished responsibility defence, along with 
the mandatory life sentence for murder (paras. 19.14-16). The report 
recommended 'conviction of murder, or manslaughter by reason of extenuating 
circumstances, which would not be defined'. However it was said that if the 
mandatory sentence for murder was retained then s2 should remain, but the 
wording should be improved. It was suggested that the definition be tied in 
with the term mental disorder, as defined in the Mental Health Act (MHA), 
rather than a legally defined format of aetiologies, so experts would have a 
better basis for their testimony. As now, the jury would be charged with 
deciding if it constituted an extenuating circumstance, but with no requirement 
that the mental disorder had to be substantial to reduce the offence. 
Subsequently the CLRC argued that such a standard was needed otherwise the 
judge would be required to give directions on the matter for the jury, which 
would not necessarily produce the same level of consistency. 
The Select Committee of the House of Lords on Murder and Life 
Imprisonment (1988-9) also recommended the abolition of the mandatory 
penalty (paras. 81_3)70, but agreed with the CLRC71 that even if this were the 
case the defences of diminished responsibility and provocation should remain 
as they did not exist only because of the mandatory penalty.72 The 1989 draft 
criminal code, clause 56, in line with the Butler report recommendations, 
replaces the word abnormality used in s2 with disorder, linking the definition 
to the term mental disorder in section 1(2) of the MHA 1983, which is, 'mental 
illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder, 
and any other disorder or disability of mind'. 73 However, intoxication is 
specifically excluded. The proposals do indicate recognition of the need to 
70 See also House of Lords, Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics (1993-4: para. 261). 
71 See para. 76 . 
72 Mackay (1995) states that the fundamental question of whether there should be such a defence IS never 
tackled. The LC maintains that it is. but admits in the context of whether we have mandatory sentence 
(2003: 213-214). 
73 However reform of the MHA is currently being debated. 
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make the law more coherent, and use more current language, but again the 
issue is one of subsequent interpretation and application of the law. 
Debates centre on whether the wording within the defence should continue to 
cover a wider range of mental conditions, or try and restrict the current remit. 
Mackay believes the draft code provides an improvement on the current 
inconsistent approach, but questions whether the inclusion of 'any other 
disorder or disability of mind' would extend the range of conditions coming 
within the rubric of diminished responsibility, advocating a narrower but more 
clearly defined defence (1995: 79).74 Yet it would seem the phrase inherent 
cause within the present s2 has already been interpreted liberally. In contrast to 
Mackay, Griew argues the proposals may be more restrictive, for example 
excluding mercy killing, those killing as a result of morbid jealousy, or the 
severely stressed (1988: 87). However, overall the reform suggestions appear 
to provide similar opportunities to those that currently exist, as the rewording 
does not change the existing theoretical position, although it does try to tie in 
the definitions to another legally devised format contained in the MHA, which 
is significant for detention decisions. Procedurally, as with the current law, the 
matter of whether the condition is substantial enough to reduce the charge to 
manslaughter is left to the jury.75 However, it seems unlikely that there would 
be any obvious change in current practices as a result of the new format of the 
defence so the caveats raised previously regarding the jury role are still likely 
to apply. 
Again Mackay has made reform suggestions, but they essentially leave the 
nature of the defence unchanged (2000: 64-9). As with insanity he uses the 
word aberrant, and he retains the word substantial, both of which are likely to 
be contested. In addition there are no defined aetiologies in which to locate the 
expert evidence. Arguably the proposal would not change the legal position 
that has developed. 
74 He already takes issue with the way that judges and psychiatrists have conspired over mercy killers to 
ensure that they have not acquired a murder conviction (p.186). 
75 Griew questions how the jury might respond to having to make the decision about whether to make a 
finding of murder or manslaughter without the expert testimony on the matter (1988: 85). 
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The SLC (2003) is currently reviewing the defence, which in Scotland is still 
located in common law. Scotland had taken a restrictive approach until the case 
of Galbraith [2001]. The SLC supports the approach taken in Galbraith, except 
for the exclusion of psychopathy on policy grounds. The SLC argue that there 
is no reason to distinguish it from other personality disorders, as it is possible 
to impose severe sentences and there is a proposal to introduce the possibility 
of detention on the basis of risk (pp.41-42). Substantively there are no major 
derogations from the English defence. The terms are reminiscent of the current 
English definition, except for unsoundness of mind, and the interesting phrase, 
medical or other evidence. It also allows for the specific exclusion of 
intoxication unless the court holds otherwise based on the facts of the case. 
The recent English LC discussions on the partial defences speculate whether 
reform should follow the recommendations of the Butler report, the CLRC, the 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Professor Mackay, or an 
amended version they present (2003: 239-240). However, again there is a 
discussion on whether or not to abolish the defence because it only applies to 
murder; it is a compromise because of the insanity restrictions and the 
mandatory murder sentence, providing as it does mitigation at sentencing, and 
therefore the mandatory sentence should be abolished; it discourages the insane 
from pleading insanity; and, they claim that it is open to manipulation, 
covering as it does individuals who commit mercy killings, for example 
(pp.237-238). The reasons they present for not abolishing it are that the 
insanity defence would be the only option left and it is restrictive; there are 
those that are not legally insane who are not fully responsible for their actions; 
that if defendants are pleading diminished responsibility rather than insanity 
then the mandatory disposal can be removed; and that just because the defence 
is used in a benign way with the consent of the prosecution, defence and court 
this is not a sufficient reason to abolish it. The reasoning encompasses both 
theoretical and procedural matters, demonstrating the problems arising from 
the inter-relatedness of the provisions of the law of homicide and the 
philosophical basis of dealing with exceptions to the rule. Mackay argues that 
there is a reluctance to get rid of these defences because they mark out an 
important distinction between those who are 'fully' and 'partially' responsible 
(2000: 81). It would appear that the existence of the defence is contingent on 
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other aspects of the law of murder. Mackay questions why if diminished 
responsibility is such an important principle, it is not extended beyond the law 
of murder. 
Provocation 
General 
A brief depiction of provocation has been included because since the case of 
Smith [2001] if the defendant has mental health problems such evidence can 
enter into court, again illustrating the importance of judicial interpretation for 
the application of the law. In addition it is frequently pleaded alongside 
diminished responsibility, which has led to the LC debating an integration of 
the defences.76 
Section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 states: 
where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find that the person 
charged was provoked (whether by things done or by things said or by both together) to lose 
his self control, the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do 
as he did shall be left to be determined by the jury; and in determining that question the jury 
shall take into account everything both done and said according to the effect which, in their 
opinion, it would have on a reasonable man. 
The Impact of Smith 
This has always been considered an objective defence, about the reaction of the 
defendant to provoking conduct, and not directly about the mental state of the 
defendant in the way that insanity and diminished responsibility are. There are 
two aspects to the provocation test: the jury are required to consider the level of 
provocation, and the defendant's self control, compared with that of a 
reasonable man.77 Mackay had contrasted the reduced role of the jury in 
diminished responsibility cases with their active role in provocation cases, 
which he attributed to the lack of expert involvement (2000: 63). However, in 
Smith [2001] a subjective aspect to the issue of self-control was introduced, 
whereby abnormal mental characteristics of the defendant can be taken into 
account by requiring comparison with an ordinary reasonable man with the 
same abnormal mental characteristics. Previously only the age and sex of the 
defendant were considered relevant. Having the self-control aspect of the 
defence as an objective standard fits in with the legal idea of the mind, which 
76 Mackay discussed the trend towards this tendency in 1988. 
77 Valverde (2003) looks at the use of this concept. 
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assumes that we can and should exert self-control in order to behave in 
accordance with social rules. The characteristics of the defendant were part of 
the assessment of the provocation. In Turner (1975) it was held that if mental 
illness was an issue then medico-psychological evidence could be admitted into 
court. Thus the decision in Smith has changed the nature of the defence, and 
introduced another opportunity for the admission of scientific evidence. 
The bases to this legal move were detailed by Lord Hoffman, who cited three 
authorities to support his arguments. First, Lord Diplock had stated in Camplin 
[1978] that the distinction between the two aspects of the defence was simply a 
nicety. In addition, according to Thomas J (dissenting) in the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal case of Rongonui [2000], it was a difficult thing for the jury to 
apply subjective elements to only one part of the defence. Finally, Lord 
Hoffinan referred to claims by Yeo that behavioural scientists argue that the 
defendant's personality has to be taken as a whole, because it will affect both 
how they see the provocative conduct, and their emotional response to it (1998: 
60-61). He made specific reference to classes of people such as battered 
women, who have been through experiences that affect their powers of self-
control. "The boundary between normal and abnormal is very often a matter of 
opinion. Some people are entirely normal in most respects and behave 
unusually in others" (p.308). It can be seen from the dissenting judgments that 
there are authorities for keeping the status quO.78 This decision is evidence of 
the law trying to achieve justice in cases that do not fall readily into the current 
defences, and relying on theories emerging from the medico-psychological 
field to do so. This area of law has become particularly problematic because of 
the increasing tendency to plead provocation and diminished responsibility 
together, which is discussed below.79 Lord Hoffinan specifically remarked on 
the distinction between diminished responsibility, where the jury can consider 
abnormal mental aspects of the defendant, and provocation where they cannot. 
Responsibility 
The change described above reflects the moral position inherent in the insanity 
and diminished responsibility defences, where the focus is on the rational 
7R Gardner & Macklem (200 1) has written on what he sees as the nine fallacies of Smith. 
79 This was first raised in Matheson [1958] and endorsed in Thornton [1992] 
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capabilities of the individual. The basis and justifiability for the shift in 
assessing responsibility in such cases is being hotly debated, but the parameters 
of the discussion are around the differences and similarities between 
diminished responsibility and provocation. Morse considers that provocation is 
in principle an objective test as it is necessary to establish that a reasonable 
man would have lost his self-control in similar circumstances whilst , 
diminished responsibility looks specifically at the mentally abnonnal 
defendant. Certainly the dissenting view in Smith was that there is an objective 
standard of self-control that can be expected. But Lord Hoffman claimed in 
Smith that the same standards of behaviour could be expected of everyone 
regardless of their psychological make-up, yet this rule may sometimes have to 
be overridden by the need to do justice in the individual case (p.313). 
Admittedly both provocation and diminished responsibility are partial 
defences, but they are very different types of defences. Horder argues that 
provocation should be seen as a partial excuse, while diminished responsibility 
should be classified as a partial exemption from liability, because it is similar 
to insanity (1999: 149). He claims that the insane and those suffering from 
diminished responsibility are moral objects, needing moral concern and 
humane treatment. 
However, the judicial initiative is arguably explainable if the changes in Smith 
are viewed in relation to the initial philosophical discussions at the outset of 
this chapter, and in light of the operation of the diminished responsibility 
defence. The changes introduced to the provocation defence draw upon the 
exceptions to rationality already established in relation to mental states. 
Furthermore, it makes use of expert evidence, which subsequent chapters 
identify works well at a number of levels in the context of diminished 
responsibility to ensure a moral outcome in line with views on the just outcome 
for the case. On the other hand if there are no arguments about the defendant's 
mental state then the operation of the defence retains coherence in line with the 
. . 1 80 
mens rea pnnclp e. 
RO However, McSherry suggests an alternative to the current approach of admitting evidence on mental 
disorder to negate voluntariness and intention, She contests the dichotomous approach of the law, argumg 
it requires the allocation of individuals into categ?ri,es, ,which does not ~ e t l e c t t the continuum perspective 
of the medico-psychological field (2003: 599), ThIS IS dIscussed further m chapter two, 
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Procedures 
With regard to expert evidence, it is still the case that if the defendant has no 
mental disorder and the objective test for provocation is relevant, then Turner 
(1975) applies. In such circumstances the jury are not thought to need the 
assistance of psychiatrists on how ordinary people react to the stresses and 
strains of everyday life (Smith: 841). Lord Clyde used this rule in Smith to state 
that "evidence is not admissible to show what effect such a characteristic might 
have on a person's self-control or whether the characteristic did in fact have an 
effect on the self control of the accused" (ibid.).81 This is not in line with 
Turner or Ca mp lin , and was not accepted by the majority position in Smith 
(Mackay & Mitchell 2003: 754-5). "[P]sychiatrists can now be called upon to 
give evidence not only about how the depression impacted on the accused's 
own powers of self-control, but also on the issue of whether such a depressed 
person was able to exercise a reasonable degree of self-control in the light of 
the alleged provocation to which he was subjected at the time of the killing" 
(ibid: 756). This introduces an important role for medico-psychological expert 
opinion in relation to legal questions. Responsibility for deciding matters rests 
with the jury. Currently the procedural means by which cases involving 
diminished responsibility may avoid being tried in court are not available in 
cases where the defence of provocation is pleaded. 
Pleading Diminished Responsibility and Provocation Together 
General 
Mackay and Mitchell claim "that the decision [in Smith] signals a move away 
from the criminal law's traditional approach regarding provocation and 
diminished responsibility as two separate pleas towards a recognition of the 
fact that such separateness is no longer practical" (2003: 745). There are a 
number of factors that have been identified as supporting the trend. For 
instance, when the defences are pleaded together it enables medico-
psychological evidence into a provocation case that would not have been 
possible without the diminished responsibility defence. An important 
consequence, acknowledged by Beldam LJ. in Thornton [1992], is that it is 
inevitable that the jury will consider the medico-psychological information 
RI p.319 
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when evaluating the provocation issues.82 Furthermore, Lord Hoffman in Smith 
held that if the jury cannot be told to ignore evidence that they have heard in 
respect of the diminished responsibility defence, then it could not be said that 
the defences are mutually exclusive. As subsequent chapters demonstrate, it is 
unlikely that a jury will be able to separate out the expert evidence in respect of 
the two defences. 83 
Yet there are differences in the burden of proof between the two defences. 
With diminished responsibility the accused has to raise and prove the defence, 
whilst with provocation the prosecution must satisfy the jury that the accused 
was not provoked.84 Thus, in Luc Thiet Thuan [1997] Lord Gof:F5 made the 
point, reiterated in the dissenting view of Lord Hobhouse in Smith,86 that 
combining the defences enables someone who fails to satisfy the standard in s2 
to subsequently use s3. Lord Hobhouse also held that an objective standard in 
s3 is the policy of the statute, "and it would be contrary to that policy to extend 
s3 to give him the defence advisedly denied him by s2" (p.329). However, now 
that provocation requires the characteristics of the accused, such as depressive 
illnesses, to be taken into account in the reasonable person test it is more likely 
that the two defences will be combined. 
While procedural practice had resulted in the practice of the two defences 
being pleaded together, the case of Smith shows that the judiciary had the 
power to decide one of two ways. The judiciary are significant in the 
development of the law and it would seem that with regard to judge's 
directions, the statements of the majority in Smith indicated a judicial 
discomfort with having to routinely apply an objective standard. Lord Clyde 
stated "[ s ]ociety should require that he exercise a reasonable control over 
himself, but the limits within which control is reasonably to be demanded must 
take account of characteristics peculiar to him which reduce the extent to which 
he is capable of controlling himself' (p.318). Lord Hoffman argued, if judges 
82 Although the appeal case of Roberts [2002] indicates the troubles that can occur with being clear that 
the jury appreciate that they are considering two possible defences. 
R3 See chapter's 6, 7 and 8 on this issue. 
R4 Additionally with provocation the judge has to ensure that the defence is raised if there is evidence that 
the defendant was provoked. The defence was unhappy when this happened and challenged it in The 
Queen (On application by Nicholas Farnell) [2003]. 
R5 p.1046 
R6 p.329 
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were freed from always having to invoke what he views as an unreasonable set 
of characteristics, then "they will be able to explain the principles in simple 
terms" (p.313). However, Weller [2003]87 illustrates that juries are still facing 
problems understanding the judge's directions, as it would seem are judges in 
deciding how to direct the jury.88 In response to this situation the Law 
Commission (2003) are now looking at the operation of the two defences. 
The Reform Debate 
Current rules have, and therefore reform in one area will have, implications for 
the principles and practices in another (Ashworth & Mitchell (eds.) 2000).89 
The LC' s consultation paper identifies difficulties with the current uncertain 
boundaries around mental states, particularly with regard to BWS,90 where in 
cases such as Ahluwalia [1992], Thornton (No.2) [1996] and Hobson [1998] 
the provocation defence was rejected but a plea of diminished responsibility 
succeeded.91 The two primary problems the LC identifies are the reluctance of 
psychiatrists to classify BWS as an abnormality of mind, and the fact the focus 
moves from the deceased's conduct to the victim's state of mind. However, as 
the LC concedes, the diminished responsibility defence often results in no trial, 
and therefore the prosecution are frequently deciding matters (p.200). 
Reform suggestions include: abolishing the defence of provocation; abolishing 
the mandatory sentence; and changing s2( 1) so that experts are not 
commenting on the matter of substantial impairment, but on whether the 
defendant's abnormality of mind was a significant cause of his acts or 
omissions in doing or being a party to the killing. So the role of the medical 
witness would be to comment on the causal link between the abnormality of 
mind and whether, from a medical viewpoint, it caused or materially 
contributed to the killing (pp.l53-154; Part XII). This appears to make what 
R7 See Barsby & Ashworth (2003) 
88 See chapter 4 
89 The January editorial of the CLR (2004) discusses the difficulties faced. 
90 In terms of securing efficacy within the law for battered women, Edwards (2004) argues for the 
abolition of provocation and the reframing of self-defence. Casey (2003) looks at the use of expert 
testimony for women who are battered in the context of self-defence. However self-defence is a 
justificatory defence whereas provocation is a partial exemption, a distinction addressed by Schopp 
(1998: 53). 
91 Casey (200 I) looks at BWS in relation to the diminished responsibility defence as outlined in 
Galbraith, compared with the Australian and English provisions. 
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experts currently do implicitly in drawing links between clinical diagnoses and 
legal considerations more overt, but with the rewording experts are linking 
their clinical view not to the matter of responsibility but to the act. It would still 
be a powerful influence for the jury and it is questionable whether those cases 
which are decided by the CPS would be affected. 
The LC does not develop a hybrid defence itself, but cite Mackay and 
Mitchell's proposals. Mackay and Mitchell suggest a plea which recognises 
that the issue is one of defects in rationality. They suggest the following, which 
reflects the American Model Penal Code.92 
A defendant who would otherwise be guilty of murder is not guilty of murder if, the jury 
considers that at the time of the commission of the offence, he was: 
(a) under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance and/or 
(b) suffering from unsoundness of mind 
either or both of which affected his criminal behaviour to such a material degree that the 
offence ought to be reduced to one of manslaughter. 
This formulation removes issues of self-control and impairment of mental 
responsibility, so the focus is on disturbance in reasoning, which is in line with 
the philosophies discussed earlier. The cognitive focus can be assessed under 
either subsection (a) or (b). Subsection (a) will cover such situations as BWS. 
Emotion is intended to encompass more than anger (Mackay & Mitchell 2004). 
Significantly, emotion does not fit easily into the legal perception of acceptable 
influences on rationality discussed previously.93 Subsection (b) is not a term 
that has been advocated in other reform discussions, the meaning of which 
would need to be established through judicial reasoning.94 The jury are still 
charged with deciding when the condition affects culpability through the term 
material degree, which, if current practice is followed, will become a matter of 
expert opinion in practice, whatever the section states about the role of the jury. 
The LC' s reasons for merging the defences are procedural and concerned with 
justice (pp.241-242). With the recent changes to the defence of provocation it 
is difficult to disentangle the psychiatric aspects of the two defences, therefore 
the law is too complex for directing juries. Both defences are concerned with 
those who kill in disturbed states of mind, thus there is a logic and justice in 
92 Model Penal Code, The American Law Institute, s21 o. (3)( I )(b) 
93 See chapter 2 for further discussions on the importance of emotion to decision-making. 
94 The discussions on judicial initiatives in this area in chapter 3 will provide some insights. 
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having a combined defence, with the twin concepts of extreme emotional 
disturbance and abnormality of mind. Arguments against a single partial 
defence are that diminished responsibility and provocation are fundamentally 
different defences, so combining the two would not reflect the ethical 
difference between them. Provocation is a partial excuse, whereas diminished 
responsibility is a partial denial of responsibility, and the fact that they are not 
mutually exclusive is not necessarily a reason to combine them. In this respect 
it could be said that the view of the majority in Smith is flawed because they do 
not pay enough attention to the differences between the defences, and a single 
defence such as that suggested would lack a clear boundary, and be 
unacceptably wide. 
The LC' s reasons identified for and against reform of these defences are 
reflected in the academic debates taking place, Chalmers (2004) argues against 
Mackay and Mitchell's suggestions for merging the two defences, as do 
Gardner and Macklem (2004). Chalmers challenges the theoretical basis put 
forward by Mackay and Mitchell for a 'merged' defence, and provides 
information on the proposed defence, developed in the U.S., which challenges 
the context and efficacy of the provision. Gardner and Macklem focus on the 
theoretical distinctions between the two defences. What becomes evident is 
that the operation of the defences lack coherence, particularly where the law is 
trying to achieve justice using the discourse from another discipline that does 
not take the same limited cognitive stance on the mind. It also depends on 
one's stance on the theoretical nature and foundations of the defences. 
Detention: Policy Issues 
Introduction 
Whilst the issues cannot be dealt with in detail,95 it is necessary to outline the 
way that the law looks at the sentencing consequences of a defence as these 
have a moral inter-relationship with the verdict, because by establishing the 
defence there has to be a moral recognition that responsibility is partial 
(Walker 1985). Norrie suggests that it is at this juncture that issues such as 
95 Bartlett & Sandland (2003) address in detail the options in relation to those with mental health 
problems. Also Eastman & Peay's (1999) edited work provides a comprehensive conceptual and 
procedural critique of the operation of the current MHA. 
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motive can be taken into account (2000: 24). An additional backdrop to 
decisions on punishment and treatment are legal concerns with philosophical 
matters of retribution, deterrence, social order and public protection (Walker 
1991; Hudson 1987).96 For example s2(2) of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act 
requires a longer than normal sentence if in the opinion of the judge it is 
necessary to protect the public from harm. These issues show the inter-related 
nature of the theory of responsibility and punishment, and the ritualistic and 
moralistic nature of the trial and sentencing.97 Judges' decisions in such cases 
are usually informed by medico-psychological opinion, but the ultimate 
decision remains with them (Harding & Koffman 1988).98 Significantly, 
judicial decisions are being made in the context of increasing concerns with 
dangerousness and risk, with the possibility of compulsory detention, on 
treatment grounds, in the public interest.99 Likewise these legal issues provide 
an important backdrop to the experts' recommendations. Peay claims that the 
"long-standing acceptance of professional discretion is being progressively 
outweighed by demands of accountability and a fear of responsibility" (2003: 
xi; 142).100 But questions arise as to the efficacy of the current legal process 
when consideration is given to the high numbers of mentally disordered 
offenders in prison, who arguably should be receiving treatment (Simester & 
Sullivan 2003: 572). Mackay claims that many pleas of diminished 
responsibility result in punishment rather than treatment, and asks, although 
there can be partial responsibility, can there be partial exemption from 
punishment (2000: 73_74).101 
Government Initiatives on Dangerousness 
Concerns about risk and dangerousness also pervade debates on release. 
Critically the law also constitutes a proactive force and the government is 
giving effect to election manifesto promises (Bartlett & McHale 2003) in the 
proposed reforms to the MHA. The Mental Health Bill (MHB) (2002) 
96 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000; see Thomas (2001) 
97 For example, Worrall (1990) and Chambers & Millar (1987) 
98 So for example, if sentence is required to be given under s2(2) Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, the 
amended s37(1) and additional s45A( 1) of the MHA 1983, means a hospital order can only be given in 
exceptional circumstances for a serious offence, which cannot be based on mental illness alone. 
99 For example see the shifts in emphasis from the Richardson Committee report (1999) to the Green 
Paper (1999) and White Paper (200?). Peay (20.03) discusses the modifications in chapter five. 
100 The roles for medico-psychologIcal profeSSIOnals would also be extended should the MHB (2002) be 
implemented, although at the m o m e n ~ ~ that is ~ o t t an imminent. prospect ( P e ~ y : : 156-7). 
101 Decisions about detention in hospItal or pnson were exammed m Hutchinson [1997] 
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incorporates a distinct approach to mental health and diagnostic categories to 
meet social order and public protection concerns, illustrating the importance of 
the role of law and acknowledging that the law is not a neutral set of rules. 10:: 
The MHB is concerned with compulsory treatment for those suffering from 
mental disorders, including mentally disordered offenders (Department of 
Health (DoH) p.6).103 Furthermore, the reasoning given for the introduction of 
the Bill associates treatment and protection issues, arguing that "[t]he need to 
protect others from further harm committed by dangerous offenders means that 
safety considerations must be paramount in their management" (ibid). As a 
result the courts will be given more comprehensive powers than under the 
current 1983 MHA. There is unease about the balance of individual rights, 
treatment and public protection within the new MHA (Eldergill 2001 ).104 
Similarly there are concerns about the impact of the emotive response that 
portrays the mentally ill in terms of their potential harm to others (Eastman & 
Peay 1999: 212-3). 
Of interest to this research are the changes introduced within the MHB in 
respect of psychopaths. For example, while the current MHA uses the term 
'psychopath', it is proposed to use the term 'personality disorders' under the 
new Act. An important matter here concerns the issue of treatment. Under the 
current MHA the hospital detention of psychopaths and those with non-serious 
mental impairments beyond 28 days, is linked to a requirement that the 
condition is treatable. Yet clause 6(4)(a) of the MHB would require imposition 
of compulsory detention where there is a 'substantial risk of causing serious 
harm to other persons'. The Consultation document claims this avoids the 
situation whereby "some dangerous mentally disordered people have not been 
made subject to the Act as it has been possible for them to argue that they are 
not personally benefiting from it" (p.7). The Fallon Committee (1999) 
concluded that whether or not psychopaths are treatable, there ought to be 
provision to ensure that they are confined if they represent an ongoing danger 
to the public. The sentence could be assessed periodically to determine if they 
are still dangerous. However, within psychiatric circles, whether personality 
102 See Vol. 25, no. 4 of the Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 2003, which is a special edition 
on reforms on mental capacity and mental health. 
103 To show the extremes to which this can be taken, Pannick (2003) discusses the judicial decision in the 
States to allow treatment of a prisoner on death row so he is sane enough to be executed. 
104 See also Layer (2002). and Mason et al (1999: Ch. 21). 
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disorders are treatable is a contested matter, and raises issues about the use of 
hospital beds for those that are not. 105 It also overlooks the diverse views held 
about the possibility of accurately predicting dangerousness and violence in 
psychopaths (Peay (ed.) 1998: Part V), a matter that is re-visited in subsequent 
chapters. I 06 
In addition to the trends identifiable in the MHB, there are initiatives being 
developed by the Home Office (HO), Prison Service (PS) and DoH. Within the 
HO there is a Mental Health Unit whose mission is "to protect the public from 
further offending by dangerous mentally disordered offenders and severely 
personality disordered people" (2003). This Unit carries out the functions of 
the Home Secretary, where the individual is subject to a restriction order by 
the court, conferred by the MHA. In addition, the PS' s Offending Behaviour 
Programmes Unit (OBPU) has been developing interventions to reduce 
recidivism in violent offenders who score over 25 on the Psychopathy 
Checklist. These endeavours are concerned with overcoming the problems 
identified with treating psychopaths, whereby treatment can be administered if 
it would provide protection to others, even though it offers no health benefit to 
the patient (Peay 2003: 154). Furthermore, there is the introduction of the 
concept of Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder (DSPD), and the DSPD 
programme, as a result of collaboration between the DoH, HO and the PS. The 
aim is to develop mental health services for people who are dangerous as a 
result of a severe personality disorder. Concerns are focused on the detention 
of people who pose a high risk, and the development of more rigorous 
procedures for assessing the risk. Furthermore the Home Office DSPD team 
and the PS's OBPU have been working together. The aim of the collaboration 
is to develop a Violence Programme for Psychopaths to be available in two 
DSPD sites, Rampton Hospital and Frankland Prison. Bartlett and Sandland 
maintain that the preventative detention of those with a DSPD demonstrates a 
shift towards a criminal rather than a medical model (2003: Ch. 6).107 The 
debate centres on risk management rather than treatment, but Hodgins (2001) 
105 This was evident in the interviews with medico-psychological experts. 
106 The difficulties faced by both professions and the matter of the defendant's rights is ably demonstrated 
in the case of The Queen on the Application of P [2002]. Also McGuire (2000) illustrates the complex 
nature of assessing risk because of the range of theories available and considerations that can form pan of 
the evaluation. 
107 This chapter maps out the gowmment initiatives that inform the approach to those with mental 
disorders within the CJS, illustrating the tensions between detention and treatment. 
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challenges this approach, arguing for the need for better treatment options, and 
a focus on prevention. 
It can be seen that current legal reforms support detention on the grounds of 
risk and dangerousness. It is a shift away from the rights of the individual 
towards coercion in the interests of public order (Eastman 2000: 90).108 The 
initiatives use diagnostic categories to support such interventions, co-opting the 
medico-psychological terminology, but interpreting and using them as legal 
categories, as with the defences of insanity and diminished responsibility.109 
Correspondingly explanations for criminal behaviour within criminology 
encompass both individual and social factors, which form part of the debate 
around interventions for those caught (McGuire 2000; Muncie et al 1996). 
Governments work with various agencies to introduce measures and impose 
sentences that address these factors. The collaborations provide support for the 
legal initiatives, but arguably submerge policy objectives beneath a mass of 
codes, statutes, cases and procedures (King & Piper 1995: 3). Therefore, 
decisions to get tough on those held to constitute a danger to society involve 
political jUdgements to affix responsibility on individuals to deal with a social 
problem, crime (Norrie 2000: 220). Peay argues for the need to balance 
individual rights to liberty, with the collective right to protection from harm 
(1989: 1-3). In this context the interaction of law and the medico-psychological 
role represents a use by the legal system of the scientific discipline of the mind 
to meet social and political policy objectives, which arguably compromises the 
role of the medico-psychological practitioner and the rights of the individual 
patient. Moreover, Peay's study, in which practitioners assess case studies, 
illustrates the disparity and difficulties in decision-making that pervades this 
area of law (2003). Critically, all these issues pervade release decisions toO. 110 
A Dialectical View Revisited 
The discussion of the substantive law, especially in relation to provocation and 
diminished responsibility, provides support for Norrie's challenge of the false 
division of form and the moral position within Kantian philosophy, whereby 
lOR For a review of arguments against similar provisions in the U.S. see Fitch & Ortega (2000) 
109 See chapter three. . " 
110 R (on the application of N) [200 I] explains the position on the nature of expert eVIdence on ~ I s k k In 
relation to release decisions with regard to psychopaths. The assessment of medIcal e\'ldence and fisk by 
parole boards was discussed in R (on the application of·Hartin) [2003]. 
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discussions of the issues are not resolvable (2000: 7-15). [C]ategories of mens 
rea, ... are designed in cognitive, Kantian, 'morality of form' terms precisely 
in order to exclude the substantive moral information required ... " (ibid: 180). 
Legal language is cognitive, factual and descriptive, and therefore inadequate 
to the criminal law task of making moral judgements, which has created a 
contradictory language and role. For example, the inclusion of oblique 
intention allows moral judgements not possible through the inadequate legal 
cognitive language. Furthermore, because the defences remain on the periphery 
of criminal law , descriptive terms such as intent, state of mind and mental state, 
which refer to issues that require a normative judgement by both legal and 
mental health professionals, are not frequently challenged (Norrie: 157). The 
nature of the judgments is examined in this research. Norrie argues for a 
recognition that the moral exceptions provided by the defences are not just 
exceptional, but complementary to the matter of intention (1997: 13). 
Norrie maintains that although individual justice requires a system of rules that 
are in principle clear, coherent and consistent, the dialectical viewpoint 
challenges the existence of such a state of affairs in the traditional rational 
approach. From the dialectical position it is argued that the legal form of 
analytical thinking produces contradictions, which is a performative 
contradiction, because it is meant to resolve them. I I I Therefore by making 
explicit the Kantian idea of responsibility, and the inherent false separation it 
supports, it is possible to develop a different way of understanding the nature 
of legal and moral reasoning. Norrie claims he is not just adopting a sceptical 
approach, but locating the problems "in the social, political, and historical 
context of modem liberal society", because the perspective taken for asking a 
question, and searching for the answer, is critical (p.9). However, Sullivan's 
(2002) review of Norrie's arguments proposes that developing a code would 
redress many of these issues, and there is no need to revolutionise the law, as 
Norrie is suggesting, in order to improve it. The evidence in this research 
shows that a more explicit understanding of the law and its contradictions 
reqUIres an examination of not just the academic debates discussed in this 
chapter, but the impact of judicial interpretation, and the approach of 
III Norrie acknowledges that contradictions are associated with the dialectical approach but these are a 
subset within the broader theoretical framework concerned with the internal and inseparable connection 
between phenomena. 
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practitioners to the application of the law. It would seem that simply 
introducing a new legislative code would not necessarily result in fundamental 
reforms without an appreciation of all the dimensions of the application of the 
law, as it might not change matters if current practices are not addressed. 
Conclusion 
The analysis of mens rea and the defences describes the substantive law that 
has been developed to give effect to the philosophical principles on which the 
law is founded. There are two dimensions that pervade the debates, views of 
the mind and the theories underpinning the rule of law, which introduce wider 
policy considerations to the application of individual justice as well as moral 
considerations. Although the law supports the idea of free will, it can be seen 
on examination that the defences in question have determinism implied in 
them. Ashworth and Mitchell argue that this threatens the normative nature of 
the law's judgements and evaluations (2000: 15). The operation of the defences 
relies on expert evidence and its terminology, even though the medico-
psychological disciplines have a very different theoretical perspective on the 
mind, which is explained in chapter two. In addition the operation of the 
defences constitutes a juxtaposition of two different professional discourses, 
alongside the inherent shared social understanding applied by the jury. 
Valverde remarks, "what science-and-technology studies in law do not even 
consider is the ways in which scientific 'truths' coexist, in legal arenas, with 
such non-scientific facts as what the reasonable person ought to have known" 
(2003: 18). 112 Nor is it just the legislative format that is important, because the 
various debates show the significance of the procedures that develop in relation 
to the normative legal position, which are elaborated on in subsequent chapters. 
Thus it becomes evident that there are value choices in the parameters of 
offences, defences, and at each juncture of the legal process as they are 
interpreted and applied. 
Nor does the position rem am static, as is demonstrated by changes in the 
operation of each of the examined defences. Significantly, recent changes in 
the application of the provocation defence, introduced through Smith, illustrate 
how the judiciary can change the moral and policy orientation of legislation, 
I I ~ ~ Also see the discussion on p.22S. 
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which may undermine the policy objectives of the government enshrined in 
legislation. This reveals the reflexive nature of the law as an institution, with 
the recourse to scientific theories providing support and legitimation for the 
legal process and case decisions. The Law Commission are now looking at the 
defences of diminished responsibility and provocation in light of changes in 
practice whereby the two defences are increasingly being pleaded together, and 
the judicial innovations. But reform discussions highlight how choices are 
being made between the possible normative positions that can be supported. 
King and Piper attribute the limits of the law's effective action to "the intrinsic 
nature of law and [to] law's own concept of its role" (1995: 12-13). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MEDICO-PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE 
MIND 
Introduction 
Chapter one indicated that the operation of the defences of insanity, diminished 
responsibility, and on occasion provocation, rely on medico-psychological 
evidence. However, the mental health sphere adopts a different view of the 
mind from that underpinning the law. This viewpoint will be examined in this 
chapter, with specific reference to the neuroscientific theories of 
consciousness. The mind is an elusive phenomenon to study, but neuroscience, 
which incorporates a number of neurologically based disciplines working 
together to provide a comprehensive understanding of the brain/mind,113 is a 
rapidly developing field, although still in its formative years. 114 In light of the 
plethora of material on the mind, attention is paid to the theories of key figures, 
to elucidate the main themes of concern to this project. This discussion enables 
an appreciation of the distinction between the two disciplines that is followed 
up in the discussions on the interaction between law and medico-psychology in 
the cases being scrutinised in this thesis. Originally it was also intended that the 
project would be considering the extent of the inclusion by the law of the latest 
views on the mind, but the findings from the research revealed that this is 
simply a facet of a broader set of suppositions about the interaction of law and 
medico-psychology, as subsequent chapters show. 
The Philosophical Parameters of the Debate 
Philosophy has debated the matter of the mind at length, centring on the free 
will/determinist debate. I IS Although in the dialectical discussion in chapter one 
the point was made that comparing the incompatibilist and compatibilist 
arguments is not helpful, it is useful to establish at least very briefly the remit 
of the debate that accompanies discussions on current scientific investigations 
and their ramifications for responsibility. 
113 Zeman (200 I) provides an overview of the field of consciousness. An excellent website for articles 
deposited by authors on the philosophy of consciousness and the mind and the science of consciousness 
can be found at http://www.u.arizona.eduJ%Echalmers 
114 Van der Henst et al (2002) analyse how the study of reasoning strategies has barely begun. 
115 A valuable collection of essays can be found in Chalmers (ed.: 2002) & Nagel (ed.: 1995). See also 
Schaffer (1968). 
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First, what of determinist VIews on will? Trusted argues actions are not 
logically inevitable, in the strict sense of specific cause and effect, but nor are 
they uncaused as the will, which she equates with reason, causes an action 
(1984: 38). However, this perspective differs from the free will standpoint 
because it relates the will to other aspects of the individual. The rationale 
being, as Hobart argues, that if the volition of the self is not detennined, if the 
will acts independently of wishes and motives, it is as if free will is not from 
the self (1966: 66-71). Thus by separating out the moral'!, from its 
propensities, can you have a morally responsible self? Hobart's position is that 
if volition is the product of the self then determinism is reconcilable with free 
will, when expressed in the passive voice. Nor does the detenninist standpoint 
challenge the fact that we feel that we have free will. Hume claims that we 
know we have a will through our own experience, which tells us that cause 
(will) and effect (action) follow one another (Trusted: 36). However, Mill 
speculates on whether the issue that is important is consciousness of our moral 
responsibility, which free will implies, orland consciousness of our free will 
(1966: 167). 
The conundrum for the compatibilist standpoint is locating which factors are 
influential in respect of the mind/will. Mill considers that it cannot be argued 
that man acts without nature (p.159). Likewise Schlick claims it is nonsense 
"that freedom means "exemption from the causal principle", or "not subject to 
the laws of nature", but causality is not the same as compulsion (1966: p.58). 
But what does this incorporate? One commonly cited stimulus is character. But 
there are two aspects to the issue, the measure of influence such aspects of the 
self has, and how to measure its effect in judgments about responsibility. For 
example, there is concern about the fact that character develops as a result of 
treatment received as infants, for which we are not responsible. Therefore, how 
can we be held responsible for its effect (Hospers 1966: 41-2; 45)? Nor is it 
possible to assess the contribution of others. Furthennore, Broad notes that 
there would be problems in deciding how far back to go to establish what 
would have given rise to a different course of action (1966: 150-1). Mill also 
believes that it is impossible to conceive of infinite regress of the chain of 
causation back to eternity (p.159). Schlick suggests that when mental illness 
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affects normal functioning it is the disease rather than the person which is 
responsible for the actions (p.60). But if there is an option to exercise our will 
then the issue is at what point is the will overcome? 
In terms of the resolution of the matter of responsibility, morality is a central 
issue. Mackie argues for a soft determinist position, whereby "it is a factual, 
psychological, question whether an action is intentional or voluntary, but it is a 
moral or legal question whether or in what ways an agent is to be held 
responsible" (pp.208; 226).116 Schlick suggests, as Hume did, that the issue of 
whether or not man is morally free is different to the problem of determinism, 
which is about natural laws. Schlick argues there are two distinct aspects, 
freedom of will and freedom of conduct, and morality is only an issue for the 
latter. Hosper's solution is to divide the moral discourse into an upper level 
relating to actions, and a lower level incorporating the springs of action. Moral 
talk applies to the upper level, this is the level at which the "Hume-Mill-
Schlick-Ayer analysis of freedom fully applies" (PA3).117 Inherent in this 
argument for moral accountability is the assumption that it is possible to make 
an effort of will and choose to act in accordance with social rules. 118 For 
example Mill claimed that whilst our character is important it is open to 
modification by our will. Likewise Hume believed morality was not about the 
action but the aspects of self, being a virtuous person (Pink 2004: 11). In 
addition Schlick maintains that punishment is about influencing the motives, 
which are the causes of actions. So the legal theories of responsibility and 
punishment are not undermined by the determinist stance, but nor is will seen 
as a freestanding phenomenon, there being recognition of the inter-related 
nature of the whole of the individual. This challenges the "Hobbesian 
caricature of human action - a caricature that reduces action to nothing more 
than an effect imposed on us by our desires" (Pink: 119). This position is 
supported by evidence underpinning the medico-psychological and 
neuroscientific theories of the mind, which is embraced by many philosophers 
(Chalmers (ed.) 2002). However, the question still remains, how do you 
determine when a person has tried hard enough (Nowell-Smith 1966: 364-5)? 
116 Campbell (1997) outlines differences between s t r o ~ g g an.d weak compatibilism. .. 
117 However, it should not be overlooked that the hlstoncal and cultural backdrop IS Important to the 
scientific construction of diagnostic categories (Foucault 1973; Szasz 1972: Horwitz 2003). 
J JR Although Fischer's (2004) compatibilist account of moral responsibility does not require genuine 
access to alternatives. Glannon (1999) comments on the theory. 
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This complex spectrum of views does not help the legal need to make a 
definitive judgment. The context and process by which this is undertaken is the 
focus of this project. 
The Neuroscience of Consciousness 
Consciousness, the capacity to reflect on matters, is a complex phenomenon to 
explain, as the following discussion highlights. It has to be conceived as having 
a number of levels that arise from a synthesis of a variety of biological 
processes, together with the higher brain processes. Critical to the medico-
psychological process is the importance of emotion as well as cognition for 
decision-making, and the social concepts that enable a personal narrative of the 
self and one's experiences and values. 
Foundations 
Dualism 119 argues that the mental, the source of our volition, is beyond the 
province of science (Trusted: 35).120 However, in addition to the philosophical 
challenges to the dualist position, during the last 15 years neuroscience has 
begun to provide empirical evidence as a result of research into the brain and 
human consciousness. 121 Recent advances in technology, .such as brain 
scans,122 have enabled scientists to investigate the brain/mind in a way 
previously impossible. 123 The study of consciousness is important because it is 
concerned with the brain/mind processes that enable us to evaluate options and 
make informed choices between moral positions. It supports our subjective 
sense of self and agency, which are important dimensions of responsibility, 
accountability and morality. The neuroscientists Edelman and Tononi suggest 
that the epistemology of the mind should now move from philosophy to 
neuroscience because we are grounded in biological processes (2000: Ch.17). 
However, the debates on the issues still involve both disciplines. 
119 Searle explains there are currently two schools of dualism; substance dualists claim that there are two 
types of substances, the mind and the body (1997: 135). Property dualist.s c I ~ i m m that mental and physical 
are two different properties within the same substance, humans, whIch eXIst SImultaneously. 
120 There were religious reasons behind this arguably because of the concerns about science intruding into 
matters of the mind and soul (Searle 1997: 6; Damasio 1994: 249). Although Albuquerque et al (2002) 
argue aspects of Descartes's viewpoint is still valid for psychiatry. 
121 Polger & Flanagan (1999) explore how many positions exist within this school of thought, 
highlighting the lack of agreement. See also Chalmers (1995); Dennet (2001; 1996; 1991). 
122 Lloyd (2002) . . . 
123 Greenfield explains the different types of scans (2000: 23). For a commentary on the lImItatIOn of 
fMRI scans see Ugurbil et al (2003). 
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Significantly, the neuroscientific theories of consciousness locate cognition in 
physiological processes, and as part of a complex inter-relationship with the 
environment. For example, Solms and Turnbull divide consciousness into the 
content or channels of consciousness, and levels or states of consciousness , 
l'nk db' "( 124 I e to ramstem actIvIty 2002: 84-90). The content of consciousness is 
the processing of the outside world by the posterior cortical channels, whereas 
the state of consciousness is the product of the ascending activating system of 
the brainstem, which monitors the internal milieu of the body. Thus thoughts 
are in response to the content of consciousness, which is an awareness of the 
outside world, and change in the internal milieu. The goal of the following 
description of consciousness is to illustrate how it challenges the dualist 
hypothesis. Therefore, the complex theories of how the neurological processes 
unite to produce consciousness are not dealt with because of the limited space 
available. 125 
The Mind/Body Link 
Science is endeavouring to explain the mind/body relationship, but it is a 
contentious issue. 126 In contrast to the dualist claims of two types of things,127 
the mental and the physical, science is pervaded by the monist tradition, which 
claims that there can only be one kind of substance, mental or physical (Searle 
1997: 135). Solms and Turnbull argue that most neuroscientists are material 
monists, who assume that mental life is the product of neurons (p.55).128 
Certainly in terms of challenging the separation of mind and body, Damasio, in 
his book Descartes' Error specifically takes issue with the famous phrase, 'I 
think therefore 1 am' (1994: 248). It implies that thinking is the basis to being, 
which is the antithesis of Damasio' s outlook. He points out how late in the 
evolutionary scheme of things thinking and consciousness came. Being came 
before thinking. Likewise Edelman and Tononi argue that consciousness is a 
124 See also Vogeley & Fink (2003: 2), 
125 These can be found in the texts discussed, and also in works such as Bieberich (2002); John (2001); 
Hardcastle (1999); Kurthen (1999); Revonsuo (1999), 
126 Differing perspectives can be found in Varela et al (1995), 
127 Searle provides an adroit explanation of materialism, in particular functionalism, the most prevalent 
theory of mind amongst philosophers today (1997: 139-40), . 
12R Solms & Turnbull make this point using Crick as a reference (p,52), Searle however argues that Cnck 
(1994) can be read to see mind as an emergent property (ch.2), in addition quantum mechanics, t ~ e e
position of Penrose (1994) is critiqued by Searle. See also Stapp ~ ~ 1999) who deVises three levels to hiS 
challenge to the mindlbrainlbody split centred round quantum phYSICS. 
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physical process because embodiment is how we know things. They define 
their position as qualified realism and biologically based epistemology, 
founded on the idea that concepts are not initially sentential because the brain 
develops constructs prior to language, with language developing by epigenetic 
means to enhance conceptual and emotional exchanges (pp.215_19).129 
However, there are those who challenge material monism because of a concern 
about the implied lack of agency, compared with sense of agency. For 
example, Searle argues that consciousness is not reducible to anything else 
because it is an emergent property of the neurons in our brain (pp.18; 22; 160-
1; 210_14).130 However, he argues against the premiss within philosophy which 
states that by accepting the irreducibility of consciousness you have to accept 
dualism (pp.194-5).131 For Searle what makes consciousness special, and 
irreducible, is that it is a first person subjective ontology, and therefore cannot 
be reduced to a third person or objective ontology. Biological experiences of 
the brain only exist when a human agent feels them. Thus he is trying to take 
account of the sense of agency that we experience. 
However, Solms and Turnbull contest the emergent property hypothesis, 
arguing it does not explain the mind/body relationship. They propose dual-
aspect monism, which holds that the brain appears physical when it is viewed 
from the outside, as an object, and mental from the inside when viewed 
subjectively (pp.54-8). This distinction between body and mind is therefore an 
artifact of perception because the observer is the instrument that does the 
observing, through perceptual modalities. They suggest the question is: what 
brain processes correlate with subjective processes? In addition Tye (1999) 
maintains subjective phenomenal experience is not conscious until it is framed 
by phenomenal concepts, the objective labels for our experiences, which are 
only available in consciousness. 132 Thus experience is physical, but cognitive 
concepts enable us to reflect on how we are feeling, which gives the sense that 
there is a gap between mind and body. This also points to the inter-relationship 
129 Damasio also attributes our capacity for memory, the coding of knowledge in language form and 
manipulation of what we know intelIigently as the key factors in this higher order thinking (2000: 310-
II ). 
130 See also Jones (2002); Lowe (1999). 
1.11 See Lowe (1999), TattersalI (2001: 665); Alper (1998: 6). 
132 See also Solms & TumbulI: Chs. 2; 3, and Musacchio (2002). 
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of the physical and social, indicating that prevailing social concepts are 
important to the way we construct our experiences and sense of self. Thus 
neuroscientists such as Damasio (1994: xiv), Edelman and Tononi (Ch.17), and 
Greenfield (2000: 197) attempt to link the body, brain and mind without 
following the materialist or dualist hypothesis. 133 
But this linking of the mind and body results in debates about the level of 
impact the physical has on our will, particularly in relation to genetics. I34 The 
Nuffield report discusses how behavioural genetics challenge the traditional 
view of free will founded on the separation of mind and body by asserting that 
genes, which are physical, affect the motivations of the immaterial self (2002: 
121_3).135 Therefore, whilst genetic research on illness does not distort our 
view of ourselves, behavioural genetics arguably might. But little is known 
about the influence of genes on behaviour, although it is accepted that they 
contribute to behavioural traits, which include fundamental aspects of 
character. This raises issues highlighted in the philosophical context of 
attributing responsibility, because if individuals are not responsible for their 
genes are they responsible for those aspects of their character? This could have 
ramifications for the conceptualization of the moral subject. But, as the 
following section shows, our genetic makeup, in most cases, simply gives rise 
to a predisposition towards, or risk of developing, abnormal behaviour and/or 
disease, because of the inter-relationship of nature and nurture. 
J V a t u r e ~ u r t u r e e
Martin argues that the neuro-reductionist approach ignores the complexity of 
social learning, with discussions of the body assuming it is "universal, 
unhistorical, unconscious of its own production, and possessed of many of the 
characteristics of modernist scientific accounts ... ", whereas with ethnography, 
the technology of sociality, individuals are seen as subjects who participate in 
cultural and social activities (2000: 576; 584). However, neuroscientific 
analysis of the influence of genes on the structure of the brain does 
acknowledge the importance of experience and the environment (Damasio 
133 For example Greenfield: 198; Damasio: ) 2-14; Edelman & Tononi: 10-) I. 
134 This is followed up in the context of defences in chapter 3. 
135 Godfrey-Smith () 999) provides a different way of conceptualizing the debate on 'genes for ..... . 
challenging the assertion that genes code for particular things. 
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1994: 112; Greenfield: 63; Solms & Turnbull: 217; Wahlsten 1999).136 For 
example, Solms and Turnbull explain the transcription function of genes in 
terms of the inter-relationship of nature and nurture, through an examination of 
the development of sexual differences during foetal development, and the 
effect it has on the brain (p.219). Our genes cannot specify the whole structure 
of our brains because there are not enough genes available (Damasio: pp.108-
9). Therefore, whilst the brain of a foetus initially forms subject to genetic 
influences, the mother's actions and what happens among cells will also affect 
development. I37 Greenfield says that the environment can influence whether a 
gene is turned on or off (p.52). "Genes do not have function locked up inside 
them any more than do neurotransmitters or brain cells. Instead, they work 
together in complex ways, producing a bewildering variety of effects 
depending on context, with only partially predictable results" (ibid: 190). 
Moreover, the adaptability of the brain throughout life is attributable to the 
"mind-boggling increase in connections" that takes place as a result of 
experience, particularly in the cortex (ibid: 55). Greenfield maintains that 
whilst nature and nurture are mutually interactive roles there is "an increasing 
emphasis on nurture as we become more individualistic, more human" 
(p.63).138 
Damasio explains that although the innate mechanisms established by the 
genes are influential, it is also necessary that an evaluation of experiential 
factors can be undertaken in light of survival priorities. Therefore many 
connections are forged after birth in response to experience, enabling 
adjustments (1994: 111; Greenfield: 55). This stance is supported by Edelman 
and Tononi's global mapping theory, which states that the strength of synapses 
is developed through previous behaviour (p.98). Also, whilst regular use 
stimulates connections139 neglect has the opposite effect (Greenfield: 57).140 
136 Plomin (2002) looks at individual differences in relation to genomics, and Griffiths (2002a) discusses 
the arguments of Baldwin on social heredity. . ' . . 
137 Greenfield provides an outline of how the brain forms In a foetus and eVIdence for envIronmental 
influences (2000: 449; 54-5). 
DR Damasio (2000: 309-11) . . . 
139 Long-term potentiation (L TP), whereby the cell has been subject to s t l m u l a ~ l O n . . a n ~ ~ m o l ~ c u l a r r change 
and the neuron can then change and remember the change for a long period. Kindling IS a slmJlar process 
that appears to complement L TP, but seems slower to develop but then to be permanent and therefore IS 
likely to be part of the learning process. (Greenfield 2000: 5 9 ~ 6 0 ) ) .' . . 
140 Although this is not possible to test out in terms of ethIcal consIderatIOns around depnvatlOn there 
have been studies on the impact on children that have congemtal cataracts by Professor Daphne Maurer of 
McMaster University. Toronto and psychologist Terri Lewis. 
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This signifies the importance of the impact of environmental expenences, 
especially in childhood. This interaction results in a pattern of evaluating the 
environment, with the higher parts of the brain concerned with such matters as 
goodness and badness, and the more primitive areas of the brain with survival 
(Damasio 2000: 309-11). This demonstrates how important it is to view what 
and how we are as individuals in terms of biological processes that operate in a 
social context (Ridley 2003; Elman et al 1998). However, this holistic 
perspective is not how the gene debate is usually presented (Griffiths 
2002(c)(d); Frankel & Teich (eds.) 1994). This inter-related viewpoint supports 
the dialectical position that the social context is an important dimension to 
judgments of the individual, and that responsibility and blame should be 
conceived as an individual and social matter. 
Dimensions to Cognition 
Another concern with neuroscientific explanations, expressed for example by 
the eliminativists, is that objective theories of genetic and neurocognitive 
science are incompatible with our everyday subjective understanding of being 
rational beings acting for particular reasons (Nuffield Report 2002: 125).141 
Furthermore, there is concern that the reductionist debate is simply replacing 
the determinist focus on causation. However, rationalists claim that a complete 
explanation is not being provided by biochemistry, that our subjective 
understanding of the world is not inferior to an objective scientific viewpoint 
(ibid: 127_8).142 The Nuffield report suggests that there is nothing problematic 
with gaining insight from science, which can inform our subjective perspective 
on thought and action (p.126). The neuroscientific conceptualisation of the 
sense of self and agency would seem crucial to the debate on the attribution of 
responsibility. 
Sense of Self 
Consciousness studies are investigating how the brain generates a sense of self 
in the act of knowing (Damasio 2000: 9-11; 312).143 Damasio's explanation 
attributes it to the fact that consciousness has simple and complex levels 
141 See also Rose et al (1990) 
142 Rose (1999) eruditely challenges this reductionist perspective.. . . 
143 Taylor (2002) expresses concern that attention has been overlooked In the explanatIOns of ownership 
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(pp.16-7). Again, the foundations of consciousness are located in biological 
processes. He believes "the self is a repeatedly reconstructed biological 
state ... ", but that there is constancy within the homeostatic internal milieu. The 
maintenance of life is the anchor to what becomes the self in the mind (2000: 
136; 1994: 226_7).144 This viewpoint is similar to Edelman and Tononi's neural 
basis of consciousness that states the biological self is imbued with value 
(p.244).145 Likewise Vogeley and Fink's description of our first person 
perspective (IPP) is "the ability to become aware of one's own mental and 
bodily states (e.g. perceptions, attitudes, opinions, intentions to act) as one's 
own mental and bodily states", which is a matter of space, action, interaction 
and body representation (2003: 38). Different areas of the brain are identified 
as important. For example, Farrer and Frith suggest the two regions of the brain 
most "involved in the perception of complex representations of the self and of 
its interactions with the external world" are the anterior insular area, when 
there is an awareness of causing an action, and the inferior parietal cortex 
when the action is attributed to another (2002: 596). Platek et al (2004) focus 
specifically on the right frontal lobe. In addition, Cicchetti's (2002) study of 
psychopathology in maltreated children is concerned with illustrating how the 
interaction of social experience and neurobiological systems results in our 
individual social construction of experiences. 
However, awareness of the physical is viewed in terms of the concepts 
available to construct the sensation of the sense of self. As Tye asserted, 
phenomenal concepts are important to the perception and construction of our 
subjective experience. Likewise Gallagher (1999) states our sense of self is the 
culmination of physical processes, the minimal self, and labelled through 
culturally available language, the narrative self. 146 Owing to the translation of 
our subjective feelings into concepts we objectify and own the '1'.147 Crucial is 
how experience shapes this process, which affects how we present ourselves 
. 148 through narratIve. 
144 W.B. Cannon coined the term early in the twentieth century (Damasio 2?00: .138).. . . 
145 Damasio, Edelman & Tononi, Carter (2002) and Scott (1999) use dIssocIatIve IdentIty dIsorder to 
illustrate the connection between body and self. 
146 See also Gottfried & Jow (2003): Strawson (1997). 
147 Deikman (J 996) also discusses 'I' and awareness. 
14R He provides diagrams to iIlustrate his point. 
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In order to illustrate this theory of the sense of self, frequent reference is made 
to schizophrenia. For example, Vogeley et al (1999) argue that the fact that 
schizophrenia results in disturbances in the sense of self demonstrates the 
connection between the brain and our subjectivity, with specific reference to 
the pre frontal cortex (PFC).149 Gerrans (2001) develops theories to explain the 
lack of a sense of authorship in delusions, whereby actions are owned, but not 
the authorship, which is explained in terms of feelings and cognitive beliefs. 
This is supported by Atkinson's study of brain injuries, which can give rise to 
erroneous beliefs, providing evidence of the relationship between the 
physiological and the narrative (2001: 225). However, Atkinson argues there is 
interaction without reduction. He claims that deficits in phenomenal experience 
can lead to deficits in the content of our reasoning and beliefs, especially about 
the self and others. It is proposed that the crucial factor is a lack of exposure to 
language, especially about mental states. 150 However, Stanghellini expresses 
concern that by focusing on the sufferer's lack of a sense of self the importance 
of the inter-subjective to our sense of self is overlooked (2001: 201).151 
In terms of understanding the difference between good and evil, Dr. Adshead 
(2002), a forensic psychiatrist, specifically explores the matter in the context of 
dissociation, incoherence of mind and lack of empathy. In particular she 
examines the different ways the word evil has been approached because 
"[ w ]hat is most striking about the people [she] meets is not that they are amoral 
but rather that their accounts of morality are incoherent" (p.3).152 She stresses 
the importance of language to the formation of the autobiographical self, 
illustrating her point by an analysis of the impact a mental illness label has on 
agency.153 However, she also highlights how the attendant expression of 
affects, is contingent on developmental and attachment processes, which 
. . d h 154 Th' . influence the capaCIty for self-reflectIon an empat y. IS IS seen as a 
critical matter in respect of psychopaths, which is discussed in chapter three. 
149 See Damasio (2000), & Edelman & Tononi (2000). Vogeley et aI's views have been the subject of 
review by Gallese (1999); Pribram (1999); Proust ( 1999). . . 
ISO This is demonstrated through research on children who are deaf or suffer from autIsm. 
151 Sass (2001) challenges Stanghellini's arguments. 
152 See also Adshead (2003) 
153 See also Hacking's (\ 999) theory of 'bio-Iooping' to explain this p h e n o m e ~ o n . .
154 Adshead cites Schore's (2001) work on the importance of the PFC for relatIonal development. 
62 
This discussion illustrates that scientific knowledge does not deny we have a 
sense of self, and will, and it is showing that our awareness of our agency is not 
independent of the body, but grounded in it. But it is also infonned by 
discourses within society, from which we construct our personal narrative. The 
following two sections discuss the importance that is now being placed on 
emotion and the unconscious. 155 
Emotion 
Until recently emotion, affect, was seen as too vague and subjective to study, 
and rational reason was venerated and assumed to be independent of emotion. 
However, since the early 1960s emotion has been seen as a fundamental aspect 
of the development of the subjective sense of the self and subsequent relational 
patterns (Cole 2001; Abrams Faude et al 1996: 229-230).156 But the ability of 
science to study phenomenological factors such as feelings and emotions, from 
a purely theoretical, abstract, objective position was questioned because it is 
not the same as subjectively experiencing the emotion (Goldie 2002).157 
Nevertheless emotion became a focus of science, but initially it was about the 
brain and the body was ignored. However, neuroscience argues that 
consciousness is not just a cognitive process (Solms & Turnbull: 92-4). It is 
exploring how personal affect experience, and responses to emotional 
expression in others, is innate and learned, highlighting the inter-relationship of 
the physical and social. 
In biological tenns for example, Solms and Turnbull discuss two areas of the 
brainstem, which enable us to be aware of our internal and musculoskeletal 
state, in relation to the world. 158 They link their theories to Panksepp's SELF-
155 Platt (2002) explains the difficulties presented in identifying the mechanisms at play in the neural 
correlates of decisions. 
156 Tomkins (1962; 1963) following the work of Darwin established this. Kendall & Speedwell (1999) 
translate key Freudian concepts into a relational framework that reflects the modern views of the 
significance of the developmental period. 
157 For a philosophical view see Evans (2002). 
15R There are neuronal and neurochemical reactions with different emotions produced by different brain 
systems. Few brain sites are involved and most are l o c a t ~ d d below t.he cerebral cortex and ~ o w n n as 
subcortical; the brain-stem, hypothalamus and basal forebram. The penaqueductal gray (PAG) IS a major 
coordinator of emotional responses, along with the amygdala. Induction sites can be found in the cerebral 
cortex, including the anterior cingulate region and the ventromedial prefrontal region (Damasio: 60-9). 
The neuronal areas of thc brain that are involved in emotional responses send messages throughout the 
body via the chemical messengers in the bloodstream as we!l as th: e l ~ c t r o ~ h e m i c a l l signals along the 
neural pathways. This results in a global change in the organism. ThIS will gIve me to a f e e h ~ g , , t h ~ t t IS 
the imaging of all the changes and then core consciousness acts so that there IS then the knowmg of the 
emotion, a feeling of a feeling. 
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th f . I' 159 eory 0 emohona expreSSIOn (pp.l09-1I l). Alternatively Damasio links 
emotions with the homeostatic process (1994: 39_40).160 Additionally 
temperament is connected with homeostatic states, which are seen as an 
indicator of later emotional and behavioural disorders (Abrams Faude et al: 
222-5). In terms of the social dimension to emotions, Schore refers to social 
intelligence, which derives from emotional interaction in infancy resulting in 
emotional literacy, and is important for the ability to cope in later life (2001: 
47_8).161 I t I h' h negra to t IS process are t e social emotions of guilt, shame and 
pride in the formation of first person attitudes to responsibility (Eisenberg 
2000; Brock & Buchanan 1999). Hacking discusses how these are socially 
constructed and culturally located concepts (1999: 18). 
Thus developmental experiences influence the range of emotional states we 
have access to, in terms of the sense of self, and empathy for others. The latter 
is often said to be missing in psychopaths (Thompson 2001; Herpertz & Sass 
2000).162 Chapter three discusses the allegations about the inability of 
psychopaths to learn in the context of detention decisions, which could also 
indicate the importance of emotional information for assessments of risk. 
However, if the sense of self is derived from cognitive phenomenal concepts 
and affect, what of their relationship?163 Campbell explores this through the 
empiricist and rationalist theories on altered beliefs from brain injuries (2001: 
96-8). He favours the rationalist position, centred on Wittgenstein, whereby 
ideas and beliefs flatten affect. In addition he cites Gerran's analyses of 
conditions such as depression, which also flatten affect, which in tum impacts 
on the sense of self. 
Significantly though, Damasio specifically challenges the prevailing view that 
the best decisions are made in the absence of emotion. He maintains that 
decisions are very difficult, or impossible to make if this is the case (1994: 
159 Panksepp believes "that affect emerges from the way vertebrate brains are designed as a result of 
evolution - with a core neural matrix for primordial SELF - representation, which imbues the rest of 
psychological life with various forms of valenced arousal"' (2001: 160). Also see his chapter in Carter 
(2002). . 
160 Thompson (200 I) who discusses consciousness in terms of empathy and the whole body and mter-
relational aspect of affect has usefully developed this idea. 
161 Griffiths (2002b) looks at the importance of basic emotions to inter-relational social episodes. See also 
Nielsen (2002) 
162 Psychopathy is discussed in the following chapters. 
163 This is an important issue for therapeutic interventions. 
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170-3).164 Similarly Greenfield believes that emotions affect thought (p.l07). 
Damasio has developed the somatic marker hypothesis, to explain the 'gut 
reaction' feelings that we experience when we consider a bad outcome in 
decision-making. 165 His theory is based on findings from patients with damage 
to selected areas of the prefrontal region, especially the ventral and medial 
sectors, and right parietal regions, because these injuries affect the capacity to 
experience emotions, and therefore, he believes, the capacity to make rational 
choices (pp.4l_2).166 However, he acknowledges that irrational decisions can 
also emerge from emotionally loaded moments, but maintains emotion is 
integral to good decision making. 167 Similarities are evident in Edelman and 
Tononi's primary and higher order consciousness, labelled mental life I and II 
(Ch.16).168 
Again social context and experience are fundamental to the operation of the 
process. Childhood and adolescence are the most important phases for 
establishing somatic markers, although the process does not stop until we die. 
"The buildup (sic) of adaptive somatic markers requires that both brain and 
culture be normal" (Damasio 1994: 177). If either is defective then the somatic 
markers are likely to be maladaptive. Again there is a distinguishing between 
physiological and cognitive awareness. Damasio's theory claims emotional 
reactions, which are physical, are different from feelings, which is the process 
of knowing about them (pp.128-33). However, whilst knowing is a higher brain 
function, Damasio does not think that it is simply a process of the higher brain, 
concerned with reason and willpower, deliberating on the emotional reaction, 
because nature has not built the mechanisms for rationality on top of the 
regulatory mechanisms, but the former have emerged from, and are connected 
to the latter. Feeling, therefore, is becoming conscious of the emotion 
generated by the older brain core, which allows choices in terms of actions and 
reactions to the environment. 
164 Greene et al undertook an tMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgments. 
165 The neural network for somatic markers is explained on pp.180-7. 
166 See Damasio on the impact on patients with particular lesions, for example (2000: 301-2). 
167 Greenfield claims that if individuals function in a strong emotional state then there may be an absence 
of thought and logic, which could account for crimes of passion. (2000: 177-8) 
168 See Damasio's comments on similarities and differences between their theories (2000: .338 n.IO: 347, 
n.4: 348-9, n.II). 
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The basic limbic system, which supports primary emotions, is supplemented by 
the higher functioning of the prefrontal cortex and somatosensory cortices by 
means of secondary emotions. They emerge once connections have been made 
between categories of objects and situations, and primary emotions (ibid: 134-
139). Thus social experiences generate subtle variations on basic emotions, 
which, combined with cognitive content, give rise to such feelings as remorse 
and embarrassment (ibid: 149-150).169 Bar-On et al (2003) expanded 
Damasio's theory to argue for a distinguishing between emotional, social and 
cognitive intelligence. 17o Alternatively Solms and Turnbull assert that emotion 
is internally directed perception, so emotional reactions to events are 
perceptions of the state of the subject, not the external event (p.l05). However, 
they recognise the social dimension of some emotional responses by suggesting 
experiences become overlaid with 'emotion', affecting our perception of 
events, people and objects. Thus, emotion is not just an internally directed 
perceptual modality, it is also a form of motor discharge, and decision-making 
involves both emotion and cognition. 
Whilst support for these theories is escalating, concern about the veracity of the 
tests used to test the impact of emotion in the decision-making process is also 
emerging. Cubitt and Sugden (2001) argue that the tests have not generated 
enough tension to elicit strong emotional reactions in order to adequately test 
the impact of emotion in the decision-making process. They devise what they 
see as a more rigorous test. Significantly their study highlights how judgment 
influences affect responses, which ties in with previous arguments about 
cognition flattening affect. More specifically, although Damasio's somatic 
marker theory is widely cited, the various physiological bases said to underpin 
it have been disputed (O'Carroll & Papps 2003; Papps et al 2003; North & 
O'Carroll 2001). 
The discussion further illustrates how different the law and medico-
psychological understanding of decisions is. However, the law is still 
concerned with the point at which these processes can be said to impinge on 
the capacity to act in accordance with social rules. Clearly there is a belief in 
169 Franks & Smith (1999) explore the significance of the neuroscientific studies of emotion for 
sociology. 
170 Also Pankscpp (2003) 
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the capacity of cognition to affect emotional responses, but some incidents 
invoke strong emotional responses. Merzhanova investigated differences 
between the exercise of self-control and tendencies to impulsivity through 
experiments with cats (2003: 168-70). The central claim is that if the 
information part of the brain is the most active then self-control is exhibited , 
whereas if it is the motivational part then you get impulsivity. Still, this cannot 
help the courts. The issue is not just in terms of cognitive impairment at the 
verdict stage because the legal system is interested in risk and impulsive 
behaviour as a result of its overriding responsibility to support social order and 
protection of the pUblic. 
The Unconscious 
Another important factor concerns the distinction made between automatic acts 
and those undertaken using more conscious control (Eysenck & Keane 1998: 
118-9; Gross 1995: 267-9). It is widely accepted within cognitive neuroscience 
that most mental functioning operates unconsciously because of the limited 
information consciousness can hold (Solms & Turnbull: 79-83). But even 
though matters do not always enter into consciousness the "representations are 
processed sub rosa, they can influence the course of the thought process, and 
even pop into consciousness a bit later" (Damasio 1994: 106). Edelman and 
Tononi's dynamic core hypothesis distinguishes between the neural processes 
that underpin conSCIOusness and the unconscIOUS, but they claim 
"[ u ]nconscious aspects of mental activity, such as motor and cognitive 
routines, and so-called unconscious memories, intentions, and expectations 
play a fundamental role in shaping and directing our conscious experience" 
(p.176).171 In support of this proposition, reference is usually made to Libel's 
experiments on identifying when patients became conscious of stimuli to their 
thalamus. l72 Libet demonstrated that the cerebral initiation of an act starts 
unconsciously because he found the conscious intention to act appears 350 
milliseconds after the onset of the cerebral activity preceding the voluntary 
act. 173 This means there are at least 100-500 milliseconds of cerebral activity 
171 Edelman & Tononi believe that their view could provide an explanation for the process of repression 
of factors seen as threatening to the self. 
172 For example Damasio, Greenfield, and Edelman & Tononi. 
m There have been evaluations and reinterpretations of Libet's experiments, i.e. Kitazawa 2002; Pockett 
2002; Klein 2002; Trevena & Miller 2002. Libet (2003) has responded. 
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before awareness. Damasio claims that "[t]he present is never here. We are 
hopelessly late for consciousness" (p.240). 
An important facet of this discussion is the operation of memory. "What you 
remember, consciously or unconsciously, depends solely on which memory 
systems are engaged when the memories are being encoded and retrieved" 
(Solms & Turnbull: 167; 160-76). An important aspect of the operation of 
memory is the way that it is consolidated over time because what fires together 
wires together (pp.139; 146_8).174 Previous sections have shown the 
importance of experience, which affects the wiring preferences in the brain. 
Thus the wiring circuits of childhood underpin the adult ones but they are 
essentially unconscious because of the developmental limitations of the brain at 
the time that they were established. Episodic memory, where feelings are 
consciously experienced and therefore form part of higher consciousness where 
labels/concepts are applied to our experience and memory, is the only type we 
will be able to consciously remember. These constitute a semantic memory, 
framed through concepts, linked to a felt experience. 175 However, as most of 
our introspective reflections are likely to be reconstructions that did not have 
the level of rationality we impose on them, it is hard to assess the impact that 
the experience may have had on us unconsciously. In fact Ward (2003) goes so 
far as to suggest a theory to explain evil behaviour located in unconscious 
beliefs. 176 
This means that in terms of emotional influences on decision-making, we are 
unlikely to be conscious of what induced an emotion and often we are not 
(Damasio 2000:47-9; 60). Because emotions are induced unconsciously they 
appear to the conscious self as unmotivated. Damasio claims it is hard to 
suppress the expression of an emotion, although cultural influences, and 
arguably immediate environmental ones, may mean we are able to disguise 
some of the external manifestations, but we will not be able to block the 
automatic internal reactions. 
174 McGaugh & Roozendaal (2002) discuss the neurochemicals invo.lved !n e ~ t a b l i s h i n g g m e m o r i ~ s . .
175 On pp. 163-5 there is an outline of t ~ e e role of the h i ~ p o c a m p ~ s s In epIsodIC memory. They dISCUSS the 
impact of the fact that the hippocampus IS not fully functIOnal dunng the first two years of II fe. 
176 Sverdlik (2003) & Mullen (2003) challenge Ward's theory. 
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Acts of Will 
Thus. the theories on the mind expounded in this chapter reveal the significance 
of the body, and social context, rather than viewing it as some abstract process. 
However, having demonstrated the complexity of the decision-making 
process,l77 what of free will? Despite the range of factors that have been 
identified, many of which are not reflected on consciously, there is no denial of 
the capacity to make choices as the explanations on the sense of self reveal. 
Thus whilst in psychology beliefs that arise from perception, and desires, 
which are linked to basic emotions, provide necessary internal mental causes 
for our actions, intention constitutes mediation between desires and actions, 
through cognitive activity and information processing (Campbell 2000: 108-9; 
Gross: 6). The process can be more complex involving choice, deliberation and 
planning toO.178 However, intentions can be evaluated, and judged as rational 
or irrational. Rationality can be subjective, that is related to the agent's own 
goals, or objective when judged against a social standard. 
A number of people have specifically addressed the link between 
consciousness, free action and intention. For example, Searle's (2000) theory 
of volitional consciousness explains rational behaviour, and the existence of 
self, within the context of neurobiological research findings. But he challenges 
the idea of linear causality, as does Freeman (1999).179 The theories suggest 
there are two levels to the process, but we are only aware of one. For instance, 
Freeman suggests there is an intentional limb and awareness of self and 
actions. The former arises from self-organising neuronal activity, whereas 
awareness is a macroscopic and subsequent part of the process. Likewise 
Crick's two levels include one we are unaware of, involving the brain's 
ceaseless computations about future plans, and the other, which we are 
conscious of, the decision (1994: 266-8). 180 We may introspect to explain why 
we have made the decision that we have, but this tends to be a process of 
confabulating because we are not actually conscious of why we made the 
J77 Hastie (2001) undertakes a review of the matter from a number of perspectives. See also Shafir & 
LeBoeuf (2002); Stuss & Levine (2002). 
17R See for example Koriat 2000, Graham & Neisser 2000, & Rosenthal 2000 discuss the importance of 
metacognition. 
179 Kriegel (2003) and Marcoulatos (2003) takes issue with Searle's linking of consciousness and 
intentionality. 
IRO There would seem to be reflections of Crick's line of reasoning in Damasio (2000: 296-302). 
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d " 181 B .I:'. C' k . eCIsIon. ut lor TIC a vItal part of the process is that despite evidence 
regarding biological processes that take place before we are conscious of 
making a decision, we have a sUbjective sense of self that feels like there is a 
conscious inner self that is able to make free choices (pp.184_5).182 Greenfield 
concurs. Additionally Solms and Turnbull argue we have the capacity to make 
an effort of will over desires (pp.280-2). The primitive levels of consciousness 
do involve compulsive reactions, so at this level we are passive, the primitive 
self is devoid of free will. However, higher levels of consciousness, and self, 
located in the prefrontal lobe, are inhibitory mechanisms. This constitutes the 
executive system, the development of which is very experience dependent. The 
problem is that an objective analysis of the brain means that the agent is 
invisible. 
Furthermore, the individual exercises their will in a social context. Damasio 
uses the consequences of brain injuries to illustrate how the brain is involved 
with anticipating the future and planning accordingly within a complex social 
environment (1994: 10). He argues that the supra instinctual survival strategies 
transmitted by culture are the result of our higher levels of consciousness, our 
abilities for reasoned deliberation and willpower (pp.123-6).183 These 
capacities mean socially undesirable behaviour resulting from basic drives and 
instincts can be avoided. But unlike Descartes, who attributed control to non-
physical processes, Damasio sees it as based on the biological structures of the 
organism. Solms and Turnbull discuss how things come to be seen as good or 
bad as a result of the introspective and evaluative levels of consciousness, 
which attaches value (pp.91-2). Baron-Cohen et al (1999) through scanning try 
and identify the areas of the brain implicated in the operation of social 
intelligence. They conclude that the amygdala is crucial, which is central to 
emotional processing. This is important in terms of psychopaths, whose 
capacity for empathy is questionable. But as always, concepts are an essential 
dimension to consider. Thus, whilst McCrone's bifold model of the mind 
acknowledges neurology, it also recognizes the way that culture exploits 
lSI Damasio and Crick are agreed on the area of the brain that they associate with will, the anterior 
cingulate sulcus, next to Brodmann 's a ~ e a . . 24, which c o n ~ e c t s s to. the corpus stratum. It is a c k n o w l e d ~ e d d
that there will be other areas of the bram mvolved but thIS area IS clearly Important. (See Ch.8 of Cnck 
for explanations on this area of the brain.) . ' 
IS2 This is a crucial line of argument within philosophy (Trusted: 36: Mill: 167; MackIe: 219). 
IS3 This viewpoint is lucidly highlighted and developed in his chapter on emotions and feelings (1994 
127). 
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capabilities found within the brain, claiming "free will is a socially-potent word 
which we attempt to live up to" (1999: 254). Additionally Zhu (2004) argues 
that developing a unified concept of volition would help make sense of the 
empirical findings on the brain. 
But Damasio is keen to make the point that love, compassion or free will are 
not any less important or real because they are premised on biological factors 
(1994: 175). It is simply that humans have automatic survival mechanisms , 
which are added to through education and acculturation. The suprainstinctual 
survival strategies make it possible to have a moral point of view, a perspective 
that goes beyond the interests of the immediate group and even speCieS. 184 So 
notwithstanding that biology and culture often determine our reasoning, 
directly or indirectly, it is still possible to go against them both. Willpower is 
related to the ability to choose in accordance with long-term outcomes rather 
than short-term ones. 185 Although consciousness allows us to deliberate on 
good and evil, it does not constitute conscience; it is the foundation for higher 
thinking that enables us to appreciate the moral aspects of a situation (Wilton 
2000). "The consciousness of most criminals is not impaired. Their conscience 
may be" (Damasio 2000: 310).186 Damasio (2003) has extended his theory on 
how ethical norms depend on circuitry in the brain, whereby categories of 
personal and social knowledge are connected to feelings, in particular joy and 
sorrow. 187 But clearly studies are being conducted into whether or not different 
trait tendencies, such as impulsivity do affect reasoning (Schweizer 2002), 
which are discussed in chapter three. 
Thus, what becomes clear for our acts of will in this elucidation on the mind is 
the development and operation of our physical processes, and the phenomenal, 
normative and moral concepts available for the formulation of our narrative 
self. The social concepts available inform our evaluation of sense of self and 
behaviour, and those we make of others. However, the concepts are not value-
IR4 Casebeer & Churchland (2003) critically review the theory of the neural mechanisms of moral 
cognition. Uchii (2002) discusses Darwin and the evolution of morality. 
IR5 Ridley (2003) also explored the result of this inter-dependence of nature and nurture. 
IR6 Also see Spence et al (2002) on the neuroscience a n ~ ~ the will. .. . 
IR7 Gunther (2004) also looks at the importance of emotIOnal value for mtentlOnal actIOns. 
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free, as they are experientialli 88 and socially imbued. An important part of the 
social context is the normative standards of the law, and medico-psychology. 
Foucault questioned the capacity of individuals to exert their will in 
contradiction of the culture they live in. He was hostile to the view of the 
Enlightenment period that "the individual [is] .. a well-willing and intentional 
actor, .. the primary agent of social action", which is the foundation of the legal 
position (Hunt & Wickham 1994: 28). Significantly, Foucault's discourse 
theory supports the idea that the position articulated by an individual is not the 
result of genuine beliefs, it is merely an adopted position from within a 
discourse (Freundlieb 1994: 167).189 Foucault's position did alter as he 
progressed from what he termed archaeology to genealogy, such that in 
Power/Knowledge (1980) he asserted individuals are not simply the result of 
external forces but are actively engaged in the production process. Nonetheless 
Freundlieb believes that "Foucault was very reluctant to grant the subject any 
real self-determination" (p.177). 
On the other hand Campbell (1999) explores power as will power. 
Furthermore, Neff and Helwig (2002) present a more complex picture through 
their examination of how cultural practices are evaluated because of the 
multiplicity of concepts available, which is illustrated through the differing 
discourses of law and medico-psychology. This line of argument is supported 
by Midgley's (2001) view of wickedness as a multifaceted matter, and as a 
result it is possible to explain conduct using a variety of motives. Working 
them out is complex in terms of identifying natural and cultural motivations. 
She argues a "good understanding of the psychology of motives is a great 
help ... " (p.207). Likewise the philosopher Dennett (2003) has claimed that the 
natural sciences are an important ally to understanding and extending our 
freedom of will. As the Nuffield report concludes, acting of one's own free will 
is "one's action is the outcome of one's choice, and, secondly, this choice is , 
itself the outcome of one's deliberations regarding what to do" (p.l2S). The 
issue is always one of balancing the objective and the subjective. Therefore the 
IRR See Barsalou et al (2003) 
IR9 This contrasts with Habennasian interpretation of speech acts which states that these are the result of a 
genuine belief by someone taking responsibility for their claim (Freundlieb: 162; 168; 173 & Hollis 
I 994). 
72 
Nuffield report argues that it is about actions which are the result of one's own 
rational deliberations, not based on an abstract notion that someone could have 
acted differently, although the law adopts this fonn of evaluation. Individual 
rational considerations result from the combination of factors outlined in this 
chapter, not all of which are not acknowledged by the law. 
Responsibility 
In tenns of the current state of knowledge, Brock and Buchanan conclude that 
simple genetic explanations for behaviour will not emerge, but it is likely that 
infonnation about the influences on our human motivational and character 
traits will be discovered, which is supported by the infonnation provided in this 
chapter. But it is unclear what will constitute enough evidence to question the 
current perceptions of responsibility. For example, Herculano-Houzel's (2003) 
study of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which included twin studies, 
illustrates that it is too difficult to separate out the impact of nature and nurture, 
brain and society, because of problems verifying whether the brain was already 
different, or if the social trigger generated the difference. Likewise Leppert 
(1999) talks about how complex genetic factors are, and how little we still 
know about them. He argues that environmental factors are more influential 
than genes in criminal behaviour. It would seem that behavioural genetics is 
showing that there are only differences of degree between 'illness' and 
'health', illustrating the spectrum approach that pervades medico-psychological 
thinking rather than the dichotomous stance of law. This research does not 
adopt a fatalist or detenninist position that absolves individuals of 
responsibility because of their character. 
Arguably a more infonned theory of responsibility would avoid the impact that 
pre-existing bias against particular groups currently has on the attribution of 
responsibility. In fact, the importance of neuroscientific theories for 
sociological analysis of the issues has been presented by Franks and Smith 
(eds.: 1999), and Dennett (2003) has discussed this in respect of philosophical 
inquiries. But Barratt and Felthous (2003) talk about the need for a review of 
the knowledge that is being produced by different disciplines on intention and 
motivation, suggesting a discipline neutral model that integrates the data 
designated as cognitive neuroscience. However, as indicated previously, there 
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is concern about the effect the biological reconstruction of the mind might have 
on the social construction of responsibility. 190 It would appear there are two 
dimensions to consider, the impact on individual perceptions of responsibility 
and the social responses from such institutions as law. 
The social construction of the individual is important, as it has repercussions 
for our understanding and perception of our self (Rose 1998). Currently the 
term individual does not incorporate a view beyond the simple make-up of the 
individual organism (Wilson 1999), which is challenged by Jenkins (2001). 
Brock and Buchanan speculate on the effect genetic information has on our 
beliefs about our freedom to act, as 'responsibility attitudes' are the result of 
beliefs and feelings, which in tum affect our actions (1999: 70-1). Whereas 
Schopp considers how genetic information concerning predispositions could 
make us more responsible through imposing a liability to attempt to minimize 
factors that will exacerbate possible negative traits (1999: 88; Novas & Rose 
2000). Parker (1999) also raises the issue of how much responsibility we can 
expect individuals to take for addressing the difficulties raised by their 
predispositions and how much responsibility society should take to help its 
disadvantaged members. This issue of balancing blame and responsibility was 
raised as part of the dialectical debate in chapter one because the individual 
should not be seen in isolation from their social context. Thus legal norms, the 
operation of the law, and the presentation of the findings of science contribute 
to our sense of self, and the responsibility we sense that we have, and take, for 
our actions (Hacking 1999; 14-15). The Nuffield report says that by explaining 
the materials and structures of human life science informs our understanding, 
which will permeate cultural phenomena (p.129). The neuroscientific 
explanations of the sense of self and agency are about the interaction between 
accepted social norms, experiences and genetic predisposition, supporting a 
dialectical approach. 
Parker (1999) stressed how important the social construction of free will is, 
and, therefore, the social response to genetic information. Parker poses the 
question as to whether genetic predispositions are substantially different to 
those that arise from environmental factors, which the legal system already 
190 Chapter 3 contains a discussion on the possible impact of biological explanations on the legal system. 
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assesses III cases such as those involving battered women. Parker argues it 
needs to do the same with genetic factors. Only mental health conditions that 
are judged by law to undermine the capacity for intent enable the defendant to 
cross the line from one of responsibility to lack of culpability, which ignores 
the multi-faceted and spectrum approach of medico-psychological views of the 
mind (Denno 2003). Yet the law uses medico-psychological information and 
expert evidence. Medico-psychological professions translate the neuroscientific 
information into diagnostic categories to be applied to individuals in a 
therapeutic setting. Crucially the legal setting uses medico-psychological terms 
but they are given legal meanings, and it is the medico-psychological experts' 
transposition of their clinical view onto legal categories that is so fundamental 
to the process of law. The medico-psychological information encapsulated by 
the diagnostic category is not sought by the legal system; it is the effect it has 
on the defendant's capacity to form intent that is the issue. 
Therefore it is the social practices and the norms underpinning them which are 
important, because these practices are the manner through which the 
metaphysical issues are addressed. "Were it not for those social practices it is 
inconceivable that the metaphysical questions would arise" (Parker: 80). The 
law has an important social role in this process through the normative values 
that are upheld, and the nature of the process through which assessments of 
responsibility are conducted. Significantly where there are questions regarding 
the defendant's mental state medico-psychological experts are used to support 
the legal role. The manner in which this is done is the focus of this thesis 
through the evaluation of the interaction between the two disciplines. Although 
Smilansky claims "that it is the reality of compatibilist distinctions in control 
that influence our knowledge when a reaction is appropriate (2003: 278), it 
would appear from the research conducted as part of this project that legal 
practice constructs particular distinctions as to what will be considered an 
appropriate reaction. 
There are individuals who even with psychiatric help cannot alter some of their 
personality traits. The diagnosis of these individuals is important with regard to 
treatment and punishment (Murphy & Lappe 1994: 124). This range of 
research founds the second dimension to medico-psychological involvement in 
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the legal process. Discovering connections between genes and behaviour could 
provide opportunities for intervention to overcome the undesirable behavioural 
traits. In light of concerns about social control and public protection finding the 
neural correlates could offer the possibility of developing new interventions. 
The discussion on the detention interventions in the name of social order in 
chapter one demonstrates the necessity to appreciate the significance of the 
social framing of issues and the importance of the strategic use of scientific 
information. Chapter three reviews the different issues of medico-
psychological involvement in the construction and interventions associated 
with what are held to be undesirable traits, and supplying evidence on a 
defendant's capacity to form the necessary legal intention. 
Medico-Psychological Experts 
The perspective on the mind depicted in this chapter is represented through 
theories and diagnostic categories within the mental health professions of 
psychology and psychiatry. Psychiatry is the study and treatment of mental 
disease,191 whereas psychology is the science of the nature, functions and 
phenomena of the human mind. Significantly neuroscientific research is being 
synthesized into the two disciplines. l92 Notwithstanding the differences 
between the professions, they each refer to generic clinical diagnostic 
categories for defining and distinguishing mental health problems and 
treatment initiatives. Differentiating between the natures of mental health 
problems can be important for the defences because insanity is concerned with 
diseases of the mind, and diminished responsibility with abnormalities of the 
mind. How the judiciary have interpreted these terms and the range of expert 
evidence that has been held pertinent to them will be discussed in chapter three. 
The essential aspects of the medico-psychological clinical position are as 
follows. 
The UK favours the World Health Organisation diagnostic manual, 
International Classification of Diseases (lCD) 10 (1992, 1993, 1994), rather 
than the American Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) IV - TR (2000). 
191 There is a useful breakdown of concepts and vocabulary in relation to psychiatric illnesses in the 
Nuffield Report (2002: 96-7). . 
192 How much it is entering into the diagnostic and treatment process IS unclear to date but the work of 
Rose (2004) indicates changes in treatment with n e u r o p s y c h ~ p h a r m a c o l o g y . . Also discussions on the 
content of DSM V recognize the need to incorporate neurosclentlfic research findmgs. 
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However, there is increasing collaboration in the development of the two 
diagnostic manuals to try and build a more standardised set of diagnostic terms 
and definitions. 193 An important distinction between the categories is that made 
between what are referred to as mental (organic) and personality (functional) 
disorders. Mental disorder is described as a partial or complete breakdown of 
control that a person normally has over his or her behaviour, emotions and 
thinking. The significant factor is the reduced capacity through impaired 
judgment or reduced impulse control (Gross: 141). These are normally organic 
disorders, referred to as mental illnesses. Functional disorders, formerly 
referred to as neuroses, encompass anxiety and personality disorders, which are 
concerned with phenomenological evidence about the way that the person 
functions, which is disadvantageous/abnormal. Personality disorders are 
concerned with personality traits, which influence patterns of behaviour and 
inform our interpretation and prediction of other people's behaviour, when the 
traits interfere with the ability to function optimally in society. Gross concedes 
that knowledge about the aetiology of diagnostic categories is constantly 
developing and current neuroscientific evidence would seem to be providing 
fundamental challenges to the divided viewpoint just explained. 194 For 
example, Damasio argues that the Cartesian split has had a big impact on 
western medicine, resulting in a lack of appreciation of the impact that physical 
diseases have on us psychologically, and vice versa. However, this chapter also 
demonstrates the current possibilities for the objective scientific classification 
of the body through scanning technologies,195 and current research is beginning 
to inform debates on mental health (Cooper 2001). 
However, the social construction of illness should not be overlooked, as the 
cultural variations in the perception of behaviours illustrates (Lopez & 
Guarnaccia 2000; Widiger & Sankis 2000). Barnard (2000) argues that 
psychology has been slow to appreciate the way that bodies are social, cultural 
and political objects. It can be seen with the changes to the remit of Anti-Social 
Personality Disorder (ASPD) and Hacking explores it with reference to 
intermittent explosive disorder (1999: 100). Language is not neutraL and 
193 See the introduction of DSM IV - TR. Kupfer et al (2002) detail the current focus for the DSM 
revisions. which places a heavy emphasis on incorporating n e u r o s c i ~ n t i f i c c research findings. . 
194 However Gross challenges the idea of simply adopting the medIcal viewpoint. argumg that the SOCIal 
dimension of the issue ofnom1ality and abnormality needs to be appreciated (1995: eh.7). 
195 See Rabinow (ed.) (1991) on Foucault's views on technologies of the body. 
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furthermore labels have repercussions in the reactions that they invoke in the 
individual and institutionally, affecting the sense of self of the individual (bio-
looping), and the disciplinary measures meted out by professional bodies (ibid: 
104-113; Heinimaa 2000). It would appear that some disorders are more 
comments on character and moral matters than they are on physical disorders 
of the mind (Zachar 2000; Mathews 1999; Spitz 1999). 
In addition, the application of diagnoses in the therapeutic setting reflects the 
individualistic perspective of the law. Kaplan (2000) discusses how the 
medical model individualises and precludes consideration of social factors. 
which is a claim the dialectical position makes against law. Thus whilst chapter 
one explored the normative base used by law to distinguish between those who 
are mad or bad, this chapter includes descriptions about the optimal functioning 
of the mind, discussed by reference to those whose mind is dysfunctional. But, 
as will be seen in the following chapters, the clinical role and application of 
diagnostic categories differs in the legal context. There, diagnostic categories 
are reviewed in terms of legal questions rather than diagnostic and treatment 
concerns. For example, personality disorders constitute a contested matter 
within the legal system because of the legal objective of limiting exceptions to 
escaping criminal responsibility, and the manner it has established to achieve 
this objective. There is also the use of diagnostic opinions on the risk and 
danger an individual represents at the sentencing stage. The analysis of the 
form of the interaction of law and medico-psychology is undertaken in the 
remainder of this thesis. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the medico-psychological understanding of the mind 
and perceived foundations and influences on the formation of intention. In 
contrast to the law's assumption that cognition operates in an abstract manner, 
medico-psychologists believe we cannot react to the world without treating it 
as a "meaningful system of situations, contexts and relations; this 
meaningfulness depends not only on the world's physical properties, but also 
on our own biological, psychological, social and cultural properties" (Gross: 
302). Intentions are based on internal mental states, such as beliefs, desires, 
perceptions, wishes, fears, and ideas, and objects and states in the world, not all 
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of which we are necessarily aware of (Gross: 267-9). However, there is no 
denial of agency or free will. Thus consciousness provides the pennit into 
civilization, but it is not considered to be civilization itself (Damasio: 311). 
Damasio, for example, considers "[e]thics and the law, science and technology, 
the work of the muses and the milk of human kindness, those are my chosen 
summits for biology" (p.28). 
Notwithstanding the differences in theory and the understanding of the mind 
between the two disciplines, expert evidence is used to support the current 
legal position. Significantly, the existing state of science, particularly with the 
emphasis on the inter-relationship of a multitude of biological processes, which 
in tum are affected by the social context, does not provide sufficiently concrete 
evidence to satisfy the dichotomous legal need for a definitive cut off point. 
Scans have enabled insights into the workings of the brain and added 
considerably to our understanding, but as Polger and Flanagan (1999) state, 
whilst neuroscience is very important, so are phenomenology, psychology and 
cognitive science. The following chapters examine the interaction of law and 
medico-psychology, exploring how the legal system negotiates and uses 
medico-psychological evidence, even though the latter seems to buttress the 
dialectical view of responsibility and individualism, which chapter one shows 
is a broader conception of responsibility than is currently adopted within the 
law. It is important to take into account how social and medical concepts are 
interpreted, and the significance of values for the framing of concepts. 
79 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND SCIENCE: COMMON 
LAW RULINGS 
Introduction 
Chapters one and two analysed the philosophical foundations to the 
understanding of the mind within law and medico-psychology, the legal 
position on criminal responsibility, the delineation of the common law mens 
rea principle, and the exceptions pennitted based on the state of the 
defendant's mind. The theoretical discussions established that there is a distinct 
difference to the perspectives on the mind and the nonnative issues being 
addressed by the legal and medico-psychological professions. This chapter, 
along with chapter four, contains the next level of analysis, an examination of 
the judicial interpretations 196 of the legal concepts and rules in the insanity and 
diminished responsibility defences,197 and procedural controls on the admission 
of evidence, enabling a review of the reasoning and process whereby 
individuals become categorised and problematised, be it in medical or legal 
tenns. 198 Fundamental to the operation of this area of law is the use of expert 
evidence. 
Reported case law embodies the courts' detenninations on the exceptions to 
attributing responsibility and show how the different conceptual positions 
represented by the legal and medico-psychological professions are dealt with. 
Reported case law details the rules developed by the judiciary prevailing in that 
particular area of law. The judicial role is unique in that they have a 
professional role within the trial process alongside the other legal participants, 
as illustrated in chapter six, and they also interpret the remit of legislation and 
establish common law rules, the role dealt with in this chapter and chapter four. 
With regard to the higher courts, such as the House of Lords and the Court of 
Appeal, judges make authoritative precedents that need to be followed by the 
lower courts, such as in the provocation case of Smith (2001). This can lead to 
196 Lyons (1999) reviews central theories on the issue of interpreting the law. .. . 
197 Attention is paid in particular to diminished responsibility as insanity is symbohca1\y Important but IS 
primarily used in pleas of Unfitness to Plead. 
198 Rose discusses what he ca1\s the technologies of medical truth (1994: 57-63). Flew (1973) looks at the 
way that physical and mental diseases have become equated, and interventions are justified on the basis of 
the disease label. 
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unintended consequences In respect of legislation, as discussed In chapter 
one.
199 
Initially the chapter examines the legal interpretations of the mental health 
terms contained in the insanity and diminished responsibility defences. Then, 
in order to illustrate the fact that the moral position is also overlaid with other 
legal objectives which can give rise to legal conundrums, psychopathy, 
intoxication and the trend to biological explanations will be examined in detail. 
These discussions demonstrate that the law obscures contradictions and 
pragmatic responses to achieving moral outcomes, as the dialectical paradigm 
outlined in chapter one asserts. Extension of the debate beyond judicial 
interpretation of the defences to significant aspects of legal process that define 
and constrain the experts' role and the admission of expert evidence, in 
addition to those imposed by the legal interpretation of medico-psychological 
terms in the defences occurs in chapter four. 
Judicial Interpretation of the Insanity Defence 
Introduction 
As chapter one showed, the M'Naghten (1843) rule states that: 
To establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of 
the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from 
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did 
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong (p.21 0: emphasis added). 
The judiciary, to establish the remit of the phrases, has deliberated each aspect 
of the rule. It was held in Codere (1916) that 'knowing' the nature and quality 
applies to the physical not legal or moral nature and quality of the act, which is 
a narrow interpretation (pp.26_27).200 In Windle [1952] the word wrong was 
interpreted as meaning a legal rather than moral wrong, ensuring an objective 
focus. Lord Goddard CJ claimed it would be unfortunate to leave a jury to 
decide if an act was morally wrong (p.833). This strand of the defence is the 
most frequently used, but it is not concerned with mens rea, as it is not about 
intention but comprehension (Mackay 2000: 67). For example, the reasoning in 
199 See also the most recent Law Commission (2004) debates on provocation. 
200 Simester & Sullivan note problems that have arisen in the U.S. from taking a broader approach (2003: 
578-9), whereas Mason et al discuss the benefits of the broader Canadian interpretation (1999:30-\). 
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Antoine [2000]201 and Moore (2001)202 claims that someone can have the intent 
to kill, whilst not appreciating the act is wrong because of the delusion induced 
by the disease of the mind. In contrast, cases on the nature and quality of the 
act are about mens rea because if the defendant does not understand what the 
act means they cannot intend to kill. 
The law adopts a cognitive focus to the terms' defect of reason from disease of 
the mind' (Eastman 1998: 117-118). There is no volitional element in this 
defence, it being simply concerned with impairment of reasoning. In Clarke 
[1972], defect of reason was held to be a cessation of the capacity for 
deliberation, for however brief a period. With regard to disease of the mind, 
Rabey (1980) confirmed Devlin J's opinion in Kemp [1957] that what 
abnormal mental state qualifies is a legal matter, and is not determined by the 
opinions of medical witnesses (PA26).203 Yet s 1 of the Criminal Procedure 
(Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 requires evidence from two or more 
medical practitioners before the special verdict can be returned, although this 
by necessity has to be based on legal criteria. Furthermore, Devlin J in Kemp 
opined that the law is not concerned with the brain but the mind, namely the 
faculties of reason, memory and understanding, because the phrase is disease 
of the mind not disease of the brain (PpA07-408). In Sullivan [1984] Lord 
Diplock upheld this view of the mind (pp.667-668). This plainly contradicts the 
position underpinning the experts' perspective that was outlined in chapter two. 
As just stated it has been held that what mental state qualifies is a legal matter. 
The judiciary's interpretation of the word disease is, according to Lord Devlin 
in Kemp for example, that it does not matter if the aetiology of the impairment 
is organic, as with epilepsy, or functional; it is a matter of whether the faculties 
are impaired so that either of the consequences in the latter part of the 
M'Naghten rules arises (PA07). He maintained that the distinction between 
organic and functional is irrelevant because the law is not concerned with the 
origin or cause of the mental condition, but the mental condition itself. 
Furthermore, in Cooper (1980) it was held "that in a legal sense 'disease of the 
mind' embraces any illness, disorder or abnormal condition which impairs the 
201 p.I08 
202 p.5 . " 
203 Slovenko (1999) discllsses similar arguments by the U.S. JudICIary. 
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human mind and its functioning, excluding however, self-induced states caused 
by alcohol or drugs, as well as transitory mental states such as hysteria or 
concussion" (p.61; emphasis added). In addition, it was held in Rabey to be any 
malfunctioning of the mind, or mental disorder, where the primary source is a 
subjective condition or weakness that is internal to the accused. Again, it was 
said that this does not need to be fully understood, the crucial thing is it stopped 
the accused from knowing what they were doing (pp.519-520). Similarly, in 
Sullivan it was said that the legal concept disease of the mind is wide-ranging, 
encompassing all forms of mental impairment that can give rise to a defect of 
reason. If the effect of the disease is substantial enough to have the effect laid 
out in the latter part of the rules then it does not matter if the cause is organic 
or functional, but it has to persist at the time of the act even if the impairment is 
of a transient or intermittent nature. 
However, despite these expansive remarks the fact that disease of the mind is a 
legal matter was reiterated in Burgess [1991] when reference was made to the 
case of HM. Advocate v Cunningham (1963), where the court had held that the 
judge has to rule whether the medical evidence shows disease of the mind or 
not (p.95). In addition, the reasoning in Kemp was upheld despite scientific 
progress in the intervening years. In fact it was conceded by Lord Lane CJ in 
Burgess that "[ w ]hat the law regards as insanity for the purpose of these 
enactments may be far removed from what would be regarded as insanity by a 
psychiatrist" (p.97). So the judge is significant in two ways. First in terms of 
his capacity to control the evidence allowed into court, as it is not necessary 
simply to accept diagnostic categories the expert thinks applicable. Secondly 
through ruling whether the evidence establishes disease of the mind, which will 
form part of the judge's directions to the jury. The focus in this respect is the 
effect on the mind, with no consideration of the details of the diagnosis. 
In terms of judicial judgments on what qualifies, although previous statements 
imply a broad point of view, the defence is seen as important for protecting 
society from recurring dangerous conduct so indications of violence are seen as 
significant. Lord Denning in Bratty [1963] held that whilst major mental 
diseases such as psychoses and schizophrenia clearly are diseases of the mind, 
"any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to 
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recur is a disease of the mind" (p.412). 204. In Burgess it was held that whilst 
danger of recurrence may be an added factor, the absence of the possibility is 
not a reason for saying it cannot be a disease of the mind (p.99). 
As a result of the limited interpretation of each aspect of the rule, and concerns 
with dangerousness, the situation has arisen whereby conditions such as 
arteriosclerosis meet the criteria for the insanity defence (Kemp). Likewise the 
development of arguments distinguishing between whether the cause of the 
condition was internal Hennessy [1989] or external Quick [1973] to the 
defendant has complicated matters further (Rabey; Roach [2001]), with 
significant ramifications for sane and insane automatism (Simester & Sullivan 
2003: 577_8).205 Primarily, the defence is now raised in relation to pleas of 
Unfitness to Plead.206 Table 1 provides examples of the diagnostic conditions 
that have been accepted by the courts. 
Table 1: Case examples of Qualifying Medico-Psychological Conditions207 
Case Name Year Defence Condition 
Kemp 1957 Insanity Arteriosclerosis 
Bratty 1963 Insanity Psychomotor 
Epilepsy 
Sullivan 1984 Insanity Psychomotor 
Epilepsy 
Burgess 1991 Insanity Sleep-walking 
Attorney General's 1998 Insanity Schizo-affecti ve 
Reference 1998 Psychosis 
Moore 2001 Insanity Psychotic Affective 
And Disorder + paranoid 
Diminished Psychosis 
Responsibility 
Discussion 
The rules have been subject to much criticism. For example, the limited 
cognitive focus means the rules have a very narrow remit (Mackay 1995:96-7; 
Simester & Sullivan: 571). The fact the law takes no notice of medico-
204 The case also discussed the fact it was not just the defence that can raise insanity as the prosecution 
have a duty to ensure dangerous individuals are not at large. . ' 
205 S McSherry (2003) for suggestions for a general defence of mental dIsorder to aVOId these a n o m : ~ o u s s consequences of the current legal approach. See also Arboleda-Florez (2002) 
206 Simester & Sullivan: 572-4. 
207 Siovenko (1999) discusses the U.S. position 
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psychological definitions of terms supports the continued existence of such an 
outdated defence, along with the limited questions the law asks. The outdated 
division between mind and brain, outlined in chapter one, results in a limited 
focus on the impairment of reasoning faculties, which is reflected in the 
judicial reasoning. It contrasts starkly with current medico-psychological 
knowledge dealt with in chapter twO.208 Critically, a true understanding of the 
mind and diagnostic conditions is not considered necessary (Rabey), it is held 
to be a legal matter, with the focus simply on the effect of the condition (Kemp: 
Sullivan). Thus this initial analysis of the intersection of law and medico-
psychology in practice through the interpretative role of the judiciary indicates 
a symbolic use of expert evidence, an issue followed up throughout this thesis. 
It appears that the aim of judicial interpretation of phrases such as disease of 
the mind is to ensure that they serve a limited legal purpose, principally to deal 
with those deemed dangerous, while still permitting a moral exception to the 
usual standard of criminal responsibility. The operation of the defence shows 
that it is not simply supporting a moral position that the insane are not morally 
blameworthy because of the incongruities that have arisen through the 
restrictions placed on the terms within the rule. Is the causal connection of the 
mental state with the act necessary if the defendant would not have done the act 
without the mental disorder, which comes back to the issue of whether the 
defence should be one of status or excuse? It is possible to detain such 
individuals without the possibility of deterrence so the question should insanity 
be a status defence has to be asked (Mason et al 1999: 528- 34). Mackay and 
Kearn's (1999) research on insanity reports indicates a liberal approach has 
emerged through the generous psychiatric interpretation of the 'wrongness' 
limb, which has been accepted by the judiciary. The strategic use of experts 
and their evidence is discussed further in chapter four, along with issues about 
the ethics for the profession. 
Judicial Interpretation of the Diminished Responsibility 
Defence 
Introduction 
20R See Denno (2003) on insanity in the U.S. and consciousness. 
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The operation of this defence is particularly important because it is the most 
frequently used. The definition of diminished responsibility in the Homicide 
Act 1957 s2(l) is: 
Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder 
if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of 
arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or 
injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility in doing or being a party to the 
killing (emphasis added). 
Unlike insanity, with diminished responsibility there are two cognitive strands 
to this defence because in addition to concerns with the capacity to 
comprehend the nature of the act and whether it is legally wrong there is a 
volitional dimension concerned with the ability to exercise will power. The 
latter has permitted the introduction of irresistible impulse into English law 
(Mackay 1999: 118). Assessing impulsivity presents problems for experts 
because the assessment of the defendant's thought processes is a retrospective 
evaluation, and 
"it truly is difficult to determine whether a defendant was unable to resist an impulse to commit 
a criminal act or simply failed to resist it. Such difficulty exists regardless of whether the basis 
for the incapacity is neurochemical, genetic, neurologic, psychiatric, or psychodynamic" 
(Wettstein 1999: 112).209 
The court acknowledged this in Byrne when it was held that there is no 
scientific proof on such matters and therefore the jury should approach it in a 
common sense way (ppA03-404). 
Each aspect of the section has been debated vociferously. In Byrne [1960] Lord 
Parker CJ held that abnormality of the mind: 
means a state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man 
would term it abnormal. It appears to us to be wide enough to cover the mind's activities in all 
its aspects, not only the perception of physical acts and matters and the ability to form a 
rational judgment whether an act is right or wrong, but also the ability to exercise will-power to 
control physical acts in accordance with that rational judgment (pA03: emphasis added). 
In addition, the term abnormality of mind is qualified by reference to one of 
four specified aetiological categories within the statute. In Byrne it was held 
that these are not based on psychiatric meanings but they have to be 
determined by experts (PA03). The first aetiology is arrested and retarded 
209 As an example he looks at the difficulty in trying to determine a link between mental illness and 
violence, referring to the DSM IV diagnosis of intermittent explosive disorder, which is very 
controversial. 
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development of the mind, which was included to encompass those not covered 
by the insanity defence because it was considered inappropriate to hold them 
morally responsible (Law Commission (LC) 2003: 142-144). Judicial 
interpretation of the categories of disease or injury was stated, in Sanderson 
(1994), to refer to organic or physical injury, or disease of the body, including, 
in this context, the brain (p.336). Conditions such as epilepsy, pre-menstrual 
syndrome and PTSD are included, which from a medico-psychological 
perspective are very different types of conditions. For example, PTSD comes 
within the remit of functional disorders in diagnostic manuals. However, whilst 
in Sullivan it was held the word disease for the purposes of insanity includes 
functional disorders, it was argued in Sanderson that functional disorders are 
covered by the other category, inherent cause even though PTSD is a 
functional disorder. 2 10 This shows how the judicial lack of understanding leads 
to technical mistakes. Mackay criticizes this interpretation of disease because it 
results in s2 having a narrower remit than the M'Naghten rules, and it implies 
that psychological injury is not an injury (2000: 61; 1999: 122-123).211 He 
argues that this has arisen because of the vagueness of the aetiological 
categories contained in S2.212 The LC claims that the position is unclear and 
"prefer the view that it does ... " include functional disorders (2003: 146). Table 
2 provides examples of the diagnostic categories that have been accepted by 
the courts. 
Table 2: Case Examples of Qualifying Medico-Psychological Conditions 
Case Name Year Defence Condition 
Dietschuman 2001 Diminished Responsibility Adjustment 
n Disorder 
Alcohol 
Dependency 
Galbraith 2001 Diminished Responsibility Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder 
Fathi 2001 Diminished Responsibility Depression 
with 
Psychotic Features 
Martin 2001 Diminished Responsibility Paranoid 
Personality 
210 It was argued in Sanderson that this was the intention o f p a r l i a ~ e n t t ~ p . 3 3 6 ) . .
ell Thomas-Peter & Warren consider the matter of personality dIsorders in terms of diminished 
responsibility (pp.86-9). 
212 Also see the LC report (2003:140-6). 
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Disorder 
Moore 2001 
with Depression 
Insanity and Diminished Psychotic Affective 
Responsibility Disorder + 
Muscroft 2001 
Paranoid Psychosis 
Diminished Responsibility Anti -social 
Psychopathic 
Disorder 
Antoine 2000 Diminished Responsibility Paranoid 
Sanderson 1994 
Schizophrenia 
Diminished Responsibility Paranoid Psychosis 
Discussion 
It would appear that as with the insanity defence adopting the true meaning of 
the medico-psychological terms is unnecessary, indicating that again they serve 
the policy objectives of the legal system. The LC acknowledges that the fact 
that the term abnormality of the mind is based on a legal, as opposed to a 
medical, concept presents problems for experts and juries (2003: 135). 
Notwithstanding these issues the defence has actually been interpreted 
generously with less serious mental conditions included within its scope 
(Mackay 1999: 118-9; Eastman 1998: 118-121). Thus, despite the debates 
highlighted in chapter one mental conditions centred on emotional states, such 
as depression, anger and jealousy have been included, if they are not the result 
of some external cause. Yet these emotional states are frequently concerned 
with secondary social emotions, such as shame, which develop in response to 
particular social conditions, and become classified as conditions such as 
battered woman syndrome (BWS). Similar developments may occur in relation 
to the recently developed American psychiatric 'culture bound syndromes' 
(Parzen 2003). This category, which is only an appendix within the diagnostic 
manuals at present, covers clinical conditions concerned with psycho-social 
stressors. Parzen examines the legal possibilities this classification of 
conditions might provide for lawyers working in immigration and with 
minority groups. In contrast Reddy (2002) expresses concern that it also 
constitutes a pathologising of other cultures. 
With regard to BWS Thomas-Peter and Warren argue that no other 
psychological theory has its foundations in the actions and intentions of a third 
party (1998: 88-9). They concur with Bowker's viewpoint that the problems of 
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the battered woman are social not psychological, but forensic psychologists 
help the court understand the psychological consequences of the circumstances 
that prevailed prior to the offence.213 Faigman refers to this as "politics 
masquerading as science" (1999: 71).214 BWS emerged from the legal setting 
and it was not recognised as a diagnostic category until 1994, and formed the 
basis to the Hobson [1998] appeal. The condition can found both a diminished 
responsibility and provocation defence. Thus in practice the law is operating in 
certain circumstances to ensure that the consequences of social factors are a 
mitigating factor even though this contradicts legal theory, by presenting BWS, 
a legal rather than psychological concept, as psychological in order to support 
the legitimacy of the law. 
In addition to the law's derogation from the strict legal position, there are 
clearly experts providing the necessary evidence to support this practice. 
Mitchell's interviews with nineteen forensic psychiatrists found that they 
considered BWS a convenient label to define a group of cases whose facts 
tended to vary considerably (1997: 628). It was not considered to be a 
psychiatric category so the facts of each case needed to be examined carefully, 
in particular the relationship of the defendant and victim. Mitchell's 
respondents claimed there had to be some form of abnormality, such as 
reactive depression, but they considered the proportionality of the killer's 
response to the abuse was a significant factor. Mitchell makes the point that 
proportionality is an aspect of provocation and self-defence, not s 2. The 
respondents maintained that many of these cases deserved sympathy but they 
cut across legal boundaries and some felt that it would better if the defences of 
provocation and self-defence were revised. In addition there was concern about 
the political use of s 2 to cover such cases, with the inherent loosening of the 
remit of 'abnormality of the mind' enabling undeserving cases to qualify. 
There was considerable variation in the responses to mercy killings coming 
within the remit of the diminished responsibility defence (p.629). Some 
considered that there ought to be sympathy towards this group of killers 
whereas others were more critical, depending on their attitude towards using 
213 L.H. Bowker, (1993) 'A Battered Woman's Problems are Social, Not Psychological', in Gelles, RJ. & 
Loseke D. R. (eds.) Current Controversies in F a m i ~ v v Violence. California: Sage. 
214 F a i ~ m a n n also discusses the negative implications to using science as a solution to political and policy 
issues (1999: 72-6), 
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the law and psychiatrists to exculpate such individuals because it was thought 
to be morally right to do so. Ultimately it was suggested that there ought to be 
more reliance on a psychiatric investigation to establish genuine abnormalities 
rather than taking into account wider considerations and the gravity of the 
homicide. What can be seen is the moral evaluation that inheres in the expert's 
role of assessing the defendant's state of mind in relation to legal criteria. 
It is clear that the issue is that of allowing moral exceptions through a legal set 
of rules which have to be seen to uphold particular principles. In fact in 
Lindsay (1997) the Scottish court held that it is more accurate to regard 
diminished responsibility as a mitigating factor than as a defence. Thus the 
defence is more concerned with the morality of the case than psychiatric 
concepts (Mackay 2000: 60). It seems that this is possible because the law 
focuses not on the causal foundations of the condition, but on the link that can 
be made between the effect of the condition and the requirements in the 
defence. A crucial aspect of this defence is the judgment about whether or not 
the condition substantially impairs the defendant's mental responsibility. The 
Butler report stated that it is a matter of degree but "the effect of the present 
law is to put strong pressure on the psychiatrist to conform his medical opinion 
I 
to the exigency of avoiding a very severe sentence, fixed by law, for a person 
for whom everyone has the greatest sympathy" (1975: para.19.7). Thus the 
process by which the law can operate in such a liberal manner needs to be 
analysed. 
Substantial Impairment: Judges, Juries and Experts 
Introduction 
In Byrne it was held that the jury are responsible for deciding if the accused has 
established the defence. Therefore how does the law achieve the liberal results 
that it does? Critical to the operation of the law is the nature of expert evidence, 
which is significant both for pre-trial decisions and the potential impact of that 
expert evidence on the jury in court. Expert evidence consists of testimony on 
the abnormality of the mind, and the ultimate issue of whether or not, in their 
opinion, the condition substantially impairs the defendant's mental 
responsibility. As noted III chapter one, Lord Goff states that the most 
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important influence on the court in fonnulating legal principles is the desired 
result in the case, therefore consideration has to be given to the judicial 
innovations regarding expert evidence in tenns of general rules and the 
application in individual cases. 
The two aspects to the expert's testimony need to be examined. The first 
concerns abnonnality of the mind. Legal flexibility is provided by the fact the 
court focuses on the link that can be drawn between the condition which , 
includes non-psychiatric based aetiologies, and the legal rule that fonns the 
basis of the second aspect of expert evidence. The judiciary has the capacity to 
include or exclude evidence, and the operation of their discretion is discussed 
in further detail in chapter four. It is clear from preceding discussions that it is 
not necessary that the law understand the meaning of the diagnostic categories 
or accept what the expert considers qualifies, as it is a legal matter. Thus the 
judicial role is an important one in tenns of interpretations of the defence and 
with regard to the evidence entering into court before the jury. The second 
dimension to the expert's evidence refers to the matter of whether the 
abnonnality of mind substantially impairs the defendant's 'mental 
responsibility', another legal concept, in the opinion of the expert. In Lloyd 
[1967] it was held that the impainnent has to be more than trivial or minimal 
(p.175). It is an important development within procedural practice that the 
expert is required to give their opinion on the ultimate issue. 
Again the matter of the medico-psychological co-operation required within this 
legal process is a significant issue.21S Forensic psychiatrists are giving an 
opinion not only on the diagnosis, but also on whether the plea of diminished 
responsibility should succeed or not (Mitchell 1997: 622). Mitchell claims as a 
result of interview data that psychiatrists are not just using mental illness to 
rate individual responsibility, but also their own personal judgment about 
justice, blameworthiness and the most socially desirable outcome. Substantial 
impainnent is about measuring responsibility and it was unanimously agreed 
that it is not possible to do this by any objective or scientific test. In Mitchell's 
study all but one of the respondents thought that the question was a moral 
and/or legal philosophical one (p.625). It was acknowledged that they had no 
215 The interviewees in this study in chapters 6 & 7 address the matter. 
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special knowledge or expertise to decide this matter and that the jury should 
decide, although it could be argued that the jury's competence to decide this is 
also questionable. The majority of the respondents claimed that they were not 
comfortable with expressing their opinion on such matters, especially if they 
were going to be subject to cross-examination. The experts did feel secure 
when relying on their professional skills and they were focused on the degree 
of (ir)rationality and the ability to exercise will-power, choice and self-control 
(p.627). It was claimed by the interviewees that psychosis was relatively easy 
to assess, whereas personality disorders were considered more difficult, as was 
depression, because there was not such a marked difference with 'normal, 
healthy' people. 
Thus the emphasis was on adopting a common sense approach of considering 
how different the killer was to ordinary individuals or through linking the 
illness and act and reflecting on whether there would have been a killing 
without signs of a disorder or depression. Again, there was evidence that social 
and political factors were taken into account, such as the possibility of 
justifying one's opinion in court, judging how the court was likely to react and 
whether the circumstances made the outcome clear in advance. However, it is 
still an application of a diagnosis to a question about comprehension and 
choice by reference to a defendant's 'mental responsibility', which is an 
oblique term that has no determinate meaning. Therefore it can only be a value 
judgment about a connection between a descriptive mental state to a legally 
devised one, and then saying if the latter was substantially diminished. The fact 
that at no point is there an actual understanding of the medico-psychological 
view of the mind or term provides ample legal flexibility and considerable 
ethical difficulties for experts. 
No Trial 
In terms of pre-trial decisions, the requirement that the expert give an opinion 
has to be viewed in conjunction with the procedural change introduced through 
the 1968 case of Cox. In Cox it was held if the medical evidence from both 
sides supports the diminished responsibility requirement, the prosecution could 
accept a plea of guilty to manslaughter so the case need not go to trial (p.31 0). 
This appears to be the position in the majority of cases (Simester & Sullivan: 
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587). Thus the impact of the expert's evidence and OpInIOn cannot be 
underestimated and this is despite what is considered to be the ill-defined 
nature of the categories contained in s2 whereby the expert is required to 
address legal conceptions of the mind. Furthermore, the legal scepticism about 
the accuracy of the mental health diagnostic process, and the problems lawyers 
have understanding the evidence, discussed in subsequent chapters, do not 
necessarily undermine the process either. 216 
This practice has a number of important ramifications. First, although 
technically the jury are the ultimate arbiters they rarely are in practice. 
Therefore, the reference in Byrne to it being a state of mind that no reasonable 
person would think of as normal is somewhat redundant as experts more often 
than not make the decision. Secondly, while cases can be appealed and the 
judge oversees matters at the sentencing stage it undermines judicial control of 
expert evidence and the conditions qualifying for the defence. Judicial concern 
was expressed about this in the 1979 case of Vinagre where Lawton LJ said 
that pleas should only be accepted where there is clear evidence of mental 
imbalance (pp.l06-7). This was in response to the acceptance of a condition 
known as 'Othello syndrome' (LC 2003: 134).217 However, Lynch (1997) 
argues that judicial status influences tactical choices even when the judge is not 
physically present. But the main point is that vague legal interpretation of the 
defence permits liberal practices, whereby the moral judgements and legal 
objectives of those preparing the case can prevail. 
Trial: Juries 
Furthermore, when cases go to trial, although it is for the jury to decide 
whether the defendant's mental responsibility is substantially impaired, experts 
give a professional opinion on the matter.218 The weight to be attached to the 
evidence has to be considered in light of rulings in Byrne where Lord Parker CJ 
stated that the jury were bound to accept the medical evidence if there is no 
other conflicting evidence that outweighs it (PA03). Similarly, in Matheson 
[1958] the court of appeal held that although juries make the decisions not 
experts, if the Doctor's evidence is unchallenged then the jury should accept it. 
216 See chapters 4. 6 & 7 on this last point. 
217 See arguments raised in chapters 6 and 8. 
21R See discussions in chapters 7 and 8. 
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However, this was qualified in Din [1962] where it was held that the jury could 
reject evidence where it assumes facts that have not been proven; if it has been 
severely challenged under cross-examination, Walton (1977); and if the 
evidence lacks weight and quality, Kiszko (1978).219 In Khan (2000) the jury 
decision showed that they had rejected the expert evidence and the appeal court 
held that the jury could evaluate the expert's opinion in light of all the evidence 
about the defendant's actions both before and after the incident to arrive at 
their decision. So the jury can have grounds to reject medico-psychological 
evidence, but essentially if the experts ultimately agree, having taken all the 
facts into consideration, then the jury is not expected to reach an alternative 
conclusion. However, as a result of the possibility that the case will not go to 
trial if the experts agree then in the majority of cases reaching trial the expert 
evidence will be contested, although the court process has particular devices to 
control the admission of evidence, as chapter four discusses. 
This illustrates another way in which legal control is sought. The practice of 
experts commenting on mental responsibility has been challenged since 1975, 
when the Butler report stated that "[i]t is either a concept oflaw or a concept of 
morality; it is not a clinical fact relating to the defendant. .. " (para. 19 .5). Griew 
suggests that the practice is permitted because it is a device that allows the 
court to stretch the scope of the section (1988: 84). The LC concede that there 
is a paradox because as a matter of principle the expert witness should not 
testify on the matter of whether or not there was substantial impairment of the 
defendant's mental responsibility at the time of the killing, but "it is felt that 
the concept is so difficult for juries that they require the assistance of expert 
testimony" (2003: 148-149). This line of argument supports the practice. 
Juries also have a summary of the evidence as part of the judge's directions at 
the end of the trial. This could influence jury perceptions of the evidence by the 
manner in which the judge conceptualizes it, and presents it in relation to other 
evidence and the facts of the case (Moore (2001); Peay 2003: 166). Thus, while 
Winter (2002) examined the framing of femininity and sexuality, similar 
arguments could be made for the significance of attitudes towards the mentally 
ill, the medico-psychological professions, risk, treatment, culpability and 
219 The data chapters suggest this level of evaluation is not so easy for the jury. 
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punishment for the form the judge's directions take. It is also possible for the 
judge to withdraw consideration of the defence from the jury if he considers 
that there is no evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant's 
mental responsibility was substantially impaired (Campbell (1986): 255). This 
is an important option. Factors that might inform judicial interpretations of 
expert evidence and inform their decisions have already been discussed in part 
in preceding chapters, but there are additional observations in chapters four, six 
and seven. 
Discussion 
It is constitutionally important to be clear who is deciding whether or not a 
syndrome is to be classed as a mental disorder because it constitutes the basis 
to being classified as a mentally disordered offender, with all the consequences 
that brings (Mustill 1998: 82). This chapter shows that judges are shaping the 
remit of the medico-psychological terms within the defences without 
appropriate training, so they can only ascribe a legal meaning in line with their 
legal training, which will be based on the viewpoint outlined in chapter one. If 
the law is not trained to understand the science, and if the issue is only about 
the effect that the condition has, and the expert is making the link by stating 
that the condition has the effect the legal criteria seek to determine, there is a 
question mark over limiting the conditions that can qualify if they are in the 
diagnostic manual. Moreover, the scope of factors that inform medico-
psychological understanding of the mind, which were described in chapter two, 
that are far more extensive than the legal perspective, could satisfy the defence 
as the technicalities encompassed by a label are not overtly acknowledged, so 
theoretical legitimacy of the law remains unchallenged. For example, BWS and 
Othello syndrome are emotional and social oriented conditions couched as 
medico-psychological conditions. However, it would seem that having a 
congruent legal process would undermine the legal control that has developed 
that enables a flexible response to individual cases, in legal terms. 
It appears that the courts are using psychiatric evidence to secure what they see 
as a just outcome, for example in mercy killings and cases involving battered 
wives. Critically, from the discussions it is plainly a benevolent conspiracy 
between psychiatrists, judges and prosecutors to stretch the evidence provided 
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by the humane medical profession (Butler report para.I9.5; Mackay 2000: 79; 
Simester & Sullivan 2003: 587). Furthermore, as most cases do not go to trial 
then this is not going to become public knowledge as the grounds for the 
defence are not debated and the law maintains its legitimacy because the legal 
position is not overtly undermined. On the other hand Mackay suggests that 
one explanation for the statistics in chapter one showing that there are very few 
cases of diminished responsibility compared with ten years ago could be that 
psychiatrists, the prosecution and juries are taking a more sceptical view of the 
plea (1999: 117). 
It should not be overlooked that with the diminished responsibility defence 
there is a guilty plea, with the defendant's mental state a significant factor at 
the sentencing stage, which is dealt with by the judiciary. Problems have arisen 
over deciding whether the defendant should be punished or receive treatment, 
which were discussed in chapter one and will be examined further in chapter 
four. The legal view stated in Smalling (2001),220 was that it is important that 
the defendant is sentenced for the crime committed and not for psychological 
failings to which he may be subject. This implies just deserts rather than a 
focus on treatment. The central issue is one of public protection and the 
assessments made of the potential risk the defendant presents. 
Legal Conundrums 
There are currently two mental states that present problems for the courts, 
psychopathy and intoxication, which will now be explored. In addition there 
are possible implications for the principle of criminal responsibility from 
emerging biological based explanations. Thus the possible connotations of the 
current neuroscientific understanding of the mind, discussed in chapter two, for 
the operation of the law will be more specifically addressed in this chapter. 
Psychopathy 
Psychopathy presents problems for both the legal and medico-psychological 
professions in terms of responsibility and detention.221 
220 Which cited Criminal Cases Review Commission Ex.p. Pearson [1999] 
221 For a historical overview of its development as a clinical condition and term see Walker & McCabe 
(1973) and Lewis (1998). For a gender comparison see Cale & Lilienfeld (2002). 
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Responsibility 
Personality disorders,222 which include psychopathy, have successfully been 
invoked in relation to the diminished responsibility defence (Byrne; Muscroft 
[2001]). Differences between the legal and medico-psychological professions 
concern understanding of the condition and definitions. For example, the law 
equates anti-social personality disorder (ASPD) with psychopathy, whereas 
mental health professionals do not (Scottish Law Commission (SLC) 2003; 
Hare 1993).223 ASPD concentrates on behavioural traits that appear to be solely 
concerned with legally prohibited behaviour, which are subject to frequent 
reconsideration, which overlooks the personality features identified with 
psychopathy (Murphy & Vess 2003: 13). The law is concerned with criminal 
behaviour, and in particular behaviour that represents a risk to social order and 
could result in harm. Therefore, whilst criminologists consider antisocial 
behaviour is behaviour that breaks the law (Nuffield report 2002: 89-90), 
psychologists take a broader view, and in line with the perspective detailed in 
chapter two medico-psychologists see it as a matter of anti-social traits because 
they consider it also encompasses attitudes, beliefs, interests and preferences 
for taking advantage of, or harming others, or a willingness to break the law, 
focusing particularly on aggression.224 Psychopathy, like other personality 
disorders, is concerned with domination by a particular personality trait that 
pervades a person's inter-relational style, with no specific connection to 
criminal behaviour. Psychopaths are not all criminals, the condition is not just 
about anti-social traits per se, and there are scales of the severity of the traits 
labelled psychopathic. However, as discussed previously, the law does not 
consider it has to adopt the medico-psychological meaning of mental health 
terms, particularly when this would thwart consideration of issues inherent in 
the legal objectives concerned with social order and public protection. 
What is the focus within legal cases? Fathi [2001] was concerned with dual 
diagnosis, psychopathy with depression, and with and without psychosis, 
which has implications for detention decisions, as discussed below. In Muscroft 
222 Manning (2000) explores how the diagnosis of personality disorder emerged and how it has been used 
despite the less than solid basis for the diagnosis, which is controversial in the psychiatric profession. 
223 Medico-psychological interviewees discuss this in chapter 7. 
224 See Lilienfeld (1998) for an overview of testing and Skeem et al (2003) review the spectrum 
dimension to psychopathy. 
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[2001] the court focused on whether a personality disorder that amounts to a 
persistent disorder, or disability of the mind, resulting in abnormally aggressive 
or seriously irresponsible conduct, constitutes psychopathic disorder within the 
meaning of s 1 of the MHA 1983.225 Thus the legal issue was whether the label 
psychopath could be used to explain violent and anti-social behaviour; the law 
tries to ascertain a diagnostic category that will explain behaviour. It is also 
significant because of the link being made between MHA categories and the 
ill-defined Homicide Act categories. In contrast, disagreements between the 
experts focused on the severity of personality disorders necessary to qualify as 
substantial because this is the crucial aspect of the expert's role. 226 Thomas-
Peter and Warren suggest that disagreements amongst medico-psychological 
professionals give the impression that experts are claiming the defendant's 
mental responsibility is substantially diminished in order to moderate 
punishment (1998: 87), which would appear to fit in with preceding assertions 
about the operation of the diminished responsibility defence.227 Significantly, 
the final arbiter in contested cases is the jury. 
But criminal responsibility is concerned with the cognitive capacity of the 
individual, and with diminished responsibility the capacity to choose 
otherwise. In terms of cognition, psychopaths understand the nature of their 
acts, and whether the law prohibits them; it is their lack of empathy for others 
that distinguish them (Ciocchetti 2003; Benn 2003; Herpertz & Sass 2000). 
Explanations of decision-making referred to in chapter two maintain that 
h ·· ~ ~ 228 F I D ., t' k empat y IS an Important lactor. or examp e, amaslO s soma lC mar er 
hypothesis suggests that without emotional competence a vital part of the 
decision-making process is missing, although O'Carroll and Papps (2003) have 
challenged the veracity of this theory. Furthermore, Hare, a leading expert on 
psychopathy, has examined the fact that psychopaths do not possess the normal 
range of primary and secondary emotions, which are important factors in 
conforming to social norms (1993: 44_52).229 Ifpsychopaths do not have all the 
levels of awareness with which to contextualize their decisions then can they 
choose otherwise and therefore should they to be judged responsible in the 
225 As noted earlier, violent behaviour is a central concern for the law. 
226 See the discussions of medico-psychological respondents on this issue in chapter seven. 
227 This would not appear to be the case in the data in chapter 7. 
m Violence and faulty emotional regulation is discussed by Putnam & Larson (2000) 
229 Also see chapter 2; Lerner & Keltner (2000); Benn (1999); Raine et al (1998) 
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same way that everyone else is? In essence they lack moral awareness so 
fundamental to responsibility for choices and actions, but cognitively they can 
appreciate that the action is legally wrong (Haji 1998). 
As preceding discussions show, the operation of the law does not necessarily 
adhere to the literal application of legal rules, with moral arguments and 
procedural practices supporting a flexible approach. The condition does not 
come within the remit of the insanity defence because however insane a 
heinous act may appear there was still the understanding by the perpetrator that 
the act was wrong and there is no volitional element to argue that they could 
not resist the impulse. Mason et aI, in the context of a discussion on the 
insanity defence in Canada, make the point that if the emotional aspect of 
decision-making is taken into consideration then emotional as well as an 
intellectual appreciation of an act is necessary and this could mean that anyone 
without remorse could be considered not guilty (1999:531). Whereas the 
diminished responsibility defence incorporates a volitional aspect, which 
enables a broader conception of the inability to choose to act in a morally 
appropriate way, and in addition the defence is a guilty plea, with the 
abnormality of mind a mitigating factor at the sentencing stage. There is also 
the fact that other personality disorders are accepted under the diminished 
responsibility defence, and as the SLC discussion debates, this begs the 
question whether it is justifiable to treat psychopathy differently. 
The Scottish Position 
The discussion to date indicates psychopaths engender an ambivalent reaction 
and the recent SLC (2003) report illustrates that the law has policy concerns 
about including psychopaths within the diminished responsibility defence. The 
current Scottish position was established in Galbraith [2001] and psychopathic 
personality disorder was explicitly excluded on policy grounds, even though it 
would technically fall within the wider definition developed in the case (p.17). 
It was held that the boundaries of legal doctrine were being established and it 
did not matter that a psychiatrist would recognize the disorder. The SLC 
challenge the basis to the decision, which was founded on the 1946 decision of 
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arra er, ecause the defendant was also intoxicated, making the 
circumstances particular to the case (p.39). Moreover, no policy reasons were 
actually given in Galbraith, whilst there were two given in Carraher. The first 
was that the remit of diminished responsibility should be narrow, the opposite 
to the reasoning in Galbraith, and secondly concerns were expressed about 
'trial by psychiatry'. However, the SLC point out that expert evidence is 
needed on matters of mental abnormality, and question why it should be 
assumed that the evidence on psychopathy will be any different to that for any 
other disorder. It was acknowledged that there is a lack of agreement about the 
condition within medico-psychology, but it was said that this is no different to 
other contested cases. Furthermore, the case of Williamson (1994) had arrived 
at the same position as Galbraith by following the case of Savage (1923). 
Finally, the SLC said that including psychopathy has not affected the operation 
of the English defence.231 The SLC claims: 
"A key feature of psychopathic personality disorder is that the person concerned lacks the 
normal moral and social constraints on his capacity to control his actions. As this condition is 
not based on a clear form of mental disorder, it does not serve as a ground for relieving the 
person from criminal responsibility. However although a person's personality will not excuse 
his conduct, it is proper to make allowance for his personality in assessing the full extent to 
which he is to blame for his conduct. Making allowance for conditions which do not provide 
full excuses is the very rationale of the plea of diminished responsibility" (p.4l). 
I 
Thus the SLC maintains there is no support for excluding psychopathic 
personality disorder from the scope of the diminished responsibility defence. 
On the other hand Reznek does argue against the inclusion of psychopaths in 
the defence (1997: 309). Reznek maintains that there is no natural division 
between those with character defects and personality disorders, and yet the 
latter are excused. Therefore, because of the political consequences of this 
discrepancy and the potential impact on the concept of responsibility, 
psychopaths should be considered evil, not ill. The efficacy of this argument is 
affected by how one perceives the remit of personality disorders vis-a-vis 
character, and what is understood by psychopathy. Certainly if the legal 
understanding of psychopathy is solely that it is an explanation for anti-social 
behaviour then it is hard to know when someone qualifies for the application of 
a diagnostic label, and how difficult it must be for experts having to fit their 
230 Which followed the Kennedy (1944) case 
231 See also DPP v Terry [1961] 
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appraisal of the defendant into legal rather than medico-psychological terms in 
light of the very different perceptions of psychopathy. 
Detention 
The diminished responsibility defence allows the judge to decide between 
prison and hospital, although hospital detention requires expert evidence to 
satisfy the requirement that the condition is treatable (MHA 1983 s 1 (2) and 
s3(2)(b )). The law is responsible for supporting social order and public 
protection and there are doubts about psychopaths' ability to experience 
remorse and respond to treatment. 232 Psychopaths present problems to both 
prisons and hospitals. For example, prison is supposed to act as a deterrent, but 
the legal assumptions underpinning deterrence do not apply to psychopaths 
because they lack fear, which is integral to our avoidance of punishment and 
pain (Hare: 54). Hare's discussions reflect those in chapter two because his 
explanations about the development of the capacity for inner control in line 
with social norms refer to childhood, the impact of nature and nurture, and the 
importance of socialization for choices (pp.165-69). In addition Hare claims 
that psychopaths do not accept responsibility for their actions, attributing fault 
to the other person (p.75). With regard to hospital it is usually assumed that 
psychopaths are not treatable, although there have been suggestions about the 
possibilities of working with their dominant personality traits, such as 
narcissism or borderline (Murphy & Vess: 24). However, Hare argues that as 
psychopaths do not see their traits as problematic and detrimentally affecting 
their judgment they are untreatable. 233 There is a growing interest in biological 
explanations through brain scans,234 but it would seem that currently the 
prevailing view is that they are untreatable.235 The consequence of this is that 
hospital detention is not an option under the MHA and because of the potential 
danger the defendant presents, as a result of the current climate and recent legal 
changes, the defendant can be given a longer than normal sentence, as 
discussed in chapters one and four. 236 
232 See Reid & Gacono (2000), & Stalenheim (2004) for evaluations of the issue of treatability. 
233 Ciocchetti (2003) discusses this in the context of their failing to see their actions as part of 
relationships. . 
234 Kiehl et al (2004), although Adshead (1999) expresses reservations and discusses other explanatIOns. 
235 Canli & Amin (2002) discuss the increasing recourse to neuroimaging to uncover the neural baSIS to 
emotion and personality and the limitations of scans in the investigation of predicting psychopathology. 
236 See also Bartlett & Sandland (2003: Ch.6). 
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A judge's detention decisions are infonned by expert opinion. Thomas-Peter 
and Warren argue that the decision is a matter of luck "detennined by which 
psychiatrists are invited to submit reports to the courts" (p.90).237 They suggest 
that this is exacerbated by the fact that reports are undertaken by psychiatrists 
who have not developed standardized objective methods of describing 
personality disorders, in contrast to psychologists. However, in addition to the 
uncertainty prevailing in the medico-psychological fields, it could also be 
argued that the legal issues the mental health specialist has to address give rise 
to problems as well (Cunningham & Reidy 1998; Hodgins 1998). Mason et al 
debate viewing the condition as one of character rather than illness and then 
question whether a person should be punished for what their character dictates 
(1999: 540-1). However, despite this philosophical point, after addressing the 
treatment issues they conclude that on the grounds of public safety prison is the 
most suitable option. Owing to the fact that hospital detention is not subject to 
the same detenninacy through judicial tariffs, Grounds (1998) suggests that 
psychopaths be sent to prison and any treatment initiatives that may be thought 
appropriate could lead to a hospital order, but they will be subject to a 
detenninate sentence. But the backdrop is one of concern about dangerousness, 
as the introduction of the DSPD demonstrates.238 Chapter one also highlighted 
the concerns that have emerged about releasing such individuals back into the 
community and the measures that have been introduced, or that are proposed, 
to bolster provisions for continuing detention. Thus discussions and decisions 
about psychopaths take place within the context of these legal concerns so, as 
previously argued, an actual understanding of the condition is not relevant, 
with the moral overtones regarding responsibility impacted by concerns about 
public protection and therefore the issue of detention and release. The legal 
procedures described facilitate the necessary legal flexibility. 
Intoxication 
"Alcohol is a drug which IS capable of altering mood, perception or 
consciousness, of loosening inhibitions and self-control, and of impairing 
movements, reactions, judgment and ability to foresee consequences" (Card 
2001: 619). Whilst intoxication clearly affects cognitive capacity. the matter is 
237 See the discussions in chapters 6 and 7. 
238 For a discussion about the debates on options for change in Scotland see Crichton et al (2001) 
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addressed by the court through evaluating whether or not the drinking of the 
alcohol was a voluntary action, because we are responsible for our choices and 
actions, and it is assumed that the effect it would have is known.239 It is a 
common law principle, explicated in Cooper (1980) for example, "that in a 
legal sense 'disease of the mind' ... [excludes] self-induced states caused by 
alcohol or drugs, ... " (p.61), which reflects sl(3) of the MHA. Even involuntary 
intoxication with the absence of moral fault cannot provide a defence if the 
court maintains that the accused had the necessary intent (Kingston [1995]). 
What has been debated is the fact "habitual drinking or drug-taking can 
sometimes lead to permanent changes in the brain tissues as to be accounted 
insanity, such as delirium tremens or alcoholic dementia" (Card: 631: Davis 
(1881)).240 The current leading authority for the consideration of intoxication in 
applying s2 is Dietschmann [2003], which is based on authorities developed 
since Di Duca (1959). With regard to the aetiological categories, in the latter 
case it was held that it was unlikely that the transient effect of alcohol, as a 
result of voluntary intoxication, however it affected the brain, could constitute 
injury within the meaning of s2. Similarly in Fenton (1975), confirmed in 
Gittens (1984), it was held that in the normal course of events drink is not seen 
as giving rise to an abnormality of the mind under inherent cause.241 In Tandy 
[1989] it was affirmed that alcoholism could amount to abnormality of the 
mind, and disease, if it causes brain damage or results in irresistible cravings so 
that consumption is no longer voluntary. The latter requires the expert and jury 
to decide at what point it can be said that someone cannot resist an urge to 
drink or take drugs. 
As the contested OpInIOn of experts in Dietschmann show, there is debate 
within the medico-psychological profession as to whether alcoholism is a 
disease and should be conceived in this way.242 Valverde states that, 
"drunkenness, even if psychiatrically classified as rooted in a prior condition 
(dependence), is rarely thought to excuse crimes, although it may serve to 
mitigate the sentence" (1998: 2). She locates this view of intoxication in a 
239 However see the case of Kingston [1995]. For a review of the U.S. position see Marlowe et al (1999). 
The Irish Law Commission reviewed the matter in 1995. 
240 It was affirmed in DPP v Beard [1920] & A -G for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963] 
241 Mackay criticized the test in Fenton because the inability to resist the urge to drink was linked to the 
first drink of the day ( 1995: 197). 
242 See also chapter 7 
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social context that values personal freedom, and free will, which is evidenced 
by the self-help ethos of addiction groups (p.3). Morse's examination of the 
legal and scientific images of addictive behaviour concludes that the disease 
model cannot fully explain addiction because it "inevitably involves human 
action and is therefore subject to moral evaluation" (2000: 49). This type of 
condition does not incur the same moral benevolence as other types of disease, 
as the exclusion of drug and alcohol problems from the MHA provisions would 
suggest (Bartlett & Sandland; 241). It would appear that the legal desire to 
limit the opportunities to those who are under the influence of drink or drugs 
has led to some contentious decisions. For example, Mackay takes issue with 
the judicial reasoning with regard to the aetiological category injury in the case 
of 0 'Connell [1997]. The case involved an adverse reaction to a prescribed 
drug but the court dealt with the matter by comparing it to voluntary 
intoxication (1999: 123-4). Yet the issue for the court is the malfunctioning of 
the brain and the common law principal is only that the voluntary consumption 
of alcohol should not afford an excuse to committing a criminal offence. 
However, what if alcohol is only one factor that the defendant relies on for the 
purposes of s2(1)? In Fenton, and approved in Gittens, the court held that the 
jury have to disregard voluntary intoxication, which is not normally covered by 
inherent causes, and consider whether the other elements establish the defence. 
Subsequently the court of appeal in Atkinson [1985] and Egan [1992] held that 
the defendant could only succeed if the jury were satisfied that the killings 
would have occurred even if the defendant had not been intoxicated. The 
House of Lords in Dietschmann [2003] expressed disapproval of these 
authorities. Lord Hutton stated that, "the subsection does not require the 
abnormality of mind to be the sole cause of the defendant's acts in doing the 
killing" (pp.1216-1217). He maintained that "a brain-damaged person who is 
intoxicated and who commits a killing is not in the same position as a person 
who is intoxicated, but not brain-damaged, and who commits a killing" 
(p.1227). This is a more benevolent approach. But the public policy aspect of 
the decision is clear, "[i]f a person voluntarily takes a drink, knowing or 
believing that it will result in an uncontrollable craving for more alcohol, the 
defence of diminished responsibility will not be available" (LC 2003: 151). 
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Responsibility: Biological Explanations 
In light of the focus of the thesis, this final section reflects on potential issues, 
as a result of emerging biological based explanations, for the legal principles of 
responsibility and punishment, which make no sense without free will.243 
Technically, proof of a lack of moral agency, whatever the cause is what 
constitutes an excuse, but plainly policy considerations do affect the operation 
of the law, hence the tendency to pragmatism rather than evidence-based 
decisions. 
The State of Scientific Evidence 
In recognition of the potential importance of the trend towards biological 
explanations for behaviour the Nuffield Council for Bioethics (2002) reviewed 
the current state of scientific knowledge in the field of behavioural genetics.244 
They examined three areas of criminal justice: exculpation, whether genetic 
information about a behavioural trait should affect the attribution of 
responsibility; sentencing, whether this is the stage at which such information 
should be taken into account; and finally prediction, whether the information 
should be used to identify future possibilities of anti-social behaviour. The 
three areas examined encompass the two aspects of medico-psychological 
involvement in the legal process; in the assessment of criminal responsibility 
and in respect of reports on the potential risk and danger the defendant 
represents when sentencing decisions are made. The last category represents an 
additional way in which medico-psychological research may be used, the 
implications of which are addressed in the subsequent discussions. 
In the review it was stated that the main clinical categories to consider for legal 
purposes are the personality disorders; conduct disorder, which refers to the 
under 18s, anti-social personality disorder and psychopathology. As previous 
discussions show these are the clinical categories defined in relation to 
behaviour that is associated with criminal behaviour, but clearly other 
diagnostic categories affect cognitive capacity and therefore mental 
responsibility. It was stated that currently personality traits and disorders are 
W Genetics and criminality is a long standing debate, see Williams (1994: Chs. 6-7). 
244 They examined conditions arising from environmental trauma: XYY males, battered spouse syndrome. 
battered child syndrome and PTSD; and the biological syndromes premenstrual syndrome, postnatal 
depression, Huntington's disease, dementia and monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) deficiency (pp.160-1 ). 
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descriptive categories rather than distinct biological categories (pp.81_89).245 
Heritability estimates based on twin studies indicate that the genetic 
contribution is substantial and roughly equal across all aspects of 
personality.246 The report also assesses studies into the causes of violence, 
noting that violence is not usually a separate area of study in behavioural 
research, but linked to other forms of antisocial behaviour (pp. 93-96; Hamer & 
Copeland 1998). With regard to violence, it is claimed that the fact that genetic 
effects are found to be rare and inconsistent is attributable in part to the 
samples studied. For example, individuals labelled violent criminals are not the 
only perpetrators, they are just the ones that have been caught. Also some will 
be persistent offenders whilst others will have committed only a single offence. 
However, these problems will be true for most studies of violence. 
Nonetheless reservations were expressed about the current state of scientific 
knowledge, reflecting challenges to adopting a myopic focus on genes referred 
to in chapter two. The report concludes that existing knowledge on the impact 
genes have on the operation of the brain is limited, so it is not possible to make 
definitive links between particular genes and personality traits. In addition, not 
all the genes that influence the brain have been identified yet. 247 Furthermore, 
traits may be attributable to the functioning of neurotransmitters, in particular 
monoamine transmitters, dopamine, serotonin and noradrenaline (Moore et al 
2002; Berman & Coccaro 1998). Finally, it is impossible to measure the 
contribution of environmental factors (Rutter & Silberg 2002). Therefore, 
because of the polymorphous nature of the genesis of behaviour it seems 
unlikely that a direct link between a particular gene and behaviour will be 
established (Alper 1998; Godfrey-Smith 1999). There appears to be no 
deterministic biological basis to any diagnostic categories, which may have an 
impact on the mental state required for criminal responsibility, yet concern 
centres on identifying possible links with categories that focus on anti-social 
behaviour. "Because 'crime' itself is not inherited, researchers are working to 
investigate which features of personality and cognitive function may be 
245 There is a useful chart on traits on p.82. 
246 Hamer & Copeland (1998) look at twin studies in the context of genetic roots to personality. 
247 There is an outline of the studies that have been undertaken into identifying genetic influences on 
personality traits (pp. 84-5). 
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associated with antisocial behaviour" (Nuffield report: 96).248 The Nuffield 
report claims that there seems to be a 'converging on the possibility' that 
"genes act to augment the resistance of young people to environmental factors 
that would otherwise increase the likelihood of antisocial behaviour" (ibid: 96). 
As part of that research more attention is being paid to trying to assess the 
impact of environmental factors, which could prove important for prevention 
strategies. 
Genetics and Individualizing Responsibility 
Previous debates show that legal reactions to evidence need to be construed 
recognizing overriding legal objectives inherent in the rule of law. The 
interaction of law and science includes important political dimensions that are 
supported by a particular view of individual responsibility, which obscures the 
social context. 249 Horton II makes the point that the law is concerned with what 
has been done and what the person has become, not what caused them to 
become that way.250 Yet chapter one introduced the dialectical perspective that 
suggests that crime is a socially constructed phenomenon. Criminological 
theories provide such explanations of criminal behaviour (McGuire 2000). 
Critically, there are a number of ways that embracing genetic-based evidence 
further undermines the dialectical perspective. For instance, Crossley (1999) 
argues that genetic defences internalize the source of criminality within the 
individual, thereby relieving society of responsibility.25 I In fact, Pickering 
Francis suggests that genetic information, as with other medical information, 
could be used to place more responsibility on the individual. Similarly, Novas 
and Rose (2000) assert that there is a trend amongst patients receiving genetic 
information to take responsibility for their life choices. They look at the 
potential impact of genetic research on our individual sense of agency, which is 
so integral to the operation of the principle of individual responsibility. This 
ties in with the point made in chapter two about the importance of social and 
normative concepts for the structure of self and agency. Certainly it would 
seem that there are pragmatic reasons for limiting exculpatory conditions 
because if genetic or environmental excuses were too broad then a large 
24R For example Raine et al (2000); Pontius (1997) 
249 For example Farrington (2000) examines childhood predictors for ASPD. 
250 See Morse (1999a) on the basis of excuses being an issue of irrationality rather than causation. 
251 See also Kaplan (2000) 
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number of defendants would be able to claim that their behaviour was 
determined by past experiences and influences, removing the need to make any 
moral effort to comply with society's rules. Potentially, everything would be 
excusable by everybody. It is, as always, the legal approach to determining 
where the line should be drawn that is critical. 
Evidence and Courts 
What the debate shows IS that there are social implications of medico-
psychological research, and it has to be viewed in relation to the two 
dimensions of the cases, evidence informing the assessment of responsibility 
and detention decisions. A matter that pervades the use of medico-
psychological evidence is the issue of the difficulty of classifying individuals 
into the appropriate category with legal cut-off points "more arbitrary than 
based on evidence" (Nuffield: 91). In contrast to the dichotomous approach of 
the law, medico-psychology measures matters on a continuum, as chapter two 
illustrated. For example, antisocial behaviour is "a trait that is normally 
distributed and therefore able to be measured as part of variation in the normal 
range" (ibid: 91). But, as the arguments of Cane discussed in chapter one state, 
the law has to make a decision. This thesis is highlighting that what is 
important is the manner in which the concepts and categories are used and 
applied by legal and medico-psychological professions to construct a 
framework for labelling and describing subjective mental states and 
behaviour. 252 As chapter two asserts the social use of information to construct 
categories is important and both law and medico-psychology do this, with the 
cases under scrutiny proving a forum where the two disciplines interact. The 
legal decision-making process has social ramifications in terms of the outcome 
of the case, and the use of medico-psychological evidence impacts on an 
individual's sense of self, which is constructed from our experiences and the 
concepts socially available. Genetic evidence is potentially unique if a direct 
cause and effect link can be established. 
Summer exammes U.S. cases where genetic defences based on scientific 
evidence such as scans have been raised, demonstrating that such evidence is 
251 Although McSherry (2003) does discuss a possible insanity defence that acknowledges the spectrum 
approach of the medico-psychological professions, discussed in chapter 8. 
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currently not sufficient to satisfy the courts (1999: 187-190). For example, 
scans have been produced to show that psychopaths process emotion-laden 
.. 253 
words dIfferently. Crossley argues that 5 levels of evidence would need to be 
satisfied by a defendant for a genetic defence to succeed (1999: 174-9). The 
defendant would have to establish: (1) that he had the gene; (2) that possessing 
the gene creates a statistical predisposition to the particular behaviour in 
question, e.g. aggression, (which would be difficult on currently available 
evidence); (3) that the genotype had given rise to the phenotype in that 
individual; (4) that there was a causal link between the defective gene and the 
behaviour, that it was not attributable to any other cause. (Yet it has been 
shown that behaviour is considered to be the result of both nature and nurture, 
purely genetic conditions are very rare); (5) that as a result of (1) to (4) the 
defendant's culpability for their behaviour was removed and therefore they 
should be excused. So a genetic defence would need to definitively establish 
either the cognitive or volitional element, even though this level of 
authoritative inter-connected proof is not possible or required with other 
conditions. Furthermore the genetic prerequisite ignores the arguments about 
the links between neurochemicals such as serotonin, and, for example, 
aggressive behaviour. 254 Prins (1998) examines the difficulties in establishing 
clear causal connections between mental abnormalities and crime. 
With regard to responsibility, psychiatrists might be looking for causal 
explanations for an individual's behaviour, but the question remains, what 
proportion of our behaviour is determined, and by what factors (Kovnick 1999: 
213; Looren de long 2000)? Moreover, as Horton II remarks, how could a gene 
interfere with the formation of criminal intent (pp.194-5)? Certainly, 
incorporating and linking genetic information to diagnostic categories of 
mental states makes a connection with the capacity to reason, which is the basis 
of the current legal approach. However, Pickering Francis sounds a note of 
caution about equating genetic information with medical information because 
medical information is generally evidence of a function-impairing condition 
whereas genetic information can relate to the genotype, phenotype, or a fully 
253 Certainly Soderstrom et al claim that their b r a i ~ ~ scan study of violent psychopaths , a d d ~ ~ to t ~ ~ ~
evidence "indicating that aberrant fronto-temporal actIvity may be a factor In VIOlent beha\ lOur (200_. 
82). 
254 See Lesch & Merschdorf (2000) 
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expressed condition with symptoms (1999: 246). Moreover, of major concern 
to the law is ASPD and as Horton II claims, it does not involve features 
associated with major mental illnesses that entail a cognitive break with reality 
therefore identifying an antisocial gene may not help defendants (1999: 192). 
Pickering Francis concludes that courts and policy makers should treat genetic 
information with extreme caution (p.248), whereas Summer argues that 
lawyers should use whatever defence they can to help their clients. What can 
perhaps be inferred from Summer's and Pickering Francis's position is the 
tension that exists between the defence and prosecution position on the use of 
the latest scientific evidence. The defence objective is to get the best deal they 
can for their client, while the prosecution represent the state and its inherent 
legal objectives of supporting the public interest in social order and public 
protection.255 This tension is a factor of the adversarial process although there 
is clearly collusion with regard to certain conditions, such as BWS. 
Wells argues that it is unlikely that the genetic evidence is going to affect the 
social rhetoric on responsibility encapsulated in the law (1998: 738-9). She 
suggests it may lead to further categorization and measures of control within 
the criminal justice system. Similarly, Moldin claims that the link between 
genes and behaviour is not likely to be direct enough for the courts, at most 
there may be predispositions,256 although links between mental illness and 
genes may become important, if any are found, as mitigating circumstances 
(1999: 137-8). The development of diagnostic categories is ongoing, but it 
would also seem that referring directly to genetics, with its inherent overtones 
of determinism, is too overt a confrontation to the legal matters referred to in 
chapter one, but it might be introduced more surreptitiously through the 
diagnostic categories that remain largely unexplained. There is no direct 
exploration of diagnostic categories in the legal practice described earlier in the 
chapter. Furthermore, the judiciary controls the sentencing stage, although 
experts provide information at that stage too, but they retain legal control with 
regard to issues of public protection centred on concerns about risk and 
dangerousness. 
255 The Code for Crown Prosecutors (2000) lists possible public interest factors for the purposes of 
deciding whether or not to prosecute. 
~ 5 6 6 For example see Dutton (2002) on the neurobiology of abandonment homicide. 
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The Jury 
As earlier discussions show not only judicial responses to evidence need to be 
considered, but also those of the jury.257 Crossley maintains that public 
perceptions of science are important for evaluations and judgments about 
evidence, with psychiatry and psychology seen as soft science because they are 
subjective and imprecise, whereas genetics is perceived as hard science 
because it appears to offer objective proof. Thus, the development of biological 
explanations could affect the credence given to expert medico-psychological 
evidence. But Crossley suggests that the public need to be educated or political, 
or ideological forces may misappropriate the evidential process (p.179). The 
evidence in this chapter, which is reinforced by arguments in chapter four, 
suggests the legal control on the evidence heard and the interpretation placed 
on it is likely to affect jury perceptions. Additionally, Perlin (1999) considers 
that the impact of the new science is likely to be limited because of prevailing 
attitudes towards the mentally ill. 
Genetics and Sentencing 
It would appear that there is ample support for the Nuffield report conclusion 
that the current state of behavioural genetics does not warrant a substantial 
reVISIOn of prevailing concepts of human action and moral responsibility 
(p.159). But the report does consider genetic information has potential 
significance for the sentencing stage.258 Dresser (1999) argues that if a genetic 
defence is accepted the consequences would not necessarily be good because 
alternative forms of social control might result in response to that group if they 
are considered unable to control their behaviour. This could occur because 
traditional justifications for punishment rely on the assumption that individuals 
have choice and control in relation to their behaviour. Coombs makes similar 
arguments and states that, whatever objectives science may have, it is how the 
findings are interpreted in relation to social problems that is so important 
(1999: 232). Thus Coombs considers that genetic information might playa part 
in the defence of diminished responsibility because it could mitigate 
culpability, and more importantly because it could inform detention decisions. 
257 This is also an important issue in the data chapters. 
m This reflects discussions in chapter four about scientific evidence being more acceptable at this stage 
of the legal process. 
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However, would it lead to further interventionist and preventative initiatives, 
such as the DSPD scheme? 
If information emerges about conditions affecting anti-social behaviour would 
tests become compulsory in order to enable avoiding action to be taken? This 
would contrast with conditions that involve no potential social harm where the 
information is only of personal benefit or addresses cosmetic issues. Rose 
(2000) suggests that such tests could form part of the risk assessment processes 
that exist, providing new forms of control. He argues that the "traditional 
dichotomies of sociological thought - free-will vs. determinism, society vs. 
biology - are not very helpful in understanding the relations of power, 
knowledge, ethics and subjectification that are taking shape within these new 
practices of control" (p.20). Yet the Nuffield report maintains that crime is a 
complex phenomenon and interpreting crime through focusing on one 
aetiological factor will be misleading. It might present quick-fix responses and 
in the process obscure other factors that are more difficult and expensive to 
address. The report concludes that the concepts of crime and antisocial 
behaviour are too complex for scientific investigation. 
Discussion 
There are two limbs to the debate on legal views of medico-psychological 
evidence. The first concerns the determining of criminal responsibility. 
Chapters one and two show that the legal view of the mind is not based in 
current neuroscientific thinking. This chapter has shown that the judicial 
interpretation of the mental concepts within the defences specifically states that 
the terms do not, and do not need to, reflect the medico-psychological 
perspective, as they are legal matters. Nor are lawyers trained to understand 
medico-psychology, and so interpretation has to come from a legal point of 
view. The nature of the legal questions is also important because if the issue is 
only the effect that the condition has, then the expert will give an opinion on 
this and there is no need for lawyers to understand the disorder itself, which 
inherently contradicts the legal standpoint. This begs the question whether 
there is a stringent limit to the nature of the conditions that can qualify if they 
appear in the diagnostic manual and experts are willing to say that there is a 
link. So it is unlikely that the law will be concerned with state-of-the-art 
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knowledge unless it directly confronts some aspect of current reasoning and is 
challenged in court. Yet the legal practice relies on the collusion of forensic 
experts and therefore the practice is unlikely to be challenged. However, it 
would appear from Mitchell's (1997) research that an important factor in the 
expert's role is their moral judgment and therefore this may form the basis to 
identifying contestable evidence in court. 259 
The fact that the law uses expert witnesses gives the impression that the matter 
of the defendant's mental state and health has been rigorously and 
professionally reviewed. But this chapter has shown that there are controls on 
the admission of evidence and the questions addressed in court. The penal 
system makes value judgments based on the standards enshrined in the law and 
the overriding social policy concerns such as public protection, and the 
evidence in this chapter highlights how this is put into practice through judicial 
interpretation of legislation and common law rules, evidenced by reported case 
law. Decisions are made about the categorisation of those with mental health 
problems depending on legal normative standards (Mustill 1998: 80). The 
medico-psychological categories are incorporated into the law but interpreted 
and applied from a legal perspective, to meet legal objectives (Eastman 1998: 
115). Both the normal and abnormal mental constructs forming the basis of 
deliberations in a case are legal, not based on medico-psychological 
understanding (pp.95-1 01). This enables the court to limit the admission of 
expert evidence and the focus of it, which is crucial for jury decision-making. 
The other limb of medico-psychological involvement concerns the sentencing 
stage. The debate then becomes one of establishing links between mental 
disorders and criminal conduct rather than cognitive capacity. Examples 
involve psychopathy, ASPD and DSPD and the quest in the behavioural 
sciences for direct biological explanations. The medico-psychological 
assessments of dangerousness and risk form foundations for interventionist 
measures. Interestingly it would seem that the two strands of the forensic 
medico-psychological roles can become confused because Raine et aI's (1997) 
study of behaviour involved brain scans of 41 murderers pleading insanity in 
259 See also additional arguments as a result of the data discussed in chapter eight. 
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the search for universal abnormalities. This contrasts with the perception of 
insanity being a defence concerned with clinical disorders affecting cognition. 
The legal use of medico-psychological evidence supports Foucault's theory 
that medicine is important for generating truths about normality and 
abnormality (1978:53; 1980). But the expert's knowledge is adapted to address 
legal categories and issues of responsibility and detention, even though 
diagnostic categories are descriptions of mental states whereas the law is about 
normative judgments about the mind and the nature of choice and 
responsibility. However, by incorporating the medico-psychological language 
and experts the nature of legal discourse is linked to the 'neutral' diagnostic 
categories, which precludes overt force to meet social policy requirements to 
ensure social order and public protection (Foucault 1978: 41; 1977: 187). 
Significantly, it would appear that the operation of law does not support 
Foucault's assertion that law defers to medicine (1978: 41). There is more 
support for Hacking's claim that there is a matrix of interactive processes that 
develop around categories (1999: 29-30). However, from the discussions in this 
chapter arguably Teubner's claim that law is an autopoietic, self-referential 
system is most clearly evident (Eastman 2000: 94-5; King & Piper 1995). It 
modifies rather than adheres to the medico-psychological evidence, such "that 
it rapidly drifts away from its original scientific meaning and its parentage 
become unrecognisable" (Eastman: 95). Furthermore the evidence is applied to 
very distinct legal conceptions and categories constituted in the defences of 
insanity and diminished responsibility, which are then used to assess 
individuals with particular mental states. Individuals are semantic artifacts 
produced by legal discourse (King & Piper: 27). This illustrates that language 
is not neutral, but is used to construct particular legal categories that 
distinguish individuals who enter the legal system. Language is performative 
not just descriptive within both disciplines, although more actively in the legal 
context it seems (Taylor & White 2000: 25-40). Take the words abnormal and 
disorder for instance (Hollin 1989: 99): 'abnormal' can mean wrong in a 
statistical sense, or wrong in a moral, judgmental sense, although it can be said 
generally to convey negative connotations; whereas 'disorder' could imply 
something is in disarray that can be put right - it does not evoke the same 
interpretations of good or bad. Therefore, the label 'mentally disordered 
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defendant' does not evoke the same negative response as 'mentally abnormal 
offender'. 
Conclusion 
It can be seen from this chapter that the judiciary are significant and limit the 
scope of the mental elements within the two defences by developing legal 
interpretations which do not represent current medico-psychological 
understanding of the mind. Through the vague construal of the terms and 
imposing a legal meaning onto medico-psychological based concepts, a 
flexible approach can be taken and legal control is retained over the operation 
of the defences. This has to be viewed in conjunction with the legal 
justifications that have developed for filtering the admission of evidence, 
discussed further in chapter four. The particular problems that emerge with 
psychopathy and intoxication serve to highlight the tensions that arise between 
the current legal perspective on criminal responsibility and requirements for 
securing social order and public protection. There are arguments that could 
allow the law to operate in any number of ways and the choices that are made 
provide interesting social and moral commentary. However, procedurally most 
cases of diminished responsibility do not go to court if in the experts' opinion 
the defendant's mental responsibility is substantially diminished. Thus moral 
decisions are being made that may not be in line with the strict letter of the law, 
and which are not as readily open to scrutiny. This shows that the pre-court 
process is important and this is explored through the interview data in chapters 
six and seven. Finally, the chapter examined the potential implications for the 
emerging trend towards biological explanations for the operation of criminal 
responsibility. It would appear that owing to the current state of scientific 
knowledge this does not constitute an imminent problem and acknowledging 
such matters could actually result in more extensive powers of control. As 
Alper suggests, "genes and environment influences should be treated 
equivalently" (p.1609). The use of diagnostic categories, however loosely, 
keeps the focus on the defendant's mental state, and the content of those 
disorders is not necessarily made explicit, yet they will be based on the range 
of factors described in chapter two which are rejected in the legal stance. This 
chapter has provided evidence of a symbiotic relationship between law and 
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medico-psychology, the nature of which is very different at the verdict and 
sentencing stage, which is examined further in chapter four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND SCIENCE: COURTS, 
EXPERTS AND EVIDENCE 
Introduction 
Previous chapters have outlined the theoretical and substantive legal issues, 
showing that the law does not simply adopt the medico-psychological 
perspective of the mind. However, although the investigation into this area 
began with the philosophy and framing of the issues, it became apparent how 
important procedures are. This is the second facet of the second dimension of 
the analysis of the interaction of law and medico-psychology, which again 
focuses on the significance of the judiciary. Chapter three outlined the 
judiciary's importance in the development of a particular legal interpretation of 
the medico-psychological criteria and the terms used in the defences of insanity 
and diminished responsibility. Chapter four addresses the procedural controls 
on the admission of expert evidence, which further affects the content and 
presentation of expert evidence heard by the jury. Initially an overview is 
provided of the historical development and foundations of legal recourse to 
expert scientific evidence, and the evolution of the forensic medico-
psychological expert, as this gives a context to the legal rulings. Following this 
there will be an examination of the rules on the use of expert witnesses and the 
admissibility of their evidence. 
The Efficacy of Using Science in Law 
Law is presented as an objective and neutral institution in pursuit of the facts 
and science has become an integral part of the legal process, presented as an 
objective source of evidence helping the law to achieve justice. The objectivity 
of both can be challenged. Law is a social institution; the criminal court is 
charged with ensuring justice in individual cases but there is also an inherent 
symbolic role because decisions have wider social implications than the fate of 
the individual. Thus the court has to ensure authoritative verdicts are achieved 
in line with overarching objectives, such as social order and public protection 
(Smith 1989: 56-9). Legal decision-making is a contingent process that is 
presented as a neutral procedure (Smith & Wynne 1989: 5-8). For example, 
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chapter three shows how criminal responsibility is a matter of social 
negotiation with a lack of boundaries between fact and value, and the following 
discussion further highlights how the values inherent within law subtly affect 
what is held to constitute valid knowledge. Significantly, the law's pursuit of 
objective facts is via the application of legal rules that incorporate particular 
legal classifications. Critically, the law determines the questions to be 
addressed within specific areas of law in individual cases, as chapters one and 
three reveal. Wynne maintains that it can be difficult to determine the key 
questions because of the different forms of normative reasoning available, 
enabling judges to exercise discretion as to which one is pivotal and concordant 
with the preferred final judgement (1989: 48-9). This is powerfully illustrated 
by the provocation case of Smith [2001] discussed in chapter one. 
Similarly, scientific investigation is assumed to be objective because 
knowledge is revealed through careful observation and analysis, but it too is 
founded on judgments within the field about such matters as the fit of 
experiments to theories, prefaced by judgments and interpretations of the 
theory, which in tum influence observations in the experiments testing the 
theory.260 Scientific sub-cultures have taken for granted assumptions that affect 
determinations about sameness and difference. Scientific claims that it 
considers facts and explains them logically to provide universal theories ignore 
the psychological, historical and social conditions that influence the theories 
through which science develops.261 Thus culture, policy, history, and 
intellectual commitments and choices inform the social construction of 
professional classifications (Wynne: 53-4). Morrow and Brown argue 
dominant political and social interests shape the development of science and 
technology and that science mediates social relations (1994: 63-79). Yet the 
myth of scientific neutrality obscures this process and supports the legal myth 
that decisions are impartial and objective rather than a feature of the political-
. t 262 economIc contex . 
260 This is considered in chapter 5 in relation to this research project. 
261 Briggs & Peat (1985) also discuss this. .... 
~ 6 2 2 Smith & Wynne refer to the Cleveland inquiry to illustrate the pomt (p.IO). SmIth dIscusses thIS 
through an examination of the I RA cases (pp. 77 -80). 
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Therefore, the factual questions to be addressed are not part of neutral 
frameworks and rules; it is not a deductive process, but one where the focus, 
analysis and responses are made in line with the practical considerations and 
social conventions inherent within the institutional regime. As part of the legal 
process expert knowledge, where necessary, is deconstructed, reconstructed 
and buttressed in line with legal requirements. In particular, forensic science 
has developed in response to legal needs for specific expertise, which 
"presupposes an agreement that legal and not scientific ends finally structure 
the production and application of knowledge" (Smith: 57). Yet medico-
psychology is also concerned with the classification of individuals, which was 
discussed in chapter two, but the argument was made that medicalization is a 
social process, whereby matters subject to moral evaluation are also the object 
of medical practice (Smith 1981: 32). Therefore, notwithstanding that medico-
psychology is an independent field of knowledge, 
"[m]edical thought and practice always exist in relation to other forms of thought and 
practice ... [for example] law and order. .. [providing] lines of differentiation which define 
certain persons, groups, sites, locales as appropriate for medicine and others as not" (Rose 
1994: 57). 
However, SCIence tries to discover the universals amongst the particulars, 
whereas courts are concerned with the particulars amongst, the universals 
I 
(Faigman: 69). Yet law and the juridical field manipulate and control expert 
knowledge to their own ends (Smith 2000: 283). Pellizzoni (2001) suggests 
that there are two ways in which the law controls the impact of medico-
psychological discourse: through 'external' power, which consists of the ability 
to acknowledge or disregard a speaker or discourse, and 'internal' power, the 
ability of an argument to eliminate other arguments by demonstrating its 
superiority. Chapters three and four provide support for this form of control 
and exclusion. 
Despite the fundamental differences between the concerns of law and science 
when looking at the same issue, which chapter one and two have highlighted, 
the law's need to apply rules that can be interpreted in a flexible manner 
according to a range of circumstances in line with legal requirements means 
that it is not concerned with medico-psychological understanding of the issues. 
Expert evidence is in many ways symbolic, as is shown by the lack of 
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adherence to medico-psychological understanding in the interpretation and 
operation of the insanity and diminished responsibility defences. It was argued 
in chapter three that the perspective and understanding detailed in chapter two 
enter through the back door through legal reference to the diagnostic condition 
without any overt acknowledgment of all that it incorporates, so the theoretical 
legitimacy of the law remains unchallenged because it is the legal question that 
is ostensibly addressed. Morawski (1999) attributes the lack of true facts in law 
to the socialization of the physical world, and the juridification of the social 
world. 
Pragmatic use is made of experts by both sides as the adversarial process 
means that experts are selected not for their neutral standing but for their 
contribution to the case. Moreover, as the medico-psychological expert's 
knowledge does not accurately fit into the practical legal questions, the 
lawyers, through the adversarial process, can highlight the gaps, undermining 
the expert's credibility, and maintaining the myth that it is possible to 
distinguish between fact and value, or science and social interests. As a result, 
some scientific disciplines criticise the adversarial process, but forensic science 
itself developed from the legal context (Wynne: 35). Thus expertise has the 
indirect and symbolic role, as well as the more direct instrumental role. 
The Rise of the Forensic Medico-Psychological Expert 
Introduction 
Having briefly discussed the legal efficacy of using science with reference to 
the discussion so far in the thesis, this section examines the development of the 
role of the medico-psychological expert in cases, which originated in relation 
to insanity.263 Significantly, during the 18th and 19th centuries social and 
political changes were taking place that led to transformations in penal thinking 
and the law (Smith 1981: 4). Also at this time the state of medico-
psychological knowledge was developing, as in the late 18th century expert 
evidence was not dissimilar to that of lay witnesses, comprised of a mixture of 
fact and opinion (Ward 2001: 106-9; Eigen 1994), whereas by the early 19th 
century medical experts began to claim a special status as a result of observing 
263 For a historical ovcrvicw covering the deyelopments in France see Harris (1989). and in Scotland see 
Houston (2003). 
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those detained in prisons, and the asylums that emerged mid-century (Smith 
1981: 3). Asylums were an important factor in the development of psychiatry, 
which was further helped by emerging information on the physiology of the 
brain. Challenges to the prevailing understanding of mental illness surfaced, 
and professionals started providing specific evidence about the defendant to 
juries. Moreover, the expert's claim to a unique body of knowledge led to the 
view that juries needed help to interpret the expert's observations on the 
defendant's behaviour, which was the state of affairs at the time of the 
M'Naghten trial (1843) when the legal rules of insanity were delineated. 
Interestingly, at the time, the Scottish courts adopted a very different position 
and held there was no definitive legal definition of insanity,264 and that it is not 
a matter of law or science, but a matter for the jury, based on daily life 
(Johnstone 1998: 115_6).265 
As identified previously, there are two dimensions to medico-psychological 
involvement in the legal system. The first is the role experts have in respect of 
assessments of a defendant's responsibility, and the second concerns 
involvement in detention decisions. What follows is a brief review of these two 
aspects. 
Experts and Responsibility 
The law only permits limited moral exceptions to the normal objective standard 
of responsibility, as highlighted by the debates in chapter one. Medicalisation 
became part of the process of making moral judgments by 1884-85 when 
prosecution procedures in murder cases required the Director of Public 
Prosecutions to ensure that medical evidence was submitted on the defendant's 
mental state (Ward: 113-4). Johnstone maintains that psychiatry has had little 
impact on the substantive law, although it challenged the law's right to be the 
only judge on matters of responsibility (pp. 84-5). There are a number of ways 
in which the law has restricted the impact of expert evidence on questions of 
responsibility. First, as chapter three established, the defences concerned with 
the state of the defendant's mind do not reflect current scientific thinking, 
which was the case even in the 1840s and 1850s where law held that 
264 HIIf Advocate v Miller (J 874) 
265 HM Advocate v Macklin (J 876) 
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defendants needed to be suffering from gross delusions or severe disturbances 
to qualify for the defence, whereas the view of medico-psychology included 
'partial insanities', 'moral insanity' and 'homicidal mania without disorder of 
intellect' (Johnstone: 86; 109;266 Smith 1981: Ch. 3). These were conditions 
where the person had the power of comprehension but they could not feel for 
another person or control their behaviour by an act of will, so their moral 
appreciation of situations was impaired. These are what would now be termed 
psychopathic tendencies and defects in the capacity for volition, which were 
held as irrelevant by the law as those affected by them were sane and should be 
punished, despite the challenges of medico-psychologists. This is still the 
position with regard to insanity, although these attributes are taken into 
consideration under the diminished responsibility defence, as chapter three 
discusses. 
In addition to the substantive framework limiting and redefining the medico-
psychological perspective, early Victorian judges favoured the prosecution 
because the prevailing views on criminal liability were strict, which could 
manifest itself in hostility to medical witnesses in the judge's summmg up 
(Ward: 113). Through judicial directions reference was often made to the 
speculative nature of the medical evidence because it was claimed that medics 
could not agree on diagnoses,267 and there were observations on the dangerous 
social consequences of accepting the medical view of responsibility.268 It was 
argued that the power to absolve from responsibility should not be in the hands 
of a profession that had no regard for the protection of society. Furthermore, it 
was claimed that juries should have an active role in deciding if particular 
scientific theories formed a safe basis for conviction or acquittal. 269 These 
arguments are still in evidence today. However, Ward maintains that the 
scepticism of judges decreased throughout the Victorian era, partly because of 
the procedural changes requiring that medico-psychological evidence be 
provided in murder cases. Arguably, medical views on madness were also 
entering into common perceptions as the discipline developed. In terms of 
266 Two key narratives were Isaac Rays Medical Jurisprodence of Insanity, and Wilson and \laudsleys 
Responsibility in Mental Disease. 
267 A.S. Taylor (1866) A Manual of Medical Jurisprodence, 8th edn. London: Churchill. 
26R Prior (1848) Times II Mar., 7; Smith (1849) Times 13 Mar., 7 and Southey (1865) 4 F. & F. 864 
(Ward: 113). '. .
269 IF. Stephen (1863) 'On Trial by Jury, and the EVIdence of Experts, In Papers Read Before the 
Judicial Society. Vol. 2. London: William Maxwell: 236-49 
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medico-psychological challenges to the restrictive legal approach, Smith 
maintains they diminished as it was appreciated that the rules operated flexibly 
enough to allow decisions which on the whole did not challenge the expert's 
own viewpoint (1981: 88-9). 
It would appear that little has changed in terms of the substantive law or 
control of the admission of evidence since the middle of the 19th century where 
it was ensured that psychiatric knowledge does not interfere with the court's 
public role of censuring crime and criminals (Johnstone: 100-102). It would 
seem that psychiatry is perceived as too equivocal about moral responsibility 
and blaming people for their actions, although explaining behaviour in 
psychiatric terms is not necessarily excusing it. Law asserts that the legal 
principle of moral responsibility is vital for the functioning of modem society 
and is therefore reluctant to acknowledge the psychiatric viewpoint, whose 
explanations of the mind challenge the legal perspective. Hence the decisions 
of Chard and Turner which assert that medico-psychological evidence is not 
allowed into court regarding mens rea unless the defendant's mental state is an 
issue with regard to a defence (Mason et al 1999: 523-25). Notwithstanding 
this, the expert's role is important in diminished responsibility cases where 
their opinion on the ultimate issue can carry a lot of weight because, although 
discussions focus on the jury deciding the matter, many cases do not go to trial. 
Moreover, in light of the complexity of the evidence it has to be asked how 
competent is the jury to evaluate all the legal and medical evidence. Arguably, 
the legal position is less stringent in diminished responsibility cases because 
the defendant is admitting guilt and the evidence provides mitigating 
information for the sentencing stage. Eastman suggests, "the absence of a clear 
welfare function of criminal law, at least during the trial stage of a hearing 
directed towards verdict, will tend to maximise any 'Teubner effect'" (2000: 
93_94).270 Even the cases dealing with such matters as BWS, which are 
derogations from strict legal theory, modify justice rather than introducing a 
welfare aspect because the condition is a legal one rather than one originating 
from the medico-psychological professions. 
270 Teubner's theory is discussed in the introduction, chapter 3 and re-visited in chapter 8. 
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Experts: Detention, Punishment and Treatment 
Conversely, medico-psychological involvement appears to be much less 
contentious on conviction, where psychiatry has become more influential since 
the 1860s and 70s, as medicalization became part of the management expertise 
in control and detention options (Smith 1981 :33). As a result of the small 
number of insanity cases and increasing interest in the 'dangerous classes' 
psychiatric interest slowly moved from the insanity defence towards how to 
handle and process habitual criminals (Johnstone: 87-96).271 This was in the 
context of a time of social change as industrialisation gave rise to new 
problems of social control and demanded new forms of social behaviour. 
Individuals held to be a problem were being constructed as mentally deficient 
because "it helped explain why habitual criminals were not deterred through 
ordinary penal measures" (ibid: 95). Thus individuals were punished for what 
they were, or were supposed to be, as well as for what they did (Foucault 1998: 
447). There was a shift from attempts to obtain compassion for those deemed 
insane towards interest in ensuring that mentally abnormal offenders, which 
included all habitual offenders, were subject to effective means of control. 
Thus from the 1860s medical-psychologists argued for habitual offenders to be 
held as individuals without rationality and the capacity for free will, on a par 
with dangerous lunatics. But the medico-psychological field criticised the law 
in respect of both groups, arguing that whilst proportionality was appropriate 
for punishing normal criminals, habitual offenders needed a medical 
assessment to determine the extent of their dangerousness and their capacity 
for reform, and furthermore that the law did not take into account the 
possibilities for treatment and cure of the insane. Thus in addition to the trials 
on insanity, what emerged were trials where issues of normality and moral 
defectiveness were reviewed at the sentencing stage, anticipating the current 
diminished responsibility defence. Consequently psychiatry became useful to 
the criminal justice system's efficient management and control of offenders 
because the medical justifications enabled interventions which could not be 
justified in purely legal terms. 
271 Foucault (1998) describes 191h century psychiatry's conceptualization of the dangerous individual. 
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With each dimension of the expert's role comes responsibility for making 
decisions about which particular medico-psychological or legal categories an 
individual qualifies for, with the consequences of that decision. The scope of 
the forensic role and issues arising from the production of the evidence will 
now be examined. 
The Forensic Medico-Psychological Expert's Role 
Introduction 
Presently forensics incorporates both psychiatry and psychology, the latter of 
which emerged about 100 years ago (Thomas-Peter & Warren 1998: 79-80).272 
However, the criminal courts in the cases under scrutiny appear to favour 
psychiatry (Redding et al 2001), which relies on medical models, which Hollin 
attributes to a lack of understanding about the role of a psychologist and the 
contribution they can make (1989: 176_80).273 This preference may be 
explained by the fact that historically experts were initially involved with 
insanity cases where the focus is disease of the mind based on medical models. 
Also the law first sought biological rather than social explanations for criminal 
behaviour (Grob 1999).274 Additionally, there is a strong medical lobby within 
parliament, which has meant psychiatrists have b e c o m ~ ~ involved III 
administrative, political and moral issues (Thomas-Peter & Warren: 103). 
Differences Between the Clinical and Forensic Assessments 
Chapters one and two have illustrated the different perspectives on the mind 
and chapter three shows how this has led to legal interpretations of medico-
psychological concepts within the defences. Thus mental health practitioners 
are likely to experience cognitive dissonance within the legal context because 
of the differing perceptions (Eastman 2000: 83). In terms of roles, clinically 
medico-psychological disciplines focus on the welfare of the patient and 
identifying where possible means of rectifying disorders, whereas in their 
forensic role they have a number of different responsibilities related to 
272 For an overview of law and psychology over the 20 th century see Ogloff (2000). Atkinson (2001) 
claims cognitive neuropsychology can offer the possibility of a ? v ~ n c i n g g understa.nding of p s y c ~ i a t r i c c
disorders through psychometric tests to measure mental charactenstlcs. Hayes prOVIdes an evaluatIOn of 
such tests (1984: Ch.1 0). . 
273 This is supported by the interviews although it would not appear to be the case more generalIy (Holhn 
1989: 175). Grob (1999) describes the influences of biological thinking on the development of psychIatry. 
274 Although Larson (1999) highlights that there have been severe consequences from accepting 
biological explanations for criminal behaviour in the past. such as sterilization. 
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providing reports and gIvmg testimony m court if required. 275 Moreover, 
references to medico-psychological experts encompass two professions that 
undertake different analyses of the mind, and references to studies conducted 
elsewhere show that the role is not necessarily undertaken in the same way in 
every culture as there are diagnostic and policy variations (Niveau & Sozonets 
2001). 
With regard to training, there is a forensic component to psychiatric training276 
and since 2000277 the British Psychological Society has provided a Diploma in 
Forensic Psychology.278 There are also the expert witness organizations, The 
Expert Witness Institute, The Academy of Experts and The Society of Expert 
Witnesses, all of which provide information and support. In addition Solon 
(2003) developed the Bond Solon organization specifically to offer expert 
witness training, in conjunction with Cardiff University.279 Interestingly, Dr. 
Jamieson, director of the Scottish Forensic Institute states that the Forensic 
Science Society is developing standards but '''Forensic' Psychology we regard 
as so far 'out there' that it is not even on our agenda" (2004).280 
Notwithstanding these training options, experienced senior clinicians' training 
is unlikely to have included a forensic component, particularly within 
psychology. 
There are fundamental differences between the clinical and forensic roles. The 
clinical role is concerned with diagnosing mental disorders and providing 
appropriate treatment interventions. The forensic role incurs a number of 
additional consequences to these two facets of the clinical role. First, the legal 
system is concerned with how the clinical diagnosis relates to the intent/actions 
of the defendant at the time of the offence, which the expert may be assessing a 
considerable time after the event; secondly, thought has to be given to the link 
between the diagnosis and legal standards enshrined in the defences, such as 
whether the mental responsibility of the defendant was substantially 
275 Jager (200 I) explains the position in Australia and S a ~ o f f f (200 I) .in the U.S .. 
276 The Psychiatric Training Manual (2001). For an overvIew see ReISS a ~ d d Meux (2000) .. 
277 The British Psychological Society Regulations and Svllabusfor the Diploma In ForenSIc Psychology 
m The Board of Examiners for Forensic Psychology was not established until 2000. 
279 This was also an aspect of the role and organizations of one the experts interviewed. . . . 
2RO Email communication 21/4/2004. Golding (1998) and Stone (1998) reflect on training and b ~ l n g g a 
forensic expert in the U.S. and the ethical difficulties because of the way that the law uses the testImony 
in relation to the defendant. 
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diminished; thirdly, there are ethical issues not associated with normal client 
interactions, for example, the assessment is at the request of another agency 
which determines the aims of the assessment and pays for it, so there are not 
the usual limits to confidentiality. Fourthly, any clinical opinions on treatment 
will inform any subsequent detention decisions. 
Because the assessments have a different focus the range of evidence sought 
and used in making a clinical judgment is different. For instance, specific 
measures have been developed, such as Forensic Assessment Instruments 
(FAIs),281 although Rogers and Sewell (1999) questioned the fact that insanity 
reports produced in the U.S. rarely made use of tests for evaluating 
responsibility. However, it would appear from the research that psychologists 
are more likely to use tests and psychiatrists are usually required to conduct the 
assessments in this context. Also important is the use of information from third 
parties,282 "because of the incentives for examinees to distort their responses to 
interview questions or test items" (Nicholson & Norwood 2000: 12). Experts 
also receive a copy of the case files in order to evaluate and test the veracity of 
the defendant's statements in light of that evidence, in contrast to a normal 
clinical setting where the patient's narrative may be accepted more readily. 
Furthermore, although the legal system is interested in the defendant's 
behaviour at the time of the offence, Scarano advocates the inclusion of a 
psychiatric evaluation of the individual's past because it fits in with the ethics 
of the profession (2001: 563).283 
However, it would seem from the discussions in previous chapters that the 
critical legal issue is the expert's capacity to link their clinical diagnosis to 
legal criteria. The psychiatrists in Mitchell's study claimed to recognize the 
distinction between the defences of insanity and diminished responsibility 
(1997: 627).284 It was said that the insanity defence is solely concerned with 
cognition whilst the diminished responsibility defence is less clearly defined 
and focused. The insanity defence was considered to be less important than s2, 
281 Nicholson & Norwood (2000: 11) provides a list of studies reviewing forms of assessment. 
282 Examples include medical, criminal justice, educational and employment records. interviews with or 
reviews of statements by witnesses, relatives and victims. 
283 See chapter 7 regarding the nature of the CPS reports. . ' 
284 Warren et al (2004) conducted an extensive review of this issue in respect of insanity reports In the 
U.S. 
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which Mitchell attributed to the fact that psychiatrists are rarely required to 
'd th' . d.c: 285 cons! er e msamty elence. A small number of respondents said that they 
contemplate whether the M'Naghten rules are relevant when conducting s2 
assessments. Mitchell's interviewees claimed that insanity is usually important 
in cases of psychosis, where it is necessary to consider if the killer knew the 
'nature and quality' of what they were doing, and whether or not they knew it 
was wrong. In terms of their perceptions of responsibility, although the 
defendant is only partially responsible with diminished responsibility and with 
insanity the individual bears no legal responsibility, some psychiatrists in 
Mitchell's study asserted that they do not consider that a person's 
responsibility can ever be totally impaired, that an impulse can never be totally 
irresistible. However the study concluded that at the extremes the court holds 
that control is so negligible that it can be ignored. Coles analyses the 
difficulties in trying to answer legal questions, highlighting how they often 
have many dimensions to them and yet experts have to provide one-
dimensional answers (2000:4). 
This understanding has to be translated into reports. Nicholson and Norwood 
evaluated forensic practice using data from studies on forensic procedure, 
judging them against standards contained in guidelines, standards of practice, 
training programme and certification procedures.286 High quality forensic 
practice is held to be when the reports and testimony "document the examiner's 
adherence to the legal and ethical contours of the evaluation, focus on relevant 
legal questions and criteria, describe the factual and clinical material that led to 
the opinions expressed, and communicate findings in language that is 
comprehensible to persons not trained as mental health professionals" (p.10). 
This last admonition is important for the legal profession and the jury. 
However, as Foucault (1977)287 suggests, it is hard to step outside one's own 
discipline as training inculcates professional perspectives and language.288 
Nicholson and Norwood discovered discrepancies between the statements 
made by professionals about their practices and the evidence in the reports. For 
example, in the surveys forensic psychologists claimed that explaining to the 
2R5 This assertion is supported by my study. 
2R6 There were two types of studies available, surveys of psychological experts and legal personnel, and 
those using sanitized copies of forensic reports, which had been coded. 
2R7 See introduction 
2RR See chapters 6 and 7. 
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defendant the purpose of the assessment and the limits to confidentiality was 
important, yet content analysis of reports showed that this was rarely done 
(p.39). Experts are supposed to state clearly what facts they base their opinion 
on and it is unclear if when new facts emerge they are asked if their view 
would be different. 
But critically "the professional aims, training and philosophies of the persons 
in these two groups have nothing in common, and are in some respects 
antithetical", which results in confusion of purpose, mutual incomprehension 
and friction (Mustill 1998: 65). Yet it is the expert who relinquishes 
professional clarity to meet the demands of the legal system in the assessment 
and report, and on entering court the expert's control of the evidence is further 
reduced, as discussed throughout the remainder of the chapter. In addition the 
evidence has to be simplified, perhaps oversimplified, for the sake of the jury, 
because the law does not want vast detail, the conclusions on the impact of 
condition on the defendant's mental state being the crucial point. Medico-
psychological evidence is also required at the sentencing stage and the 
diagnostic information that would normally inform treatment interventions has 
to be reconceived to take account of matters relating to risk and dangerousness. 
Therefore there are additional ethical issues for forensic psychiatry to consider 
than are presented by the normal clinical setting because of the moral claims of 
social groups and individuals affected by legal decisions (Sameer & Adshead 
2002). 
The Admission of Expert Evidence 
Introduction 
The discussion so far supports the proposition that the interaction of law and 
science is not a neutral process as law uses science strategically and requires a 
very particular role of the forensic medico-psychological expert. The next 
section discusses the procedural and judicial controls on the admission of 
expert evidence into court in support of the defences, which is influenced by 
factors discussed earlier, namely the belief in the value of the limited legal 
assessment of responsibility and the desire to ensure that trials are conducted in 
line with legal objectives and not those of medico-psychology. Thus there are 
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boundaries imposed on expert authority defined by the courts view of the 
problem rather than by relation to professional hierarchies of skill or 
knowledge (Wynne: 39-46). While it has been stated that many cases do not go 
to trial, nevertheless the rulings form a backdrop to decisions and practitioner's 
work because the presumption is that the case will be tried, and therefore the 
evidence has to be robust enough to survive the adversarial process if it does. 
In order to adequately address the court process it is necessary to provide a 
brief outline of the nature of expert evidence, which encompasses fact and 
opinion, and the impact of the adversarial process. 
Evidence: Fact or Opinion 
Expert evidence can take two forms, fact or opinion, each seen as presenting 
problems within the legal system. With regard to the former, expert knowledge 
is often presented in terms of probabilities, in line with the spectrum 
perspective summarised in chapter two, which contrasts with the dichotomous 
legal approach. It is suggested that juries can find it difficult to understand the 
reasoning behind probability compared with quantitative statements (Smith 
1989: 64-6). Experts may also be permitted to offer an opinion. In the wardship 
case R (A Minor) [1991] it was held that experts should only express opinions 
that they genuinely hold, which are not biased in favour of one party. In the 
context of the current discussion expert opinion could involve linking clinical 
assessments with facts and legal criteria, or an opinion on the ultimate question 
being determined by the court, as with diminished responsibility. The latter is 
the most problematic because it involves moral and justice questions that are 
beyond the remit of the mental health expert's domain. Mitchell found that 
experts were sanguine, deriving little help from case law (1997: 627). It was 
said that some conditions, such as psychosis, were easier to comment on than 
personality disorder and depression, where the differences between normality 
and abnormality were less pronounced. 
The fact/opinion distinction has not gone unchallenged. The philosophy of 
science disputes the possibility of distinguishing unproblematically between 
fact and opinion (Smith 1989: 66-9). For instance, answers that are not a 
simple yes or no may be treated as opinion because even though the answers 
are premised on probability, the possibility of a theoretical alternative can be 
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interpreted as uncertainty, which is an option the court can readily utilise. In 
verifying this with forensic pathologists, scientists and psychiatrists, Smith 
found that the first two groups considered that there was no problem 
distinguishing between fact and opinion, whereas psychiatrists thought there 
could be. Arguably this could be explained by the different nature of the 
disciplines.
289 
Smith asserts that the admission of expert opinion is itself tacit 
acceptance that facts do not speak for themselves, although he acknowledges 
that some facts might be difficult to comprehend. He also suggests that it 
illustrates that the court's comprehension is interpretative because, for 
example, both defence and prosecution counsel adopt an interpretative 
approach to the content of factual statements. Yet the myth of the fact/opinion 
distinction is perpetuated, which in line with arguments already made in this 
thesis provides a measure of flexibility in the legal response to the evidence 
and the credence that is accorded to it. 
The Adversarial Process 
The adversarial system polarizes rather than reconciles differences, which 
affects the approach to experts and their evidence. 
Professional Identity 
Lawyers know little about scientific disciplines and it seems only need to know 
a little, and are more concerned with winning, so it is more important for them 
that their expert appears credible rather than necessarily being clinically able. 
Courts usually favour the expert perceived to be the most prestigious witness, 
for example, when neurologists and psychologists disagree about the degree of 
impairment resulting from a head injury in a civil case, the neurologist's views 
will prevail. The polarization inherent in the adversarial process can overlook 
the fact the experts come from different fields and use different methods 
(Smith 1989: 80-7). Earlier discussions noted the preference for psychiatrists 
over psychologists in criminal courts, which ignores the new trend to 
. k· 290 collaboratIve wor mg. 
289 Certainly the Director of the Scottish Forensic Institute distinguished what he saw as the vague science 
of psychiatry and psychology from the other sciences. 
290 For example see the work of Solms & Turnbull 2002 
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Evidence 
In terms of the approach to evidence, in contrast to medico-psychology the law 
adopts a dichotomous perspective, viewing matters in black and white terms 
because of the necessity for a verdict of guilty or not guilty (Thomas-Peter & 
Warren: 93). Whilst facts are always open to question the adversarial process 
favours the defendant because in criminal cases the standard of proof is 
'beyond all reasonable doubt', although owing to the admission of guilt the 
diminished responsibility defence only has to be proved by the defendant on 
the 'balance of probabilities'. The former standard however, is often an 
impossible requirement in science or medicine because of the spectrum 
approach. Moreover, with medico-psychology, even if there is a clear mental 
illness diagnosis, there is the possibility of dual diagnosis with a less serious 
condition, which can undermine the validity attributed to the former (Eastman 
1998: 120). Redding et aI's (2001) study of lawyers' and judges' VIews on 
mental health experts' testimony found they did not like the fact that 
supporting evidence was often presented in terms of probabilities. Supporters 
of the adversarial process argue that scientists are too imprecise and influenced 
by hidden bias, but that cross-examination can reveal the true facts. For 
instance, it was held on appeal in the case of Williams (2000), where the issue 
, 
was one of new evidence supporting a diminished responsibility plea, that 
discrepancies in the medical evidence could not be reconciled by written 
reports, and they needed to be resolved by oral testimony and cross-
examination. On the other hand the psychiatric respondents in Mitchell's study 
asserted that differences in opinion should be discussed in order to facilitate the 
clarification of scientific divergence, and the comparison of data and 
information, because the purpose is not to try to reach agreement, as 
disagreements are inevitable with, for example, personality disorders and 
'substantial impairment' (1997: 630). 
Thus the adversarial process results in an artificial polarisation of scientific 
discourse, implying that it is false, which publicly demeans science and 
encourages unbecoming conflict. Furthermore, the social context surrounding 
the controversy limits the extent or clarity of the deconstruction. Thus the 
adversarial system is not well suited to comparing and assessing the merit of 
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distinct kinds of evidence because the court takes an either/or approach to 
factual evidence, showing that it does not appreciate the different ways of 
formulating reality. 
Importantly, the expert is supposed to be an independent witness before the 
court but a number of factors potentially undermine this principle owing to the 
polarising nature of the legal process. Potentially problems could arise if 
experts regularly work for one side because this may foster a particular 
mindset. Furthermore, there is a rehearsal with counsel before the presentation 
of evidence and experts also help counsel identify the potential flaws in the 
expert evidence for the other side. Barristers are also trained in tactics for 
discrediting witnesses and their evidence (Hollin: 174). Thus experts 
experience a lack of control over their evidence once in the legal system, 
particularly in court. The value system and identity of their scientific culture 
can be stripped away, converting their expert knowledge into practical 
decisions (Wynne: 29-30; 37). 
However, there are limits to the process of deconstruction because scientists in 
conflict are still from the same professional milieu, and trust and co-operation 
play an important part in scientific interaction (Wynne: 37; Faigman 1999: 56). 
Furthermore, scientists differentiate between their rational approach and the 
adversarial system, which is recognised as having little to do with the truth and 
more to do with winning the case (Smith: 70-3). Thus there is an emphasis by 
scientists on personal integrity within the adversarial process as they mediate 
between the scientific and legal norms. Experts handle working within the 
adversarial system by, 
"intellectual identification with the scientific discipline; group solidarity among experts which 
overrides being pitched in opposition by the courts; ... ; conceiving of expert evidence as a 
service to the court ... ; and writing reports in a firm style that indicates to legal people the 
limitations of evidence and retains control over the possible meaning of expert knowledge" 
(Smith: 72). 
In addition Carson makes the point that being seen as an expert and surviving a 
battle of words and wits is prestigious (2000: 26). 
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The Judiciary 
Introduction 
Within the discussion on the efficacy for law of using science it has been stated 
that there are usually a number of legal options available for categorising the 
information presented in a case. Reported case law such as the provocation 
case of Smith [2001] shows this. It is an example of the strategic nature of the 
relationship between law and medico-psychology because, despite the lack of 
any direct reference to mental states, the judiciary has introduced the 
requirement that the defendant's mental state is considered. The greater 
recognition of mental characteristics of the defendant with the provocation 
defence is an illustration of the law extending the use of expert evidence 
strategically. As with diminished responsibility the defence depends on the 
expert being willing to give an opinion on whether they consider there is a link 
between the alleged abnormal mental state of the defendant and the legal 
criteria. The case has introduced a subjective element into what was intended 
as an objective defence. It is another example, like the diminished 
responsibility defence, which actually operates in a fairly benevolent manner, 
where strategic use is being made of expert evidence, despite the rhetoric about 
ensuring expert evidence does not overwhelm the law. Clearly this has not met 
with universal agreement, as the dissenting judgments and subsequent 
commentaries show. Critically, the practice of pleading both diminished 
responsibility and provocation together has muddied the waters between the 
two defences, illustrating the incoherence that can develop as a result of taking 
legally-driven strategic options in cases. Only time will tell how the judiciary 
might develop the defence as a result, and what legislative reforms might be 
introduced. 
The judicial gate-keeping role in applying the law includes the oversight of 
court processes, which includes such matters as the admission of expert 
evidence. There are questions over what informs judicial attitudes to mental 
health issues over and above the influence of the legal perspective with its 
inherent values and concerns (Woolf 2001; Griffiths 1997).291 Critically the 
exercise of discretion has led to rules relating to the credibility of the expert 
291 See chapters 6 & 7 
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and the content of their evidence. With regard to evaluating the content of the 
expert's evidence, chapter three has already shown that judicial understanding 
is not in line with current scientific understanding. Judicial training does not 
include the evaluation of science or an understanding of medico-psychology. 
With regard to legal considerations, earlier discussions indicate a tendency to 
limit the impact of expert evidence on the matter of responsibility in line with 
the points raised in chapters one and three. The courts have addressed the 
expert's duties and responsibilities, the credibility of the expert and their 
theories, which will now be examined. 
The Expert's Duties and Responsibilities 
The judiciary define the duties and responsibilities of expert witnesses in the 
cases of Ikarian Reefer I (1993)292 and the appeal case Ikarian Reefer II 
(1995),293 Clough [1998]294 and Carroll (1985).295 They are concerned with the 
expert being independent and having integrity about acknowledging where 
their expertise stops. Although the duties appear to be straightforward, it would 
seem they are not so readily applied in litigation (Edmond 2000: 222-4). For 
example, an identifiable tension exists between the duty of the expert to the 
court296 rather than the particular side they are acting for, and the adversarial 
process that underpins the operation of criminal cases. The court believes that 
experts have a duty to point out the strengths and weaknesses of their evidence. 
For example in R (A Minor) [1991] it was held that experts should be objective 
and not omit factors which do not support their opinion, and their opinions 
should be straightforward and not misleading; but this is not necessarily what 
their barristers will want. The barrister's role is to win the case and an 
important part of that is ensuring that their own expert appears credible while 
discrediting the evidence of the expert acting for the other side. Therefore, 
although "[ t ]he court is more likely to expect the expert than the barrister to 
describe 'the whole truth"', the questions asked affect the remit of the answers, 
which in tum can restrict the evaluation of the scientific evidence (Smith 1989: 
75).297 
292 Especially pp. 81-2, Cresswell j's judgement. 
293 pA96 for Stuart-Smith LJ 
294 p. 1484-5 
'9, 
- . pAI7 
296 Stochl'dl (1993) 
297 The interviewees discuss these matters in chapters 6 & 7. 
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Divisions in legal OpInIOn have also ansen regarding the admonition that 
experts only give evidence in their area of expertise. In lkarian Reefer I 
Cresswell J stated that experts should make it clear when a question falls 
outside their area of expertise. However, the Court of Appeal held that this mav 
not always be possible, and it is necessary for experts to consider the 
probabilities on hearing information from other experts. Another instance of 
differences in the two jUdgements relates to interpretations to be placed on an 
expert changing their stance. Formerly it was held that it made the expert 
appear unreliable whereas subsequently it was held that it demonstrated they 
were not biased or unwilling to make concessions. Edmond claims that this 
shows how norms can be used to either strengthen or weaken knowledge or 
authority, allowing identical knowledge and expertise to be understood 
differently. 
Expert Credibility 
Earlier discussions suggest that the law theoretically assumes that science is 
reliable, but it does not necessarily presuppose that individual scientists are 
(Wynne: 54). In Stockwell (1993) it was clarified what qualifications and 
experience are required to present expert evidence. Interestingly, an expert's 
credibility is only called into question if they are a witness, not if they are 
simply providing questions to counsel about the evidence presented by the 
expert acting for the other side. It has already been said that the law favours 
what are perceived to be the more prestigious witnesses, and may prefer 
particular disciplines in an area of law. Debates on expert credibility have also 
focused on approaches towards 'repeat players'. There have been differences in 
attitude between the U.S. and U.K., with the U.S. courts inclined to criticise 
those acting regularly as experts, unless they are state experts, whilst in 
England these attributes are viewed favourably (Edmond: 234-5). In fact 
inexperience has been a basis for English judges excluding evidence because of 
problems with communication, translation and simplification (Ikarian Reefer 
I). The adversarial system requires robust expert witnesses and legal personnel 
consider a good expert is one with good communication skills (Smith: 69-70). 
Certainly it would seem that the entry into the legal domain can lead to a 
change in meaning of expert evidence, or a loss of control by the expert, which 
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each legal side will want to minimise. In order to deal with the complexity of 
what is required, tacit skills resulting from the culture of practice prevailing 
within each professional field, which acts as the dominant guiding force, will 
be important, so many experts will be repeat players (Palmer 2000: 667). There 
appears to be little legal and forensic support for court-appointed experts, even 
with the option of each profession nominating its most professional experts, 
because of the possibility of error and bias.298 
Evidence Credibility 
The other area the judiciary challenge is the credibility of the evidence, on the 
basis of scientific method and whether or not it comes from an established 
scientific community within the field. 
Scientific Method 
At the outset of the chapter it was stated that scientific method can provide a 
powerful legitimation device, but it has also been a ground for challenging the 
reliability of evidence. The U.S. Supreme Court case of Daubert (1993) held 
that it is important to ascertain that the methods used are valid and reliable and 
then the court will not have to concern itself with ascertaining the reliability of 
the conclusions.299 This reasoning was adopted in Bonds (1993) but 
subsequently held to be too simplistic in Hall v Baxter Healthcare Corp (1996) 
because it meant that disagreements between experts on conclusions force the 
judge to think that there is some mistake in the investigative or reasoning 
process. The revised position acknowledged that "[t]here is no universal 
scientific method determining every aspect of scientific practice" (Edmond: 
220). But the judiciary have no training in evaluating such matters and so much 
depends on the medico-psychological discipline anyway. The courts use 
idealised norms about scientific procedures to distinguish 'proper' and 
'improper' scientific knowledge and practice. A study of judges' views on their 
gate-keeping role following the Daubert case found that whilst they thought 
the guidelines were useful they had trouble applying the criteria because they 
could not understand many of the scientific methods (Gatowski et al 2001: 
454). 
298 See chapters 6, 7 & 8 for further discussions. 
299 pr. 2795-97. 
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The U.S. courts have also used the fact that publications are peer-reviewed as 
evidence that the data in question is reliable, even though experiments are not 
necessarily replicated or results recalculated (Edmond: 230-33). English judges 
are more generous towards unpublished results, perhaps because of the absence 
of mass tort litigation and civil juries. Faigman asserts that there is no reason 
why the judiciary cannot master the scientific basics as they are intelligent and 
much of the scientific evidence they review is specifically for the courts (1999: 
64). 
Established Scientific Community 
Another factor courts have used to distinguish between evidence is whether 
there is an established field or community pertinent to the line of enquiry, 
although there seems to be little consensus amongst the judiciary about what 
the tenn 'scientific community' means (Edmond: 227_8).300 There is an issue 
around how the verification is undertaken as those presenting the evidence are 
likely to have a vested interest in confinning that there is an established 
community in respect of their evidence (Faigman: 62-3). There have been 
variations in judicial application of this rule, with England (Parkes [1987]; 
Bolitho [1998]) and Australia accepting evidence that represents a minority 
position more readily than the U.S .. In fact it would appear that the use of 
judicial statements as a line of reasoning to suit legal purposes is having 
ramifications for the scientific field. 30l For example, the appeal court in Carroll 
held there was a division in the field of odontology because of the disparity in 
the evidence provided by the three experts, and as a result the evidence was 
excluded and the conviction quashed. In contrast, in the case of Robb (1991) 
the expert presented phonetic evidence using techniques that were not accepted 
by the majority in the field, at least without additional verification/02 yet the 
court held that as the witness had not been proved wrong the evidence stood. 
On the matter of whether or not to include or exclude novel evidence, 
300 Bonds (1993) case & Jarrett (1994): 176; 189 . ' . 
301 As an example in the civil case of Parkes (1987) It was conceded It was not an easy matter for a Judge 
t decide between two experts. It was conceded that the longer experience of one lent value to their e ~ i d e n c e e but their seniority was also used to argue that they were le.ss likely to be receptive to ~ o d e m m
thinking. The judge opted for the more modem theory of the inexpenenced expert. based on the facts of 
the case. Harpwood (2001) discusses this in relation to Bolitho [1998]: 238-9; 241-2. See also ellmore 
r 1977]: 939-41; Carroll. 
~ 0 2 2 This was an issue in the case of 0 'Doherty [2002] as well. 
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"inclusion is usually explained in tenns of the pennissive and liberal aspects of 
evidence law. Where evidence is excluded, reference shifts to stress the 
importance of reliability, scientific recognition and dangers" (Edmond: 239).303 
This illustrates that judges manipulate evidentiary standards and categories to 
legitimate decision-making, which can result in ill-infonned judgments 
concerned with developing reasons to control the admission of expert evidence 
in order to ensure legal objectives. Thus, in light of discussions in chapter 
three, the law does not need to recognise the current state of medico-
psychological knowledge and therefore it is unlikely to worry about state-of-
the-art thinking, unless it represents a useful device to meet legal objectives. 
What is also evident is an ambivalent attitude to SCIence III that there is 
scepticism about the reliability of scientific evidence specifically for litigation 
purposes, the presumption being that there is rarely an alignment between 
science and society because the 'truth' science tries to uncover is "only 
occasionally and serendipitously coincidental with social and political uses" 
(Edmond: 224). This is tied into the assumptions discussed earlier that 
knowledge exists independently of context and/or purpose and is therefore 
neutral, objective and unbiased.304 It is the myth of the objective nature of 
science that buttresses the legitimacy of legal decisions. Yet the idea that 
science is abstract is also challenged by the fact the forensic science services 
have been spawned by the legal system.305 Whilst forensic facilities may be 
associated with such matters as pathology and DNA testing, although medico-
psychological professions have a distinct clinical role this chapter shows that 
there is also a distinct forensic function. Chapter three makes the point that 
experts are aligning their clinical opinion to categories that have legal rather 
than medico-psychological meanings. For instance the BWS was a legal 
concept that became a medico-psychological one, and ASPD and DSPD are 
related to the legal context and discourses. Furthennore, there is the medico-
psychological involvement in the detention role of the legal system. 
303 A recent example is Us. \' Sche.Oer (1998) 
304 See the English case of Whitehouse [1981]: 256-7 and the US case of Daubert: 1317 as examples. 
305 Daubert: 1317. 
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The Judge and Jury 
The jury are a key player in the court process because they make the final 
decision on the verdict. The analysis of the interaction between law and 
medico-psychology in court needs to take account of the fact the jury can 
potentially undermine legal control and the adversarial presentation of the 
evidence takes place before this critical audience. Judicial controls on the 
admission of expert evidence and of the court process will affect the jury's 
perceptions of the issues. Chapter three considered the importance of expert 
opinion but the final review of judicial controls on the admission of evidence 
requires a brief review of the judicial arguments centred round the jury role, to 
restrict the admission of expert evidence. In addition, there is the fact that 
judges sum up the evidence and explain the legal rules as part of their 
directions before the jury retire to make a decision. 
Admission of Evidence and the Jury 
Another basis on which judges assess the admissibility of expert evidence is to 
consider whether it is appropriate and necessary in terms of the jury's role 
(Edmond: 235-6). Admissibility in this context is covered by the Turner rule 
([1975]; Thomas-Peter & Warren: 93). First, the judge has to: consider if the 
evidence is overwhelming or confusing, because it is feared that if the jury are 
overwhelmed by the science they may attach more weight to it than it can bear. 
Secondly, expert witnesses can only testify when the matter in question is 
beyond the knowledge and experience of the judge and jury, such as with 
BWS, because the jury should be able to form an opinion on 'normal' human 
behaviour. 306 Thirdly, evidence can be excluded if it is thought the jury do not 
require assistance, the evidence is redundant, or it usurps the jury's role. 
Mackay and Colman, whilst conceding that the admission of expert evidence 
should be restricted, maintain that Turner is too dichotomous in its division 
between normality and abnormality, and argue that it would be better if 
evidence were permissible on abnormal and unusual states of mind that fall 
short of mental disorders, which may not be readily understood by the jury 
(1996: 95). Certainly the Turner rules give judges wide-ranging discretion to 
306 Edmond discusses this with reference to the Canadian case of Lavellee (1990) (pp.23 7 -8). 
include or exclude evidence that the jury hear in line with the legal objectives 
they want to prevail in the case. 
Judges'Directions and the Jury 
Judges give directions at the end of the trial on the relevant legal rules and 
. d . h . 307 Issues, an summanse t e facts and expert eVIdence. However, the jurors 
have no legal background and previous chapters have demonstrated the 
complex normative and moral nature of the cases under scrutiny. The Judicial 
Studies Board provides specimen judicial directions, including those for the 
law under discussion, which are available online.308 Although it is not feasible 
to detail the directions in full, observations from the diminished responsibility 
section that are salient to the debates are briefly reviewed. It is said that 
abnormality of mind includes matters of perception, understanding, judgment 
and will, which appears to be wider than the quote from Byrne on cognition 
and volition. Within the notes section there is an admonition that medical 
evidence be carefully scrutinised to consider how much depends on hearsay or 
statements made to the doctor by the defendant himself. There appears to be 
scepticism about the nature of the evidence and in particular the likelihood that 
the experts might be duped by the defendant (Smith [2002]). It was held that it 
was harder to lie about diagnostic matters than ordinary matters, and it is the 
former which are considered by the court. In addition, reference is made to 
ensuring that the jury are clear that alcohol and drugs are not covered by 
inherent cause. 
Observations on the matter of judicial directions have also been made in cases. 
For example, it was held in Lowe (2003) that judges can improvise in their 
explanations of the legal rules, the essential matter being that they are 
conveyed in clear and simple language. With regard to the summing-up of 
expert evidence the judicial review case of R (on the application of Farnell) 
[2003] and Norton [2002] state that it should be fair and balanced and that it 
should be borne in mind that it is unhelpful to saturate juries. However, it 
would seem that with selective summaries there is always the issue of bias on 
the part of the judge. Account also needs to be taken of the judge's symbolic 
307 Young (2003) has undertaken a comparative evaluation of the impact of judge' s directions based on 
jury research. 
30R http://www.jsboard.co.uklcriminal 
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status in terms of the weight that will be attached to what they say and the fact 
they are pulling the legal and evidential matters together at the end of the case. 
There are clearly problems. For example, the Taylor [2003] appeal concerned 
the adequacy of the judge's directions in a case where the defences of 
diminished responsibility and provocation were pleaded together. Similarly, in 
R (on the application of Farnell) [2003] there were problems with adequately 
addressing the new basis for provocation introduced by Smith [2001]. In 
addition, chapter one highlighted that jurors struggle with the concept of mens 
rea and the legal definition of intention. Chapter three has shown that medico-
psychological terms also have legal meanings, which may be very different 
from the medico-psychological profession's perspective and to the folk 
psychology of the pUblic. The jury have a number of grounds on which they 
can decide not to take into account the expert evidence, which were outlined in 
chapter three, but it seems an onerous task for the jury to distinguish these in 
light of the emotion in a case, complex directions and complex evidence. 
Young concludes that simplicity of language is important and suggests that the 
jury could receive directions at the start of a case as to the central issues in 
order to provide a focus (2003: 15-16). 
The Jury and Expert Evidence 
Whilst the law controls the remit of the defences and therefore the questions 
addressed and the admission of evidence, insanity and diminished 
responsibility verdicts are influenced by the application of science by the 
expert to the legal criteria. Although many cases do not go to trial as a result of 
expert evidence there is the impact of the interface between the expert evidence 
and lay consensus if the case reaches trial, with the final decision resting with 
the jury. The judicial controls on the admission of expert evidence with regard 
to its impact on the jury have just been noted. The interplay between science 
and the jury historically began with the expert acting as an adviser to the jury 
on the matter of insanity at the end of the 19th century (Ward: 105). But then 
experts did not examine the defendant as they do now, they commented on the 
case in light of their professional experience, which arguably usurped the role 
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f . 309 o wItnesses generally. The role of the jury was only preserved through 
judges insisting that whilst expert opinion should be taken into account it 
, 
should not be accepted uncritically. However, Ward argues that the expert's 
role has gone from one of adviser to authority in diminished responsibility 
cases (p.117). There is support for this in light of the judicial comments on the 
credence to be given to expert evidence once it enters into court, and the 
grounds on which the jury should ignore it, discussed in chapter three. In 
essence, if the experts agree, having taken all the facts into consideration, the 
jury is not expected to reach an alternative conclusion. 
Thus it seems that once the judges have decided the evidence is admissible in 
line with legal aims then it is to be relied on, as they want the jury to make 
decisions in line with legal objectives. Perhaps this is particularly the case with 
diminished responsibility because the defendant pleads guilty so the evidence 
is mitigating information for the sentencing stage. Significantly, in diminished 
responsibility cases the jury are still presented as having responsibility for 
deciding if there was a substantial reduction in mental responsibility,310 
although, as stated in previous chapters, since the case of Cox [1968] juries are 
rarely required to decide this. This means that the medical evidence in cases 
reaching trial will be contested and therefore the jury have to decide between 
competing viewpoints. Critically, the jury have a symbolic role for the 
professionals involved in the legal system because if there is an outcry about a 
verdict it can be said that the jury are responsible for the final decision. 
Similarly, the expert as an authority, both in court and through the operation of 
the Cox rule, may provide the law with an alternative device for displacing 
responsibility using the 'science card', should it be needed for the purposes of 
appearing neutral, even though chapters three and four show the level of legal 
control. McSherry argues that the role of deciding the ultimate issue should be 
given back to the jury as it involves social and moral considerations and 
experts should simply comment on whether the defendant was mentally 
impaired at the time of the offence (2001: 20). The evidence in chapter three 
does show that experts are aware that giving an opinion does require them to 
make social and moral judgments. 
309 Frances (1849) 
3 \0 Byrne (1960) & Egan [1992] 
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Research has been conducted into jury decision-making, which will be briefly 
reviewed because while only a few cases go to trial it is an important aspect of 
both the legal and medico-psychological role in court to convince the jury that 
their perspective on the incident is the right one. 
Jury Decision-Making 
Professionals fulfil their role within the constraints outlined and then 
responsibility for the verdict is devolved onto the jury. But most of what 
happens in court is far removed from ordinary conversation, yet it is heard and 
has to be understood by a lay audience (Lynch 1997: 126). The legal controls 
discussed in this chapter and chapter three affect the nature and scope of the 
evidence the jury hear, but the jury cannot be controlled beyond that, which is 
the concern that founds some of the suggestions in the Auld report, which 
proposes reform of the jury system.311 Clearly there is no way of knowing the 
basis to a jury's decision, but research has been conducted, often using mock 
juries?12 
The jury's assessment of the credibility of witnesses, including those giving 
eyewitness and expert evidence, takes place in an environment that is 
unfamiliar and stressful. Body language and speech styles have been identified 
as important considerations which can potentially influence decisions, as have 
the attractiveness of the defendant, their socio-economic status, gender, race, 
age and demeanour in court. 313 With regard to the latter, anxiety traits have 
been found to reflect those for dishonesty whereas confidence gives the 
impression of honesty (McEwan 2000: 114; Hollin 1989: 165-6). The more 
coherent a narrative appears the more likely it is to be believed, especially if it 
is tied to reality by means of factual evidence. This may mean that the fact such 
expert evidence is not anchored in legal requirements is overlooked. "The 
anchoring construction consists of evidence that connects the narrative to 
general beliefs" (McEwan: 116). Psychologists have also found that there is an 
innate tendency to create a story from what we hear, which is likely to be 
influenced by personally held perceptions of crime stories (Weiner et al 2002). 
311 See Dennis (2002) for a discussion on this. 
312 Darbyshire (200 I) reviews evidence on juries and lists the conclusions to be drawn. 
m Abshire & Bomstein (2003) look at the impact of race. 
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The quality of the 'case' story is affected by poor comprehension and memory 
(McEwan: 115). Cooper and Hall (2000) found that the expert was judged in 
terms of views on the parties they were representing. There is also the effect of 
the judge's instructions on evaluations of the expert evidence. Wheatman and 
Shaffer's (2001) study found that information on the detention options in 
insanity trials affected jury reactions. Schuller and Rzepa (2002) found that 
jury reactions to expert evidence on BWS were mediated by their views of the 
defendant and when judicial instructions indicated that they were not tied to the 
strict letter of the law. 
Next to be considered is jury comprehension and views of the legal rules. 
Collett and Bull Kovera (2003) compare the effect of British and American 
trial procedures on jury decisions and conclude that the British system is less 
distracting because there are fewer extra factors to interfere with the processing 
of the evidence, although it was suggested that the judge's non-verbal cues 
within the case had more impact. However, the research indicated that overall 
this did not improve the juries' capacity to determine the strength of evidence. 
Whilst the rules are complex, it has also been found that the judge's directions 
can be confusing because they refer back to matters that jurors are struggling to 
remember, having no experience of legal matters (McEwan: 112-4). Spackman 
et al (2002) suggest that instructions are construed by jurors to fit with their 
evaluations; for example, the murder/manslaughter distinction is affected by 
perceptions of the defendant's past behaviour and emotions. 
Mitchell found the public concept of mens rea was wider than the cognitive 
focus of the law because it took into account wider social policy issues, such as 
disregard for human life (2000: 826). Malle and Nelson's (2003) contrast of the 
legal and folk concepts of the mind, which included mens rea, illustrated how 
the two can clash and cause confusion for the jury, resulting in distortions of 
justice (p.578). This highlights the tension that exists with juries having to 
apply both legal concepts and common sense understandings. Malle and 
Nelson suggest the judge should specifically recognise and distinguish the two 
forms when instructing the jury. Research contrasting legal conceptions and 
common sense assessments of forseeability suggest that forseeability is more 
likely to be implied if it is easy to imagine or recall a personal instance, and if 
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an alternative outcome can be readily envisaged it is more likely to be thought 
that the resulting outcome could have been avoided (McEwan: 117-25). 
Psychologists have also shown that hindsight produces inflated perceptions of 
forseeability. The concept of the reasonable man also presents problems if he 
has to have similar characteristics to the defendant when medico-psychological 
problems are involved because without experience it is difficult to understand 
or conceptualise. 
Central to the cases under scrutiny are issues around mental illness and 
dangerousness, and the jury represent public attitudes, which will affect their 
reactions to the expert's evidence and the legal rules. Furthermore, murder 
cases are inherently emotional. Examples of research on these points include 
Angermeyer and Schulze's (2001) investigation into the potential impact of 
news reporting of violent incidents by the mentally ill on public attitudes. They 
concluded that although the information is not processed uncritically, the 
media do generate stereotypical images.314 Also, in chapter three the point was 
made that public perceptions of psychopathy are significant, and Guy and 
Eden's (2003) study on risk perceptions of violence examined the effect of pre-
conceived ideas on perceptions of expert evidence. Attempts have also been 
made to assess and measure the difference between moral' judgements of 
violent behaviour based on justice and vengeance (Ho et al 2002; Wolf 2001). 
Mitchell's (2000) surveys of public opinion on homicide found evidence that 
there is an attempt to respond in a discriminating and balanced way to the loss 
of life and the killer's culpability. There was also consideration of wider social 
implications, especially the matter of dangerousness, so although the mentally 
ill often commit brutal murders and are liable to repeat the behaviour, there 
was concern that individual responsibility was adequately assessed, as well as 
public protection being ensured (p.826). 
It would seem that individual perceptions about the correct verdict do not 
readily change, although the impact of group dynamics needs to be considered 
(McEwan: 112). The make-up of the group in terms of such things as attitudes 
and intelligence, which affect the capacity to deal with the information in the 
trial and the deliberations on the verdict are important (Hollin: 169-71). These 
314 See Williams (1994: eh. 4) on the media and perceptions of crime. 
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are likely to influence the evaluation of the facts and expert evidence (Mason et 
al 1999: 526). The issue of responsibility and blame has been investigated and 
it has been suggested that there is more responsibility attributed when the 
consequences are serious, although this is not an uncontested argument. There 
is also evidence that assessments are made of the victim's culpability. In 
addition, arguments have been made that evaluations of circumstances are 
made in terms of the belief that the world is just and that something can be 
done to avoid catastrophic incidents. It would appear that the discrepancies 
between legal and jury decisions lie most often in the realm of acquittals. 
Discussion 
The law upholds the rule that individuals are responsible and purports to ensure 
that any evidence indicating they are not is reliable (Gerard 1999). This chapter 
has already discussed the fact the law has deliberately aimed to limit the 
influence of medico-psychological evidence in respect of responsibility. In 
addition, the political thoughts and policies relating to the mentally ill are an 
important backdrop, as Stone (1984) illustrates through a comparison of an 
American and Russian case. It can be seen from chapter one that the shift and 
emerging emphasis on matters of dangerousness are important indicators, 
although it is clear from this chapter that this is a long-standing concern. 
Furthermore, the expert's evidence is tightly regulated in part because of 
concern that expert evidence could overwhelm the law, and the jury, as 
ultimate arbiters, will be deciding between experts and not the legal 
presentations of the facts (Coles & Veie12001: 616). 
Both this chapter and chapter three show the level and nature of legal 
intervention in relation to medico-psychological evidence but neither judges, 
nor lawyers in general, receive training in science or mental health issues, 
although Faigman maintains that they should (1999: 64).315 Arguably, judges 
gain some familiarity with evidence through experience, but evaluation appears 
to be informed by a combination of prejudices towards those that have mental 
illnesses, scepticism about experts and scientific method, and legal 
preoccupations with dangerousness. Significantly the law has led to the 
establishment of forensic experts and requires that specific legal questions be 
315 See chapter 6 
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answered, yet experts are required to provide independent evidence. 
Furthermore, the spectrum aspect of medico-psychological evidence is 
overcome by requiring an opinion on the matter, underpinned by the 
adversarial process. This shows the range of ways in which the law excludes 
and controls medico-psychological discourses to achieve the social and moral 
outcome preferred, it is not a neutral process. Therefore despite the amount of 
time that experts have been involved in the legal process, and the considerable 
developments in the understanding of the mind that have occurred within 
medico-psychology, the relationship has not fundamentally changed, as the 
reality of the knowledge of the mind is not required for the operation of the 
law. Procedural factors controlling the range of evidence is the critical factor. 
Mitchell expresses concern at the role required of psychiatry in areas where the 
law is under pressure to produce a particular result (1997: 623). Mitchell's 
study demonstrated that whilst psychiatrists do make use of the elasticity of s2 
to allow their personal views to be expressed, there was concern that the law 
uses them to mitigate potential injustices. Coles and Veiel assert that clinicians 
need to stay with the science and not use it to support a more personal position 
on the issues in the case (2001: 616). Lymburner and Roesch (1999) claim 
there is a shift in focus in Canada from the legal restraints on the operation of 
the insanity defence toward assessing the quality of forensic assessments and 
measures. It would appear from this study that they vary enormously. 
Mitchell's respondents want to see the law take more accurate account of 
psychiatric and psychological research. Mitchell argues that if the law is going 
to benefit from expert opinion in this way then "it needs either to do more than 
simply call for common sense or to ensure that the experts are not put in the 
invidious position of stepping beyond their expertise and probably significantly 
influencing the outcome" (p.632). But as chapter three showed, plainly the 
diminished responsibility defence is being operated in a benevolent manner by 
both professions. 
Moreover, if judges are ill-equipped to deal with expert evidence then juries, 
who are the ultimate arbiters, are in an even worse position. However, the story 
they hear is subject to gate-keeping by the judiciary through the restriction to 
legal categories and the admissibility of evidence, which is further exacerbated 
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by the adversarial process and counsel's fonn of questioning. There is currently 
considerable debate about the involvement and role of juries (Auld 2001: 
Carruthers 2001). The Auld report (2001) considered revisions to the jury 
process, which have been incorporated in the Criminal Justice Bill (2002). 
Essentially this includes provision for defendants to apply for the trial to be 
conducted without a jury (s36). Judges have criteria to help them decide. with 
public interest a major factor. The prosecution may also apply on the basis of 
the complexity of the case, but this seems to be restricted to financial matters 
because it has arisen as a result of concerns about fraud trials (s37).316 
Sentencing 
The intersection of law and medico-psychology also encompasses the 
sentencing stage of the criminal process. Earlier in this chapter the inception of 
the expert's role at the sentencing stage was reviewed, which has generated a 
different response from the legal system. Experts' court reports frequently 
provide evidence about risk and dangerousness but they are also called upon to 
undertake a specific report to help the judge decide on the most appropriate 
sentence. The primary legal focus with regard to risk is concern over violent 
behaviour because of the potential for hann to others. The debate extends 
beyond the individual to the social implications of being labelled a risk and 
dangerous. The foundations to the current approach were detailed in chapter 
one. 
The judiciary are again figural, detennining the place of detention, prison or 
hospital, and the length of the sentence. There are more consistent nonns with 
regard to verdicts than punishment, because of additional difficulties with the 
latter involving decision-making about whether treatment or punishment is 
most appropriate (Hawkins 1998); the debates and labels relating to deviance 
are not static. Solomka examined the role of reports in the passing of longer 
than nonnal sentences under s2(2)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991/17 
which requires a report if the defendant appears to be, or is, mentally 
disordered and poses a future risk of serious hann, unless the court considers it 
316 For commentary on the proposed changes see Elliott (2002); Robertshaw (2002). Honess (1998) 
evaluates the problems said to exist in complex fraud trials. . 
317 Wood (1998) contests the use of such sentences, arguing that ci\1I detention is more appropnate than a 
longer prison sentence for those held to be dangerous. 
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already has enough information to make a decision (1998: 408-11). The reports 
analysed included information on diagnosis, treatability, and risk of re-
offending. Detention in hospital requires the condition to be treatable under the 
MHA, an issue in civil and criminal detentions.318 What is considered 
treatment is important, feeding could arguably qualify, but it constitutes 
another flexible tool for the decision-making process. Forrester claims the 
treatability requirement has been interpreted liberally and pragmatically to 
achieve hospital detention (2002: 341). Scott discusses how important 
emotional literacy and the capacity to learn is considered to be (1998: 462). 
This reflects the perspective outlined in chapter two about the importance of 
emotion to decision-making and is significant for the assessment of 
psychopaths. Verdun-lones's discussions on the involvement of medico-
psychological experts in assessing dangerousness notes that because hospitals 
do not want psychopaths as they are considered untreatable they try to ensure 
that they do not have recourse to the MHA provisions (1998: 304; 310-11; 314-
5). Mason (2000) expresses concern about the psychiatrist's role because the 
law is unlikely to disagree with an expert who recommends the continued 
detention of a psychopath on the basis of risk. Mason asserts that there appears 
to be an increasing trend towards "using special hospitals as places of 
detention", which is supported politically and publicly by concerns about those 
with personality disorders and public safety. 
However, the reliability of risk assessments has been called into question 
(Solomka: 414; Scott 1998; Menzies et al 1998). There are doubts about the 
accuracy of the research that underpins assessments because of the inconsistent 
results, such as the arguments made in the Nuffield report discussed in chapter 
three (Thomas-Peter & Warren: 96-7; Mason 2000).319 For example, violence 
has social, psychological and biological antecedents, and in addition the 
samples are open to challenge. Menzies et al claim that 
"danger, violence, risk, psychopathy, conduct disorder, and related constructs are not discrete 
or insulated entities amenable to narrow scientific calibration - rather, they are complex, 
multidimensional, and discursively charged phenomena, with deeply engrained and 
318 Dallaire et al (2000) review the use of dangerousness in civil detentions. 
319 The authors cite the views of J. Monahan & H.J. Steadman, (1994) 'Toward a Rejuvenation of Risk 
Assessment Research', in Monahan, J. & Steadman, H.J. (eds.) Violence and MenIal Disorder: 
Development in Risk Assessment. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press to explain why this has been 
the case (pp.96-7). 
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contradictory connections to human thought and action and to wider social structures and 
cultural forces" (1998: 514). 
Yet Hare et al (2000) argue for the validity of the Hare Psychopathy Checklist 
- Revised (PCL-R: 1991) for predicting crime and violence. Similarly 
Soderstrom et al (2002) assert that there are advantages provided by brain 
scans.
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Thomas-Peter and Warren maintain that owing to the ethical 
considerations inherent in risk assessments these methodological issues need to 
the addressed. Notwithstanding this, Monahan (1998) argues that it is 
disingenuous and in the long run counter-productive to deny an association 
between mental disorder and violence. He maintains that by acknowledging 
this a considered view on the policy responses and provisions can be 
undertaken to ensure a balance of the individual's rights and society's 
protection from harm. 
The medico-psychological role is complex because of the linking of mental 
health with public order and protection. Mullen argues that the public expects 
those in mental health services to be helping to deal with those who kill and 
represent a danger, and he argues that this is part of the profession's social 
significance, that homicide is a health issue (2000: 578). This leads to the 
search for explanations, be they organic or functional, for criminal behaviour, 
with aggression and violence the issue for social order and public protection.321 
Scarano points out that dangerousness is a legal word whereas risk of violent 
behaviour is concerned with clinical matters (2001: 562). Poletiek reflects on 
the differences in perspective between law and medico-psychology of the term 
dangerousness in civil hospital commitments, and, although each profession is 
using the same legal criteria, professional perspectives lead to different biases 
in the assessment of dangerousness (2002: 28). Dangerous is an evocative word 
and affects the evaluative nature of responses to behaviour so labelled. To 
illustrate the difficulties, the development of the 'diagnostic' category DSPD 
for the purposes of detention is problematic because it has no legal or medical 
status (Forrester 2002: 338-341). The Royal College of Psychiatrists suggests 
that the provisions are more about public order than mental health and that 
320 Hawkins & Trobst (2000) look at the conceptual issues and research findings with regard to frontal 
lobe dysfunction and aggression.. . . 
321 Walters (2000) discusses the search for the VIOlence prone personality. A list of literature on 
aggressive behaviour can be found in the journal A g g r e s s i ~ ' e e Behaviour (2002) Vol. 28. 
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psychiatrists should not be agents of social control. However, Forrester points 
out that the current MHA already supports such definitions and detentions 
, 
through the psychopathic disorder. He argues that that emerged in much the 
same way and has survived despite its lack of meaning, precision and 
reliability. As noted earlier, Foucault claimed that social responses developed 
in reaction to what someone is as well as to what they have done, which in this 
instance is through the concept of dangerousness. Forrester states that previous 
provisions have fallen into disuse and that this is likely to occur with the 
current proposals. Manning's (2002) observations of the group dynamics and 
development of knowledge within this area leads him to be more speculative 
about the future. 
Conclusion 
The law has adopted a very pragmatic approach to the use of scientific 
knowledge. There are two dimensions to the interaction of law and medico-
psychology. First, there is the expert's evidence on a particular mental state 
affecting the defendant's cognitive capacity to be responsible for their actions, 
which reduces moral culpability. Law has priority over science, historically and 
politically, which can make the position of the expert a difficult one at times: 
"Our criminal law, founded as it is on the principle of individual responsibility, is not a mere 
means toward reducing antisocial activity; the institution is itself an essential end for society. 
There is no more reason to accept the decisions of experts than any other group" (Smith 1981: 
175). 
Therefore, while science provides legitimacy for legal decisions the knowledge 
is presented in a particular format with the possibility of procedural 
purification to ensure it supports legal purposes. The use of expert evidence is 
symbolic. Experts are expected to apply their scientific knowledge to legal 
concepts and rules. Mitchell found that experts know what the process allows 
and wants, and adapt and work within it. Evidence that the law is operating in a 
benevolent manner in the context of diminished responsibility is in large part 
possible because of the adaptation of the expert to the legal requirements. The 
arguments about scientific objectivity appear to be a smoke-screen for securing 
moral outcomes, at least in the context of diminished responsibility. 
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Crucial to the manner in which law and medico-psychology interact are the 
judiciary, both in terms of developing the law, but as this chapter shows 
procedurally, and as a practitioner in the legal process. Lynch maintains that 
the judge is a backdrop to tactical decisions, an audience and participant in 
court, and a social fact (1997: 100-4). This also informs the initial case process 
as it is anticipated that cases will go to trial, although it seems this is not the 
position with diminished responsibility. The jury are also important, although 
the shift in the use of expert evidence has arguably undermined the jury's role, 
but legal rhetoric maintains the symbolic prominence of the jury. Changes rflay 
occur in the role as a result of the Auld report, whereby professional judges 
might make decisions at the expense of lay participation, and juries will have to 
be more accountable for their decisions (Jackson 2002). 
Secondly, there is the medico-psychological involvement at the sentencing 
stage. The focus on dangerousness and risk has led to an association of mental 
disorders with criminal conduct, for example, psychopathy, ASPD and DSPD. 
This dimension of the expert's role is more about providing foundations for 
interventions in relation to categories of people rather than individuals. 
What is perhaps of concern is that if the assertions of Petrila (2004) are true, 
that forensic mental health is so important to mental health debates generally, 
then mental illness is equated with criminal conduct. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
METHODS 
Introduction 
This chapter explains the different data sources and methods used during the 
research, noting the reasoning behind the choices made, and detailing the 
problems encountered. 
A multi-level analysis has been adopted in the theoretical and practical 
examination of the intersection of law and medico-psychology in cases of 
insanity and diminished responsibility. A qualitative theoretical stance has been 
assumed because it appreciates the subjectivity within the research process and 
the matter under investigation, recognizing the barriers to achieving objectivity 
(Filmer et a11998: 2 5 ~ ~ Ch. 3; Lazar 1998: 8-21; Punch 1998: Ch. 8).322 In fact 
the matter of subjectivity and objectivity is a theme that runs through the thesis, 
as the focal point is the meeting of the social institution of law and the 
scientific field of neuroscience and medico-psychology. The ideographic, or 
qualitative approach, tries to understand the social world, in part achieved 
through obtaining first hand subjective knowledge, whilst remaining aware that 
I 
meanings are negotiable in relation to the context (Hornsby-Smith 1993: 54-
57). Accordingly, the production of knowledge is not seen to be a neutral 
process, researchers are part of the world that they are seeking to understand, 
and those studied actively interpret their own behaviour (Brunskell 1998: 39-
41). However, there is no agreed doctrine underpinning all qualitative social 
research (Silverman 2000: 8-9). The thesis highlights this in relation to the 
social construction of the legal categories and the process of allocation to them. 
Documentary Research 
Introduction 
In order to examine the nature of any interaction between law and medico-
psychology in insanity and diminished responsibility cases the respective legal 
and medico-psychological theories of the mind, the technical legal framework, 
322 Hughes (1990) provides a lucid outline of the historical complexities involved in the study of social 
life and action. See Creswell (1998), Silvemlan (2000), and Henwood & PIdgeon (1993) on the nature of 
qualitative research. 
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common law position and role of experts have to be explored. The infonnation 
for these dimensions of the study was found in statutes, reported cases, Law 
Commission reports, Home Office statistics, and legal and medico-
psychological academic texts. This constitutes a diverse range of documents 
from very different sources that approach the topic from different perspectives. 
Documents are socially produced, containing infonnation developed on the 
basis of certain ideas and theories (Macdonald & Tipton 1993: 188-198). In 
addition, the use and meaning of language varies between different 
professional groups because of divergent standpoints, as is evident, for 
example, with the two disciplines under scrutiny in relation to the tenns and 
concepts relating to the mind. However, the fact that the project makes use of a 
wide variety of different sources in order to evaluate the nature of the 
interaction of law and medico-psychology ensures that no one perspective 
prevails; the matrix of viewpoints is examined to enable a consideration of the 
construction of the interface and the issues. The effect that the researcher's 
perceptions and views have on the interpretation and construction of 
subsequent observations is discussed directly in the section on data analysis 
dilemmas, although it is a theme throughout the chapter as the nature of the 
construction of the different data sources is reviewed. 
Official Statistics 
Whilst statistics are associated with a quantitative approach, official statistics 
have been used in chapter one to illustrate the number of insanity and 
diminished responsibility cases in recent years because an integral part of the 
review is the impact that the structure of the defences and their incumbent 
sentencing options has on recourse to the defences. The statistics included in 
the thesis were obtained from the Home Office Homicide Index, which has 
categorized cases from the mid-1970s. In addition to using publicly available 
information, by gaining Home Office clearance access was secured to recent 
statistics that included a more comprehensive range of data about the cases. 323 
Confidentiality requirements were imposed by the Home Office, which 
included a requirement to ensure that individuals are not identifiable. They also 
reserved the right to refuse infonnation. The data that have been supplied as 
part of the research project have to be deleted or destroyed on completion of 
.12J This additional data infonned the construction of the vignette. 
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the project, with a written and signed declaration sent to the Home Office to 
confirm this. In addition to agreeing to these Home Office conditions it was 
necessary to register annually under the Data Protection Act 1998. Requests are 
processed by a gatekeeper who has released statistics covering the period 
2000/2002, although the most recent request has not resulted in another set of 
statistics to include in the final presentation of the thesis. It has been possible to 
obtain additional incomplete data for 2003 from a publicly available report on 
Homicide and Gun Crime (2004). Significantly, the figures for 2000/2002 that 
are included in the official pUblication differ from those the Home Office 
supplied directly for this research. 
The statistics show how many defendants have officially been categorized as 
successfully pleading insanity and diminished responsibility, but there are a 
number of qualifications that need to be made regarding the production and use 
of official statistics. For instance, errors can be introduced in the statistical 
process itself between the occurrence of the event and the recording and 
production of data (Kitsuse & Cicourel 1963: 133). There can be differences 
between initial recording schedules and the published statistics (Hindess 1973: 
47). This may explain the discrepancies between the Home Office statistics 
supplied and those cited in the recent report. Another issue concerns the fact 
that statistics are a particular representation of the culmination of a complex 
decision-making process as the difference between official statistics and the 
British Crime Survey show (Williams 1994: ChA). The analysis of the 
intersection of law and medico-psychology in the thesis is effective in 
illustrating the negotiated nature of the final case judgments contained in the 
statistics. The project highlights in detail procedural practices and critical 
junctures that provide the opportunity for alternative outcomes, and the 
concepts, norms and objectives from which the possible choices are made. 
Despite the scepticism about statistics some argue that they can be useful 
(Bulmer 1999; Levitas & Guy 1996), whereas others (Kitsuse & Cicourel) hold 
that official statistics are problematical because they do not fit social science 
classifications and are a map of organisational policies, politics and priorities. 
Therefore, statistical data are the result of categories of factors that have been 
socially constructed (Silverman: 7-8). There is support for this position in this 
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project, which exammes the legal reconstruction of definitions of mental 
illness, which in itself has generated a plethora of research on the importance 
of social and cultural influences (Szasz 1972; Doyle 1981). Bulmer 
acknowledges these shortcomings but he asserts that official statistics at least 
show the "magnitude, nature and locality of a problem" (p.133). Similarly 
Silverman claims that official statistics are social facts, providing opportunities 
to conduct longitudinal studies, historical research, area-based studies, 
international compansons and insights into the procedures of organisations 
(1998: 98; 133). In respect of the current research the decline in the use of 
insanity and diminished responsibility highlighted in the statistics forms an 
important reference point in legal discussions on the operation of this area of 
the law. Therefore, as this thesis shows, the social production of statistics can 
be investigated notwithstanding that the statistical data does not elucidate the 
process and the impact that decisions have on those categorised through the 
defences, that there is no sense of the discretionary power that doctors or 
judges are applying, or the ambiguity that accompanies a mental health 
diagnosis in clinical or legal terms, there is no appreciation of the normative 
judgements inherent in assessing these cases in order to take account of 
concerns about dangerousness and public protection, that they produce no 
sense of the social meanings for the actors, and that there is no uniformity of 
application (Silverman: 106). Research such as the current project examines 
the conceptual process that leads to categorization encapsulated in the statistics 
(Hindess: 12), with the caveats that accompany the production of information 
by researchers, which are discussed in this chapter. 
Crown Prosecution Service Case Files 
As the thesis explores the interaction of law and medico-psychology through 
investigating the practitioner's roles and practices in addition to the theoretical 
issues, one important way to examine the practical interaction appeared to be 
obtaining access to case files, which the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) are 
responsible for. At the outset of the project it was anticipated that 20 case files 
would enable a suitable review, particularly of expert reports, which contain 
the expert's opinion on which so much importance is placed as chapters one 
and three discuss. However, a number of access problems were encountered 
and as a result only two case files were studied. 
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Obtaining security clearance for access to the CPS was not difficult. 324 The key 
requirements imposed on conducting research were the guarantee of anonymity 
for the individuals whose files were examined; agreeing to no mechanical 
copying of the files only note taking; no quoting, or dissemination of the 
material to individuals outside the Service without prior approval of CPS 
Headquarters, with the CPS retaining the right to edit or otherwise restrict 
pUblication of any such information, which included a thesis. The expert report 
synopsis contained in chapter seven has been approved. It transpired that 
security clearance was not an automatic guarantee of access (Hornsby-Smith 
1993: 59), there were problems securing the co-operation of the CPS offices 
that were contacted because the area Head could exercise personal discretion. 
The three offices selected were located in the same areas as the interviewees 
but they are not identified in order to maintain the confidentiality of individuals 
in the cases and interviewees. Two were central offices, whilst the other came 
within the catchment area of one of the central offices, although this was not 
self-evident when the request was made. One central CPS office agreed access. 
The second centre presented reasons to deny access each time contact was 
made and after several follow-up calls it was stated they would make contact 
when it was more convenient but they did not. The local office lost the initial 
request and subsequently refused access. 
The head of the department within the CPS who dealt with access to the case 
files exercised stringent gate-keeping and a number of problems were 
identified. First it was stated there could be no access to active case files. 
Secondly, there was no system to enable identification of files by the type of 
plea because reference is by name and number. In addition, owing to limited 
CPS resources, whilst they were happy to help they could not allocate any 
personnel time to detect any relevant cases. Finally, it also transpired that as 
soon as a case is over, so point one no longer applied, the CPS case files were 
rapidly sent on to the archives in London. Case files can take up to two days to 
read325 and therefore it was not possible to spend the necessary time in London 
to view 20 cases because of the prohibitive fieldwork costs. illustrating how 
324 Agreement was secured through a NIS form, Character Inquiry form, Research Undertaking form and 
Declaration requiring acceptance ofpertment aspects of the OffiCIal Secrets Act 1989. 
325 A supervisor who has undertaken this task supplied this infomlation. 
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institutional procedures and financial constraints can affect the avenues of 
research within a project. 
Following several telephone discussions it was established that if relevant case 
names could be supplied to the CPS it might be possible to view those files 
after the case was over and before it was dispatched to London. As a result the 
Crown Court were contacted to ascertain if the court lists would identify 
relevant cases. A letter was required to explain the request for senior managers 
to consider it, which resulted in a website address where the lists are displayed, 
but the same identification problems applied. The Home Office statistics were 
not recent enough to be of assistance. A supervisor suggested a barrister who 
deals with murder cases as potentially providing a way of identifying case 
names. The problem was explained to the barrister who agreed to help and as a 
result of meeting them a number of names were supplied from the Chambers' 
case list. The names were given to the CPS office and as a result access to two 
case files was permitted, neither of which established a plea of insanity or 
diminished responsibility, and they had to be viewed in one day. This made it 
difficult with no experience of case files, and the fact that there were several 
boxes of materials for each case, which were not in any order. One case 
contained a psychiatric report and the other a defence and prosecution report, 
where both experts concluded that there were no grounds for a diminished 
responsibility defence. Therefore, although it was helpful to see the content of 
case files and expert reports the intended reviews and comparisons were not 
possible. That said, viewing the case files and in l?articular the expert reports 
was important for understanding the nature of reports, in particular the 
conclusions and opinions on which so much emphasis is placed. The three 
expert reports are outlined in chapter seven and inform the discussions in 
chapter eight. 
Researching Practitioners 
Introduction 
In addition to the different forms of documentary analysis of the interaction of 
law and medico-psychology the project examines the practitioner's perspective 
and role. The documentary evidence shows the incongruity between the 
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perspectives of the two disciplines and the importance of the complex legal 
procedural processes for the interaction in the application of the law. In order 
to comprehensively review the level and nature of the interaction between the 
two professions an investigation of how practitioners applied and worked 
within the theoretical and substantive legal framework discussed in chapters 
one to four was necessary. Two options seemed possible, viewing a case in 
court and conducting interviews. 
Court Cases 
An option that appeared to provide an opportunity to gain practical insights and 
contextualize the interaction between the professional disciplines, observing 
key actors within the adversarial process and the use of expert evidence, which 
was the focus of chapters three and four, was viewing a court case. 
Unfortunately, the problem with identifying cases by defence type created 
difficulties for discovering when a suitable court case was to be heard. As 
discussed in chapter one, there are very few cases and not all of those go to 
court. Despite inquiries to the court service, CPS, legal and medico-
psychological respondents, and checking local newspapers it was not possible 
to attend court to view a case. Some respondents indicated that they were 
anticipating cases in the near future, but they were settled before the hearing. 
The Judge, in addition to trying to find a suitable case said in the interview that 
he would find out if it was possible to provide access to judicial case 
summaries for the research project but it would appear that this was not 
permitted as, despite a follow-up letter, nothing further was heard on the 
matter. The problems in viewing a court case illustrate an important point made 
in the thesis regarding the lack of public scrutiny of insanity and diminished 
responsibility cases because the decision-making process has shifted to the 
CPS, which reinforces the importance of considering the pre-court processes 
and the approaches of the practitioners who are making the decisions. The 
review of case files in London would make an important avenue of research to 
ascertain the nature of the evidence supporting the decisions, which could be 
linked to points made within this thesis. 
160 
Interviews 
Conducting interviews with the professionals involved in homicide cases 
appeared to offer the most effective opportunity to review the practical 
interaction of those applying the law in these cases. The second level of 
analysis that focuses on the judiciary and the construction of the role of the 
expert already shows how important practitioners are to the development and 
application of the law discussed in chapter one. 
The Interview Sample and Access 
Interviewing is a complex matter and there are particular issues inherent in 
interviewing professionals (Hornsby-Smith). Researchers need to consider the 
institutional setting and be aware of the protocols that exist. Studying the issues 
through documents did provide essential insights but it was during the 
interviews that the limitations in understanding the practitioner perspective 
became clear through the distinct bifurcation between the theory debates in the 
earlier chapters and the pragmatic procedural focus in the interview data. This 
supports a fundamental assertion in this thesis that it is necessary to examine 
the intersection of law and medico-psychology in the application of law from 
the three dimensions covered by this project. 
The first stage was to identify possible interviewees. It was anticipated that 
obtaining a representative sample would be difficult because of concerns about 
persuading professionals to give up their time, so an opportunistic approach 
was adopted. A geographical area was identified and the key selection criterion 
was simply to contact those who had been practising since the 1970s or early 
1980s because it was anticipated that the sample would be small and their 
extensive experience would provide the most helpful insights in relation to 
what was a complex moral and legislative matter. Originally it was expected 
that the names of pertinent professionals would be found from the CPS case 
files. As this proved not to be a viable option the alternative was to use 
professional registration directories, which were available online. Using the 
search term criminal lalt' to locate solicitors, and criminal responsibility for 
experts, searches of the Law Society Directory for lawyers, and for expert 
witnesses, the UK Expert Witness Directory and the British Psychological 
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Society Directory were conducted. The results provided more details about the 
practitioners listed and it became apparent that the number of people 
undertaking this sort of casework is not large. This was supported subsequently 
in the interviews where it became clear that only a small pool of people within 
an area deal with homicide cases. The significance of this is discussed in 
chapter eight. As it happened, after the interviews had commenced snowballing 
occurred and other respondents were identified as a result of respondents 
mentioning their names during the interviews. One consequence of requiring 
experienced practitioners, at least with regard to the lawyers, was a lack of 
possible female respondents. The one female lawyer contacted referred the 
request on to a male within her firm. Of the two female respondents, one was a 
psychologist and the other a psychiatrist. 
The barrister could not be selected from directories as none could be located, 
but the individual within the CPS dealing with access mentioned his name, it 
was in one of the CPS case files, and an interviewee recommended him. There 
were no organisational gate-keeping issues with the barrister, defence lawyers, 
psychiatrists and psychologists but there were with the CPS, police and, 
potentially, the Judge. The CPS office only permitted contact with their most 
senior lawyer. Similarly, as a result of writing to the Chief Constable about 
interviewing a senior investigating police officer (SIO) a pre-selected 
interviewee telephoned to arrange an interview. The Judge was approached 
directly. Potentially the Lord Chancellor's department (LCD) can act as a 
gatekeeper but Judges' names are listed on the LCD website. Initially contact 
was made with a circuit judge who stated that he did not have the appropriate 
certificate to try the cases being studied but he recommended the High Court 
Judge who was eventually interviewed. There were gate-keeping protocols to 
negotiate in order to interview the judge as a result of their official status. 
The difficulties in gaining access to busy professionals for research purposes 
were exacerbated by the small number of suitable candidates. The request letter 
contained details of the project, the funding source, the researcher's 
professional and educational background, and the project supervisors and their 
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specialization.
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The British Sociological Association's remarks on informed 
consent state that the researcher should explain to the participants as 
comprehensively and clearly as possible what the research is about, who is 
undertaking it, who is financing it, why the research is being done and how the 
information will be disseminated (Hornsby-Smith: 63; Warren 2002: 88-90). If 
the researchers and researched share similar backgrounds then trust is more 
likely because it indicates an understanding of the technical, ethical and moral 
issues that they are faced with (Seale 1998: 11). The interviews showed that 
professional acceptance was an important factor in the operation of the law. 
In terms of unsuccessful requests, three defence lawyers, three psychiatrists 
and three psychologists declined to become involved in the project. The 
reasons given were that they considered they did not have the relevant 
expertise or that they did not have the time. In two instances the request was 
simply ignored, even after following up the initial inquiry. The final sample 
consisted of one High Court Judge, one CPS lawyer, one SIO, one barrister 
who is also a Recorder (a part-time judge),327 three defence lawyers, three 
psychiatrists and three psychologists.328 Whilst there are the concerns about the 
limitations of using small samples in qualitative research, attempts have been 
made in the research process to ensure that issues were explored 
comprehensively. The research represents a novel exploration of the issues that 
can be developed further through subsequent studies, as discussed in chapter 
eight. 
Interview Method 
As the project is concerned with exploring professional reasonmg and 
pragmatic professional considerations when the two professions negotiate their 
roles in cases, semi-structured interviews appeared to offer the best method of 
obtaining this information. Semi-structured interviews are useful where the 
subject matter is sensitive or complicated (Fielding 1993a: 138-139). For 
example, Smith and Wynne used this approach to conduct research on some 
326 See appendices . .. . . 
327 Although only one was formally interviewed, another barrIster Jomed a dISCUSSIOn after the formal 
interview. In addition there were the two meetings with another barrister about case names and for a 
review of the validity of the vignette. . 
m The vignette was piloted with an experienced expert witness and provided views on procedural Issues 
too. 
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matters covered in this project, which are discussed in chapter fOUL although 
they used a question schedule to ensure particular questions were raised for 
comparative purposes (1989: 11). The research in this project required a 
reflexive approach so themes rather than questions were used as a guide 
because it was unclear what the practitioner's perspective might include. 
Warren states that the "purpose of most qualitative interviewing is to derive 
interpretations ... " (2002: 83). Semi-structured interviews allow the respondent 
to give a considered response and minimise the introduction of bias through 
extensive interaction. The respondents in the study are required to deal with 
what appeared to be a complex set of issues in terms of their professional roles 
and the operational categories with which they work. What was sought was to 
maximise the opportunity for their rationale, attitudes, beliefs and the 
descriptions of their actions to become explicit, so it seemed appropriate to 
keep the interviews as open ended as possible. Adopting this approach proved 
to be very informative and significantly exposed the contrast between the 
practitioners' perspective and focus with that of earlier theoretical debates, 
which is discussed in chapter eight. 
The themes were developed from the documentary research, providing general 
guidance but it seemed important to see what the professionals themselves 
identified as the main issues, thus revealing contrasts both between inter-
professional practitioner perspectives and with those in the legal and medico-
psychological discourses in academic debates. Essentially, the themes 
concerned the respondents' views on the substantive law, suggestions for 
reform, procedural matters and their roles, and inter-professional 
understanding. Notwithstanding that the aim was to ensure the interviews were 
as unstructured as possible in order to elicit the professional viewpoint, a case 
scenario represented in a vignette was used. 
I,T,° tt 329 
,,'gne e 
A vignette was used because the aim of the interviews was to explore the 
interaction of the legal and medico-psychological professions and the 
negotiation of the different discourse perspectives, and providing a case 
scenario to all the respondents introduced a familiar format that would provide 
329 See appendices 
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a common focus across both sets of interviews. Vignettes are "short stories 
about hypothetical characters in specified circumstances, to whose situation the 
interviewee is invited to respond" (Finch 1987: 105-110). Vignettes are 
essentially non-directive in that although they do provide a structure through 
the factors that are included, they allow respondents to attribute their own 
meaning to the situation. Meanings are social and this research explored the 
constructions of meanings in a specific context. Because of the difficulties in 
making the implicit explicit (Johnson & Weller 2002), it was anticipated that 
the familiar focus was more likely to result in the implicit professional norms 
becoming explicit because with a vignette the respondent is making normative 
statements about a set of social circumstances rather than expressing beliefs 
and values in a vacuum. 
However, it was not assumed that language is simply an accurate reflection of 
thoughts and actions (Fielding: 148). Nonetheless, institutional ethnography 
"takes for its entry point the experiences of specific individuals whose 
everyday activities are in some way hooked into, shaped by, and constituent of 
the institutional relations under exploration" (DeVault & McCoy 2002: 753). 
Thus the viewpoint within the institutional context where the moral and 
political issues in the theoretical discussions are dealt with was sought, to 
identify the discursive and organisational processes that shape the professional 
activities and application of the legal rules. Both professions have distinct 
professional perspectives and cultural norms but they coalesce in the case 
process, so an exploration of the different considerations each profession has in 
a case seemed the most effective way to illustrate these distinctions. 
There were a number of factors that influenced the formation of the vignette. 
Of particular assistance in the documentary research were the leading cases 
where judicial reasoning indicated their principle concerns and the range of 
conditions that have qualified for the two defences, examples of which are 
listed in chapter three. Furthermore, each case presented a resume of the key 
circumstances related to the defendant and the incident, which provided 
instances of the personal and social characteristics that might exist in cases of 
this type. In addition there were details of significant factors provided as part of 
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the Home Office statistics. A summary of the range of key information and the 
most common examples is provided in Table 1. 
Table 1: The key features in homicide case reports 
Basic Factor 
Relationship 
Method of Murder 
Circumstances 
Mental state of the accused 
Example 
Suspect and Victim 
Sharp Instrument/Gun/Strangulation 
In/consistency of the accused's behaviour 
before and after the incident 
Is there any indication of pre-meditation and 
attempts by the accused to conceal their 
actions? 
What was the trigger for the violent act? 
What, if anything, does the accused say at the 
time and immediately after the act in 
question? 
Is alcohol a feature? 
Is there any history of, or indication that at the 
time of the act the accused was suffering from 
a mental illness? 
The defendant in the vignette is called Malcolm. The scenario is divided into 
sections. It outlines the nature and quality of the relationship between the 
suspect and victim as it is usually someone known to the victim, and often 
related, that commits the murder. In addition, the vignette describes the 
defendant's expenence of familial relationships, existing personal 
relationships, and the circumstances surrounding the homicide. A potential 
trigger to the incident is noted, and the nature of the defendant's behaviour 
after the stabbing. Plainly, in light of the focus in this research it was necessary 
to include facts that implied there was some reason to question Malcolm's 
mental state. 
Having identified from the case reports conditions that the courts have 
acknowledged, research was undertaken into the definitions within the 
diagnostic manuals, which also list disorders that could present similar 
symptoms in order to appreciate the cluster of factors that would be relevant. 
Additionally a search of 'SOSIG', the social science search engine was 
conducted using the term 'psychological disorders'. This resulted in a list of 
U.S. and U.K. websites, with those dealing with dissociative disorders of 
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particular interest,330 owing to the requirements of the law for establishin a 
b 
these defences and because the neuroscientific research referred to in chapter 
two reveals the importance of these types of disorder. 331 Finally, a review of 
personality disorders was undertaken, which concentrated on borderline, 
avoidant, paranoid and adjustment disorders. The vignette alluded to a number 
of these factors in reaction to the trigger that led to the incident and Malcolm's 
behaviour afterwards. It was intended that the scenario would be ambiguous so 
that the interview process would lead to the interviewees deliberating and 
discussing the basis of their choices because it was likely that there would be a 
range of possible options, which indeed occurred. 
Finch asserts that vignettes are difficult to construct effectively so that they are 
comprehensive, comprehensible and plausible (p.ll 0). In addition, interpreting 
the responses may be difficult because it is not necessarily evident what factors 
are generating responses. Thus, following the formation of the vignette, and 
supervision feedback the vignette was piloted with a senior psychologist and 
barrister. A number of important points arose from the psychological review. 
Initially there was a misunderstanding about the purpose of the vignette. It was 
assumed that the vignette was meant to represent a psychological report and 
therefore the inferences and statements made throughout, which had no 
supporting evidence, resulted in the response that this would be impossible for 
an expert to defend in court. It was considered that the role of the expert had 
been usurped because it was their role to collect this information and interpret 
it. This indicated how important it was to ensure that matters were effectively 
explained to potential interviewees. Two additional points concerned the 
instructions experts receive from solicitors, and what sort of investigations the 
vignette might generate. These observations have been included in chapter 
seven as they add to the procedural discussions. However, the points gave an 
initial intimation of the nature and automatic reaction of an expert's 
professional concern. The barrister who provided the names supplied to the 
CPS reviewed the vignette. The feedback was not as in-depth as the expert's, 
however following a number of conversations it was concluded that the 
330 For example, (3 III 0/02) 
331 For example Damasio (1994,2000), Edelman & Tononi (2000) & Carter (2002) 
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vignette would provide a non-directive discussion on the issues that may arise 
in such cases. 
What was interesting about the reviews of the vignette was how responses were 
primarily tied into professional considerations in a case context, which was the 
objective with regard to the interviews, so they were a positive indication that 
the vignette would facilitate this. In fact the overwhelming focus on procedure 
became a major outcome from the research, which is discussed in chapter 
eight. Nevertheless, there is always the possibility of differences between what 
people think they ought to do and what they would actually do in a situation 
(Finch: 112-113). Finch warns against assuming vignettes produce an accurate 
prediction of action in terms of the attitudes, reflecting Fielding's point about 
presupposing that language is an accurate reflection of thoughts and actions. 
However, the use of open questions provides the possibility to verify the 
respondent's position, supported by a reflexive approach following on from 
each interview. 
The initial inquiry letter stated that a vignette would be used, which would be 
forwarded in advance of the interview to enable time to develop a considered 
response. It was a possibility that professionals might consider a vignette-
focused interview more time consuming than one requiring no prior 
preparation on their part, although alternatively it could be seen as providing a 
familiar range of information through which to discuss matters. The 
interviewees were very generous with their time, with most interviews lasting 
at least an hour. 332 The vignette did provide a useful focus with all the 
interviewees engaging fully with it and there was considerable positive 
feedback. 
Informed consent was obtained again at the time of the interview, in particular 
as permission had to be sought to tape the interviews, and there were no 
objections.333 There are a number of advantages to taping interviews. It makes 
it possible to revisit the information and interaction (Fielding: 145-147). As 
noted previously, a reflexive interview approach was being taken and it is not 
332 One interview lasted several hours. 
333 One respondent wanted to discuss a case and make a point. but would only do so if the tape recorder 
was turned off. 
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always obvious at the time what information will be important, or to appreciate 
all the possible lines of inquiry and analysis. In addition with an unstructured 
interview format interviewer contributions can lead to difficulties remembering 
or writing everything down. Therefore, not recording the interviews potentially 
undermines the validity of the data because of the inherent unreliability of 
memory and notes. 
A potential problem with interviews, particularly unstructured interviews, is 
interviewer bias (Fielding: 147-50). There is a research agenda in terms of 
interest in the area, the interpretation placed on the data informing the focus in 
the interview and the theoretical perspective inherent in the methodological 
approach, as methodological awareness contains a political sensitivity (Seale: 
10). The methods chosen were designed to reduce the intrusion of the 
researcher, although the vignette clearly provides a particular focus. Also, the 
interview transcripts made it possible to monitor and reflect on the interactions. 
Furthermore, with qualitative research the relationship between researcher and 
researched is of crucial importance because inherent in the methodological 
stance is a recognition of the two-way nature of the process as interactions are 
co-created (Reason 1996). Gender can be an important dimension to 
interviews, and only two respondents were women (Warren: 94-96). 
Additionally, the demeanour of the interviewer and the mode of questioning 
can cause respondents to monitor their answers. With regard to this, while no 
specific incident stands out, two identifiable aspects were that there was often a 
lot of laughter that was based on assumptions of a shared understanding of the 
issues, which implied an inclusion in their professional culture, and the inter-
professional relationships between the professions were evidently significant 
from the data. In addition, some interviewees asked a lot of questions, and the 
nature of the professional roles of both sets of practitioners is to elicit 
information in order to categorise. Finally, although the respondents did not 
review the transcripts of the interviews, at the end of the interview four 
respondents requested a copy of the thesis on completion. 
Data Analysis 
The research project makes use of different sources of information on the 
issues under investigation to ensure methodological triangulation (Seale: 52-5; 
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Macdonald & Tipton: 199). The documentary component is comprised of a 
range of material from very divergent sources with different inherent 
perspectives influencing the interpretation of issues. The incongruities between 
the legal and medico-psychological perspectives throughout the thesis are 
testimony to this. Inevitably, however, there will be an impact on the analysis 
and presentation of the data resulting from the agenda and perspective of the 
researcher, just as there are influences on the choices made in the construction 
of cases. Descriptions of social matters are not a literal view of the world 
, 
illustrated by the fact that the adversarial process results in two very distinct 
presentations of the facts of the case. Nor is it alleged that the presentation of 
the information, in particular the descriptions by the practitioners, which is re-
presented in the data chapters, is not the culmination of the processes of 
categorisation into the classes available within the parameters of the normative 
and legislative legal framework. Miles and Irvine succinctly state, "individual 
experience is constituted within social structures - structures that themselves 
make possible and delimit individual and organizational practices" (1981: 117). 
The researcher's inherent assumptions are formed through personal history, 
culture, and theoretical perspective. One solution is for the researcher to 
disclose their attitudes and values (Henwood & Pidgeon 1993: 25),334 yet bias 
can only be explained to the extent that the researcher can appreciate it. The 
social world is constructed through language, which is imbued with cultural, 
gender and institutional values (Filmer et al: 25; Potter 1996). Meaning differs 
according to the social relations and institutional settings "within which they 
are produced, reproduced and sometimes reshaped" (Jupp & Norris 1993: 47). 
The difficulties that face the researcher in distinguishing all the influential 
factors that influence their interpretation of the issues is also a fundamental 
challenge in relation to eliciting professional attitudes and actions. Challenging 
discourses can be difficult, because as part of the society being challenged the 
researcher and research participants have been inculcated in current language 
constructions (Lago & Thompson 1996).335 This is central to Foucault's 
premise (1980) and an important theme in the thesis. The constraints of 
professional discourses and the difficulties these present for appreciating the 
.134 Fortier (1998) highlights the gender and ethnicity issues encountered in her fieldwork. . 
m Lago & Thompson (1996) consider the role of norms in inhibiting recognition of cultural dIfferences. 
170 
perspective of another profession were evident in the data and throughout the 
research. 
The interviews were transcribed by the researcher because of the benefits that 
offered in developing familiarity with the data. The hesitations and pauses are 
included because it appeared more valid to reproduce the quotes as accurately 
as possible thereby reducing the likelihood of researcher interpretation being 
imposed on what was said.336 However, it is not purporting to be 
conversational analysis;337 it is undertaking to detail the procedural and 
professional concerns informing the understanding of practitioner's concerns 
throughout a case in relation to the legal framework outlined in the theoretical 
debates. In order to do this, following the transcription of the interviews the 
NVIVO qualitative analysis package was used to arrange the data from each 
interview into the broad themes that formed the interview guide, with some 
data incorporated into more than one theme because of the interlinked nature of 
the matters under discussion.338 Inevitably an order will be imposed on the data 
that did not exist in the interviews (Czarniawski 2002; Gudmundsdottir 1996). 
It seemed appropriate to divide the data into substantive law and reform 
discussions, procedural matters, roles and key players, in order to highlight any 
relationship with earlier theoretical themes and to detail the information that 
was distinctive to the role and concerns of practitioners because the study is 
aiming to identify where law and medico-psychology intersect in the three 
dimensions identified. The presentation of the data highlights the fact that the 
main focus in the interviews was on practical and tactical matters, providing a 
stark contrast to the theoretical debates in chapters one, two and three. The 
procedural orientation meant that conceptual issues were rarely addressed 
explicitly. An important factor to emerge from the interviews was the 
orientation towards diminished responsibility because none of the respondents 
had been involved in an insanity plea, despite their extensive experience. 
Coffey and Atkinson state that coding does not constitute analysis, the 
"important analytic work lies in establishing and thinking about such 
336 A full stop and space were added for each second in a pause. For an explanation of detailed recording 
codes see Coffey & Atkinson (1996: Ch. 2); Heath & Luff (1993). 
337 For more detailed alternatives see Hutchby & Wooffitt (J 988) and Schiffiin (1994). 
33R See Seale (2002) on using computer packages and Fielding (1993b) on coding 
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linkages ... " (1996: 27). However, there is interference from the researcher in 
categorizing the data for subsequent detailed scrutiny, although the data was 
organized into a format that reflects themes identified earlier in the research 
into the intersection of law and medico-psychology, again to minimize 
researcher influence. To illustrate the distinctiveness of the two professional 
narratives, which is a recurrent theme in each facet of the investigation, the 
data chapters outline the legal and medico-psychological responses 
respectively. The stark contrast to previous theoretical debates pointed out the 
lack of symbiosis between theoretical debates and practitioners concerns, and 
gave rise to different considerations for the analysis of the intersection of law 
and medico-psychology. This further challenged developing coherence within 
the thesis, as it became more manifestly one of two separate halves. The 
analysis in chapter eight is a limited synthesis of all three dimensions of the 
research into the intersection of law and medico-psychology in the operation of 
the defences of insanity and diminished responsibility, owing to the restrictions 
on length. The examination represents an interpretation by the researcher as 
part of the heuristic research process (Moustakas 1990; Bulmer 1999: Ch. 1). 
This has been seen as giving rise to concerns about reliability, one of the 
criticisms levelled on occasion at qualitative research (Silverman: 9-11). 
However, the procedure and reasoning adopted is documented as fully as 
possible. The issue of interpretation is inherent in all forms of research. 
Finally, the confidential CPS and interview data, in hard copy and on the 
computer, has been stored securely and will be retained for seven years.339 
Conclusion 
The project explores the intersection of law and medico-psychology using a 
number of methods. The chapter has described the issues relating to each 
methodological choice, reflecting on the correlations between researcher 
considerations in relation to methods with those within the thesis topic itself. 
Another researcher may have adopted a different approach, but as Seale argues, 
the middle ground between all the perspectives is seeing social research as craft 
skills that are driven by practical concerns (pp.26-33). Social researchers need 
339 As stated earlier, the original Home Office data has to be destroyed and notification sent to the Home 
Office. 
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to take a pragmatic approach to exploring the issues, which is reminiscent of 
the approach of the legal system to cases. Seale maintains that the important 
thing is methodological awareness rather than strict adherence to a particular 
methodology as poor studies arise when researchers are blind to the 
methodological consequences of research decisions (p.49). This mIrrors 
conclusions in chapter eight that assert that legal deliberations on the law 
require a broad awareness of the issues incorporating all three dimensions 
explored in this research project. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
LEGAL INTERVIEWS 
Introduction 
This chapter is the first of two data chapters, and portrays the interview 
responses of the legal fraternity. The practitioner's perspective provides the 
third level of analysis of the intersection of law and medico-psychology in 
respect of the issues under consideration. The data covers issues dealt with in 
chapters one, two, three and four. Initially this chapter will describe the 
comments made on the substantive law, followed by the observations on 
dealing with cases, covering pre-trial, trial and sentencing stages. The 
interviewees described the technical considerations, legal objectives, 
perceptions, tactics and perceived impact of expert evidence, often from a 
prosecution or defence perspective. 
Glossary of Interviewees 
The Judge 
JM - Barrister/Recorder34o 
AC - Chief Prosecution Lawyer 
DW - Defence Lawyer 
KR - Defence Lawyer 
SB - Defence Lawyer 
GF - Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) 
The Law 
The first part of the chapter addresses the remarks and reform suggestions 
made in respect of the legal rule of mens rea and the substantive law of the 
defences. 
Mens Rea - Guilty Intent 
Chapter one examined the extensive debates that have occurred with respect to 
the principle and meaning of mens rea. However, the same scope was not 
represented in practitioners' concerns. The discussions of the subject by the 
barrister JM, and the Judge focused on the technical legal requirements for 
explaining the rule to the jury. So JM referred to s8 of the Criminal Justice Act 
340 A recorder is a part-time judge. 
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1967, used in giving directions to the jury.341 He said most judges use that 
formula, or at least some paraphrase of it. In terms of the convoluted 
incorporation of forseeability contained in the Woollin [1999] definition, which 
was outlined in chapter one, the Judge said 
"[l]iterally, I think, I think for, from a, practical politics point of view, you can ignore it, it 
does?'t arise. I, think in practice, . there is no, great difficulty, with directing juries, on mens 
rea, In most cases. Erm, it's simply an intention, in murder, to kill or do really serious injury. I, 
myself, have never ever, directed a jury, or indeed been in a case, I think, in which the jury's 
been directed, to start looking at it in terms of forseeability for specific intent cases". 
JM reflected on how difficult it is to prove someone's intention. The Judge 
discussed how hard it is for juries to comprehend the legal rule as intention has 
a legal meaning. DW, a defence solicitor, supported this perception, with an 
example. DW trains solicitors on mens rea and stated they find it a difficult 
concept to grasp, with each training scenario resulting in very subjective 
interpretations. He said "it's quite surprising, . the different attitude you get 
from solicitors as to, what is, . you know, the appropriate mens rea and what's 
not". SB further illustrates the different approaches that professionals have 
when categorising offences III relation to intent, referring to 
murder/manslaughter decisions. SB called it "one punch manslaughter" 
because the defendant did not intend the punch to kill or cause really serious 
harm. 
"It wasn't the kick, that the other bloke delivered, but he's charged with murder. It was the, the 
way he fell to the ground, and banged his head. It was the blow on the head from the ground 
that caused it. Now is that murder"? 
He said even though the incident was caught on CCTV the prosecution would 
not accept a manslaughter plea, which he claimed was a distortion of the law. 
SB said manslaughter still results in a lengthy period in custody. 
The scope for individual interpretations of legal rules is evident, which can be 
seen in the different responses to the vignette, which is further affected by 
whether the lawyer acts for the defence or prosecution. The observations on the 
difficulties with understanding intent illustrate the potential problems for juries 
who are less familiar with the law, and perhaps a negative consequence of 
having a legal definition so far removed from the usual understanding of 
intention. 
341 Ives [1970] outlines how the jury might be required to look at this section. 
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Reform Suggestions 
The reform debate in chapter one centred on the development of a statutory 
definition of intent, a move not supported by SB. He argued for the law to stay 
as it is because the current scope of mens rea and actus reus are wide enough 
to enable a review of any issue that might arise. He is concerned that 
codification may introduce restrictions on the range of evidence that might be 
considered. This would support earlier arguments that the law is able to adopt a 
flexible approach through developing reasonably loose definitions. In contrast 
DW argued for the re-examination of all homicide law, expressing scepticism 
that a legislative definition would emerge. First, because the Law Commission 
(LC) has promised it for a long time and it has not happened. Secondly, as a 
result of the recent abolition of doli incapax the law now imputes the same 
legal understanding to children as adults. He views the modification as a 
backward move, attributable to political reasons rather than a legal rationale. 
Alternatively, the Judge and JM challenged the fact that murder includes 
"really serious bodily injury or really serious bodily harm" because it is very 
difficult to explain to the jury, and unlikely they actually understand (JM). 
Additionally JM believes it has resulted in people serving life imprisonment for 
murder, even though the jury were satisfied they did not intend to kill, because 
their decision had to be in accordance with the judge's directions.342 JM 
conceded not everyone agrees with his point of view/43 although he said a 
number of eminent people have suggested it to the government over the last 30 
years. 
The discussions do not reflect the theoretical focus of those in chapter one, the 
issues raised are plainly concerned with changes that would affect achieving 
'just' results. The matters raised as a result of their experience as practitioners 
are referred to in terms of whether the changes would either lead to unjust 
results, or are necessary for the law to operate more fairly. 
3 4 ~ ~ He further illustrated his view that the law is incoherent through the crime of attempted murder where 
ou have to prove intent to kill because you have to prove intent to commit the full offence. ~ 4 3 3 The QC who joined a discussion after the interview did not concur with JM' S vlewpomt. 
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The Defences of Insanity, Diminished Responsibility and 
Provocation 
In line with the moral position inherent in the development of the defences, JM 
said that the law should not treat defendants as if they are in full control of their 
mental faculties if this is not the case, despite how difficult this may be for the 
victim's relatives. What follows are the discussions of the defences by the 
interviewees. 
Insanity 
Despite the philosophical and symbolic importance of the insanity defence, it 
has been shown in preceding chapters that it is rarely used, except occasionally 
in the context of fitness to plead.344 The Judge confirmed this, saying that "in 
my experience that is becoming more common", a view supported by other 
respondents. As a result, despite the considerable experience of the lawyers 
interviewed they had no experience of insanity cases. For example, KR a 
defence lawyer said that neither he nor his partner had undertaken a case of 
insanity at trial, although his partner had handled one in relation to fitness to 
plead. He claimed there are probably three of four cases of fitness to plead a 
year in his area. In earlier chapters it was suggested that the reason the defence 
is not invoked is the sentence, which was affirmed by interviewees. For 
instance SB stated that 
"whilst it appears attractive to get an acquittal, an acquittal on the grounds of insanity isn't 
really too helpful to a de, detained person. Because you, you never know what the position is. 
You don't know what your rights are going to be. You don't know how much you're gonna be 
hospitalised" . 
The Judge also ascribed the shift to the spectre of detention for life with no 
tariff. In addition, as AC said, diminished responsibility effectively takes 
insanity out of the equation. There were no remarks on whether the law should 
be changed to ensure the insane were able to obtain an acquittal, or whether it 
should be a status or excuse defence. 
Diminished Responsibility 
The central focus of the interviews was the diminished responsibility defence. 
Chapters one and three have established the technical considerations with 
344 See Mackay & Keams (2000) 
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regard to the critical issue of whether the abnonnality of the mind substantially 
impairs the defendant's mental responsibility. The observations of the 
respondents were more pragmatic and did not contain the analysis of the effects 
of recent developments on the overall legal position, as the more academic 
debates do. However, the Judge said "that, people, argue diminished 
responsibility, enn, . where the intention, may be slightly, less clear than is 
needed, for diminished responsibility". This provides confinnation that the 
defence provides a tactical device. In the interviews only DW paid attention to 
the conditions that can come within the remit of the defence, and there was no 
wide-ranging debate on the interpretation of the tenns used in the defence. DW 
remarked, "it is a bit of a case of anything goes". He said that by way of 
illustration it took the criminal law years to catch up with BWS, and Othello's 
syndrome, an irrational fear or belief that your partner is having an affair. It is 
DW's conviction that the law is becoming more open, and not bracketing 
matters in the way it used to. "If there really is something there which does, 
impair somebody's, reasoning, ... so that, you know, they're properly described 
as being under diminished responsibility, then, . to make sure that justice is 
done the court should be told about that, and er, the jury should be able to 
assess that". Therefore it is DW's opinion that if the defendant is suffering 
from diminished responsibility, the court should be made aware of it, even if 
the state does not fit into a convenient legal box that has been used for a few 
hundred years. "Maybe it's those concepts that are out of date. And I think, . 
you know, the law is, moving forward on that". These remarks support 
previous observations within the thesis that the law is operating benevolently 
and that it is not concerned with technical matters but securing what is 
perceived to be justice in the case. 
Another significant factor in preceding discussions, which was addressed by 
interviewees, is that of requiring experts to state their opinion on the ultimate 
issue. The Judge maintained it is important "for the psychiatrist, to make plain 
the factual basis", of their decision, and if the facts are disproved the expert 
should be consulted to ascertain if their opinion has changed in light of the new 
factual scenario. Nonetheless, in tenns of arriving at an opinion. the Judge said, 
"it's a very difficult, line, how much choice," someone has in a situation. 
Furthennore, AC remarked on how important the word substantial is, and how 
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difficult it is to evaluate, because what is substantial to some might not be to 
others. But "everyone involved in the court process needs to know that that 
doctor has addressed his mind to substantially ... we may as well know what 
he thinks and what his assessment is". As an expert he is entitled to give an 
opinion, although AC admitted it is an onerous task.345 In terms of the process 
by which the expert reaches an opinion, to facilitate the assessment the expert 
is given a copy of the case file, which AC conceded is not designed to go to a 
doctor. In addition the expert interviews the defendant. Significantly AC 
distinguished his own role from that of the expert, saying that as a lawyer he 
reviews the evidence from a different perspective to a doctor, who also deals 
with a live body, not just a bundle of paperwork. AC also claimed it was unfair 
to expect a doctor to determine if the defendant is 'blagging' simply as a result 
of having access to the case papers. Thus the importance of the expert's 
opinion is acknowledged as well as the difficulties in arriving at such a 
judgment. In addition the roles are distinguished through a sceptical reference 
to the perspicacity of the expert to test the veracity of the defendant's story. 
As noted previously, changing the role of the expert whereby they now give an 
opinion has affected the role of the jury. First the case may not go to trial if the 
experts on both sides agree, and the CPS decides to accept the plea. Secondly, 
if the case does go to trial the jury now hear expert opinion, which will inform 
their thinking and potentially could have a significant impact. No mention was 
made of the former, and in relation to the latter JM argued it is absurd to expect 
the jury to address the issue without expert opinion. The Judge said he viewed 
the topic as "a medical thing", which earlier discussions have shown it is not. 
But JM held that problems do arise when the doctors disagree and the jury then 
have to decide between the two experts, although the Judge said he was 
confident juries can assess the evidence. In fact the Judge alleged that "the 
reality is that in most cases, one, person is saying well, you know, 
responsibility was diminished, but in my view not substantially". Critically. 
both AC and the Judge emphasized it still is a matter for the jury.346 
345 There were mixed reaction on this from the medico-psychological respondents in chapter 7. 
346 This point is made by a medico-psychological respondent in chapter 7. 
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Provocation and Diminished Responsibility 
Chapter one explained the marked shift in the operation of the provocation 
defence since the case of Smith [2001] but the respondents did not address this. 
Furthermore, there was limited discussion of the concerns that have arisen with 
regard to pleading the provocation defence alongside diminished responsibility. 
The Judge said that in his experience "the defence, is running, both, diminished 
responsibility, and provocation". This was supported by KR's assertion that as 
far as his responsibilities are concerned any mental health information enters 
court in one of two ways, either through provocation, or through having a 
diagnosed mental illness. 347 The Judge expressed disquiet about the difficulties 
it presents for the jury because of the different evidential burdens,348 whereas 
JM alluded to the difficulties in cases concerned with relationships that have 
broken down and one of the parties suddenly snaps and kills the other one. The 
interviews indicated an acceptance of this shift in practice, and the problems 
identified were raised in chapter one, but again a more in-depth appreciation of 
the theoretical issues was absent. 
Psychopathy and Intoxication 
Throughout the thesis two states have been identified as creating particular 
problems, psychopathy and intoxication, but JM was the only legal interviewee 
to address them. JM observed that with regard to "mental disorder and mental 
illness, the psychopath of course is a major problem". He suggested it is 
probably not known yet if such an individual is fully mentally responsible. He 
also thought matters are complicated further if they have other mental disorders 
or illnesses because these will be treatable, whereas psychopathy is not. 
Therefore once the other mental illnesses are treated in hospital the defendant 
will be suitable for release in relation to them, but still be dangerous owing to 
the psychopathic tendencies. This reflects the major legal concern about the 
potential dangerousness of the psychopath and the problems arising from the 
fact they are currently considered untreatable. 
W However the case of MF [2003] shows that there can be difficulties because the decision in large part 
depends on the infom1ation that the defendant supplies. , _, 
34R Provocation has to be disproved by the prosecutIOn beyond all reasonable doubt whcn.:as the deft:nce 
have to prove diminished responsibility on the balance of probability. 
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As identified previously, in terms of intent the law is reluctant to recognise 
intoxication as an excuse and although psychiatrists are introducing the 
possibility that alcoholism constitutes a disease of the mind, it is currently a 
contested matter. 349 JM's view is that it is difficult to assess the degree of 
alcoholism that might lead to brain damage and psychiatrists do not have the 
pathologist's advantage of actually looking into the brain.35o However, JM 
conceded that if alcoholism has caused brain damage then the condition might 
qualify as diminishing responsibility. In line with the current legal position, he 
suggested the question is: was taking the first drink of the day a conscious 
decision, or an unconscious one programmed by the disease. JM argued if the 
drink could be resisted it considerably reduces the strength of the defence 
argument, which occurred in a case he was involved in. 
Reform Suggestions 
The reform discussions provided suggestions and concerns about options for 
change. In terms of revising the language used, a matter highlighted in chapter 
one, KR took issue with the Victorian foundations, and in particular turns of 
phrase, in the common law and statutes. KR argues that the law on fatal 
offences needs to be codified, or at least put into clearer modem language. His 
suggestions in part resulted from experience of practising law in Australia 
where the statutes were more modem and much clearer. KR believes that when 
you are talking about 
"significant impainnent of the mind, disease of the mind, er, ... abnonnality of the mind ... 
that those are just such arcane and archaic concepts that they do need to be put into, into 
modern language, I think. So that juries have a better peg to hang the evidence on ... ". 
In addition, JM suspected problems will get more acute because psychiatry as 
an art is not static but constantly developing, whereas words in Acts of 
Parliament are static. He suggests that unless the statutes are reviewed every 20 
or 30 years, every decade or so the psychiatric words will be out of sync with 
the law again.351 This overlooks what has been shown earlier, that there is no 
correlation between legal and medico-psychological meanings and concepts, 
and no evident desire for there to be any. The earlier deliberations intimated 
that the significance of language is in terms of the social connotations attached 
349 See also chapter 7. . 
350 Will neuroscience change this as it develops new ways in which to scan and analyse the bratn? 
J51 See the debate on psychopathy in chapter 7. 
181 
to particular words or phrases. Furthermore, JM questioned the codification 
proposals that will result in a reliance on symptom otology because behavioural 
manifestations are easy to engineer with a little bit of research. He knew 
defendants who had read psychiatry books and pretended to be "bonkers".352 
This shows the legal scepticism towards defendants. 
There were also concerns about reform proposals affecting the current legal 
flexibility. For example SB states 
"over a period of history, . we've got to a position now where the law, . and the laws that exist. 
have been sufficiently scrutinised, to say well actually, we're not in a bad, .. we're not in a bad 
position, because, . what we intended to achieve at first, . has now been, honed, to what we are 
actually wanting to achieve". 
He also argued it allows for changes in public opinion that have taken place in 
society over the last few decades to be reflected in the law. It is perhaps ten 
years behind, but this is not a bad thing because public opinion can change 
from year to year. He maintains judges provide sufficient flexibility and 
adaptability for the various scenarios presented in cases. This supports the 
perceptions gained through the research in chapters three and four. 
SB expressed concerns that increased codification would restrict the 
introduction of mitigating information, which is a major part of the defence 
solicitor's role. He argues this information enables the court to appreciate the 
bigger picture, and the impact the defendant's history has had on the behaviour 
in question. He maintains this broader view of the defendant allows the law to 
take account of social factors, in an acceptable way, at the sentencing stage, 
rather than with the verdict. SB expressed the opinion that it is difficult to 
know whether simplifying the rules of evidence would enhance the law, and 
the spirit of the law. What is required is that the law properly protects the rights 
of the defendant and the victim. As an example he cites the difficulties in 
achieving a balance in the questioning process in rape cases. In his view 
restricting the admission of evidence can have a detrimental effect on the rights 
of the defendant. He acknowledges that you have to bear in mind the public 
interest point of view but argues that to undermine the rights of the defendant 
to support his case, simply to protect the feelings of an individual, is not the 
352 These issues will be discussed further in chapter eight. 
right balance. This does not mean that he does not actually understand why 
they have introduced these restrictions. This encompasses the defence 
perspective very aptly, and also how he is concerned with a wider sense of 
justice than the theoretical debates, but which is reflected in the practices 
outlined in chapter three. 
Similarly, AC said "legal draftmanship is [not] what it was. We have some 
very odd things in new legislation these days which give us, practical 
problems". AC argues that practitioners, when giving effect to it, realise why it 
was the way it was before. AC believes that "in some areas, the prosecution's 
almost driving . . changes of attitude or changes of approach, or looking at 
things afresh". It would seem there is support for his belief with the changes in 
the operation of the diminished responsibility defence. In the area of law under 
scrutiny AC is concerned that a statutory framework could influence the 
process too much and reports will become conclusive. "You're gonna have 
lawyers struggling with that because we've had reports with conclusions which 
we've tested, . and we've come to a different conclusion". Thus the issue is one 
of legal control as currently the CPS decide, if both reports claim that the 
defendant's mental responsibility is substantially diminished, whether the case 
goes to trial. The final decision remains a legal one, namely whether there are 
any public interest issues, as defined by law, to be addressed in the case. The 
individual defendant is perceived and dealt with in light of social 
considerations, the broader issues are a lens to view the individual and their 
case, but this lens is a legal one, as a social institution charged with ensuring 
particular social norms and values are upheld. However, public interest, as 
defined by the law, means justice has to be served for both victim and 
defendant, and there is an evident scepticism towards defendants on the part of 
the prosecution. 
Thus the focus for reform is on the practical problems that would affect the 
undertaking of the lawyers' role and the securing of justice, as they perceive it, 
which appears more liberal than the strict letter of the law. So the issue is one 
of retaining flexibility to introduce matters into cases rather than any broader 
conceptual debate. 
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Procedural Considerations in a Case 
The legal responses to the vignette provided an informative insight into the 
procedural considerations in a case where the defendant is thought to have 
mental health problems. The description of the responses covers the various 
stages of the case process in order to highlight the critical junctures and base of 
professional deliberations identified by the interviewees. What the interviews 
provide is an insight into practical case decision-making within the legal 
conceptual framework outlined in preceding chapters. 
The Police Station 
The police are important because they investigate the incident, produce the 
case file, and control detention and questioning at the police station.353 A 
number of observations were made about options available at this stage if there 
are concerns about the defendant's mental state. The police have the first 
opportunity to make an assessment about possible mental health issues. GF, a 
senior investigating officer, explained the defence solicitor or interviewing 
officer might identify that the defendant is potentially vulnerable and consider 
an appropriate adult should be present. "[I]fyoufelt that this person's got some 
mental difficulties and, . first of all you would think, is he fit for interview"? 
GF stated there is no training to help with the recognition of mental health 
issues. He said the defence solicitor is seen as a security net, although he 
suspected they were no better informed. Consequently the welfare of the 
defendant is contingent on police officers and solicitors being able to spot 
mental health problems on the basis of tacit knowledge, developed through 
experience. Clearly the behaviour of the defendant may be very extreme, or 
witnesses, family or friends may furnish pertinent information. GF said the 
taking of medication, such as anti-depressants, would be a consideration, but if 
medically the depression were not thought to be serious then no special 
measures would be adopted. He remarked "we are conscious, we're not, we 
don't, we're not er, .. erm, if you like, ride roughshod over, people's needs, if 
we can identify them". GF claimed the police are more sensitive to the 
defendant's needs than they used to be. 
351 Sanders (1994) examines police practices in the police station. 
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Notwithstanding this aim, GF pointed out how difficult it is to identify serious 
mental health problems for mental health professionals, let alone the police. GF 
provided a case example, which appeared to be a significant experience. The 
man in question was on anti-depressants for mild depression, although he had 
taken a small number of pills in a suicide attempt the year before. He was in a 
relationship with a woman who had two children aged 6 and 11, each by a 
different father. Both natural fathers were involved with the children, which the 
man in question, who was inclined to be jealous, found hard because he wanted 
an exclusive family unit. One night the man interfered with the 6 year old, 
hanged her, tried to harm the mother, then ran off and hanged himself. He had 
given no sign of wanting to harm anyone else, so even though he had stopped 
taking his medication, as a result of the diagnosis of mild depression the 
medical profession were not concerned. Thus, GF concluded, experience was 
essential to assessing what to do in a case, but mistakes are inevitable. 
SB's insight, as a defence solicitor, was that the police station is the most 
difficult part of the process because the courts have a certain procedural 
organisation, whereas at the police station "there are so many more issues that 
you've got to cope with before doing your work". In particular, he maintained, 
murder cases are very pressurised incidents with the emotions and sensitivities 
that surround them. Significantly, SB argued that much of what solicitors do is 
dependent on acquired experience. 
"I mean that there are, the experience helps, because, in the pressured situation of the police 
station, where you have to make decisions, really within minutes, and without reference to any 
material, without reference to any reports, and without seeing the evidence that the police have 
against them, you need the confidence to stand by your decision. And that comes with 
experience" . 
This illustrates the importance of tacit knowledge gained through professional 
inculcation and experience. 
As noted previously, GF said the police rely in part on the defence solicitor to 
ensure the defendant's interests are protected, yet the police perspective 
initially informs a defence lawyer's tactical decisions. For example, KR said 
solicitors receive "disclosure as it is called from the police officers, ... before 
you speak to the client in any detail". Moreover, SB said the defence solicitor's 
decisions about the defendant's mental state are unqualified assessments: there 
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is no training except in signposting about which avenue of investigation to 
pursue. KR also stated that most solicitors have had no in-depth training in 
mental health issues because there is none, only circulars produced by the 
Home Office on mentally disordered offenders. KR stated you can practise for 
15 or 20 years without any instruction on psychiatric issues. which he 
conceded is probably wrong. He suggested there might be some half-day 
continuing education courses with psychiatrists, but it is not part of the formal 
training in crime. Also criminal lawyers specialising in mental health law may 
have a better working knowledge, but "most of us rely on, er, you know, 
inherent feeling for clients". Nonetheless KR asserted it is dangerous to rely on 
your own perceptions of someone's mental capacities. 
So you have a position whereby the police and the defence lawyers are making 
decisions about the defendant based on tacit judgments about their mental 
health based on experience, as they have no suitable training. If there are 
concerns about the defendant's mental health police surgeons provide medical 
support at the police station. When making a decision about whether to call 
one, GF claimed the government's new contractual arrangement in some areas, 
whereby there is no longer a local police surgeon, could affect matters. As a 
result of the changes surgeons may have to travel large distances and "the 
clock is still ticking" on the time allowed to question a defendant. This is 
another illustration of how changes in one part of the Criminal Justice System 
can potentially affect the operation of another. As AC said, the consequences 
of a lot of the legislative change make you realise why it was the way it was 
before. 
Notwithstanding the fact the police do not like wasting time on the clock, SB 
stated the police are under pressure to make sure defendants are detained 
properly and do not do anything "silly". Moreover, despite GF's remark 
regarding reliance on defence solicitors, SB said only the police can request the 
police surgeon because the solicitor has no authority to say they ought to bring 
in X, Y or Z. SB cited a case example where the defendant confessed to the 
murder. 
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"And I mean, it, it became very difficult for me then to say to, the police, erm, this man is mad, 
a ~ d d I do.n't.think he ought to be detained. And I don't think he ought to be interviewed. Because 
hIS admIssIOns were so, open, honest, rounded, constructed well ... ". 
The prosecution argued that as the defendant's explanations were so lucid, and 
the details so accurate, it was murder. This point of view persisted even when 
the defence obtained medico-psychological reports demonstrating there were 
problems and that the defendant had a psychiatric history. This shows the 
contrasting defence and prosecution objectives in a case. Nevertheless, SB 
argued that usually, in serious cases where there is clearly a mental health 
issue, the police are not critical if you raise the issue. In addition he said that as 
his firm is well known and has a good reputation, the police usually listen. This 
is an indication of the importance of reputation and established relationships 
for the operation of the legal system. 
A police surgeon is called to verify whether or not the defendant is fit to be 
detained and fit for interview, although SB pointed out these are ongoing 
assessments. GF suggested it is quite difficult for the police surgeon, especially 
as the defendant's mental state is frequently affected by drink and drugs. In 
addition, KR made the point that police surgeons are not consultant 
psychiatrists or psychologists. SB said they are simply GPs with a little bit of 
training. Furthermore, he argued the difficulties are exacerbated by the fact 
everyone is under stress in a police station. SB asserted, "basically, if they've 
got their limbs attached to their bodies, they're capable of being detained. And 
that's all the police are bothered about". Similarly KR said doctors take a robust 
attitude about fitness for interview. "You've got to have a pretty significant 
impairment for them to determine at the police station that you're not fit to be 
interviewed". If found unfit for interview the defendant might be certified by 
two psychiatrists under s3 of the MHA and taken to hospital. If mental health 
difficulties are identified but the defendant is fit for interview, they are deemed 
to be a vulnerable adult and require an appropriate adult as well as a solicitor to 
be present. SB stated that an appropriate adult would always ensure a legal 
representative is present to advise on the law. However KR's 
"experience tends to show that people who have let's call it some mental i m p ~ i ~ e n t t at the 
moment without defining exactly what it is. generally appreciate, generally. the slgmficance of 
the situation they are in such that when they're asked that question they do say yes I do want a 
solicitor" . 
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Tactically, if KR thinks he might run diminished responsibility, he may advise 
the defendant to say nothing. 
What this discussion shows is the importance of experience in assessing mental 
health matters. There is no training and clearly no understanding of mental 
health matters. But critically it demonstrates that the legal system is not 
underpinning the moral concerns identified in the theoretical debates with 
stringent systems because lawyers and non-specialist medical personnel are 
making judgments about the defendant's mental health. The important issue 
remains the legal evaluation of the situation and obtaining evidence to make 
the initial case decisions. There appears to be no intersection of law and 
medico-psychology at this point in the legal process. 
Vignette 
To demonstrate that a case can generate a variety of reactions this section 
describes the responses to the vignette. They illustrate how attitude, 
perceptions and legal objectives affect decision-making. 
In evaluating the case SB remarked it was unlikely a solicitor would not think 
the vignette scenario strange. He claimed, as a result of experience, he had a 
sense of 'normal' behaviour by murderers. SB remarked on the fact the 
vignette incident involved alcohol, but for him the most alarming thing was 
that Malcolm does not recognise the significance of what he has done in 
stabbing JD. Furthermore, Malcolm does not leave the premises in a panic with 
a view to avoiding detection. SB concluded this is not a normal reaction to 
killing someone. KR referred to the significance Malcolm's behaviour towards 
the police, and his contiguous comments, would have in putting the arresting 
officers on alert that there is something strange. He said the officers could 
subsequently alert the custody sergeant that there are possible mental health 
issues. Alternatively, KR suggested the custody sergeant may think Malcolm is 
not functioning at 100 percent, and subsequently act on the basis that he was a 
vulnerable suspect. KR suggests 
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"even disregarding any issue about his mental capacity, on a murder case the custody sergeant 
would probably, invariably call the doctor out to see Malcolm, but he'd be doubly reinforced in 
doing that ifhe thought there was some issue".354 
DW said that at the police station he would determine if Malcolm was fit to be 
dealt with, in particular if he was sober enough to give coherent instructions. 
DW regarded Malcolm's amnesia as an indication of some sort of psychiatric 
or psychological problem and would have him assessed as quickly as possible, 
although he claimed it is difficult to get professionals down to the police 
station?55 However, he said you could get the police surgeon down to assess 
whether he needs diverting under the MHA. KR thought an appropriate adult 
would be necessary and he would have a doctor certify Malcolm was fit for 
interview. He would not let Malcolm say anything until a doctor had seen him 
and an appropriate adult had been called. In addition, if he suspected a 
psychiatric history he would get onto the GP or psychiatrist who treated him. 
SB said, "I think that the police surgeon is, from what, is said here, he's gonna 
say he's fit to be detained but not fit to be interviewed perhaps". 
An alternative suggested by DW was recommending he say nothing and that 
the mental health professionals can be involved when he is remanded in prison. 
Also KR said if he considered Malcolm might say things that are negative to 
his interests, he would write a pre-prepared statement with Malcolm, which can 
be submitted at the point at which the police are going to charge him. Legally 
he has said something, and if the police have charged him it is difficult for 
them to then go back into an interview situation. "So, look you've charged him 
so you think you've got enough evidence, he's said everything he wants to, 
there's what he wants to say, put it on file". 
KR's hunch, based on the information in the vignette, and the presumption 
there is no history of mental illness, was that Malcolm does not have a mental 
illness under the MHA, but perhaps has a personality disorder. "That's what I'd 
be thinking here, aggressive personality disorder, but not necessarily mental 
illness". This suggests experienced solicitors feel they can distinguish between 
mental illness and personality disorder. Nevertheless, KR said if Malcolm 
354 This was not said by any other respondent. . . 
m Some medico-psychological respondents indicated they would like to be involved thiS early In the 
proceedings. see chapter 7. 
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continued to say he did not remember the incident alarm bells would ring 
higher. "But, being realistic you'd be wondering as a solicitor, is he saying that, 
because he's fearful of the position he's in or is that potentially a, a genuine, err, 
symptom". This sceptical attitude is evident in other interviews. 
Interestingly it is the defence lawyers that responded to the vignette directly. 
Despite the ambiguities within the scenario the lawyers all suspected mental 
health problems and discussed having the defendant assessed, whilst attending 
to their strategic responsibilities regarding how much the defendant should talk 
in the police interviews. 
The Charge 
In light of the early stage at which a charge has to be made the police normally 
choose murder, unless the CPS advise manslaughter. AC stated that the police 
consult the CPS when "they are arresting and charging, and to be fair often 
they will consult us before arrest for advice on the case evidentially as, as it 
sits". GF attributed increasing CPS involvement to changes following the Auld 
report (2001). But GF still said "I would say 99.9% of the time, it would be a, a 
murder charge. The manslaughter might come later". 
Once the defendant is charged the possibility of trial becomes the central focus. 
KR said cases are dealt with much quicker than they used to be, within a week 
of going into the magistrate's court it will be up in the Crown Court, whereas 
they used to rumble on for perhaps three months before going up. The Crown 
Court judge sets the case timetable; when the prosecution have to serve papers 
and when the hearings will take place. KR said there are a number of options at 
this stage for involving a medico-psychological expert. The court may initiate 
contact with a community psychiatric nurse or individuals from the local 
psychiatric hospital, to request an assessment and help decide where the 
defendant should be incarcerated. 356 Another option, discussed by AC, is that at 
the plea and directions hearing the defence could say they want medical 
reports. He said the defendant in the vignette "is fairly easily flagged up as one 
where we're going to get into the realms of diminished responsibility". 
J56 S4( I) of the Criminal Justice Act 199 I requires a trial judge to ensure that a psychiatric report is 
provided to the court on anyone who is or appears mentally unstable. 
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Furthermore, if the defendant is charged with murder and their mental state has 
not been assessed, an assessment will be undertaken once they are remanded in 
prison. The judge at the remand hearing may order an assessment is done 
during the next month. Alternatively the defendant may be remanded to a 
secure hospital because of concerns about his mental state. 
Preparing the Case for Trial 
Initial Defence and Prosecution Considerations 
As indicated earlier, legal considerations are different from a defence and 
prosecution perspective, although it appears to be important to both 
prosecution and defence to secure the preferred barrister. AC emphasised 
establishing a prosecution case team by the second remand hearing, 
significantly deciding which QC and junior counsel are appropriate and getting 
them on board as early as possible, as you may lose your first choice to the 
defence. DW said homicide cases require a very senior barrister and there is 
only a small pool of people, as with experts, so it is important to phone them or 
contact them immediately. AC discussed making decisions as a team, which 
consists of the police, CPS and leading counsel, working from basic principles 
and experience.357 AC said he values having the three perspectives at the table, 
as each of these parties is independent of the other. An example he gave of the 
advantage of this independence is that the police can get too close to a case and 
the family, which without the counter checks provided by the CPS and counsel 
may mean that public interest issues are overlooked. But AC said the primary 
considerations for the prosecution are the evidential hurdles and likelihood of a 
conviction, and then public interest matters are considered. You may be 
"almost immediately put on notice, diminished responsibility, is this the way 
that's going, is that the argument that's going to be raised"? From a 
prosecution barrister's perspective, JM states that if the defendant is saying he 
cannot remember having done the act "there is bound to be some mental health 
problems somewhere". This does not reflect the legal scepticism towards the 
defendant that is normally evident and it represents a very simplistic 
connection that contrasts starkly with observations in chapter seven. 
357 There is a CPS Code for prosecutors and a booklet containing instructions for prosecuting advocates. 
which has to be adhered to. 
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SB discussed his attitude and perception of his role, and tactical 
responsibilities, as a defence lawyer. SB believes the defence are "knights in 
shining armour" because they challenge everything, including authority, as 
they stand up for the "little man". SB argued you build a rapport with clients 
and begin to see them as a sort of mate, someone you see through a particular 
difficulty, much the same as say social services. However he pointed out you 
do not see them socially. SB suggested you form these relationships because 
most clients come back, although one suspects not for murder, but he did 
discuss representing two brothers for different murders. The defence solicitor's 
job is to try and convey their persona in court, which for SB is what makes the 
job interesting, although under-funding is putting the role at risk. Additionally, 
SB argued he has an obligation to represent his client, so all the evidence has to 
be explored, leading him to dispute claims that the defence often cause delays, 
maintaining that the crown prosecution and courts are more often responsible. 
For example, the defence cannot advise a client what to plead before they know 
whether or not there is sufficient evidence against him. "Even if the client has 
admitted the offence to us, . English law requires us, to establish the 
prosecution have enough evidence to prove it". SB said it is very difficult to 
fulfil this duty if the CPS and police do not disclose evidence. 
In terms of initial legal tactics SB said he considers if the police interviewed 
the defendant without an appropriate adult where it seems one should have 
been appointed. If this is the case he said he would be rubbing his hands with 
glee because that puts real pressure on the CPS to do a deal. 
"If they know that they're gonna have egg on their face, through the police not acting properly. 
So, you know, from our, strategic and tactical point of view, that's s o m e t ~ i n g g that I:d be 
looking at". However, "I don't think the detective inspector, would run the nsk, o ~ ~ havJn? a 
murder case kicked out because they didn't deal with someone properly at the pohce statIOn 
stage". 
The distinction between the concerns of the two legal perspectives is portrayed 
very clearly in these representations. There is also a very clear sense of the 
importance on fulfilling the role required, rather than the technical details 
discussed in chapter one. In addition, there is the first sense of the importance 
of inter-professional relationships. 
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Choosing a Medico-Psychological Expert 
Having decided it would be propitious to obtain an expert's opinion, there is 
the issue of choosing an expert. It became apparent that lawyers develop 
preferences premised on experience of the expert's performance in legal terms, 
not necessarily indicating clinical competence. In addition there was evidence 
of procedural constraints restricting defence choices. However, an important 
fundamental point, raised only by KR, is that "there's a lot of confusion, even 
in legal circles, between the differences between psychiatrists and 
psychologists" . 
In terms of judging experts based on performance, AC said they are evaluated 
on two things, the calibre of reports and performance in the witness box. 
Notably both are crucial components to success within the adversariallegal 
process. With regard to reports, KR said the psychiatrists and psychologists he 
prefers provide comprehensive discursive reports rather than relying on 
prescribed headings, which he believes is an indication the expert knows the 
client. In respect of court appearances, the Judge held, "obviously the lawyers 
pick them and those who are, doughty fighters". Significantly, AC has found 
the quality of the expert's report and their performance in the witness box can 
, 
be incongruent. "Doctors and other experts are not unknown to resile entirely 
from what they've put on paper once the right questions are asked".358 The QC 
that AC regularly works with only likes two particular people, which he 
endeavours to get because "if you've got, someone of that calibre and 
experience giving you advice of that nature ... ". AC has already emphasised 
the importance of securing the barrister he prefers and the importance of team-
work, and securing the 'right' expert appears to be a part of the co-operative 
working process. 
However, attention was paid to factors affecting the secunng of preferred 
experts. DW has three or four psychiatrists or psychologists he likes to use, and 
said as he is part of a big firm he does not usually have any difficulty getting 
them. 359 In addition, as an experienced homicide lawyer he alleged he 'pulls 
strings', although getting the reports quickly is more of a challenge. However, 
35R Experience of being in court is discussed in chapter 7. . 
359 DW is also part of an e-group for criminal lawyers, which provides recommendatIOns on request. 
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DW referred to a current high profile murder case he is involved in where all 
the experts required said yes immediately, which, he suggested, was a result of 
the case featuring heavily on TV.36o DW argued it is particularly important in 
homicide cases to get people you have used before, or that have come 
recommended, because clients are looking at the possibility of life 
imprisonment. "You don't want to take the risk of somebody unknown". 
Therefore he maintained that to get the 'heavyweights' you often have to wait 
because lots of other people use them as well. 
AC joked about the reasons why defence solicitors might have their favourites, 
but SB contextualized his discussion by reference to the fact his preferences are 
in large part dictated by the franchising requirements to justify the expert 
chosen. The defence has to apply to the Legal Services Commission (LSC) for 
funding. SB and KR both said funds are normally granted, with perhaps a 
quibble about whether you should have gone to psychiatrist one or two. 
Decisions can take as little as ten minutes or up to three or four days. As soon 
as legal aid is granted it can be used, so the expert can become involved at the 
early stages, providing they are available. SB said the biggest problem is the 
lack of availability of preferred experts, and when they have to use someone 
new it has to be explained under the franchising requirements. This rule also 
applies to the appointment of barristers. 361 This administrative process 
generates pressure to stick with the small pool of established experts to ensure 
the funding from the LSC, even though this is likely to result in delays. 
The discussions indicate there are tactical and procedural reasons for experts 
becoming part of a favoured small pool of professionals. The legal system 
reinforces the use of those that work well within the legal context, which will 
be judged on legal terms because there is no basis for an assessment of clinical 
competence, and as chapters three and four show, no legal need for it because 
the defences are concerned with legal interpretations. 
360 OW also discovered that his 16 year old client falls between the psychological specialisms dealing 
with childrcn and adults. 
361 S8's finn have a Directory indicating whether someone did a good job or not. to help the 
inexperienced solicitor. 
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Instructing the Expert 
Having acquired an expert the solicitor despite the lack of any mental health 
training has to provide the necessary instructions which supply the framework 
for the assessment process. Therefore, legal considerations will prevail. 
Importantly, AC stated if the defence decide to run the diminished 
responsibility defence the prosecution usually seek a report after viewing the 
defence information. KR said current practice is for the defence to get two 
psychiatrists to say that the person is suffering from a mental illness, and was 
doing so at the time of the index offence, in order to convince the prosecution. 
As indicated previously, the preference is to involve an expert as quickly as 
possible. KR said that this is so with murder cases in particular, because, based 
on his experience, it is difficult for psychiatrists to project back, especially if 
they see the defendant months after the event. KR argued practices are 
changing and he normally comes away from the bail application and goes 
straight to a psychiatrist, and the LSC. Significantly KR is in charge of the 
Crown Court department in his area and said he gets very upset if there are 
delays in cases that come before him. This illustrates the importance of the 
attitudes and practices of those influencing legal practice and processes. 
There were differences in approach to signposting the avenues the expert 
should investigate. Concerns centred on giving the expert adequate 
information, not influencing them, and not helping the other side in the case. 
DW said he produces a detailed letter setting out exactly what they are looking 
for and what the case is about. In addition he said he asks that if anything else 
of interest emerges to let him know, implying the expert knows what is of legal 
interest. In contrast SB asserted he does not "want to say too much to the 
psychiatrists about, the thought I had about it". SB explained this tactically, 
saying the information in the report is not privileged unless it is part of a letter 
to the solicitor.362 "And I've got to be very careful about that because the, 
psychiatrists report, may deal with issues that I want dealing with, that the 
prosecution may not even think of'. The example he gave was, why had the 
defendant with a constant mental disorder not stabbed someone before. SB 
wants the answer, but not in the report where it will be revealed to the CPS, as 
362 See Davies [2002]; Clough [1998] 
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it might assist them. This shows the report is a tactical device, particularly in 
light of subsequent discussions on comprehending the reports. 
A number of points were made about the issue of expert independence and 
being a team player. KR discussed how he tries to avoid 'colouring' the 
expert's judgment, which he argued is helped by the fact that in addition to 
seeing the client and a discussion with him, the expert is in receipt of all the 
case papers produced by the police and CPS. "[T]hey'll certainly see, what is 
important for them to see. ... anything we think may help them reach an 
important decision". GF asserted that the case file is likely to contain 
significant statements for the expert, as it includes a profile of the defendant 
from witness statements, the forensic science and the defendant's statement. 
However, it would seem that the earlier an expert is involved the less 
developed the case file is going to be. This was a matter noted by DW, who 
pointed out that sometimes not all the information is available. As a 
consequence occasionally it is necessary to phone the expert and ascertain 
whether, had they known the information, it would have made a difference. An 
interesting development is the evolving practice of the police videoing 
defendant's interviews, which might in due course provide tactical evidence for 
the defence to have an expert assert that the defendant's behaviour exhibited 
identifiable symptoms of mental difficulties and thereby challenge the veracity 
of the evidence obtained.363 
Notwithstanding these remarks, AC claimed it is inevitable that the legal side 
instructing the expert affects their approach. AC asserted he is not denigrating 
the expert's professionalism, he is simply saying "the starting point carries a 
disproportionate weight". Consequently, experts rely on what the defence 
lawyers and defendant tells them, although the police files will have an impact. 
Despite this viewpoint, AC then said, "it is not a doctors job to review evidence 
in the same independent way that I do it, ... It's his job to give a diagnosis of 
the individual in front of him". 
Likewise the Judge said "although, . each report now finishes, with the words to the effect. that 
they know they must be dispassionate, and, are giving, an opinion for t h ~ ~ b ~ n e f i t t of t h ~ ~ c o u ~ , ,
... it's human nature isn't it, that erm, ... you fight for one SIde, . the reahty IS that you re paId 
... it can be very lucrative work". 
363 Perhaps they would make good training material for police and solicitors. 
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Plainly from previous chapters the legal system engenders a partisan approach 
through the adversarial process. This is also likely to be bolstered by the 
development of inter-professional relationships. The remarks also reveal a legal 
scepticism to expert evidence that pervades the other two dimensions of the 
analysis of the interaction of law and medico-psychology and supports the 
legal position that it should control the admission of expert evidence. 
Subsequent instructions might also be produced. SB said they are "under a 
duty, to check firstly that the report matches the instructions". DW said "if 
something is not addressed in the report I'll happily send it back and say, 
you've missed, this that or the other. But then you wait, weeks more ... ". 
Barristers can also play an important part because they can request the expert 
address further specific questions. AC said this could be necessary if the expert 
is inexperienced in writing reports for criminal cases and perhaps as a result 
adopted too academic an approach. Cases may even be adjourned if the report 
requires an addendum. But does the possibility of delay affect legal decision-
making? It would seem this possibility adds to the pressure to secure the 
experts familiar with the system. As a barrister, JM said it is important to 
ensure that he has the relevant information, whilst being I careful not to 
influence the expert. Therefore "the formulation of the conclusion, may be an 
area that you want to talk to him, so as to satisfy yourself, particularly as I said 
earlier, if, if it's a, a psychiatrist you haven't dealt with before. To make sure in 
your own mind that he has actually addressed, all the statutory criteria". Once 
satisfied on this he said the expert is independent, which shows the important 
legal focus, the conclusion, with little attention paid to other matters, as it is 
hard to envisage what is meant by independence if the report concludes that 
there is evidence of a defence. 
As earlier discussions indicate, an important matter is the delay in experts 
producing their report. DW attributed this to the fact that most firms use the 
same people so they are very busy. 
"The difficulty is, the numbers of people, actually doing criminal work and .. you know, they 
take on the work, and if they say no then we badger them until they do say yes, because 
they're, . we want, people that we've used before, we want people who are recommended". 
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As a result he claimed you often have to wait 14 to 16 weeks for somebody to 
be seen and get a report. 
Another issue, which SB and DW discussed, is the cost of reports. SB said it 
costs between £800 and £ 1 000 for six hours worth of work. He pointed out the 
LSC grant the authority to incur the cost of the psychiatrist, and if it is refused 
the defence lawyer has to foot the bill, hence the propensity to stay with those 
experts the LSC readily sanctions. DW said "[p ]sychologists will only talk to 
us when they can send us massive bills". Reports can cost thousands of pounds, 
with experts charging over £ 1 00 per hour for attending court to give their 
.. 364 Wh d c. OpInIOn. ereas elence lawyers work on fixed legal aid fees of £46.50 an 
hour for criminal work, although everyone assumes that they are getting £ 150 
to £200 an hour. 365 DW admitted he has a very poor view of the medical 
profession because of this. 
The Report 
A number of remarks were made about the content and format of reports. For 
instance, JM discussed the fact that experts are required to include a paragraph 
in the report stating that they are aware that their duty is to the court. He said in 
the past they were effectively 'hired guns', something AC also mentioned. JM 
said that that is thoroughly unsatisfactory and does not help the judge. As noted 
earlier, KR prefers a more discursive report, "like anything there's some 
excellent psychiatrists, there's some not quite so good, .,. some can be very 
mechanical in their reports almost with headings, ... the psychiatrist I generally 
instruct are far more discursive". Their reports are sometimes twice as long and 
not just template headed, but he finds them "far more useful as they really get 
into it, and get into the client if you like ... ". KR said whilst the expert 
normally sees the defendant once, perhaps twice, for between one and four 
hours, in a current case the defendant had unusually been seen four times. 
364 This seems to be a prevalent legal view, which contrasts with that made by RH in chapter 7. 
365 OW said, owing to the poor financial rewards, he has to justify undertaking criminal work to the 
partners in the firm. Many big firms have stopped because to make any money a high volume of cases is 
necessary. Also the poor rate of pay means few solicitors do defence work as the prosecutIOn can offer 
more money. OW says the government's new public defenders service costs on average 50% more per 
case than in private practice. 
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JM said he is concerned that the report comes from a reliable expert who has 
asked the right questions. So with regard to the diminished responsibility 
defence it should have been assessed whether the defendant suffers from a 
mental illness, which arose from a condition of arrested or retarded 
development, and as a result of this his responsibility was diminished. If it was, 
was the diminution substantial? JM believes that "any expert worth his salt will 
do the automatic sort of, conversion, into our language. ... Although he may 
say, in his report, the medical language so that his colleagues understand". 
Similarly JM maintained any reputable expert can translate it for the benefit of 
the jury, but he said 
"it is more difficult for psychiatrists actually than it is for lawyers because, I mean psychiatrists 
can explain to you in psychiatric terms, and then you sit down with him and, and you, you 
discuss, how best you can word it, within the legal constraints". 
These concerns are understandable in light of the role of the barrister within the 
adversarial process. They also clearly indicate the expert is required to meet 
legal needs in making clear conclusions, in legal terms that the jury can 
understand. 
The Judge alleged, "some psychiatrists are more willing than others, to say that 
it's diminished responsibility". Is this an important factor in the development 
of preferences by prosecution and defence? He acknowledged psychiatrists 
hold different views, but he was concerned "they may not always, see the 
victim". He attributed this to the doctor-patient relationship, which is premised 
on the assumption that the "patient is telling them the truth". But he argued it 
might not be the complete picture, in legal terms anyway, as it is not simply 
focused on diagnosis and treatment. Assessments for legal purposes require a 
"dispassionate approach which not every, psychiatrist has". But nor did the 
judge think the expert should say what the court wants because "their integrity 
is at the heart of expert evidence". The Judge said if a defendant confesses to 
the expert, as the case is about getting as "close to the truth, ... as possible ... 
it, may be better ... " that it comes out. This reflects the ambivalence inherent in 
the role of the clinical forensic expert as clinician and actor within the legal 
process, and the possible legal perceptions and interpretations of the expert and 
their opinion. 
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In terms of including scientific evidence, KR stated that in his experience. 
psychiatric reports seem to be based on talking to the client, whereas 
psychological reports are more scientific, based on particular tests, such as IQ 
tests. He said they seem to rely on both old and new tests. With regard to citing 
research to support an argument, KR had seen references to reports, but not 
technologies such as brain scans. However, he did know of a case where a 
neurosurgeon as well as psychiatrist and psychologist had been involved. 
although he admitted he had never thought to instruct one. KR stated "your 
stock solicitor's first port of call with vulnerable clients with query mental 
impairment [is a] psychiatrist". The psychiatrist guides the solicitor, and if 
technological research were suggested money to conduct the tests would be 
applied for. 
JM said once the reports have been produced it is common for the experts to 
respond to one another's reports. He alleged they might go into a room 
together, consider areas of agreement and disagreement, and think whether a 
joint report is possible. The prosecution are likely to accept a joint report 
supporting a defence and the case will not proceed to a full court hearing. Thus 
even potentially contested cases are avoided wherever possible. 
SB said with regard to Malcolm it is difficult to see what kind of assessment 
will be made, "it's one of those ones where they may say that he had, . he was 
too insane, in, in the legal terminology". 
Legal Perceptions of Medico-Psychological Comprehension of the Law 
When SB was asked whether psychiatrists have a problem understanding legal 
definitions, such as abnormality of the mind and disease of the mind, or fitting 
in with court requirements, he answered none at all. KR claimed most reports 
state the person has not got a mental illness but a personality disorder, and he is 
unsure how bad a personality disorder has to be to make it a mental illness. 
Likewise DW stated he has found no problem in homicide cases, pointing out 
that they only use very experienced experts in such serious cases. He said new 
people coming into the field do need some guiding through concepts, but he is 
always happy to sit and chat through things with them, but they are not 
necessarily happy with the legal concepts. On this last point, JM said 
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psychiatrists do not like the fonnulation of diminished responsibility and would 
like to get rid of it. It is his belief that when "they're giving evidence in court 
proceedings, they've really got to, you know, er, it goes against the grain I 
think for, for a lot of them", because they have to convert their opinions into 
language which is consistent with the Homicide Act. In fact JM believes that 
there is a major problem with doctors talking to lawyers.366 This reflects the 
picture in chapters two and three about how far removed the definitions within 
the defence of diminished responsibility is from the medico-psychological 
understanding that experts have to work with. That said, experienced experts 
are those that know how to work within the legal meanings. 
Legal Comprehension of Medico-Psychology 
What of legal competence in comprehending expert reports? SB believes both 
the court and solicitors have difficulties understanding psychiatric reports and 
tenninology. He said it helps that reports are written in a fairly standardised 
fashion. "It's just that the, the infonnation contained within psychiatric reports, 
is often very voluminous. And, and also, enn, techi, very technically phrased". 
This was not evident in the reports that fonned part of the CPS case files, 
which are reviewed in chapter seven. Therefore, SB argues, it can be difficult 
to work out what they mean, even with the help of medico-legal dictionaries.367 
"I'll be, I'd be lying if I said sometimes I wasn't confused completely". SB has 
found that psychiatric reports of four pages will require probably three times as 
much reading as a witness statement of the same length. As a result SB reads 
reports with the philosophy that nothing in it is going to be straightforward and 
then it is possible to cope. He conceded experience has its benefits. Whereas 
DW said he has found he generally understands reports in cases such as 
homicide, because he deals with the reports personally and goes through them 
in a very detailed way. He attaches comments to reports he sends to barristers, 
and argued that barristers should be able to critique the reports. As a barrister, 
JM finds the major problem is the definition of mental illness or mental 
disorder. He believes now that most people are aware of ICD 10, which most 
psychiatrists use, although there was no reference to it in the CPS reports.368 
366 See chapter 7 for the medico-psychological viewpoint. 
367 This reflects the psychiatrist Drs view of the helpfulness of law books. 
36R JM pointed out he is conscious there are some differences in the diagnostic definitions of ICD 10 and 
DSM IV. 
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It would seem lawyers expenence difficulties understanding reports yet 
technically they are crucial to decision-making and form part of the 
information the solicitor and client need to evaluate to make tactical choices. 
However, training is not held to be necessary. Furthermore, this discussion 
provides some indication of the difficulties juries face trying to understand 
unfamiliar technical evidence in order to make a considered judgment and 
arrive at a verdict. 
Expert Reports and Case Decisions 
The expert's report potentially has a number of repercussions for legal options 
and tactics, which are different for the defence and prosecution. 
Defence Perspective 
The expert's judgment about which defence can or cannot be supported is 
potentially very important. SB stated he is in the hands of those assessing the 
defendant as to which way the case will be fought. Likewise KR said, you only 
decide which defence to run once you have received the report. The report is an 
evidential tool. It can be seen how important it is that the expert is trusted and 
can link their clinical judgments to the legal issues. 
KR claimed that many reports assert the individual has no mental illness, but 
even if the report supports a defence the matter has to be discussed with the 
client before offering a plea.369 DW remarked on how important it is to ensure 
clients are fully aware because it is very easy "for, solicitors on, on both sides 
of the case to forget about the people involved". He believes that one of the 
biggest criticisms, fairly levelled at the criminal justice system, is that it forgets 
the personal element that it is about real people and real lives. Though he 
conceded that with some homicide cases it is better to forget it is real life. That 
said DW has found it varies how much clients want to be involved, although in , 
homicide cases they usually want to be included, with some wanting a copy of 
every piece of paper. 
369 The case of Weekes [1999] is a good example of the issues that can arise from the defendant refusing 
to use reports that support a diminished responsibility plea because of their mental illness. 
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However, the report might say that the defendant was not capable of 
formulating instructions. SB said, 
"of course if the assessment suggested that he wasn't able, to formulate, proper thoughts .... 
Wasn't able to formulate mens rea. Wasn't able to formulate roper thoughts, r would ha\c to 
assume that he wasn't able to formulate proper instructions". 37 
If the defendant is fit to instruct, do they want what fits in with the legal 
viewpoint? DW cited an example involving a defendant accused of rape who 
objected to the psychiatrist's remarks that he constituted a danger to all women 
and was therefore unsafe to be released back into the community. Therefore, 
even though this constituted significant information the report was not used. 
Notwithstanding this the defendant received 5 life sentences. DW said that if 
he believes the report should be used he offers very strong advice to that effect, 
as part of his professional role, but at the end of the day it is the client's case. 
He admitted most clients cede to his advice.371 Significantly there is no duty on 
the defence to disclose unfavourable reports because it is a confidential 
document. 372 This demonstrates further that reports are devices in the legal 
process and not strictly about the defendant's mental state. However, the Judge 
argued "you do effectively know if you're prosecuting, . that's happened to be 
fair, if they're switched on anyway". He maintained that if someone is in 
custody there is a record of who has visited and if no report appears it is 
obvious why. Furthermore, it may be a second report that is disclosed, but 
reports usually cite which documents have been seen in reaching the 
conclusions, so it is a matter of being astute about it. 
As a defence barrister JM's first concern is whether the defendant is fit to 
plead, whether there is any point running the insanity defence. If there is 
insufficient evidence for this the next option is whether there is evidence of 
diminished responsibility. "I would hope that by the time I came into it er, the 
defence solicitor would have got a defence psychiatric report and if he hadn't 
erm, then, told to quick, told to go get one as soon as possible". This remark is 
interesting because of previous assertions about how important it is to get a 
370 Viljoen, Roesch & Zapf (2002) have undertaken a study on the effect of different mental states on the 
capacity to instruct. . .. ., 
371 It was held in Hobson [1998] per curiam that the task of counsel IS to exercIse Judgment and dIscretIOn 
as to the way in which a client's case can best be presented, and not simply act as a mouthpiece for the 
client. 
372 DOI'ies [2002] deals with reports being privileged. 
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barrister on board early, more than likely before a report is ready in view of 
claims about delays. Furthermore solicitors are aware that barristers can be 
particular about which experts they will work with so they have to wait to see 
which barrister they will be using. 
Prosecution Perspective 
AC held that prosecution decisions are made on the merits of the particular 
case. The team go back to first principles, but essentially leading counsel make 
the final decision when there are medical reports. Consideration is given to the 
internal consistency of the defendant's behaviour, their antecedents, the 
information from prison assessments, and the two reports that are likely to have 
come from the defence. AC said 
"[n]ow you have to remember we're lawyers therefore we're arsey and, cynical and difficult 
people. (Laughter) And all too ready not to believe, . what's written in front of us. (Laughter) 
So there's, there is, there is no, sense in which, we accept the material given to us on face 
value". 
He argued attitudes are informed by practice, and he believes there are experts 
for hire, "[w]ho'll come up with the right answers".373 AC argued it is the 
prosecution's role to decide if "we buy that. It's, guilty plea to manslaughter 
we all go home. Or to say .. not a criticism of the doctor, but we're not satisfied 
with that". In which case a report is obtained, and the doctor's view is tested 
under cross-examination. He said it depends if the prosecution team were 
already thinking that it was diminished too. AC said sometimes they receive a 
defence report supporting diminished when there has been nothing in the case 
to make them think the defence will be raised. AC's attitude and interpretation 
of this is that "people in the frame for very serious crimes who are going to be 
away for a very long time, do tend to cast around and explore every possible 
avenue to see if there is a way out of it". When the defence tries a number of 
defence options these are known as 'Billy Bunter' defences. ''I've not seen a 
cake and if I had seen a cake I didn't eat it, and if I did eat some cake I didn't , 
eat it all". Consequently AC finds obtaining expert opinion from someone they 
are familiar with can be helpful before deciding how to proceed. 
m There is evidence of this sceptical attitude in Fa/hi [2001] 
204 
It seems the 'familiarity factor' is an important one that can result in either 
discrediting the expert or perceiving them as a valuable team player. Again the 
issue is one of legal control dictating the perspective. 
Trial or no Trial: The Issue of Public Interest 
If the prosecution and defence psychiatrists agree that the grounds for 
diminished responsibility are established then the CPS consider whether to 
accept the plea (Cox). AC said he hoped the combination of the defence and 
prosecution process means "the accumulative whole works". He stated that 
expert "reports carry enormous weight and importance". Certainly this 
procedural practice means that the case can be effectively decided on the basis 
of the expert evidence, without any public reflection on it via a jury. The Judge 
made the point that the expert's conclusions have to be tied to the facts so that 
if new evidence emerges, which changes the facts, the expert can be apprised 
in order to establish if the expert wants to change their opinion. Cases are 
evaluated in terms of the legal view of public interest. A number of comments 
were made. 
Importantly DW claimed that in his experience even when both sets of experts 
agree it is rare that the case would not go to trial. He maintained "there's very 
little incentive on the prosecution, . to agree things in advance", and there is 
considerable political pressure on them to be seen to be tough on crime. 
Therefore, he asserted, it is a brave prosecutor who would put his head above 
the parapet and say it is not worth taking it to trial. They would rather let the 
courts decide and if anything goes wrong the court can be blamed. DW 
discussed a case where it took the CPS six months before they eventually 
dropped the case, and then it was on evidential grounds. He said the police had 
put pressure on the CPS to keep the case running, showing the importance of 
the inter-relationship of the various components of the legal process on 
decisions made in each case. In that particular case DW said it was about the 
victim's family having their day in court. 
JM also discussed circumstances where the prosecution do not simply accept 
the defence psychiatric report, even though it would save a lot of public 
money. He claimed the police are very hesitant about any mental illness 
205 
diagnosis, as they consider the defendant is pulling the wool over the 
solicitor's, barrister's and psychiatrist's eyes. JM acknowledged that on 
occasion there might be some truth in this, as there is an obvious benefit to 
being convicted of manslaughter on the basis of diminished responsibility. 
Furthermore, he remarked on how difficult these types of defences are for the 
victim's family because the concepts are beyond them and therefore it does not 
represent the necessary redress. However, JM also asserted that the law has to 
give effect to the basic proposition that if somebody is not in full control of 
their mental faculties the courts should not treat them as if they were. An 
earlier quote from JM said they do try to urge experts to agree. 
AC provided an example of CPS decision-making in the public interest. He 
discussed a case where it was anticipated the judge would prefer manslaughter 
to murder. The case concerned domestic violence allegations against a man in 
his 70s, 
"so a judge on a practical basis may say, is this worth a murder trial, perhaps he's going to 
serve no longer than he's going to serve, does this really matter, can't we do manslaughter and 
all go home. Without all this fuss and bother". 
However, his perception, based on experience, was that he did not "buy" the 
defence report because it made the perpetrator of the domestic: violence sound 
like a victim, even though he had killed his wife. AC attributed the tenor of the 
report to the fact that doctors "tend to rely to a very large degree on what 
they're told". AC admitted that some of the defendant's statements to the 
doctor would have convinced him too, but the man was obviously cunning and 
devious and in light of all the statements from people who knew the defendant, 
he could not accept the picture presented in the report. He said that in fact they 
were so confident it was a poor quality report that they did not obtain a 
prosecution report. They believed once they had the doctor in the witness box 
they would be able to prove their viewpoint. When they got to trial the judge 
wanted the case entered as manslaughter but they said "no, we've already 
thought about that in great detail m'lord and we're proceeding". The defendant 
was convicted of murder. AC's justification was the difference the label made 
to the man's daughters, and the community, which the legal system needs to 
remember. "I think it is right and proper that certain things are litigated, that is 
what the court process is there for". This illustrates earlier discussions 
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regarding the importance of the CPS lawyers in the determination of how cases 
proceed. 
Court 
This section provides the practitioner's perspective on the issues raised in 
previous discussions on the intersection of law and science within the court 
context. Earlier chapters have outlined the judicial interpretation of the legal 
provisions, and the rules on the control of expert evidence. This section 
provides the practitioner's concerns in a case framed by those technical 
requirements. The dialogue addresses the presentation of the case with regard 
to the two key decision-making proponents in the court, the judge and jury, as 
with previous discussions. 
Judges 
Judicial Attitudes 
Significantly, as chapter three in particular addresses, judges develop common 
law interpretations of legal rules, which represent the legal reflection of 
cultural, social and theoretical shifts. As well as the judicial role being 
concerned with the delineation of legal meaning of terms that refer to the mind, 
the judiciary have also developed rules that control the admission of medico-
psychological evidence. The importance of the background and persona of the 
judge is recognised as affecting the legal process.374 In addition consideration 
has to be given to the impact of legal training and the duty to secure legal 
objectives. However, the judge admitted there is no medico-psychological 
training unless the Judicial Studies Board has a "psychiatrist addressing us". 
Even then it is not training in a technical science, because there is the 
assumption that "a competent expert, should be able to explain it". Some legal 
practitioners commented on the law reflecting current social and scientific 
outlooks. Therefore, while KR asserted that responsibility for contemporary 
scientific research reaching court lies with experts,375 there is also the effect of 
judicial responses to take into account. SB said the law is currently "perhaps lO 
years behind, public opinion", whereas DW claimed "we're dragging it into the 
20lh century, . as the rest of us have moved on into the 21 SI, ••• ". Thus despite 
374 Griffiths 1997; Woolf 200 1 
375 Only two psychiatric respondent mentioned neuroscience and genetics. 
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the significant role of the judge in delineating the operation of this area of law 
and the nature of expert evidence there is no medico-psychological training. 
This has to be viewed in light of the fact the judiciary are important gate-
keepers for securing legal objectives such as the protection of the public. Yet 
they are also part of the practitioner team in court cases. 
As GF stated, judges are now involved in the management of cases much 
earlier on. "[A] judge is sort of, allocated to it. ... [They] manage that case and 
start looking, at the timeliness, of its progress". It was indicated above that it is 
from the initial stages that representations about mental health issues can be 
made. SB said, 
"the courts don't interfere with the way we present a case, or prepare our case .... I know that 
I'm, the kind of person who's gonna argue with the judge, rather than let him, stamp on me .... 
you stand up for yourself, and your client expects you to". 
SB considered it can become personal in the Crown Court, because the judge 
can actually have a go at you, which is not the case in the Magistrates Court. 
SB held the court may commission its own psychiatric report if it believes it is 
necessary in the interests of justice, but he viewed this option as problematic 
because "the court then ask, the questions, and not us". This removes vital 
tactical control and undermines the dichotomous adversarial presentation of the 
arguments. A more partisan approach could potentially materialize if the judge 
has strong views as the judiciary have a strong influence by nature of their 
position in the legal hierarchy. 
Experts in Court 
Experts do not always attend court. DW stated "I've never done the figures I 
would have thought probably about two-thirds of the reports that we get ... we 
would actually call them to give evidence". He prefers to call the witness, even 
if the prosecution will not really challenge them, rather than just have the 
report read out to the jury because he thinks it does not come across as well. As 
chapter four discussed, if an expert goes into court the judge can question the 
expert's competence and evidence. There is also the impact of the barrister's 
questions on the evidence to consider. 
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Expert Qualifications 
As discussed in chapter four, judges assess the credibility of the expert's 
qualifications and experience.376 On this point the Judge stated that he had not 
done a case at the bar, or as a judge "in which the qualifications, of the expert, 
.... have been brought into question". He did state that plainly some are more 
qualified than others. The issue that may arise is when "an expert, ... stray[s] 
into an area, . in which their expertise is less, clear". He claimed it is more 
difficult with the qualifications of psychologists because "the issue involving, 
psychologists, don't, that often arise, in my experience of criminal cases" 
therefore he experiences more difficulties in determining whether or not they 
are speaking from within their area of expertise. 
Admission of Expert Evidence 
The Judge said evidence is admitted where it is something the jury "in their 
ordinary lives, will not know about". As noted previously, DW believes the 
law has become more generous in the admission of evidence in diminished 
responsibility cases, for instance, 'battered woman syndrome'. 377 AC also 
discussed syndromes, saying that they explain a defendant's conduct through 
illustrating how other individuals in similar circumstances would behave in this 
way because these conditions give rise to particular behavioural manifestations. 
Alternatively, as chapter four notes, the judge has the power to exclude 
evidence on the basis that it usurps the jury's role, as they are meant to be 
adopting a common sense approach. Having both alternatives regarding expert 
testimony allows a wide-ranging exercise of judicial discretion on the 
admissibility of evidence. 
Chapter four indicated that courts favour the most 'prestigious' witness. KR 
mentioned that there are differences in judicial attitude to psychological and 
psychiatric reports. "[ J]udges will invariably prefer a psychiatric report, ... the 
judges can sometimes feel, in my experience that psychological reports, that 
that they're telling me nothing I don't knoW".378 He subsequently said that this 
is not a universal outlook. KR also said appreciating the difference between the 
376 Ikarian Reefer 1(1993); Sroc/..:well (1993) 
377 Edmond discussed this in some detail on pp. 237-8, with specific reference to the Canadian case of 
Lavellee [1990] 
m This is discussed by Holl in (1989: 176-180). 
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disciplines comes with expenence. For instance a psychological report is 
essential to establish a defendant's IQ. Clearly, prejudice against psychology 
ignores the way that the two central medico-psychological disciplines provide 
different information on the mind and that increasingly collaborative working 
partnerships are developing with the acknowledgment that no one discipline 
provides all the answers. 379 
Judicial Directions and Expert Evidence 
Judges give directions to the jury at the end of the trial, which incorporate a 
summary of the expert evidence and explanations of the legal rules to be 
applied. In terms of legal rules, JM said judges are constrained by Acts of 
Parliament, if the Act expresses something in a particular form of words the 
judge cannot tell the jury to ignore that. In terms of expert evidence, SB stated 
that "I don't think that, if there was a finding, . of a mental health issue by a 
psychiatrist, I don't think a judge would dare to ignore it". However, 
summarising the expert evidence is not circumscribed in the same way as with 
the legal rules and therefore there is more scope for personal attitudes to 
influence the presentation. For instance there is the difference in views on 
psychology and psychiatry that have just been noted. SB stated "[ u ]sually on, 
issues of, law like that, the judge would try and give the jury some direction as 
to what they ought to be finding". The Judge said, "it shouldn't be too difficult. 
You can simplify it, and you can put it in writing, in parts, not completely but, 
in chart form ... ". He claimed that mostly the issues are clearly defined 
between prosecution and defence, if both sides do their job properly. Yet the 
directions come from an influential member of the court and could affect the 
perceptions of the jury as they undertake their independent role. 
Juries 
The jury's role as final arbiter is an important factor in the adversarial legal 
process. Therefore, lawyers' perceptions of what influences the jury and their 
understanding of the issues are likely to affect the undertaking of their legal 
role. Bearing in mind that the cases that reach trial are going to be contested 
and part of an adversarial process, JM's point that the jury decide disputes 
379 This is not to say that there was not any rivalry between the disciplines evident in the interVIews in 
chapter 7. 
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between experts is an important one. Although SB argued that whether they get 
the decision right or wrong is not problematic, it is "the balancing of the 
evidence one way or the other .. that's healthy". In terms of cases that go to 
court, although the debate to date has focused on the meaning of legal concepts 
and the admission of expert evidence, it can be seen that the jury represent the 
'wild card' in a case. Legal control is maximised but decisions cannot be 
guaranteed to meet legal preferences. AC referred to this as public interest. He 
discussed a case where he thought, "no reasonable person could do this ... ", 
but the individual was convicted of murder. AC explained this state of affairs 
by reference to the 'Yorkshire Ripper' case, although he said the point of view 
expressed was personal rather than professional. He said while there was 
clearly something wrong with the mind of the Yorkshire Ripper it was 
imperative he was convicted of murder, whatever the expert reports said, 
because there are cases where issues outside legal concerns can affect people's 
views. In these instances, he argued, the jury's perception of the public interest 
will override legal considerations. This also provides an example of the 
strategic use of expert evidence to achieve moral outcomes, and the way that 
both experts and juries are valuable legal tools as responsibility for decisions 
can be attributed to them. 
Understanding Expert Evidence 
In light of the previous discussion on the problems lawyers expenence In 
comprehending expert evidence, can a juror, as a layperson, understand it? JM 
believes that as psychiatry develops the evidence "must get more and more 
complicated for a jury". Legal skills and expert credibility in the witness box 
are considered to be important factors affecting jury comprehension. SB said "I 
would imagine they find it difficult. .. I suppose it depends on the way in which 
it is presented to them, the skill, . of the barrister, will dictate how much of the, 
. point, the jury realise and take in". However, as KR says, you have defence 
and prosecution counsel presenting two very different perspectives of the facts 
and the medical position. Therefore, 
"although [the jury] are going to be urged to carry out a. a cold and clinical analY,sis of the 
medical evidence that they've heard they are bound to be persuaded as any human bemg would 
be ... from the advocacy of the advocates". 
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In terms of the barrister's questioning of expert reports, JM said that he talks 
with his psychiatrist about the differences between the reports. Also, he said if 
each expert attends court, while one is giving evidence the other one can 
suggest what their barrister should pick up on. "Erm, and they will very often 
say well, the symptoms are not under, sufficient in my view, er, for him to be 
able to express so confident a conclusion". Certainly the Judge alleged that the 
fact the expert acts for a particular side can lead to "some astonishing, views 
expressed", and "of course, the danger is that you're a jolly good witness and 
terribly convincing and the jury believe everything you say". However, he 
observed that while experts might be very convincing in court, this is not a 
guarantee that they are good practitioners. This illustrates how the case process 
is dependent on co-operative team-work between lawyers and expert witnesses. 
SB proposed that ultimately it is only necessary for the jury to understand the 
expert's conclusion on whether the defendant is mad or not, and whether or not 
he will recover. KR also maintained that the conclusion is very important and 
declared that the jury on hearing it should be able to look at the facts to 
determine whether they fit in with the medico-psychological statements.380 
Alternatively, JM claimed 
"some judges will do it if counsel don't, er, well Doctor I've got to erm, direct the jury about 
this and I'm going to have to explain to the jury, ... what diminished responsibility is, and what 
they need to be satisfied about .. .is he suffering, er, from a mental, illness ... ". 
The Judge thinks diminished responsibility must be difficult because it is a 
matter for the jury whether the diminution of responsibility is substantial, and 
quite a lot of cases are emotional, but the jury need "to be dispassionate in 
making that assessment". Essentially he thinks they are reasonably sensible on 
medical issues but if it is a horrific murder "there may be the temptation, ... to 
call it murder". The Judge suggested it would help if a written summary of the 
expert's reports, or the conflicting issues were provided. "[T]hese are not easy 
topics for them to grasp, ... They're not easy topics quite often for the judge to 
grasp ... ". It is more difficult now with the practice of running diminished 
responsibility and provocation together. This indicates the difficulties in 
understanding the evidence and the potential for other factors to take 
precedence in light of that. 
3RO There is a summary of a couple of reports from CPS case files in chapter 7. 
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Nevertheless, despite this recognition of the difficulties the jury face, KR 
maintained, 
"you know you've got QCs ~ f f 30 years experience and the judge of 40 years experience. They 
all ~ n o w , . . they can all s p ~ a k k In co.de, when you're looking at say diminished responsibility, you 
don t go Into, normally, Into, an In-depth assessment of what the evidence is of mens rea and 
what the psychiatric reports say in countering it. Because there is invariably a gut feeling about 
the r e ' p o ~ s , , ... you had hard evidence that he has hallucinations ... and the prosecution 
psychlatnst went to see them and backed that up, you'd have a pretty body of evidence to run 
diminished responsibility with". 
This indicates, as did previous debates, how tacit knowledge is fundamental to 
legal interaction, and in this situation it appears to impact on the nature and 
scope of the information presented to the jury throughout the trial process. So, 
in addition to the effect on the presentation of the two views as a result of the 
adversarial process, there might not be a full legal argument because the 
'correct' evaluation of the matter is plain to the professionals. KR believes that 
where you can get more legal argument with the lawyers cross-examining the 
doctors is on fitness to plead. 
Understanding the Legal Rules 
The jury also need to comprehend the pertinent legal rules, for which the 
judge's directions are crucial. However, DW held the view that 
"there's a lot of time, . er, on, on all sorts of different legal concepts, that I think, . the 
directions that are given, . to the jury by the judges, work on the assumption that we have 12 
law students who've just finished their degrees in there". 
DW suggested that there are likely to be 2 or 3 on a jury that are not that bright 
and may have literacy problems and therefore the judge needs to break "it 
down into almost noddy language ... but unfortunately the majority of judges 
don't seem to deal with it, . on that basis". 
It was outlined in chapter one that the mens rea concept is complicated because 
it includes two facets, intention to do the act and oblique intention, 
forseeability about the consequences of one's act. 381 KR actually stated that the 
fact mens rea includes both dimensions makes it difficult for juries to 
comprehend the concept. Significantly the Judge claimed he tends not to use 
the second facet in his explanations. With regard to diminished responsibility 
3 ~ 1 1 A concern supported by the fact in the cases of Maloney [1985]. Hancock [1986] and Nedrick [1986]. 
the jury returned to ask for further clarification on the meaning of intention, even though the definition is 
said to reflect' common usage'. 
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AC said, "I think juries struggle with anything .. as complex as, . diminished 
responsibility". Furthermore, when AC discussed the complexity of legal 
categories he said that it "is, you know, why we've got the judicial system 
whose boards, flap about the word for word directions to try and help the jury". 
Consideration is being given to whether or not the legal system is doing the 
best that it can 
~ ' [ s ] e e i n g g as they're making the most important decision in the whole case isn't it, quite 
Important that we reassure ourselves, that they are given the best advice and assistance they, 
they can receive to reach their conclusions". 
However, he also acknowledged how difficult it is to make a decision as a 
practising lawyer let alone as a juror who knows nothing, "at least we're 
building on, previous experience". 
Perceptions of Non-Legal Influences on Jury Decisions 
The interviewees acknowledged that juries struggle to understand the legal 
rules and expert evidence, and offered speCUlations on other influential factors. 
They can only be tentative perceptions because direct research on jury 
decision-making is not permitted, as chapter four discussed, but they provide 
some indication of legal insights and perceptions, based on considerable 
experience, which arguably affects how the interviewees carry out their role. 
Respondents referred to the everyday process of evaluating someone's 
credibility, which in the court context incorporates experts, lawyers and the 
defendant. On the matter of judging between experts, 1M raised the possibility, 
jokingly, about gentlemen on the jury deciding between two female 
psychiatrists based on which one they fancy the most. Similarly DW suggested 
it is important who presents best in the witness box, whereby "if one expert 
turns up nicely dressed and is well spoken and, . somebody else is your nutty 
professor, . erm, then, the nutty professor is likely to come second, just because 
the, the other one presents better". 
In terms of evaluating lawyers, DW cited an old legal joke "that the jury is 12 
people selected at random to decide who's got the best lawyers". An example 
he provided from his time as a prosecution rather than defence lawyer, 
concerned a case where the evidence was overwhelming but the jury acquitted. 
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He thought that they considered that the nice young man defending would 
never have defended someone he knew was guilty. He also acknowledged it is 
hard to know what a jury's decision is based on when you have contradictory 
and complex expert opinion. Finally there is likely to be an assessment of the 
credibility of the defendant. Another example from DW stated that at every 
party a criminal lawyer attends there is always someone who talks about their 
time on a jury. He said they say things like "they've convicted the guy because 
they didn't like the way he walked to the witness box, or they acquitted 
because, she was such a nice lady". 
In addition to making assessments of individuals, reference was made to the 
tendency to make moral value jUdgments of situations. Homicide cases can be 
very emotional, which the Judge claimed can be a big issue, especially if the 
jury see horrific pictures of the crime scene. Certainly the pictures in the CPS 
case files were very disturbing. One option to de-sensitise the jury is through 
repeated exposure to the pictures. Also JM wondered 
"whether the jury still with diminished responsibility look at what the defendant did and, . I 
suppose apply the test 'is the defendant morally responsible', if they come to the conclusion 
yes he is, they may well convict of murder". 
Likewise DW wondered "how much attention the jury pays ... to what's said, 
as opposed to what they think is the justice of the situation and er, . just decide 
a verdict accordingly". He considered that by and large juries look at the case 
and consider what they think is fair in the circumstances, "almost, irrespective 
of what the judge has said to them". JM concluded that all that can be asked of 
the jury is that they take a common sense view, which is what the law 
presumes. 
The lawyers plainly recognIse there are any number of factors that can 
influence jury decisions, many of which reflect the themes in the research on 
the matter in chapter four. It seems there may be cause to argue that this is a 
potential factor in the current practice of diminished responsibility cases not 
going to trial where there is evidence to support this option, if the professionals 
are all agreed that that is the most just outcome in the case. 
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The Future of Jury Trials 
A number of legal respondents expressed concern about the jury role in light of 
increasing case complexity. For example, the Judge's personal view was that 
he is unsure, because of the difficulty of the issues, if the jury is the most ideal 
way of dealing with the cases under scrutiny. Yet he also thought it is valuable 
to participate in something of great importance to society. Similarly KR 
wondered if the legal system has become too multifaceted with regard to fraud 
and complex medical evidence. 
"[J]uries were designed for deciding facts on, routine criminal cases and that they, they were 
not designed to assess either serious fraud issues in a fraud case or medical evidence in in , , 
connection with, with murder. .. ". 
SB also referred to fraud cases when arguing that some cases have become too 
complex for juries. Likewise AC said, some areas of law are difficult for 
practitioners, let alone a jury. SB suggested that a consequence of focusing on 
so much detail is that the bigger picture is lost; the technical matters obscure 
the obvious facts. However, DW stated, ''I'm a fan of the jury system because I 
don't think there's a better one. But that doesn't necessarily mean I think that 
it's very good. It's just the best of a bad, bad lot". 
In terms of solutions, SB indicated there is a move to take serious fraud cases 
"out of the hands of, lay juries, and they're looking to put them to specialist 
juries ... " .. Alternatively, KC discussed the possibility of a judge sitting alone, 
but said, "it is difficult to speculate what would happen if judges were 
assessing that evidence on their own". He suggested that "the likelihood would 
be that less people would be successful, . in, . succeeding on diminished 
responsibility ... because [judges would] be inherently cautious .... ", 
furthermore, that it is hard to imagine that judges are going to make the 'moral' 
decisions that juries are seen to make. Significantly the Judge held "I, certainly 
wouldn't want it to move, to being a judge, deciding, guilt or innocence". 
There is an appreciation of the difficulties that such cases represent for the jury, 
and this may be another reason that few cases go to trial. The interesting thing 
is that the fact so few cases go to trial is not raised. 
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Sentencing: Detention - Hospital v. Prison 
As noted in preceding discussions, the operation of the defences and proposals 
for reform are integrally linked to sentencing options. The respondents 
identified a number of issues. 
Sentencing 
First, KR discussed the importance that a finding of manslaughter rather than 
murder has for the length of the sentence. He said the mandatory life sentence 
incurs a minimum Home Office tariff recommendation of 12 years, whereas 
manslaughter usually results in a sentence of between five and seven years. 
In the cases under discussion a major issue concerns the matter of deciding 
where the defendant serves their sentence, prison or hospital. Chapter one 
outlined the pertinent provisions and in chapter four the importance of expert 
reports to this aspect of the decision-making process was discussed. Court 
reports usually make recommendations on the matter, but it may be that an 
additional report is requested at the sentencing stage. However, such 
information may not emerge to inform decisions, as an example provided by 
1M highlighted. He discussed a case that concerned a man who had been 
released after serving eight years for motiveless assaults on women, and who, 
whilst out cycling stabbed a woman to death. As the defendant pleaded not 
guilty on the basis that it was not him there was no scope for exploring his 
mental state and he was convicted of murder. 1M stated that 
"my view is there was manifestly something wrong with him because people don't generally go 
round and, they may go round raping, they may go round attacking women to rob them, ... but 
a motiveless attack erm, . is odd". 
1M argued that evidence that he had attacked a number of times before needs to 
be viewed as an indication that he is likely to do it again "and I would want to 
be jolly careful myselfbefore I let him out". 
Additionally, a number of possible problems were identified with reports 
obtained at the sentencing stage. KR said, for example, that occasionally when 
a psychiatrist wants to assess the defendant in a hospital psychiatric unit rather 
than prison, under s38 of the MHA, there is no bed available. 1M discussed a 
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case from when he was sitting as a Recorder, where the perpetrator was 16 or 
18, and had been convicted ofbuggering a six-year-old he was babysitting. 1M 
was unsure whether the defendant had acted as a result of teenage sexual 
experimentation, or if he constituted a serious danger to children.382 A senior 
judge suggested getting a report from a psychologist rather than a 
psychiatrist.383 However, the psychologist concluded it was not possible to 
express a view because the defendant still denied the offences. 1M interpreted 
this as showing that the defendant was very dangerous and gave a youth 
custody sentence. Sometimes the prosecution and defence psychiatrists can 
disagree on whether the defendant should be sent to a hospital under the MHA. 
If this is the situation 1M suggested it might then be necessary to say to the 
solicitors that the doctors should discuss the matter further to see if they can 
produce a joint report, amend their report, or develop it. He argued this is not 
about forcing doctors to make decisions, but the judge might not be able to 
make an order, certainly with a restriction order attached, in a case where there 
is a dangerous defendant with a mental health problem. This indicates that the 
legal rules, such as requirements that two doctors have to sanction MHA 
detentions, may hamper judicial discretion on perceptions of the danger 
presented by the defendant. 
The issue of judicial discretion at the sentencing stage is important. SB asserted 
that 
'judges ... their decisions are self made. They decide what's going to happen, and if they want 
a person locking up, er, in prison, they will find a reason for accepting the psychiatrists advice, 
but locking them up in prison". 
Yet a subsequent remark was that "where there's, psychiatrist is saying, don't 
lock him up in prison I think the judge would find it very, very difficult, not to 
follow that line". He suggested the loophole for the judge would be if the 
prosecution had a psychiatrist claiming that the defendant should be in prison. 
The way that the judge frames the matter will be critical to the legitimacy of 
the decision made. This reflects the ambivalent nature of the thinking and 
views that pervade this area, which has been highlighted previously . 
. 1 X ~ ~ It would seem this behaviour was questionable from any perspective. 
3R3 An example of the benefits of appreciating the difference in their expertise. 
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Notably, if the defendant goes to prison first and is then referred to hospital, if 
the hospital eventually decides that the defendant is well, they are sent back to 
the prison for the remainder of the sentence. The parole board would then 
decide when they should be released. If the defendant is initially sent to 
hospital there is not the same minimum tariff recommendation and 
responsibility falls on the Mental Health Review Tribunal (MHRT).384 The 
difficulty in making the decision and the consequences were highlighted by a 
case example supplied by 1M. The jury had been confused about whether it 
was murder or manslaughter and ultimately a decision was made based on the 
reports produced by the prosecution doctors that the defendant should go to a 
special hospital because 
"under pressure from various sources including pressure from the judge we eventually, rather 
than having a retrial agreed to accept a plea of, guilty to manslaughter on the grounds of 
diminished responsibility". 
Some four years later the MHR T decided that the defendant did not have a 
mental health problem and therefore that they had no authority to detain him, 
even though he had killed his girlfriend. 1M believes that at the time of 
sentence everyone was misled so the defendant was sent to hospital and now 
there is no mechanism whereby he can be brought back to court even though he 
has only been detained for four years. He argued that the doctors who claimed 
he was "as nutty as a fruitcake" should provide some answers. It would appear 
that these possibilities reinforce the legal scepticism towards defendant's 
allegations of mental health problems and the capacity for medico-
psychological professions to provide accurate diagnoses. However, it would 
seem that there was pressure to make an argument about diminished 
responsibility because of the wish to avoid a re-trial and therefore there is a 
question if the defendant has been treated or whether the defendant was 
perhaps not seriously mentally disordered, although conditions permitted under 
the diminished responsibility defence are not necessarily serious mental 
disorders. If the latter is the case then it begs the question as to what the special 
hospital has done with the defendant for four years. The fact that the defendant 
is able to go free after such a short period of detention does undermine legal 
control and ideas of punishment. 
1 ~ 4 4 For a review of the different considerations of the MHRT and parole board see Harding & Hoffman 
(1988), Walker (1985: Ch. 14) on parole boards. 
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JM speculated on whether the courts are the appropriate body to detennine if 
the defendant needs a secure special hospital or a high security prison. In 
addition he argued such trials are painful for relatives of the deceased because 
the trials seem to be primarily concerned with whether the judge will send the 
defendant to prison or to hospital. Thus JM believes that on occasions the 
doctor is under some pressure to say that there is nothing wrong with the 
defendant so that he is sent to prison. He also suggested that matters have been 
exacerbated by government closure of many mental hospitals. 
Release 
The issues around dangerousness and release have been examined in earlier 
chapters, and similar concerns were echoed in the interviews, through case 
examples of defendants who went on to kill again. Significantly, the Judge 
claimed expert evidence is probably more important in tenns of release and the 
matter of dangerousness than in respect of sentencing, reflecting arguments 
made in chapter four. However, the Judge and JM also held that diagnosis is a 
human activity, which like all other human activity by definition is fallible. JM 
argued that a balance has to be drawn between psychiatric opinions on an 
individual's mental health and the matter of their dangerousness, in particular 
where the decision that the defendant is no longer dangerous is contingent on 
their taking medication. JM said in his experience a lot of individuals feel that 
they know more than the psychiatrist and actually stop taking their medication. 
In support of his beliefs he referred to a particular hospital, also cited by other 
respondents regarding the same issues, where a number of patients had failed 
to take their medication and went on to kill. JM also acknowledged how 
difficult it is to devise foolproof systems to overcome these problems. The 
discussions indicate the problems that exist with the interaction of law and 
medico-psychology in dealing with those held to be a risk to society, in large 
part because of the different considerations that underpin the respective 
professions' review of the defendant's mental state. 
Refornl Suggestions 
There were a number of refonn suggestions, which recognise the tensions and 
difficulties with these decisions. For instance DW argued that the mandatory 
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life sentence for murder causes the problems, a recurrent theme in the Law 
Commission debates. He contextualised his discussion saying the mandatory 
requirement takes away judicial discretion and it should be about the 
punishment fitting the crime. He maintained that although judges are thought to 
be 'out of touch' most politicians are even more so. He supported his point 
about ill-informed political decisions by referring to the introduction of the 
'three strikes and you are out' policy for various offences. This has given rise 
to a situation where with burglary a judge will be required to impose a life 
sentence, although his recommended tariff would be two years, making the life 
sentence a nonsense. Therefore, DW stated "if they actually concentrated on, 
stopping crime rather than just, . mucking about with the system, er, criminal 
justice, then, they'll probably be far more effective". He maintained an 
important concept is that judges and the courts are independent, whereas 
politicians are concerned with ulterior policy issues, and when politicians tell 
judges what to do their independence is undermined. Whilst this recognises the 
tension that exists between legislation and common law nevertheless, the 
earlier chapters have highlighted the significance of the judiciary in securing 
particular policy objectives. 
In terms of judicial discretion, 1M's suggestion involved more interaction 
between law and medico-psychology, whereby the judge decides the tariff but 
psychiatrists, probation officers and other appropriate professionals determine 
where the defendant spends their custodial time, which would need to be 
compatible with the convention on human rights. 1M thought that it was a 
sufficient safeguard that there is judicial involvement in subsequent release 
decisions. In terms of the problems 1M identified with releasing those with 
continuing mental health problems on medication, he speculated on the 
possibility of judges, when passing sentence, imposing something similar to a 
probation order where various conditions are attached. He suggested it could 
include attending the GP practice at particular times to ensure that medication 
is taken, and if the person fails to tum up they will be in breach of the order. 
Another proposal was that the MHRT could make an order for conditional 
release, which may require that individuals have to reside in a particular place, 
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where it would be ensured that they took their medication. 385 But JM said if it 
was decided that there needs to be some sort of halfway house problems will 
arise over who should run it, the Home Office or the Department of Health. JM 
believes matters have become worse because many of the big mental hospitals 
have been closed, placing people into the care of the community, creating 
problems both for the community and those with mental health difficulties.386 
Chapter one shows that there are collaborative developments emerging focused 
on those considered to be very dangerous. 
Discussion 
Two overriding observations that emerged from the data will be briefly 
addressed: first, the difference between the practitioner's perspective and 
previous theoretical discussions, and secondly, the importance of professional 
relationships. 
What distinguished the interviews from the earlier two dimensions of the 
analysis of the interaction of law and medico-psychology was the lack of 
reflection on the moral issues and legislative aspects dealt with in the previous 
chapters. What emerged was a sense that despite the significance in theoretical 
debates regarding the moral nature of the defences, and the seriousness of 
homicide cases, these cases were to a large extent routine. The concern was the 
application of particular tactical procedures, which is dependent on whether the 
case is being viewed from a defence or prosecution perspective. Dingwall et 
aI's (2000) investigation of the litigation strategies of defence lawyers in 
personal injury cases found expertise within professions leads to strategies 
based on experience. The mechanical processing of cases challenges the 
complex idea of the rule of law (Silbey 1981: 22-4). This form of processing 
cases is the way that decisions are made regarding the application of the 
remedy universally, the symbolic goal, and individually, the instrumental goal 
(Eisenstein & Jacob 1977: 24-28). 
The other matter is the significance of inter-professional relationships, which is 
reinforced through the data in chapter seven. The "formal aspects operate 
385 R (on the application of H) [2002] deals with the condition setting powers and responsibilities of 
MHRTs, especially when their stipulations cannot be met immediately. 
3R6 Discllssions in chapter 7 reinforce this argument. 
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through a comprehensive system of informal relationships, norms and practices 
of court practitioners" (Church 1982: 398). The fact that there are a small 
number of professionals involved in such cases within an area provides support 
for the proposition of a local legal culture (pAO I). As a result "each person 
who acts on his [the defendant's] case is reacting to or anticipating the actions 
of others" (Eisenstein & Jacob: 10). Despite the partiCUlar tasks of the lawyers 
there are shared instrumental goals as part of the adversarial process, and 
familiarity enhances the likelihood of successful negotiations (pp.30-34; 61). 
The operation of the diminished responsibility defence is based on plea-
bargaining, and although justice is linked with the due process model, in reality 
the plea bargain model prevails (Feeley 1979: 26-8). This makes the CPS 
rather than the judge important, but also it seems that this process depends on 
the culmination of the inter-professional relationships. However, the reliance 
on expert evidence as a tactical evidential tool is still underpinned by 
scepticism about such evidence, which appears to offer the opportunity to 
assemble arguments to reject the evidence when it suits legal objectives to do 
so. What was interesting was the position of the judge who helps develop the 
law and is a practitioner within the legal process. The perception gained from 
chapters one, three and four of the judicial role as part of the legal process was 
challenged through the picture painted in this chapter. Interestingly the judge 
and jury were the crucial audiences, referred to by practitioners. 
Conclusion 
The discussion has outlined what the various legal practitioners had to say 
about the law, procedural considerations and tactics throughout the case 
process, and experts and expert evidence. The debates indicate that the 
relationships that develop and underpin interaction of legal and medico-
psychological professionals are very important, but as AC remarked, they each 
have very distinct roles. There are identified legal considerations within a case, 
which frame the information demanded from the expert and reactions to the 
information provided, which in tum are affected by whether the perspective is 
that of defence or prosecution. In addition, there are distinct ramifications as a 
result of expert evidence both during the case and in terms of sentencing, 
although none of the legal personnel have any training in medico-psychological 
matters, and appear to have little understanding. This chapter illustrates how 
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the difficult philosophical and legal framework is not really addressed by 
practitioners and the way that the law is formulated leaves the way open for 
practitioners to manage the uncertainty and pragmatism inherent in case 
decisions, in what is perceived by lawyers to be a just manner. The interview 
data shows how decisions are the result of interplay between tacit knowledge 
accumulated through professional training and experience, substantive law, and 
the scope for legal tactics within the role in question. It would seem from the 
subjectivity evident in the process that the juxtaposition of the personal and 
professional is a crucial dimension to the decision-making process within a 
case. Each case is negotiated through a range of possible options and the 
interviews have demonstrated some of the factors that are taken into 
consideration, reflecting the manner the difficult legal and moral issues are 
addressed. In terms of the interaction of law and medico-psychology, this takes 
place at a procedural level, as the legal personnel do not appear to comprehend 
the medico-psychological evidence. The point was made in chapter three that 
judges develop the law without any understanding of the medico-psychological 
understanding of the mind, and it would seem that the law can operate 
throughout without an adequate comprehension, as the expert's conclusions as 
to whether or not there is a link between the defendant's mental state and the 
defence is all that is required as an evidential tool. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
MEDICO-PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVIEWS 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the medico-psychological observations made about the 
law and legal process. It provides a mental health practitioner's perspective on 
the two levels of analysis addressed in chapters one to four, the legal theory, 
interpretation and procedures. Initially the chapter addresses the medico-
psychological understanding and views of the substantive law. Thereafter 
attention will be paid to the forensic role, which includes initial involvement in 
a case, undertaking assessments and writing reports, giving evidence in court, 
and finally detention and release decisions. In addition to the interview data the 
chapter includes observations made by the psychologist that reviewed the 
vignette to check its validity, and details of the reports in the CPS case files. 
Glossary of Interviewees 
DT - Psychiatrist 
JR - Psychiatrist 
SP - Psychiatrist 
LC - Psychologist 
RH - Psychologist 
TB - Psychologist 
The Law 
Introduction 
Earlier chapters have shown that this is a complex area of law, yet the expert is 
required to assess the defendant's mental state in light of the defences and to 
make recommendations regarding any potential link between the mental state 
and defence criteria. This implies a thorough understanding of the law, and the 
ability to translate a clinical diagnosis into the mental health options 
incorporated in the defences (discussed in chapter three) in order to give an 
opinion. There is an issue of adequate legal training for experts. Although 
current courses contain a forensic component, the experts currently involved 
with these serious cases have been practising for a long time, and will not have 
undertaken this training. Although suitable continuing professional training 
might be possible, none was mentioned by the interviewees. 
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As regards those currently acting as experts, the psychiatrists DT and JR both 
said understanding comes with experience. DT said "it's assumed that if you're 
in forensic psychiatry you will understand the law, and that's not, you know, 
you don't get particular training in that" ?87 DT initially relied on forensic 
psychiatry textbooks, whereas now if she is unclear about a particular legal rule 
she can contact the legal team, which she prefers because legal textbooks are 
difficult to understand. 388 In addition some barristers voluntarily send her 
information, which she admitted is not always comprehensible, but she likes 
the fact they involve her in the debates. 
''It's good, I mean, you, you know, it's a good atmosphere and, oh, I mean all, although in the 
end, you know, you're doing something really serious and, ... it's not a laughing matter when 
you get into court but, there's lots of sort of, humour and, and er, and banter goes on, in the 
background" . 
DT argued the exchange of information benefits both professions because she 
also explains mental health matters to lawyers. She maintained it is a continual 
learning process because each case gives rise to debates on the central issues. 
Similarly JR said, "I think there's a lot more we can learn from each other". 
This demonstrates, as did chapter six, the importance of the relationships that 
develop between the small pools of people involved in homicide cases for 
comprehending professional discourses. The established relationships help 
overcome the problem of a lack of training, which is more significant for the 
medico-psychological profession because they are being required to adapt to 
the legal rules and definitions. 
Mens Rea - Guilty Intent 
The psychologist RH was the only respondent to discuss mens rea. In line with 
the medico-psychological perspective described in chapter two, he expressed 
concern that the legal concept takes so few factors into consideration. One 
example RH discussed referred to Gudjonsson's suggestibility scale,389 which 
provides "the psychological context of the decisions that were made" in terms 
of whether the decision-maker could choose to say no. 390 In addition, as 
387 This supports the opinion of JM in chapter 6. 
388 SB made the same point about medico-psychological books. 
389 Gudjonsson (2003) . ' 
390 Rassin & Merckelbach (1999) consider the use of this in the legal settmg because of dIfferences 
between clinical and judicial decision-making. 
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chapter one illustrated, a contentious aspect of mens rea is oblique intention.391 
RH argued that from a psychological perspective it is necessary to "distinguish 
between the act and the consequences of the act. ... They're two quite different 
things". RH says that many people, when asked whether they intended to do 
something, "because they've done it, they accept that something has happened, 
they then sort of go back and, and retrospectively rationalise, . But, well, I must 
be guilty ... ". Whereas RH maintained that when balancing the likely 
consequences of an act, "if you're making probability judgments of risk, . and 
erm, had sex and just had an orgasm, then, you're likely, to assume less risk. 
No different to actually having, having a bit to drink". Alternatively, if you are 
depressed, have suffered from stress for a long time, or had a fright then you 
are likely to perceive more risk. In addition alcohol, drugs, menstrual cycle, 
time-of-day, tiredness and shift-work could all impair someone's judgment. 
Furthermore, he suggested you have to ascertain if the judgment is based on 
what someone else has said, or on feelings, which in tum is affected by 
paranoid or obsessive traits. Likewise could they understand what was said, or 
remember it long enough to make a decision? This presents a much more 
subjective picture than the abstract legal position described in chapter one. 
The Defences 
As stated, experts are fitting clinical diagnoses into the terms of the defences, 
as defined by the judiciary. In terms of understanding the legal concepts of 
abnormality of the mind and disease of the mind the psychiatrist DT said, "no I 
haven't had any difficulties at all". DT said that whilst the law is difficult, if 
you stick to the manslaughter act it is pretty clear and definite.392 "The only 
thing, it, it is always the same, when there's any argument about mental illness, 
mental intent, or, personality disorder, it always comes down to the one word, 
the substantial". However, DT claimed she had no trouble deciding where to 
draw the line because it is "a sort of gut instinct that's just sort of, that's what J 
feel comfortable saying in court". Whereas the psychiatrist JR' s response to 
whether or not he understands the legal definitions said, yes and no. He argued 
customary practice has developed around what is intended, which has made it 
easier to apply medical understanding and conditions. As examples he said, the 
391 In chapter 6 KR identified this as an issue. although the Judge maintains that in practice it is not. 
392 This would seem to be a reference to the Homicide Act 1957 
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term inherent causes refers to personality disorder, disease means mental 
illnesses, and injury equates to head injury. He pointed out psychological 
injury is overlooked. It would appear in practice the law uses inherent cause to 
cover many conditions, although in chapter three it was explained that in 
Sanderson PTSD was classified under disease and injury. 
With regard to psychological responses, in terms of disease of the mind, RH 
simply said minds are not diseased. TB said he had had problems 
understanding abnormality of the mind until the defence was successful using 
adjustment disorder, "which is the mildest diagnosis one can find and if that 
comes under the heading of abnormality of mind, then everything does". 393 He 
argued it may not diminish responsibility, but at least it can be put before the 
jury, although this means that over 400 possible diagnoses have to be 
considered when doing a report. TB does not mind using the legal language if 
he can give it some coherence by assessing whether the diagnosis relates to the 
offence. TB, perhaps because he is a psychologist, said he had not been asked 
to comment on the issue of substantial impairment, although in a recent case 
where he had assessed a defendant's intelligence he believes the legal team 
were getting at that issue. In TB's view psychotic behaviour, schizophrenic 
conditions and sub-normality of the mind substantially impair someone's 
mental responsibility. As previous discussions as well as TB's example show, 
less serious mental states do qualify for the defence, which arguably supports 
the impression that the diminished responsibility defence operates to achieve 
moral outcomes. 
Again it seems expenence rather than training informs understanding. 
Furthermore, like the lawyers, the experts' professional roles are informed by 
tacit knowledge. In this instance it illustrates the subjective nature of opinions 
on the ultimate issue, although there is clearly a recognition of what the law 
requires that appears to differ from their professional opinion. But in addition 
to the personal practices of individuals, the ethos of the small pool of 
professionals within an area is also potentially significant. 
393 This condition was cited in Dietschmann [2001: 2003] 
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Criminal Responsibility 
Although there was not an extensive discussion of the actual law, the experts 
did express views on the issue of criminal responsibility, paying particular 
attention to psychopathy and intoxication. Significantly, despite the contrasting 
professional perspectives on the mind, it was not argued that the law should be 
more lenient, but there were concerns about the lack of veracity in the legal 
approach, which gives rise to inconsistencies. For example, RH said, 
"[t]here are a lot of people with cognitive impainnent get off things they shouldn't. . You 
know, it would be in the public interest, what, what's the reason, the person is. because you're 
cognitively impaired doesn't mean to say you're not, you're not responsible, because you can 
be". 
RH argued that these legal decisions should not be made until the person has 
been assessed. Furthermore, he challenged the legal assumption that we simply 
choose our actions in an objective manner, and should therefore automatically 
take responsibility for them. RH argued that if a man batters his wife, but the 
wife knows how to defuse and escalate the situation, and chooses the latter, it is 
questionable whether the man should take all the blame, especially if he has 
had a drink, as his reactions will be automatic. Similarly if you tried to stop a 
paranoid obsessive carrying out their rituals it would be likely to generate a 
violent reaction. RH believes "the person wasn't, '" responsible for their 
behaviour". This demonstrates the difference between a psychological and 
legal approach to evaluating decision-making. RH is advocating medico-
psychological input whether or not a defence is raised, which is not permitted 
owing to the Chard and Turner decisions. 
The psychiatrist SP also had this view. He argued that it is important to be able 
to acknowledge the individual's characteristics in court, using information 
from mental health professionals, although he conceded there are problems 
with the lack of professional accuracy. However, SP suggested that the law's 
dichotomous approach creates problems because often comparisons are not like 
with like, for instance when you compare someone who has had few adverse 
life experiences with someone who has suffered a significant number. 
Furthermore, some people cope better with life than others, and whilst you 
might do your best at the end of the day "(( it is in your biological make up to 
behave in a certain l1'(1.V, can you hold such a person responsible'''? This is one 
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of the few references to biological foundations to behaviour, but it did not 
result in a denial of responsibility. SP said it is difficult to say someone is not 
responsible for their actions, even though it is possible to identify factors that 
make their behaviour problematic. Chapter three addressed the differing 
debates on the consequences of raising biological arguments. 
Psychopathy 
Currently psychopathy does come within the remit of diminished 
responsibility, although TB alleged that psychopaths will not qualify for the 
diminished responsibility defence, or it would be very difficult, because the 
law cannot take account of sophisticated psychological concepts. Plainly it 
does qualify but not on the basis of sophisticated psychological concepts as 
chapter three established that the legal understanding is not the same. TB 
argued that the law should codify the distinction between ASPD and 
psychopathy, but claimed that the law does not seem to appreciate the 
distinction in order to do so. DT also took issue with the legal definition, 
arguing it shows a limited understanding of personality disorder and is very 
descriptive. 394 She too identified that ASPD equates to psychopathy in law, and 
that lawyers simply read out the definition for ASPD.395 "In psychiatric terms, 
psychopathy applies to any type of personality disorder". For DT this is the 
biggest discrepancy between the law and psychiatry, and for her is a major 
source of irritation, as ASPD simply refers to behaviour that qualifies as 
criminal, whereas DT views personality disorders from the more complex 
professional position identified in chapter two. But it illustrates again that the 
law does not incorporate the actual discourse of the medico-psychological 
profession, and develops legal clinical categories containing elements that 
support the securing of legal objectives. 
The discussion of the unique problems presented by psychopaths showed how 
professional opinion varies, and mirrored previous legal debates. DT cited a 
case where she disagreed with the consultant psychiatrist acting for the other 
side, even though they both worked in personality disorder services. The 
394 DT says that the main time that the issue is debated is at Mental Health Review Tribunals (MHRT) in 
relation to detention decisions about someone held dangerous because they have a severe personalIty 
disorder which is a mixture of personality traits. 
395 This view is supported by the fact the SLC makes this mistake in its recent report (2003: ~ 6 ) . .
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defendant in question was considered to be extremely psychopathic, having 
held someone hostage and tortured them for months. She said the other 
psychiatrist had argued that because the man had a severe personality disorder 
his mental responsibility was substantially impaired. DT argued "[a]l1 along he 
was making choices. All, although his choices, may have been based on a 
severe personality disorder, he still had that choi, choice". Thus DT believes, 
based on years of working with people with personality disorder, that whatever 
physical evidence is found a personality disorder does not remove the capacity 
to choose, and so mental responsibility is not substantially impaired, although 
she conceded it is a philosophical debate. She also said there is evidence that 
psychopaths can learn to do otherwise, therefore if they do not respond to 
treatment focused on distinguishing right from wrong they should be punished 
if they commit another crime. This view contrasts with the views cited in 
chapter three on the matter of treatment and another statement by DT included 
in the sentencing discussion of this chapter. However, her case example 
demonstrates that not everyone in the field holds the same point of view, 
therefore in a contested case, as chapter six suggested, it is down to how 
persuasive the expert is when giving their evidence, and the barrister's 
questions, which is also discussed later. Also there is the matter of public 
opinion with regard to psychopaths, which the jury represent. 
JR also viewed the issue as a philosophical one, saying psychopathy provides 
an explanation but not necessarily an excuse. He argued it is necessary to 
address whether, "as a result of the personality disorder was the person, unable 
or unwilling, to exert, the necessary restraint, or self-control". So the issue is, 
does the personality disorder affect choice, and if so when can it be said to 
have done so, which is a less rigid view than that ofDT. 
SP initially discussed psychopathy in terms of the difficulties that arise from 
the differences in perception between a layperson and psychiatrist, which is an 
important matter in terms of the jury's perception and interpretation of expert 
evidence. TB asserted that the moment ASPD or psychopathy is raised judges 
and juries are prejudiced against the defendant. SP argued, "I don't think we've 
got our act together strong enough, . to say look there are clinical evidence for 
a, a person we would call a psychopath". He believes about one in two hundred 
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people fall into this category in Britain today. "And the difference between 
them and the rest of the population is that, erm, if we scan them on MRI 
scanning you would find the parts of their brain don't light up when it comes to 
empathy". Thus psychopaths cannot empathise with people, they have no 
remorse or guilt, and project blame on to others. For example, SP says that 
Malcolm's desire to watch TV and his not perceiving the fact he has just 
stabbed JD as a problem is a classic textbook example. It indicates no feeling 
for the person killed; they are merely an object. This reflects the assertions 
made in chapter two about the importance of empathy and phenomenal 
concepts to normal functioning. 
Consequently SP questioned whether psychopaths could make the same 
choices and therefore be subject to the same standards of responsibility. SP 
suggested it is not" a mental illness as much as a state of mind that's fixed from 
birth. And therefore the person, in a sense is not responsible". He argued that 
psychopaths do not have the capacity to understand the world the way that 
everyone else does, although they know other people perceive death as wrong. 
It is this last point that is crucial to DT's stance. SP suggested you could say to 
the court that someone in this state is responsible, but does not understand the 
emotional impact that they have had. However, the law does not readily 
acknowledge the importance of emotion to decision-making. It would seem 
that SP is less dismissive of the physiological evidence than DT, who supports 
the cognitive approach of the law. 
However, the physiological evidence currently available is not sufficient to 
establish a definitive cognitive impairment that reduces responsibility in the 
eyes of medico-psychological professionals, let alone the law, although the 
English law does allow this condition to qualify. The issue is does the 
condition substantially diminish the defendant's mental responsibility, which is 
not the same standard of impairment to cognitive capacity required for the 
insanity defence. It would seem that much depends on the beliefs of the expert 
the defendant has acting for him. The psychiatrists in Mitchell's (1997) study 
claimed that despite the lack of an agreed professional definition about 
psychopathic symptoms they did not experience problems making a diagnosis. 
The unanimous view of the respondents was that such a killer might come 
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within s 2 but it was not automatic. They held that each case must be dealt with 
on its merits with regard to abnormality and the capacity for self-control, and 
the matter of treatability was irrelevant. The majority noted that it is often 
difficult to feel any sympathy for psychopaths and that there is little public 
sympathy along with the fear of repetition. However it was thought to be a 
matter for the court to decide whether a defendant should be shown any 
sympathy. It would seem the issue for the law is the risk the psychopath 
presents. This debate showed the ambivalent attitudes that prevail within 
medico-psychological professions and the position adopted by an expert 
depends on their subjective position in the philosophical debate. 
Intoxication 
The other contentious area is intoxication. The intoxicated person is usually 
held not to have an abnormality of the mind in law. JR said "most er, 
perpetrators of extreme violence, including homicide, are under the influence 
of alcohol, and/or drugs at the time they do it", as are a substantial proportion 
of the victims. In terms of responsibility LC believes that people know the 
effect alcohol will have on them and therefore cannot allege surprise at the 
nature of their behaviour under its influence. Nevertheless, JR suggested severe 
intoxication is a traumatic injury to the brain, which leaves demonstrable 
injurious effects, usually temporarily. For JR the issue is whether or not you 
equate alcoholism with disease. "I think the psychiatric establishment, I think 
the world, is split about this". JR said there is emerging genetic evidence in 
respect of alcoholism, but there is little support for claiming it is a disease, in 
contrast with other conditions where "there is no evidence, to support, the erm, 
the disease, notion of, schizophrenia, manic depressive, psychosis, ... there is 
no actual evidence", but they are accepted as diseases. He argued that currently 
the problem is that the evidence is indirect, unlike with physical illnesses. LC 
made similar points, arguing services that deal with those who have alcohol 
problems maintain "drinking is not, erm, is not an act from a mental disorder". 
Even if the individual is dependent on alcohol, they are scathing about the idea 
alcohol constitutes a dependency syndrome, as it is not an illness. 
JR suggested political views influence the presentation of the legal psychiatric 
issues. In his experience if the expert evidence goes against the legal 
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viewpoint, which was identified in chapter three, it can lead to stem looks and 
words from the judge. He provided a case example involving a section 18 
wounding, where the accused was drunk and had a "mental state abnormality". 
When he addressed the matter of intoxication in court, claiming he was neither 
excusing nor condoning but simply offering a psychiatric defence, he found 
that the judge hardly listened to him. JR held that the judge dismissively said, 
"it might be interesting but it's not really relevant because er, of the self-
induced intoxication". This reflects points discussed in chapter four on the 
importance of the judge for the admission of expert evidence, that is essentially 
determined by legal concerns. JR was concerned about his responsibility to 
make sure the jury were aware of the peculiar mental state because it was 
complicated. But as discussed in chapter three, it is the initial choice to have a 
drink that is legally important, not the fact intoxication alters mental cogency. 
It would seem that currently there is no medical evidence or opinion to support 
an alternative approach. 
The law requires that in cases where the accused is intoxicated, that there is a 
separation of the actions affected by the abnormality from those resulting from 
the effects of alcohol. The respondents in Mitchell's study claimed that they 
did not consider this a problem, but also said that it is necessary to consider if 
the two are linked because this may be a way that the individual responds to 
the abnormality. 
Reform Suggestions 
Whilst interviewees in this study did not provide reform suggestions, the 
forensic psychiatrists in Mitchell's study expressed various views that it seems 
pertinent to briefly summarise (1997: 630). Some said that s2 was imperfect 
but it was not necessary to reform it. Others suggested that if the mandatory 
life sentence were made discretionary there would not be the same pressure to 
bring cases within s2, although there would still be the stigma that 
accompames the murder label. There were some that claimed psychiatrists 
should not be pressed to express an opinion on whether the defendant's 
responsibility was diminished as this took them beyond their area of expertise. 
Others suggested that there ought to be more clarification about what is meant 
by 'substantial impairment'. One respondent considered diminished 
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responsibility could be extended to cases other than murder and even that it and 
the insanity defence could be replaced by a system that operated on gradations 
of abnormality. Finally there were suggestions to modernize the language of s2 
and replace the term 'mental responsibility' with something that refers to moral 
culpability and responsibility. Mitchell asserts that if the study reflects the 
national picture on the workability of s2 then it provides a good argument for 
extending the defence beyond homicide (p.632). 
The Forensic Expert 
In line with chapter six, the points raised by the interviewees deal with the 
initial professional contact, pre-court processes, trials and the sentencing 
aspects of a case. The debate covers issues raised in previous chapters, 
especiall y chapter four. 
Expert Reputations and Titles 
In chapter six it became apparent that there is a small pool of experts operating 
within an area, with legal choice primarily based on judgments about 
competence in report writing and performance in court. However, SP suggested 
that the limited choice might have arisen because, as in his area, there are a 
limited number of clinicians. For example, he said there are only four 
psychiatrists available to prepare this type of report in his region, whereas in 
more populated districts there might be as many as fourteen psychiatrists. He 
also acknowledged that perhaps only one or two would specialise and do the 
majority of the work. Certainly DT discussed how she was initially involved in 
less serious cases, such as personal injury, but progressed to specialising in 
serious cases. She said she now finds that she can be selective about which 
cases she takes on, and does about fifteen reports a year, as difficult cases can 
take a couple of months. Nowadays DT secures work simply through her 
reputation, and illustrated this by saying, "I'm in the Expert Witness thing. erm, 
I've been in that, for, for a few years, and this year, when they rang me to 
update it, I said look, take me out of the next one, I really, I don't need it". TB 
also referred to the importance of reputation for repeat referrals, which he 
linked to the efficacy of his reports. Similarly LC referred to reputation, but 
added that the relationships that develop are important too. RH supported the 
latter argument, claiming judges now wait until he, or another member of his 
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organisation, are free to provide the appropriate assessments and reports. 
Interestingly, based on the nature of the discussions in chapter six, this will be 
reputation for competence in meeting legal needs rather than clinical 
competence. 
In addition to the importance of reputation experts alluded to the significance 
of professional titles. SP asserted titles affect perceptions of your credibility, so 
there are psychologists and psychiatrists who would do a really good job, but 
they are deemed not to have the appropriate paperwork or title. But 
professional clinical qualifications do not guarantee expertise in court work. 396 
RH expressed concern about the qualifications held by many psychological 
expert witnesses. "An awful lot of people in the business haven't got a clue 
what they're doing". Moreover, because solicitors do not know whom to 
instruct, the reports can be useless. He cited a case example where the court 
took one look at the report, which had cost £5,000 and tore it up. The solicitors 
had used someone recommended, who was not a chartered British 
Psychological Society (BPS) psychologist. RH thinks that the BPS as an 
organisation fails to offer guidance on expert witness testimony, and the 
profession needs to be properly policed so an appropriate standard is 
established. It would appear the lack of legal understanding about the medico-
psychological profession can lead to problems. The consequences of mistakes 
also reinforce the use of known experts. 
Pre-Trial Responsibilities 
Initial Instructions 
As stated in chapter six, solicitors make the initial contact, and instruct the 
expert. LC believes that the legal profession broadly understands the difference 
between psychologists and psychiatrists now, although firms who do not deal 
regularly with particular kinds of work may not appreciate the distinction. This 
perhaps seems a little optimistic in light of previous evidence in this thesis. LC 
stated psychologists do not normally do murder and manslaughter assessments, 
a consultant psychiatrist does. 
396 Whereas the Judge said being a convincing witness does not mean they are clinically competent. 
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It became apparent that solicitors have different approaches to instructions. 
This set of interviews indicated just how important this initial contact is. DT 
said, 
"defence or CPS doesn't make a difference whatsoever. As far as I'm concerned and I think 
that's why, erm, I do carry on and get, and get the work from, one or two s o 1 i c i t o r ~ , , who know 
that, that I'm going to give them, the most honest account possible". 
However, DT's choice of which cases to accept can be influenced by the 
solicitors involved. She said she will not work with certain firms because 
"they are hopeless and they mess things up and they don't get the information to you on time, 
erm, er, and they, you know, and they don't give their client a fair deal really because, they've 
got their own, agenda, .... ". 
For example she said that once she received a letter asking her to see a client, 
but it did not say who the client was or what they had done. Likewise TB 
discussed how variable instructions are, "[fJrom nothing, er, you know please 
assess this person, to very precise". TB prefers detailed instructions, "[b]ut very 
often, you know, just assess this person, it is up to you to make up the 
instructions if you like". LC said instructions vary depending on the nature of 
the law, "in criminal cases there are often, they don't give you very clear 
instructions at all". They sort of say what the problem is and then leave you to 
it, whereas in child protection work you get very clear guidelines and usually 
produce joint reports. In addition she said problems arise when a committee 
designs the questions, as you can have three questions basically asking the 
same thing. RH argued they do not know what questions to ask, suggesting 
good practice would be fifteen narrow questions. However he had recently 
received a letter regarding a man who had disintegrated in court which said, 
"the judge wants him assessing he thinks he's a bit nuts". Alternatively, LC 
held that sometimes instructions provide a sort of psychological profile, which 
of course does not mean anything. Interestingly the psychologist who reviewed 
the vignette said that they had reservations about some solicitor's statements 
about defendants, although they conceded the information might prove helpful 
in planning the assessment. The fact that the instructions are of variable quality 
and leave it up to the expert could be explained by the lack of legal training in 
medico-psychological matters. 
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The legal interviewees discussed the likelihood of bias on the part of the expert 
because they are arguably part of the team, whereas medico-psychological 
respondents expressed concern about being asked to take a particular direction. 
SP said he has found, "you get some solicitors who give you more than an 
inkling of what they want". For instance they may say what they are intending 
to do and suggest that they would like a particular angle. However, SP held that 
he has not been bullied, or definitively asked to write a particular report. In 
contrast DT considers it a positive that the lawyers she works with tell her how 
they are thinking and whether they think there is anything in it. "In their letter, 
they'll say look, you know, we got this evidence, er, well I mean tapes, erm, 
and they are actually pretty clear, they really are". This, alongside previous 
examples of how close working relationships help with the exchange of 
information, demonstrates how the established relationships could have an 
impact on the production of expert evidence through the general professional 
inclusion that develops. For example, with firms DT regularly works with, if 
they have not had their plea and directions hearing, they will tend to consult 
her about her availability before sorting out the trial date. Whereas TB even 
found himself in a situation, acting for the defence, where the prosecution were 
arguing they did not have time to get an expert, so he found one at an expert 
witness conference. 
The assertions of respondents in this study are supported by a survey 
undertaken by the UK Register of Expert Witnesses (1995).397 It was claimed 
in the study that frequently solicitor's fail to specify what is wanted, the norm 
being simply to request a 'psychological report'. Suggestions were that 
requests might ask if there are any mental health problems or disorders; if there 
are any mitigating psycho-social factors; about the likelihood of re-offending 
and the implications for any custodial sentence. Any relevant factual details 
should also be included, for example, witness statements, and a history of 
previous convictions. Interestingly it was claimed that it would be helpful to 
know what the defendant's defence is to be, along with other information that 
would allow an expert to estimate how much time they would need to prepare 
the case, and therefore how much it would cost. This last point contradicts the 
prevailing view held by both sets of respondents in this research. Likewise the 
397 Issue I, September, 1995 
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Law Society has produced guidelines on instructing experts, which it would 
seem are not being followed. 398 Significantly the guidelines are intended to 
assist solicitors to make "effective use of experts" so they meet solicitors' and 
the court's needs as this better serves their clients and the interests of justice 
(2002: C4.1). 
In addition to the instructions the interviewees discussed how important it was 
to receive a copy of the case files (depositions), for preparing for the 
assessment. DT said there is no point spending three hours with a defendant 
going through their account of the offence if you have not had the benefit of 
looking through the depositions and witness statements so that you can 
challenge what is said. This contrasts with the legal respondent's perceptions of 
the 'gullibility' of the medico-psychologist with regard to the defendant's 
story. In fact DT argued the capacity to get the depositions together quickly is 
another important way to assess a solicitor's competence. DT claimed that once 
she has the depositions she will try and get things wrapped up within a couple 
of weeks "because it doesn't help to have things, sort of, hanging on. And they 
start to blur together", despite earlier remarks that cases can take a couple of 
months.399 
In addition she argued that counsel's advice, and knowing who the barrister is, 
helps you to know what they are thinking. This shows the importance of 
working relationships for judgments about what is required, and ultimately for 
the operation of the law in such cases. It also implies a partisan rather than 
independent approach to the assessment process. When acting for the 
prosecution the expert will usually receive the defence expert's report. The 
vignette reviewer and DT also mentioned seeing GP records for identifying 
matters such as substance abuse, or mental health problems. All these types of 
records were in the CPS case files offering a wealth of information and insight 
into the victims' and the perpetrators' lives. In particular the pictures of the 
murder scene are graphic, and made it easy to understand the Judge's point 
about the emotional impact they can have on a jury. 
39R The Law Society Guidelines on Expert Evidence can be found on the Law Society website. 
399 This contrasts ~ i t h h the legal claims about delays. 
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The Assessment 
Procedural Issues 
As chapter four discussed, the assessment process incurs additional 
responsibilities for the clinician compared with those of the usual 
doctor/patient relationship. For example, doctors normally arrive at a diagnosis 
and treatment plan on the basis of the information supplied by the patient. Yet 
it was identified in chapter six that lawyers consider that this face value 
acceptance of the patient/defendant's story undermines the validity of reports. 
However, the experts claimed that in this context they do test out the 
defendant's story, which is why the case files are so important. JR said the 
information in the depositions makes it possible to test the veracity of claims, 
such as not remembering or understanding what happened. The client "might 
not want to say anything but, you have to form an opinion about, that, because 
that's all about automatism and intent, you see". RH talked at length about the 
mode of questioning necessary to elicit as much descriptive information as 
possible, which means avoiding confronting someone about their behaviour, 
thoughts and values. The psychologist who reviewed the vignette stressed the 
need to interview other parties too, which in the scenario would include the 
father, Sharon, any close relative and the employer. As a result of the amount 
and complexity of the information DT said she completes a case before getting 
involved in another. She referred to a double murder case where the 
depositions "were about a foot thick, and, really erm, and that was a very 
detailed report". So the interviewees presented a very different picture to that 
drawn from the assertions of the legal respondents. 
Experts identified a number of procedural problems that they find affect the 
efficacy of the process. For example, SP says it can be difficult relating the 
mental health information to the time of the incident if the assessment takes 
place months after the event, "it would be much nicer if we were there the day 
they were arrested. Which doesn't, can happen. The police arrest and we go 
straight in" .400 He said currently psychiatrists only see the individual at the 
police station if the police surgeon decides a MHA assessment is needed. 
However JR said an individual might need to go to hospital to be assessed, but 
4(H) The legal respondents also made this point. 
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there are no beds available, so they have to go to prison. TB also discussed the 
delays, saying a person may have been in jail anything from seven months to a 
year, yet once the solicitor makes contact there is pressure to produce a report 
quickly. TB said he endeavours to interview the defendant within a few days of 
getting the first phone call, but not before he has received a letter of instruction. 
LC identified another factor that can affect the assessment process, where 
individuals have already been through one legal process, and/or perhaps 
received therapeutic support. "So it's thinking who else has been in that 
process before you actually see them, to prepare a report for court, ... ". It would 
seem that there could be ramifications from police interviews as well.401 LC 
also raised the matter of confidentiality, saying it is the responsibility of the 
expert to ensure the person is advised about the limits of confidentiality 
because the report is for the court. LC cited a time when a defendant who had 
denied guilt to the police, made an admission to her. This information can 
reach court through the report, and LC was unsure whether the solicitor 
subsequently used the report. So there are numerous ways in which the 
defendant's narrative can be influenced. LC's last remark shows that the report 
is an evidential tool. 
As regards how long an assessment takes, JR says that when the case is a 
straightforward one, like Malcolm, he would spend about two hours face-to-
face with them, but up to six to eight hours reading and preparing the report. 
TB discussed the time taken in terms of the nature of the tests, saying he 
usually sees defendants for one or two hours for a standard assessment, where 
he uses the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI).402 "Erm, which, with most 
people I can do it in about an hour". TB was particularly concerned with risk 
assessments of sex offenders and held the PAl is helpful because it generates 
information in a systematic format. He said he might be required to undertake 
additional tests, for instance related to suggestibility or intelligence.403 TB said 
he does not assess someone's intelligence unless he anticipates arguments 
about the appointment of an appropriate adult at the police interview. 
401 See McKenzie (2002) 
402 See Edens ct al (200 I) for an evaluation of the P AI for forensic assessments. . . . 
40.1 An aspect of the case of Fell [2001] was the suggestibility of the defendant tn relatIOn to police 
interviews. 
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Interestingly TB referred to an occasion where he prepared a report without 
conducting an interview, because the defendant refused to attend one. "And he 
was a, he wasn't say, he wasn't a rapist, but he was on the way to being, he, he 
was an exhibitionist." On the basis of perceptions and information provided by 
other parties TB came to the conclusion the defendant was on his way to 
serious criminality, and recommended that they lock him up and treat him. 
RH also discussed the cost of reports, admitting he is expensive. A report costs, 
"I mean we charge, I don't know, £2000 for a full report on, on one person. On 
a, on a mother and, father, £3800 I think". Assessment of a child costs £300. 
VA T is charged on top of this. In justifying the costs RH discussed how long it 
takes to do an assessment, referring to the reading time beforehand, the 
assessment, dictating the report, typing it up, usually by a secretary. In addition 
there may be travel and hotel costs. RH equated this with a solicitor charging 
£120 an hour. However, in chapter six it was established defence solicitors do 
not receive this level of remuneration. LC pointed out that the psychological 
service she is attached to do not charge for the reports, whereas the 
psychiatrists do undertake court reports as private work. 
Diagnostic Issues 
The respondents discussed a number of clinical issues. SP said he focuses on 
the "man himself' on the night in question, and "was he mentally ill, if not was 
he physically ill, if not, is this, is there something seriously psychological that 
you think should be considered". SP maintained it is only from the age of 18 
that it is possible to classify a personality disorder, as in children the most you 
can say is that there are traits, which could be developmental. This overlooks 
conduct disorder that covers the under 18s, which is discussed in chapter three. 
SP argued having something psychologically wrong is the weakest ground 
because many people believe we all have problems. RH also said "one of the 
things the court has a problem with, if the person hasn't got a mental illness, 
but is psychologically disturbed", but it still means their reasoning is impaired. 
But in chapter three it was shown that the courts claim they accept functional 
disorders. This could be an important issue for cases where the CPS accept a 
plea, or let the case go before a jury. There are clearly functional disorders that 
are readily accepted because they are related to particular case types where the 
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law wants to achieve a moral outcome, such as with battered women, because 
there are no issues of future risk. 
SP alleged problems anse when there is an elusive medical condition that 
requires more time to investigate, for example, temporal lobe epilepsy, a rare 
organic disorder. 404 SP has encountered this in a couple of cases where it had 
been missed. It usually occurs in young men who have unprovoked aggressive 
outbursts, which they cannot remember. "[T]hey've got temporal focus, which 
can cause rage and aggression", which can cause many of the symptoms of 
paranoid schizophrenia. However, he argued, even if someone has temporal 
lobe epilepsy it does not mean that on the night in question they actually had a 
temporal fit. This indicates a concern to be a competent clinician in diagnosing 
conditions. Whilst insanity is used less and less, DT said it is something you 
are expected to look at if you see somebody who is "actually barking mad", but 
generally they are not. 
The psychologists RH and TB both challenged the psychiatric process of 
arriving at a diagnosis without using proper diagnostic processes. RH said he 
takes exception to simply referring to a diagnostic category in either DSM IV 
I 
or ICD 10, because anyone could use them, as it is a diagnostic manua1.405 
Moreover in the UK there is an assumption that only doctors can diagnose, yet 
the preface to the diagnostic manual indicates that it is for use by anyone with 
experience in mental health issues, such as nurses, occupational therapists, 
psychologists and doctors. TB made contentious remarks about psychiatrists, 
claiming it is becoming more common, where one party employs a psychiatrist, 
for the other side to get a psychologist to counter their argument through the 
use of tests. "And I'm pleased with that because, I've never come across a 
psychiatrist who knows anything about, psychometrics". RH also said 
"[t]raditionally it's been a psychiatrist, but if you look at things now like 
certificates of incapacity, more and more and more psychologists are doing 
them". TB said he hopes as more psychologists are providing evidence judges 
404 The effect this condition has on volition and the sense of self is discussed by Pontius (2003). 
405 RH discussed the fact the UK uses leo 10 not DSM IV and all the diagnostic codes used in NHS 
statistics are based on leo 10. Yet he said, reference to PTSD and ADHD is actually based on DSM IV 
because it is not included in leo 10. "There's no, there's no standing. in terms of the DSM IV criteria. but 
it's used routinely, in the UK". TS refers to DSM IV categories. even though in the UK leo lOis used. 
Arguably this could affect the acceptability ofTS's report. 
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will begin to appreciate the difference between the psychiatric and 
psychological diagnostic process. He held that it is not that psychiatrists are 
incompetent individuals but that their profession has not kept up with modem 
knowledge. Therefore, despite the assertions in chapter four about scientists as 
a profession being united it would appear there are inter-professional rivalries 
within the medico-psychological field. 
Assessments of Malcolm 
With reference to Malcolm's claims not to remember the incident, DT said in 
her experience once reality starts to set in defendants usually remember. She 
suggested his reaction could be a hysterical response, a dissociative reaction or 
an indication of an epileptic fit or fugue state. However, DT claimed any 
dissociation is likely to be a response to the offence, not a cause. DT also 
speculated that "[h]e might have a personality disorder, . A few changes of jobs 
and things, but it's all down to his paranoid personality traits". Furthermore, it 
is not unusual for people with paranoid personality disorders to say that they do 
not remember an event. What is unusual, she stated, is the complete gap and 
the fact he does not accept that he has done anything wrong. "I'm sure the 
solicitors would be looking for a, a cause in terms of abnor, abnormality of 
mind, but I suspect that this one wouldn't have it". In her view nothing appears 
to constitute a substantial impairment, he does not fit the bill for ASPD, so 
Malcolm's case would not go to trial by means of the diminished responsibility 
defence. 
Similarly, JR's view of Malcolm was "there isn't, isn't any, definite information 
here that there is a mental health problem". However, he said this was not a 
definitive opinion because there were indications of a possible serious mental 
health problem linked to paranoia or psychosis. JR held Malcolm is more 
likely to have paranoid personality traits as he is an insecure individual. JR's 
'gut feeling' is that Malcolm would not come into the mental health system 
based on the available information, however he believed the defence would try 
a psychiatric angle, but he did not think it would work. particularly because of 
the political issues surrounding alcohol and violence. 
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In contrast, SP claimed he would be looking for evidence of ongoing mental 
illness that has been missed, such as dissocial personalizv disorder or 
psychopathic disorder. One possibility SP suggested was paranoid 
schizophrenia, even without the obvious auditory hallucinations and delusional 
symptoms, as some cases are not so straightforward. SP considered temporal 
lobe epilepsy was not applicable because of Malcolm's age and he did not 
exhibit the confusion and perplexity that often follows such an incident of 
memory loss. 
The psychological responses were less detailed, which fits in with previous 
assertions that psychologists are less likely to be called upon to make such 
assessments. TB wondered whether Malcolm was being truthful when he said 
he could not remember. He suggested there might be a possibility of 
dissociation, which he conceded would not be discovered through the standard 
assessment he uses. LC also mentioned dissociation, stating that such an 
assessment would require a lot of questions regarding memories of the 
incident. She said she would not be readily convinced because he is aware of 
other ongoing matters. Another possibility she suggested was process 
dissociation, but said it is highly unusual. LC also mentioned personality 
syndrome, perhaps bordering on a kind of mental illness, but her overall view 
was that he is likely to be paranoid with some obsessional personality 
dimensions. When the vignette was reviewed it was said there might be 
indications of Asperger's Disorder. 
This illustrates the focus within the diagnostic process, although plainly this is 
from a limited vignette scenario rather than a detailed interview. Clearly certain 
characteristics invoke particular diagnostic categories, as there are overlaps 
within the range of responses, particularly with dissociation and paranoia. It 
would seem, however, that the interviewees, whilst wanting to verify a number 
of possibilities, suspect on the information supplied that they would not 
recommend the diminished responsibility defence. From the discussions so far 
in the thesis the more subjective aspect of the process would be in the 
evaluation of the effect of the condition on the defendant's mental 
responsibility. 
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The Report 
Legal respondents identified the quality of the report as an important criterion 
for selecting an expert. In particular the conclusion was cited as significant 
because it contains the recommendations and opinions about the mental state of 
the defendant in terms of the incident, and possible applicable defences. It is 
this link that earlier chapters showed the law is interested in because the focus 
is on the effect of the condition on the defendant's mental responsibility. The 
medico-psychological interviewees made a number of points. DT claimed you 
only look foolish if there is no basis to running a defence. For example in the 
double murder case referred to earlier, she went through every possible defence 
and wrote out her reasons why they were not applicable. DT also said that it is 
necessary to consider what the eventual sentence is likely to be and include a 
section referring to such matters as remorse, regret, and the determination of 
the defendant to move away from the factors that contributed to the offence, for 
instance drug use. She cited an example where the defendant was attending 
substance misuse groups in prison and intended to go to the domestic violence 
groups. DT argued it is important to include these factors because they 
subsequently inform the parole board, an insight she had gained from sitting on 
these. This reflects the fact that the information is mitigation at the sentencing 
stage of the diminished responsibility defence, as the defendant pleads guilty to 
manslaughter. 
DT also discussed the fact that reports supporting a diminished responsibility 
defence have to contain an opinion on substantial impairment. In her 
experience "the majority of er, erm, . requests for, a report by, erm, a murder, 
erm, in, a murder charge, are asking for that". SP's comments on the matter 
were that you might say that the person was under immense pressure and acted 
out of character, and therefore it's diminished responsibility, because of 
mitigating circumstances linked to a mental illness. In such circumstances he 
said the defendant might know that what they did was wrong, but the court 
holds their illness as a mitigating factor because murder is often emotionally 
driven.406 Significantly SP commented on the lack of accuracy within 
psychiatry, saying "you certainly won't get" agreement. He acknowledged that 
406 But SP believes we are far more cautious than the U.S. in taking these factors into account. 
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this undermines perceptions of the profession, but declares you get good and 
bad in every occupation and advocated improving accuracy and the general 
standard of court reports through training. His remarks are interesting, first 
because of the acknowledgment of the importance of recognising the impact of 
emotion with the diminished responsibility defence. Secondly because he is 
attributing the lack of uniformity in the medico-psychological approach to 
problems within his own profession when earlier discussions indicate the 
assessment can only be an evaluative process because clinical judgements are 
being related to socially constructed categories about mental states and 
responsibility that have been developed by lawyers. 
RH said he has seen reports that do not conform to the law's standards because 
they contain no statement of truth, they do not identify the expert's 
qualifications, they do not include references that indicate how up-to-date the 
expert is, and they do not distinguish between evidence and opinion. LC 
remarked that her reports have not changed over the years, except that they 
might be a bit longer than they used to be and are perhaps more fully 
referenced, although LC is unsure how helpful the latter is because she 
surmises that most judges will not follow them up. "[E]ssentially what they 
want is the best evidence that you have from your own discipline,. Written, er, 
er, and described in language which, can be understood by the intelligent 
layman". On the matter of science entering into cases, LC said she does not 
believe this has essentially changed and generally science and law work well 
together. "I mean, I, I think, I think the key thing is that, you've got to be sure 
about your own science, ... ", therefore the report should establish what you 
have actually found, what opinions you have gained and the basis on which 
you link the two, and the court then decides whether to act on it. 
Briefly, as further information, Mitchell's interviews with forensic psychiatrists 
regarding their role in diminished responsibility cases found that they 
perceived there were three critical issues (1997: 624). First, does a mental 
abnormality exist?407 The second concerned mental responsibility and finally 
407 Mitchell stated that Dell's (1982) research found that of the 13% who disagreed whether the defendant 
qualified for s2 about halfwere about whether an abnormality of mind actually existed (p.624). 
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detennining whether the defendant's mental responsibility was substantial(I' 
impaired. Mitchell claims that 
"[t]he general view is that the role of forensic psychiatry is to offer evidence as to whether the 
accused's behaviour was autonomous - how far the defendant was able to exercise free will 
and to criticize and adjust his or her beliefs and intentions - so that he or she can properly be 
held responsible" (p.621). 
The respondents in his study claimed reports focused on the individual's power 
of reasoning, rational judgment and ability to exercise willpower, including 
control over thoughts as well as deeds. The defendant's thoughts, perspective 
and actions were compared with those of the ordinary citizen. It was said that if 
there is no clear evidence of mental illness then a comprehensive examination 
of the individual's life should be undertaken. The experts did not restrict 
themselves to the time of the killing in looking to link the killing and mental 
abnonnality. One respondent actually said that in his experience the court had 
not always required a link. The respondents claimed that they invariably 
considered treatability and treatment issues too. It was acknowledged that this 
was not important for questions of responsibility, but most said they tended to 
bear in mind the likely sentence. Some admitted that they might be swayed by 
what they thought that the court would accept and was in the public interest. 
This implies a familiarity and focus on legal rather than medico-psychological 
concerns. But Mitchell remarks that essentially, rather than develop their own 
rules of thumb to judge matters psychiatrists fall back on their expertise and 
focus on mental illnesses and personality disorders. Afterwards they consider 
wider issues, such as how the court and the public will view the case and how 
they will justify their opinion. Accordingly 'mental responsibility' is construed 
in psychiatric tenns. However with certain types of cases, such as BWS and 
mercy killings then there is evidence to support concerns that the opinions of 
psychiatrists are influenced by personal judgements about culpability and what 
is socially desirable. 
On the other hand Mackay and Keams examination of insanity reports in 44 
cases, which resulted in 91 psychiatric reports, found little evidence of 
connections between clinical judgment and the limbs of the defence (1999: 
722-3). For example five reports did not address the issue of insanity at all, 
whilst another 14 reports indicated that the defendant was insane at the time of 
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the offence, but either offered no explanation of how this related to the 
M'Naghten rules or were ambiguous. It is alleged that the 'wrongness' limb 
wouid appear to be interpreted by psychiatrists in a liberal manner beyond that 
of it being a legal wrong as stated in chapter three. Mackay and Keams 
conclude that this is the preferred option and it appears that psychiatrists "are 
adopting a common sense or folk psychology approach and that the courts by 
accepting this interpretation are, in reality, expanding the scope of the 
M'Naghten rules" (p.723). 
CPS Case File Reports 
What follows is a brief description of the format and content of the psychiatric 
reports found in the two CPS case files.408 
Case One 
Briefly the case involved a male juvenile, who knew the victim. There was 
alcohol and drug use at the time of the incident, with extensive scientific 
reports produced on the mental effects that would result from their use despite 
the fact these matters are not usually acknowledged by the law for the purposes 
of assessing responsibility. Death occurred as a result of a single stab wound to 
the heart.409 There was a clear trigger event, and the subsequent behaviour of 
the defendant was unusual and inconsistent. He denied he had the necessary 
intent, claiming he had simply bumped into the victim whilst in the room, and 
did not know what had happened until later in the day. 
There was only one expert report by a specialist in child and adolescent 
forensic psychiatrist, who listed their qualifications. The report was based on 
an interview with the defendant conducted six weeks after the killing. The 
report outlined the defendant's family history, school history, including his 
attendance at special institutions as a result of previous serious convictions, 
which were listed. Earlier mental health problems were outlined, and his drug 
and alcohol use. Using a scale of 0-10 it was said the defendant's level of 
depression at the time of the interview was (2), compared with (8) at the time 
40R Care was taken to ensure anonymity and the CPS have read and approved the account. 
409 Killing with a sharp instrument. according to Home Office statistics received as part of this project. IS 
the most ~ o m m o n n method of murder. 
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of the incident. The report also stated that the defendant claimed he had been 
hearing voices since just after the event. Apparently the voice, which said he 
should kill himself, sounded similar to that of the victim. The defendant said 
part of him did want to die, but he was also scared of dying. He had tried to 
hang himself whilst on remand. 
In the psychiatrist's opinion the defendant had a serious mental disorder within 
the terms of the MHA as his symptoms were consistent with a major 
depressive disorder, complicated by flashbacks of the stabbing. The report 
stated that the defendant's current place of detention could not manage his 
mental health needs and recommended that under s36 MHA he should be 
transferred to hospital for treatment. After treatment he could be returned to 
prison to face trial. Crucially the depression and flashbacks were seen as a 
consequence rather than cause of the stabbing. Additionally, in light of the 
defendant's history of violent crime and behavioural difficulties, a diagnosis of 
emerging Sulipathic Personality Disorder was made. (As this is not a 
diagnostic category it may be a typing error and mean sociopathic personality 
disorder.) The CPS accepted a plea of guilty to manslaughter because the 
witnesses were deemed unreliable. The defendant was sentenced to five years 
in a young offender's institution. 
Case Two 
The second case involved a more brutal murder, which generated considerably 
more documentation.41o The accused was male, knew the victim, and death 
resulted from 18 stab wounds using two blades. There were also head injuries 
caused by a blunt instrument, and bruising. The accused denied involvement 
until the evidence was overwhelming. The defence and prosecution both 
obtained expert reports. 
The Defence Report 
The defence report was by a consultant forensic psychiatrist based on one 
interview about seven months after the incident. The report stated that before 
the interview the expert had read the defendant's statement to the police, health 
records, a consultant psychologist's report from a road traffic accident (RT A) 
410 There was a 112 page document listing all the material produced in support of the case. 
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in 2001, and a CPS report by a senior forensic psychiatric registrar.411 There 
was no list of the expert's qualifications. Briefly, the details on the defendant 
were as follows. 
The report summarised the defendant's family history, paying attention to his 
relationships with immediate family. Then there was a description of the 
defendant's personal history, which included details of head injuries, 
employment and school history, including academic results, and reference to 
the fact he was bullied. The report then dealt with personal relationships, 
embracing discussions on the defendant's sexual orientation because 
homosexuality was an important issue in the case. Then there was information 
on drinking, smoking and drug (prescribed and illicit) habits. The report noted 
that the accused was on anti-depressants and wanted counselling, but the prison 
lacked the necessary expertise to deal with the PTSD resulting from the RTA, 
which had already led to two overdoses. 
The expert then addressed the defendant's forensic history, which was minimal 
and did not include violence. Following this the circumstances of the offence 
were described, including the nature of the relationship between the defendant 
and victim. The defendant alleged the victim had propositioned him three years 
earlier, and again at the time of the offence. The defendant claimed the victim 
had also threatened him with a knife and it was in the ensuing fight that the 
victim was stabbed. The defendant left the scene not knowing whether the 
victim was alive or dead. The psychiatric report then described 'other relevant 
information', covering mental rather than physical injuries resulting from the 
R T A, which led to PTSD with depression. It was stated that as a consequence 
of this the defendant's life had fallen apart; he lost his job, his relationship 
ended, and he started sleeping rough. 
The psychiatrist's opinion and recommendations initially dealt with the 
defendant's denial of the incident and explanation of his actions as resulting 
from threats of homosexual acts by the victim. Reference was made to the 
defendant's limited intelligence, although an earlier learning disability 
411 It has been stated by the respondents that it is usually the defence who obtain a report first. 
Furthemlore the case files seemed to indicate that the second intcniew by the prosecution expert was 
after the interview date given by the defence expert. 
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diagnosis had been rescinded. In tenns of his mental state, reference was made 
to the RTA and resulting PTSD. In addition it was stated that during the 
interview the defendant showed signs of moderate depression, but this was not 
linked to the offence. It was suggested that the defendant was a vulnerable man 
who might have felt threatened by the victim. Significantly the psychiatrist 
stated it was not possible to say whether the defendant's account was accurate. 
Reference was made to the defendant being on anti-depressants, which can lead 
to suicidal ideation and, on withdrawal, violent behaviour. However, it was 
concluded that while reactions like this are well documented, the type of anti-
depressant being taken by the defendant was unlikely to reduce his control of 
his behaviour, and he had been on them for some time without exhibiting 
violence. But it was suggested that the court should take into account his low 
intelligence, poor mental state following the R T A, and the breakdown of his 
relationship because these factors would make him vulnerable to being upset. 
The psychiatrist's conclusions regarding the legal options stated that the 
defendant was fit to stand trial because he could understand the nature of the 
charges and instruct counsel. Diminished responsibility was deemed unsuitable 
in this case, but there was clear evidence that the defendant was depressed and 
in a poor state of mind at the time of the offence. It was suggested that this 
would support an argument for provocation or self-defence. Reference was 
made to the fact it was the victim's knife and there was no evidence of 
premeditation or a desire to injure the victim. The report concluded that the 
court should take into account the defendant's vulnerability when making 
decisions about self-defence and/or provocation. 
The Prosecution Report 
The defendant was interviewed twice, some two months apart, for a total of 3 
hours. The expert stated that they had read the case files prior to interview and 
there was no list of their qualifications. The report incorporated the same range 
of background infonnation, although more details of the defendant's mental 
health problems from medical files were included. However. the assessment of 
the defendant's mental state at the time of the two examinations was explained 
by reference to different factors. The report described the volume and pace of 
the defendant's conversation, which was said to be nonnal. He was coherent in 
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his explanations of his history. His body language was said to support his 
declaration of low mood, although the defendant denied suicidal thoughts. It 
was stated there were no features to suggest psychotic mental illness. Terms 
such as psychotic were explained; "by psychotic I mean a severe mental illness 
which impairs the patient's grasp of reality; by delusion I mean a false, fixed 
often bizarre idea held against reason; and by hallucination, I mean a 
perception in the absence of the appropriate external stimulus". Therefore the 
defendant was held to be cognitively oriented in time, place and person. Tests 
of the defendant's memory, capacity for maths and spelling, and for the 
presence of organic brain disease revealed no evidence of major problems.412 It 
was noted that the defendant claimed he was suffering from PTSD, believed he 
was mentally ill, and wanted to receive medication and help. In addition it was 
reported the defendant denied murder, insisting it was self-defence. A review 
of the defendant's progress since remand held that he appeared to be well 
behaved, and that his mental health had improved considerably since he had 
been given anti-depressants. The prison staff had no concerns about his 
physical or mental health. 
The opinion and recommendations regarding legal options held that the 
defendant was fit to plead by the usual legal criteria. There was no learning 
disability, his I.Q. being in the dull to normal range. He was not mentally 
impaired under the MHA, and any psychological disturbance due to the PTSD 
did not substantially diminish his responsibility for his actions. The expert 
indicated a willingness to attend court to give the opinion that the diminution 
was trivial rather than substantial. In addition it was said there was no evidence 
to suggest that the defendant could not form a specific intent to kill, and 
insanity and automatism were ruled out. The psychiatrist concluded there was 
no psychiatric recommendation to make. The defendant was sentenced to life. 
In contrast to what is said to be expected practice, there were factors missing 
from the reports that were examined. For example declarations by the experts 
that they understand that their duty is to the court, or a list of their 
qualifications, or research references. Nor were any assertions about possible 
legal options dealt with in depth by reference to criteria within the statutes, 
m The report noted the tests undertaken and provided some examples of the results. 
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such as with the provocation defence. The bulk of the report was not directly 
related to legal matters and the discussions within the recommendations and 
opinion section were brief. No mention was necessarily made of risk or 
possible detention and treatment options. 
Reform Suggestions 
Only one respondent discussed reform. In terms of assessment JR advocated 
adopting the TVS system in Holland, where the defendant is assessed for about 
six weeks rather than the average of two hours with our approach. Furthermore, 
a lawyer works in the assessment institution and it is their job to write the 
reports, which JR believes allows a much better interface between the two 
disciplines, although that is not supported by the data in chapter six. The other 
notable feature of the system is the attempt to assess the proportion of 
accountability affected by the mental illness. 
"So they will say, well this person, actually they estimate them, this person seems to be about 
30 percent accountable, but, 70 percent of him wasn't accountable for what he did because of 
the, mental disorder, thing. And so, he'll get a proportionate prison sentence, they have to do 
both. Prison and therapy". 
JR argued that this is a more transparent system than ours, but the difficulty 
lies in assessing the percentage. To illustrate his point JR referred to a case 
where a young man became psychotic and believed he was in the film The 
Matrix and his mother was an agent. In a matter of hours of this happening he 
stabbed and killed her. JR was unsure how much was attributable to the illness, 
and how much to the fraught relationship between mother and son. But his 
view is essentially that if you could accommodate both aspects like the Dutch 
system "then that's more, I mean it's fairer, . juster outcome" because the 
person would go both to prison and hospital. 
Expert Reports and Case Decisions 
There were a number of comments made on decision-making in terms of the 
report. With regard to the exchange of information and making decisions, LC 
and TB said how important case conferences are. SP pointed out how 
subjective what happens is, so much depends on the individuals involved in the 
case. It is all about "what the police say. And what the solicitors say and what I 
feel, and the social worker. We have to make a decision, joint". For example, 
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SP discussed when he had debated with a solicitor whether the defendant was 
fit to plead. SP believed the defendant was responsible for their actions and 
advocated that they go through the court system as they could then be sent to 
hospital afterwards "[b ]ecause if I bring them in before sentencing they can get 
out of it. It's a loophole really". He also argued how important attitudes to 
mental illness are, which he suggested are informed by whether the person has 
any personal experiences, and whether whatever knowledge they possess is 
prejudiced or preconceived. SP argued that trying to move people's perceptions 
is very hard, even within the medical profession. Therefore the intricacies of 
cases can be underestimated, and many believe madness is not an illness that 
can be treated, which can result in no attempt to understand. He remarked that 
if the medical profession can hold views like this then what could be expected 
of the legal profession or jury? 
To illustrate his point SP discussed a case where he expected the solicitor to 
instruct a medical expert because the man, in his 30s, had acted very out of 
character when he initiated an armed attack. He was a family man who had 
obtained a number of supportive character references, and who had also been 
receiving treatment for illness and anxiety. In addition the person he attacked 
was stealing from his business, which was foundering. The man ultimately 
approached SP privately, but the solicitor refused the report. SP explained that 
the judge was likely to stop the case for a psychiatric report, but the solicitor 
still refused the report, which surprised SP. In addition to illustrating SP's point 
about the importance of attitudes to mental health, the example is interesting 
because the solicitor ignored the client's wishes, which contrasts with the 
assertions of the legal respondents on this matter.413 In contrast LC discussed 
how hard some solicitors try to understand her reports and explain them to 
clients. One problem that TB highlights is the lack of feedback about the case. 
For instance, he saw the outcome of one case in the local paper and had no idea 
whether or not his report was used. This demonstrates the importance of legal 
objectives informing the use of expert evidence. 
413 Whilst this case example may have occurred before the recent provocation case of Smith [2001], if the 
diminished responsibility defence was not appropriate it would seem like an Instance to consIder 
provocation. 
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Court 
The legal rules and academic observations pertinent to experts giving evidence 
in court were outlined in detail in chapter four. This section reveals the medico-
psychological experiences and perceptions of attending court and dealing with 
the adversarial process with specific reference to the key players, judges, juries 
and barristers. 
Judges 
Judicial Attitudes and Responsibilities 
The remarks of experts indicated that they consider individual judicial attitudes 
are significant. For example SP said "it depends on the judge as well 'cause, 
you know even the solicitors say, ohh, it's so and so and he's not gonna listen". 
However, interviewees distinguished between personal mind-sets on mental 
health matters, and those resulting from a legal perspective. Thus on the issue 
of personal viewpoints SP argued that whether or not judges are amenable to 
taking mental health factors into consideration depends on whether they are 
psychologically minded, which he attributed to personal experience of mental 
health problems. However, he questioned if it can be said that judicial attitudes 
remain static because repeated exposure to expert evidence is likely to have an 
impact on their knowledge and point of view. For instance JR argued that the 
education of judges is of vital importance and TB suggested judges are 
becoming more familiar with, for example, personality disorders, as they read 
more reports. In terms of educating judges and maximising the likelihood they 
will understand what is being said, RH advocated that experts note how often a 
judge writes things down, and then give their evidence taking pauses timed to 
the frequency with which the judge needs to make notes. He stated that 
emphasising a point will ensure that it is written down as a single point. RH 
claimed that barristers recognise the importance of this process. This last point 
shows the importance of experienced experts in the process for the delivery of 
information. More generally there is an assumption that repeated exposure to 
medico-psychological evidence has an impact, but this is not necessarily well 
supported by the data in chapter six. 
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In addition the judge is inculcated into the legal perspective. JR discussed the 
impact this can have by reference to a case concerned with whether the 
defendant was fit to plead. JR had been treating the defendant for paranoid 
delusions for some months, but eventually JR also became incorporated into 
the defendant's delusions and so the defendant stopped taking his medication. 
Therefore, in JR' s professional opinion the defendant was not fit to stand trial. 
The judge's response to JR's evidence was, 
"he's responsible, enn, he'd seen, thousands of er, accused people, and they have, will all say, 
that they're innocent. ... How do you know this guy isn't, pulling the wool over your eyes"? 
JR admitted in the interview, "I think that's a fair question .... I couldn't answer him. And, 
and, and actually, I, I hadn't, thought, of that question. Because I would say, locked into, my 
psychiatric field, .. I hadn't thought, well maybe he is a con man". 
This contrasts with earlier statements in the chapter that the defendant's 
perspective is not automatically accepted and supports the legal concerns 
expressed in chapter six. It also shows how important professional perspectives 
are for the framing of evaluation of matters. 
However there were also positive examples. SP talked about judges stopping 
trials to order reports to ensure there were no outstanding mental health issues. 
In addition, RH had been called upon to help a judge assess expert reports in a 
child custody case. RH had also been in a case where the judge had called him 
into chambers to confer on the issues. This also affirms the lack of medico-
psychological understanding within the judiciary and their reliance on expert 
advice, which potentially is important in terms of the expert's interpretation of 
their clinical diagnosis in respect of the legal rules and issues. However, RH 
distinguishes what he perceives to be an increasingly open attitude within the 
child and family courts with the autocratic attitude of judges in the criminal 
system where the legal issues are very different. But critically what these 
examples highlight is the subjectivity introduced into the process through the 
influences on judicial discretion. 
Expert Qualifications 
As chapter four explained, the judge is required to evaluate the expert's 
professional capacity to provide the evidence. In line with assertions in chapter 
six, titles are recognised as an important determinant. LC discussed the fact 
that many psychologists are not doctors since this trend is a recent 
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phenomenon. She maintained it undermines credibility because it is then 
necessary to explain one's professional standing. LC supported her assertion 
with a case example where a professor's arguments, which had not been 
researched, were given more credence than her own extensively researched 
findings. She said the professor likened the situation of a boy in care who was 
being abused by a female member of staff as putting "a young dog in with a, an 
experienced bitch", at which the judge smiled and nodded. These attitudes will 
permeate trials, both with and without a jury. 
RH claimed that the judge's familiarity with the expert could influence judicial 
assessments of credibility, although he said this might not always be 
advantageous. RH could recall being protected by a judge who made it clear 
that what he, RH said, was to be taken seriously otherwise it would be wasting 
the court's time. Alternatively "if they don't like you it's just, bad, you know, 
they'll shut you up .... I think you've spent enough time explaining this .... can 
you finish . . . in 10 minutes?" Then all that can be achieved in such 
circumstances is a brief summary of the key points, such as "13 points in 20 
minutes". 
Admission of Expert Evidence 
The operation of the legal rules on the admission of expert evidence, described 
in chapter four, was said to shape disciplines and sub-disciplines by affecting 
the level of commitment to particular perspectives. Remarks by RH support 
this proposition. He argued, "the influence judges have on psychological 
evidence is enormous" but "it always staggers me how learned and, wise ... 
they are ... and the ability to think ... logically, and 1 think they do think 
scientifically". LC's view concurs with this last point as she said, "generally 
most judges are fair and intelligent and weigh up the evidence and then, and 
critically review it ... ". Yet RH also discussed the impact "the particular 
prejudices of the judge" can have by referring to a judge who does not accept 
psychology theories about children. "[I]t affects, how testimony is given, it 
affects, what's listened to, what's recorded, and her judgments". There is also 
JR's experience in respect of evidence on intoxication discussed earlier. 
Significantly, judges give directions to the jury and TB referred to their 
importance for the jury's comprehension of expert evidence and the legal rules. 
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Therefore the same facts before a different judge could result in a different 
outcome. This affirms arguments in chapters three and four about the 
importance of the judge for the operation of this area of law in terms of the 
inclusion of expert evidence. 
In addition to the subjectivity introduced by the judge, SP argued it is 
necessary to acknowledge the impact of the individuality of each expert. RH 
also made this observation, noting its importance for the theories that enter into 
court. He expressed concern about the possibility of miscarriages of justice 
based on extreme theories, saying he has never been asked if the majority of 
his colleagues hold similar views.414 However, RH said that in particular 
geographical areas judges and experts are in frequent contact and therefore 
judges become familiar with good practice and the issues to be addressed.415 
But the data in this project highlights that the small number of experts are 
likely to be selected for their efficacy in legal rather than medico-psychological 
terms, although their perspective and theories will dominate. It also supports 
arguments in chapter six about the importance of inter-professional working 
groups for the operation of the law. RH places responsibility with the expert to 
distinguish between prevailing and state-of-the-art theories, so that the benefits 
of the latter are appreciated. This was the stance of the legal respondents, 
which will be the case when one considers that the lawyers have no mental 
health training and have trouble understanding the reports that they do read. 
However, RH did acknowledge that there might be problems with judges 
understanding state-of-the-art evidence, and without training it is hard to 
imagine that that evidence is effectively evaluated. Yet crucially the court can 
rule if an expert is deemed to be speaking from within their discipline, or from 
outside it. As stated in chapter four, English judges have been more generous 
with regard to unpublished results than is the case in the USA, for instance. 
RH also discussed how the legal framework affects judicial attitudes to 
scientific theories. He contrasted the dichotomous legal perspective with the 
scientific propensity to use percentages. Yet RH believes the jury are capable 
414 It was noted in chapter 6 that the Judge thought the expert acting for the other side would ensure that 
the credibility of the theory would come to the attention of the court. However: whilst this may be the 
case where there are at least two experts. civil cases are usually conducted WIth a JOIntly Instructed expert. 
415 Currently there is a lot of debate about the standard of evidence that has been submitted in relation to 
cot deaths. for example see. Burrell & Murray (2003). 
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of making decisions on evidence such as, in a "sample of a 100 people, 90% do 
this". Similarly, in line with chapter two SP argued for a spectrum approach to 
assessing issues and finds legal evidence poses a dilemma because of the law's 
concern with either/or thinking. SP said, "if you start saying to the court. I'm 
not certain but these are the theories, it, it won't hold water will it because the 
court is very much black and white". On the other hand this matter was 
addressed by Cane, and discussed in chapter one, in terms of the necessity of 
law to arrive at a verdict. Thus there is a fundamental tension in the two 
approaches that affects the interaction. The law avoids some of the 
uncertainties by requiring that the expert give an opinion in diminished 
responsibility cases as to whether the abnormality of mind does substantially 
diminish the defendant's mental responsibility. 
With regard to the last mentioned practice of seeking the expert's opinion on 
the ultimate issue in diminished responsibility cases, JR stated that you can 
hardly avoid saying something about the matter of substantial impairment, and 
had done so, but that he had "had an unpleasant discussion with the judge 
about that". JR had said to the judge that whilst he can know certain things and 
explain them, it is not his decision as to whether the defendant's mental 
responsibility is substantially impaired, that is a decision for the jury to be 
made on the judge's instructions. JR said it was apparent that the judge did not 
know this, brushed it aside and asked for an opinion. JR's view is that an 
expert "can show there is a link between one and the other, but, it is the jury's 
decision. Because, if, essentially it's about, whether they are guilty or not-
guilty of murder. .. , It's not my decision to say that". But JR also observed that 
if the fact the opinion comes from an expert is likely to be an important 
consideration to the jury, it could be seen as automatically deciding the matter 
and therefore why bother with the jury. Furthermore if the expert is plausible 
then there is a sense in which psychiatrists are being drawn into convicting 
people and "that's something which psychiatry, needs to be very careful 
about". His remarks echo concerns raised earlier in the thesis. RH also argued 
that definitive answers have to come from the judge and jury because an 
expert's role is simply to give the best advice they can. He said sometimes 
those in court listen, perhaps too much, and sometimes they do not. But experts 
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need to appear as a science practitioner, and be "very clear about what is, . fact, 
if there is such a thing", distinguishing clearly between fact and opinion. 
What can be seen are particular factors that stand out about the judicial 
approach, some of which mirror previous discussions, but very little is viewed 
in terms of the legal constraints that have been identified before. 
Juries 
Whilst experts appreciate it IS important that the judge understands the 
evidence, they also stress their responsibility to facilitate the jury's 
comprehension as the ultimate arbiters. For example, DT said when she is 
compiling her report she considers the jury's potential reaction to it. If she 
thinks that she is stretching a point, and if she "were sitting there, in the jury 
and, and, you know, was going to raise [her] eyebrows at that, ... [she] 
wouldn't say it". This statement is interesting in two ways. First because it 
presupposes a professional has the capacity to judge a layperson's perception 
of expert opinion even after years of being inculcated within their disciplinary 
perspective: it would seem the lawyers identified this as a problem even with 
experience. Secondly there is the fact that a professional would evaluate their 
considered opinion in terms of the reaction and judgement of a lay audience. 
A critical factor that was identified by interviewees as facilitating 
comprehension was the language used. DT stated that you have to "[k]eep it 
simple stupid", using layperson's language as much as possible. She claimed it 
is a mistake to assume using lots of jargon will give the impression that you 
know your stuff. She said some people also launch into lectures but it does not 
impress the jury. JR also said understanding is best achieved by trying "to keep 
it as simple as possible", but conceded it makes it difficult to explain diagnostic 
categories. However, he remarked that as the law is a blunt instrument "[his] 
evidence [he] present[s] as a blunt instrument as well .... I'm not going to 
attempt to, . you know, give them the details. It's futile, I don't have the time". 
JR distinguished between the UK and US, saying there is a more academic 
focus in US cases, as experts use flip charts and give lectures on the subject. 
LC also held that the objective is to pitch the report for the layman, avoiding 
jargon wherever possible because it is unnecessary. This said, SP claimed he 
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reads reports full of jargon, admitting how easy it is to fall into the trap. He 
argued that professionals overlook the fact that it is not other psychiatrists 
reading the report, so for example "[t]hey'll put things like erm, 'there was no 
evidence of formal thought disorder'. It doesn't mean anything. It does to me." 
Again from the data in chapter six it would appear the language used is a 
barrier and simplicity is not necessarily achieved, although there may be some 
distinction between the presentation of evidence in reports and in court. 
RH related his views on language use to the level of intelligence among jury 
members. He claimed lots of the public are Sun readers, which means they 
have a basic reading age of 10, so there is an onus to use as little technical 
language as possible, although, he added there is a danger that if the evidence 
is not complex people think there is not a lot behind it. RH suggested the best 
approach is to be middle of the road, adopting a common sense approach 
because "good psychology, the, the, general public should, should understand. 
It should make sense to them". In order to make it comprehensible RH draws 
on everyday life to illustrate technical points.416 
TB's perceptions differ somewhat from those held by RH, although TB said, 
"[ o]h I think it's vital, it's no use hiding behind, words and, pretending that you 
(sic) clever because you can use words that other people, that other people 
can't understand". However he argued that "you can't just treat the jury as a 
bunch of, uneducated clods, 'cause if they are then you've got a helluva lot 
more work to do ... ". TB initially claimed "if I can explain it successfully to 
the legal fraternity then, the jury ought to be able to understand it", but 
subsequently conceded that perhaps the legal fraternity have an advantage 
because they read more reports. Yet the legal respondents admitted that they 
have problems understanding expert evidence even with the advantage of 
familiarity and a high level of education, recognising therefore that it must be 
very difficult for the jury. 
SP emphasised that he attempts to make his conclusions very clear, for 
example, 
416 He did this throughout the interview and he was very effective at making his point. 
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"he is responsible for his action, he knew what he was doing, before and after there's been no 
evidence during this period or now, that he's not fuBy aware of the con;equences of his 
actions, . And it should be punished". 
This would clearly afford the jury the opportunity to understand and take the 
infonnation into account, however this is a medical opinion on what the law is 
trying to establish. Furthennore, SP said he sees the legal position as "[i]fhe's 
aware, but doesn't fully understand, that this is punishable, he's innocent". 
This is a limited representation, which is significant in light of the role of the 
expert in linking the clinical diagnosis to legal standards. There appears to be 
the possibility that the desire to communicate clearly will lead to distortions in 
meaning, which is then exacerbated by the loss of control by the expert once 
the evidence enters the legal domain. 
Expert Evidence, Barristers and the Adversarial Process 
Whilst experts can control the content and format of information within the 
report, once in court there is the impact of the adversarial process, especially 
barrister's questions, to contend with. The medico-psychological interviewees' 
responses correspond with those of legal interviewees on the importance of 
barristers to the exposition of expert evidence. However, in LC's experience as 
a psychologist, "in relation to criminal cases it's rare, that you actually, ... erm, 
get invited to the court", which she interpreted as an indication that the report 
covered all the necessary points so no further clarification was required. TB 
also made this point, but in addition he said the report will still be explained in 
court, and the barristers will "each ... translate it to his own advantage, so 
they'll get two versions". Nevertheless most reports are by psychiatrists and 
therefore this may not be a representative experience. It was said in chapter six 
that it was considered to be a tactical advantage to have the expert give 
evidence in court. 
Chapter four explained that in acknowledgement of the problems generated by 
the adversarial system the expert's duty is to the court because the expert is 
more likely than the barrister to describe 'the whole truth,.417 As part of this 
duty the expert is expected to indicate the strengths and weaknesses of their 
evidence, which does not fit in with the tactical concerns inherent in the 
417 Stockwell (1993) and Ikarian Reefer 1 (1993). 
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adversarial process. Critically, as JR stated, the dichotomous legal perspective 
means the focus is on "getting you to admit that it is or it isn't." which "is er, 
specious, way of doing things ... ". He said there is a difference between being 
cross-examined to elicit a clear opinion one way or another, and the aim being 
to discredit you. 
However, there is always the matter of the impact of experience. For example 
DT claimed that going into court taught her the sort of things that barristers 
ask, alongside attending case conferences. DT remarked that "you could be 
brilliant at giving evidence and, and persuading the jury but you need to have a 
barrister erm, who asks appropriate questions". RH also argued that "you get a 
balanced view if you've got decent counsel .. [but] if you've got bad counsel 
they'll never get a balanced view". On this last point DT admitted that 
sometimes her argument can be quite weak, and would have been stronger had 
she been acting for the other side, but because the barrister did not ask the 
right, (or wrong) questions, this was not evident. DT attributed this to 
inexperience impinging on the barrister's ability to make effective use of 
discrepancies, because "barristers should be homing in on that" as establishing 
doubt about one aspect of a report can cast doubt on the rest of it.418 Her 
remark also shows that experts do take a partisan stance. 
DT's explanation overlooks observations by other interviewees concerning the 
help experts give barristers in identifying the weaknesses in the evidence of the 
other side. For example, JR remarked that sometimes there is a rehearsal 
beforehand on how to present the disagreements. TB also discussed how an 
aspect of his role is explaining to barristers what he thought were the 'terrible 
blunders' by the other expert. Similarly LC said, "barristers are there to, to 
present the case to the court, so that it, it helps them actually, erm, prepare their 
case. You, you don't get a much bigger role really". Furthermore, by explaining 
the psychological issues to them they know how to ask you direct questions in 
court. This interaction was discussed in chapter six and suggests it involves the 
expert in being part of the legal team. However, LC also said about the need to 
be independent, "I think the best way to help people, is to do the best you can 
m The Judge had great difficulty with this assertion. arguing how important the expert IS on one's own 
side for helping to identify problems in the report produced by the expert on the other side. 
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to be er, an impartial, ... expert anyway". Furthermore the evidence is easily 
challenged if it is biased. In contrast to DT RH attributed poor performances by 
barristers to inadequate preparation, holding it is possible to identify those who 
received the brief 10 minutes before the hearing because they do not know 
what they are talking about and tend to follow a set pattern of questioning. He 
said this is much more likely to happen in the criminal courts, because some 
barristers will do anything for money.419 Notwithstanding this he suggested 
that long running cases received more detailed attention. Clearly murders fall 
into this last category. 
Lawyers said they prefer experts who stand up well to cross-examination. It 
would appear that experienced experts are very aware of barristers' tactics, 
which enables them to withstand the process more adeptly. For example, RH 
discussed undermining the adversarial process, citing a time when he had 
challenged the barrister's technique of questioning because it was not eliciting 
the relevant information. He conceded "I'm thought to be appalling in the 
witness box, . if someone starts getting difficult". Whereas DT discussed the 
importance of not being too garrulous as the other side can come back on the 
points, and there is no opportunity to find supporting research, it has to be off 
the cuff. DT feels that "often ... it comes down to theatre in the end".42o This 
illustrates that experienced expert witnesses appreciate the tactics inherent in 
the adversarial process, and learn measures to endeavour to communicate their 
key points to the court. 
Reform Suggestions: Education and Communication 
Introduction 
In terms of reform, medico-psychological respondents stressed professional 
and inter-professional training and understanding. Although the lawyers 
frequently referred to their lack of training in mental health issues, and the 
difficulties they have with medico-psychological evidence it was overlooked as 
419 An allegation made against expert witnesses in chapter 6. . 
420 Certainly the impression gained during the interviews was that a number of the respondents enjoyed 
the challenge of the legal process. See Carson (2000: 26) 
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:b . 421 Th' I a re onn Issue. IS wou d seem to be explained by arguments in chapters 
three and four that show that the lack of understanding does not impinge on the 
legal process and the law is not actively seeking to incorporate medico-
psychological knowledge. In tum this would explain why experts considered 
there is a need for greater inter-professional understanding. 
Training Experts 
SP believes "[t]hat psychiatrists [should] be specially trained to do court 
reports. So in other words you apply as a specialist area, and you go on the 
training courses and you're rigorously tested".422 Notably however he 
expressed concern about the lack of coherence in current clinical psychiatric 
training and "think [ s] the same would happen if you did a court case thing". SP 
claimed that presently forensic psychiatrists are often very capable but "their 
opinions vary terrifically". Significantly he alleged that general clinicians often 
do a lot of reports, although usually not murders. SP went on to suggest there 
should be a panel of experts used for such cases, so "there's specialists who 
know exactly what the courts want". It would appear that this effectively 
occurs in this particular area of law anyway. Furthennore, his argument 
implied being a proficient medico-psychological expert needs inculcation into 
legal perspectives to ensure confonnity with the requirements of the system, 
which would perhaps further affect clinical independence. However, the core 
of SP's argument was that the whole subject needs revisiting, especially issues 
of communication between key players, to assess what is required to most 
effectively serve justice rather than the current pragmatic approach. It would 
appear that with a core of professionals involved in such cases practices 
develop, but as a result of the explorations of the interaction between law and 
medico-psychology in chapters three and four the law fosters the pragmatic 
approach so that it can achieve justice in an ad hoc way based on legal 
evaluations of the merits and issues of the case. 
Similarly JR advocated that law and forensic psychiatry learn more from each 
other because working in forensic psychiatry is "a different reality to the, the 
421 The Scottish Forensic Institute has introduced forensic science training modules for the Law Society, 
although the Director in an email communication indicated that the medico-psychological professions 
were not really considered to be proper science. 
422 This has been suggested within the legal profession (Robins 2000). Although there are different expcr1 
witness organisations, which is discussed by Pamplin (1997). 
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lawyers of the courts, working in that setting all the time". He believes there is 
only a little space in the middle where they meet, usually at the last minute, in 
the pre-trial conference. JR argued more time in court would make it more real. 
JR's perceptions reflect earlier discussions within this thesis regarding the 
nature of the interaction between law and medico-psychology. 
Educating Legal Personnel 
TB argued education of the legal profession is important, particularly 
barristers, citing reports as a useful tool for providing insights. He believes it is 
a slow process of accumulating psychiatric and psychological knowledge, but 
matters are improving. He argued that in particular increased understanding of 
psychological knowledge, concerned with suggestibility in interviewing for 
example, not just that which is applicable at the sentencing stage, would 
improve the operation of the law. SP suggested that everyone involved in the 
case should be fully educated, "[ e ]ven if it's just, a couple of hours in the 
morning to go through the stuff'. 
Disquiet was expressed at the lack of judicial understanding of mental health 
issues, yet they rule evidence in or out, and direct the jury.423 SP believes 
judges should be up to scratch on diagnoses, especially those applicable to the 
particular case. SP said he would ensure training, and insist on compulsory 
attendance because he is concerned that judges have no real concept of what 
the medico-psychological expert is actually doing. 
"Basically what happens, I think, a judge says we better have a psych opinion because it is the 
expected thing. Then he or she, makes their minds up when we write in saying this person is, 
er, unbalanced by their circumstances and they subjectively decide whether they believe that or 
not". 
SP expressed the opinion that judges need to understand the concepts more 
than solicitors who are just a cog in the wheel. But this overlooks the 
importance of solicitors in terms of involving experts, instructions and tactical 
decisions, especially as so few cases get to trial, which is down to the CPS. 
Educating solicitors may help fulfil the stated desire of experts to be involved 
. h l' 424 In cases muc ear ler. 
423 Note the Judge said the Judicial Studies Board provide some education, but conceded not much. 
424 This was a point also made by the lawyers. 
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It has been discussed that questioning by barristers results in expert evidence 
being presented in a particular light, usually emphasising a particular direction. 
RH argued "for there to be some controls on that, judges need to know a lot 
about it. Because judges, ... need to know where to draw the line".425 To 
demonstrate his point he said that in over 1 000 assessments he has never been 
asked to locate his viewpoint within the psychological field as a whole. 
However, as chapter six showed, the Judge said they rely on the fact there are 
experts on both sides as a safety check. However, as RH argued since the 
Woolf reforms in civil proceedings it is unlikely there will be more than one 
expert, unless the case goes to appeal and a judge authorises an additional 
report.426 RH is questioning the level of trust that can and should be placed on 
experts, especially if, as he believes, law reform will result in greater reliance 
by the courts on expert opinion. 
There is an acknowledgment of the lack of legal understanding of medico-
psychology, which is particularly perturbing with regard to judges in light of 
their significant role in the legal process. 
The Jury 
In terms of the difficulties juries experience in understanding expert evidence, 
SP made a number of suggestions. For example, that they could have a mini-
tutorial on the morning of the case to help them understand concepts more 
clearly, "[0 ]therwise how can they make a decision". He argued that by 
educating the jury through actual case examples, such as the meaning of 
shoplifting in depression, could show that these are diagnoses rather than 
excuses. However, it has to be asked if such a short introduction could be a 
significant help when you consider how legal professionals struggle with years 
of exposure. Yet it would be information that is not simply presented through 
barrister's questions. SP also believes it would help to train psychiatrists to 
explain medical diagnoses simply.427 
4 ~ 5 5 The education of judges and who undertook it was a big issue for RH. who is part of an organisation 
that provides legal training in psychological issues to lawyers. because he has not been able to access 
training provision for judges. 
4c6 See Sowersby (2001) 
427 The Judge suggested the jury would benefit from having a summary of the expert's report. 
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SP argued the consequences of not educating the jury is that they will fall back 
on attitudes and prejudices about mental illnesses. "It's very subjective. So if 
you said to the jury this young man has been diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia, . they've already, they've made their mind up now". He 
maintains that they will either decide that the person is not responsible. or that 
they want to get rid of those sorts of people from the community.428 He 
claimed it is unlikely decisions will be based on any actual knowledge of the 
manifestations of the particular mental illness. For example, schizophrenia is 
seen as split personality by many lay-people. Certainly the lawyers discussed 
factors that may influence the jury as a result of finding the law and the expert 
evidence too complex. SP said it is very hard to educate the public. SP said his 
concerns about improving education arise because cases are so subjectively 
decided, hanging on the views of a range of people, and their reactions to the 
expert evidence presented. SP admitted to being unsure how hard this idea 
would be to implement. This demonstrates SP's concern that prejudice and 
ignorance on the part of the jury could lead to discriminatory decisions. 
Sentencing: Detention - Hospital v. Prison 
Introduction 
It was established in chapter four how important experts are to decisions at the 
sentencing stage and for the management of those with mental health problems. 
As indicated, reports usually provide recommendations as to sentence as well 
as identifying possible defences. However, as always, there is the issue of the 
expert needing to be cognisant with the legal options. For example, JR, an 
experienced forensic psychiatrist, who admittedly has not been involved in an 
insanity case, thought that in homicide cases the individual would not 
necessarily be sent to hospital. But on being told this was the case he pointed 
out that for those confined in hospital eligibility for the initial tribunal hearing 
occurs at six months, with two tribunals possible in the first year. 429 However, 
the political and legal backdrop outlined in chapter one means those with 
serious mental health problems are unlikely to be released for some time. 
m This vicw is supported by Mitchell's studies cited in earlier chapters. 
429 Legal concerns about early release were discussed in chapter six. 
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Detention 
TB said you can see when solicitors want to do best for their clients, and as an 
expert you want to help, but this has to be done in an independent wav, bv 
being honest about whether probation or prison is best, and outlining any 
treatment issues. Again there is the possibility of a tension between the clinical 
role and judgment versus being part of the legal team and meeting legal 
concerns. For example, TB said one time he was able to recommend probation 
because of the level of support available from public services and the family, 
which would enable the defendant to change behaviour patterns. TB stated that, 
"sometimes one's, opinions are important. Sometimes, they're peripheral". For 
instance in one case TB found his recommendation of prison because of the 
defendant's dangerousness were ignored and the judge gave a community 
order. This example contrasts with what one would expect, although it also 
illustrates earlier arguments about the ability of the legal system to ignore 
medico-psychological evidence to secure legal objectives. 
Chapter one highlighted that, notwithstanding this expenence, there IS 
increasing concern with provisions to deal with 'dangerousness'. But an 
evident issue throughout the thesis is the lack of legal clarity in decision-
making around whether detention should be in prison or hospital. Experts 
perceive it is a capricious process. For example SP stated it appears arbitrary in 
many instances, because it is often hard to distinguish between those in special 
hospitals and prison. He remarked "it seems to be very SUbjective on the 
courts", very dependent on the judge who may use reports, but ultimately he is 
unsure how the final decision is made. In his explanations of the different types 
of hospital, SP said special hospitals house "long-term and dangerous people 
who are untreatable and, and a risk to the public", such as a paranoid 
schizophrenic who acts out their delusions. JR pointed out "it's not, inevitable 
that homicide cases go to er, . high secure", the vast majority of those detained 
are in less secure accommodation. However, SP suggested that for detention in 
such a hospital stays are typically 8 to 10 years, incorporating a long 
programme of assessment and treatment. JR claimed about 10 percent of 
individuals in high security hospitals get stuck in the system. 
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Someone initially sent to prison may be subsequently transferred to hospital. 
JR said this occurs if the prison cannot manage the mentally ill or disturbed. JR 
remarked that the medical establishment does not c o n d o n e ~ ~ forgive or p u n i s h ~ ~
but it is not necessarily lucky to be sent there because an order can result in 30 
years on a mental ward. He claimed that he is unsure which is w o r s e ~ ~ prison or 
h o s p i t a l ~ ~ as some people can be quite damaged by the experience of long-term 
special hospitals because it is "a territorial i n s t i t u t i o n ~ ~ every aspect of your life 
is controlled, or m o n i t o r e d ~ ~ or er, . virtual loss o f ~ ~ of individuality ... ". He 
acknowledged the same sort of considerations applied to the prison system but 
hospital is tougher "because people are trained to be looking into your mind all 
the time". There is no escape because everything said and done is s c r u t i n i s e d ~ ~
whereas the prison system tends to leave you alone. JR suggested perhaps the 
outcome is basically the same whichever institution the defendant is sent t o ~ ~
because they are locked away and it is a matter of luck whether anything 
happens while they are locked a w a y ~ ~ and the way it affects them. Thus in 
contrast to common perceptions that hospitals are the easy option this is not the 
view of an expert working in the field. 
Psychopaths 
Again the psychopath presented a conundrum both in terms of legal d e f i n i t i o n s ~ ~
as discussed previously, and as an essential dimension to decisions about 
prison or hospital based on whether or not the condition is considered to be 
treatable. Psychopathy is generally considered u n t r e a t a b l e ~ ~ although TB said it 
is a vitally important to distinguish between A S P D ~ ~ which is treatable, and 
psychopathy which is not. TB said he is not against trying to treat p s y c h o p a t h s ~ ~
but argued the older the individual the tougher the j o b ~ ~ and with the shortage of 
resources it is essential he include this sort of practical advice in the report. His 
view is that "all you finish up doing is making them better psychopaths". SP 
discussed the arguments propounded by Professor Hare about psychopaths 
being untreatable. 
"He reports that there is no treatment, there is no real change, the wiring is all wrong. finish. 
Once you've got them detain them, they're gonna keep doing it. It's just the levels because 
again you can be psychopathic and not, dangerous, in the sense of physical harm". 
JR expressed concern that those with severe personality disorder are frequently 
not offered treatment because of this assumption, whereas untreatable 
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schizophrenics and other mental illnesses receive the benefits of the mental 
health system. In light of earlier debates within this thesis this could be 
attributable to the different moral judgments made of psychopaths and those 
suffering from mental illnesses. 
SP claimed there is research arguing it is possible to work with the other 
personality disorder traits of a psychopath, teaching social awareness in a 
minority of cases. Similarly DT maintained that the other conditions with dual 
diagnosis are treatable, but not the psychopathy, although another remark she 
made cited in the earlier examination of psychopathy in this chapter revealed a 
different stance. But in chapter one it was noted that there are two new special 
hospital units that will research DSPD. SP argued that establishing the units 
was a politically motivated decision, but acknowledged that it offers an 
opportunity to address the issue of treatment. He speculated, "whether we end 
up concluding there that, you know, biologically speaking these people, you 
can't change the blueprint. Or whether we'll end up saying well, you can do 
something". In contrast RH discussed how the proposed new MHA is evidence 
of a move away from treatability to containment. RH speculated that 
approaches to the vignette scenario would be different under the new MHA. He 
argued the trend has to be viewed in conjunction with the DSPD initiatives, 
which illustrate the political and policy trend towards emphasising social order 
and public protection with regard to individuals with mental health problems. 
Release 
DT said that expert court reports should also include information that will be 
useful for release decisions, which will be in addition to a report covering the 
detention period, and a risk assessment. The respondents focused on problems 
on release from hospitals, much as the lawyers did. An example provided by 
JR illustrates very aptly the tensions of dealing with mental health issues and 
retribution. This is a case where the defendant, who established the diminished 
responsibility defence and has been detained in hospital for a depressi ve 
illness, is likely to be released after only three years. He argued this is difficult 
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t t . I t' d 430 o accep III re a IOn to mur er. Yet JR held that the defendant is 100 percent 
normal and questions why the tribunal has not discharged him, whilst 
acknowledging that with this sort of case "they would do their best to look for 
something, that could keep him detained". This reflects examples provided in 
chapter six. 
JR also raised concerns about the lack of support servIces within the 
community following release, an issue also mentioned in chapter six.43 ! JR 
discussed the case of an individual who has served 14 years for major assaults, 
both before and during his detention. JR considered him to be one of the worst 
examples he has known of an unstable and dangerous individual, but 
Broadmoor and the local regional secure units refuse to take him. As a result he 
will be released back into his local village where the community mental health 
team (CMHT) will have to deal with him. JR said the CMHT are aware that 
they will not be able to provide adequate support, and there are concerns that 
he will kill someone to either demonstrate how he feels, or because he is out of 
control. All the agencies, police, health, social services, and probation, are very 
anxious because whilst they will try to share information, there is nothing 
much they can do besides monitor the situation. JR claimed, "the person will 
not cope, in a hostel, with lots of, of criminal, people around them, unstable 
people, around them. They'll do something". JR said the individual in question 
recognises that they cannot cope and are afraid that they will hurt someone. 
This reinforces JR's view that the law is a blunt instrument, as the government 
simply expels a person at the end of their sentence. Furthermore, even if the 
individual expresses concerns to their psychiatrist they cannot necessarily be 
locked up if there are not suitable grounds to do SO.432 He said that he hopes 
that the government's new provisions will result in additional support for such 
cases. JR is involved in a local initiative developing services for those coming 
out of the high security system, who can be neglected and receive inappropriate 
treatment. 
430 In Walton [2003] it was held that the court should not avoid using the MHA prO\isions if there is a 
suitable bed if the condition is treatable by imposing a life sentence, in order to thwart the release of the 
prisoner by the MHRT. . . 
":1\ Clunis [1998] involved a claim ofncgligence against the Health Authonty for Inadequate after-care by 
a defendant with mental health problems who killed on release from hospital. 
m Does this imply the MHA is not adequate to the task? 
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Discussion 
The analysis of the interaction of legal and medico-psychological practitioners 
from the data in this chapter can be dealt with by way of two themes. First 
there is the matter of understanding the substantive aspects between both 
professions, and secondly the nature of the working relationships. The data 
reinforces the arguments made at the end of chapter six on the importance of 
practices and relationships of practitioners for the application of the law, 
despite the lack of a genuine epistemological interaction between the 
disciplines. 
One would not necessarily have expected as in-depth a review of the rules of 
law and its social role from the medico-psychological experts as from the 
lawyers, although in fact there is little to distinguish them. If anything, the 
experts reflected more on the issue of responsibility, which can be attributed to 
the fact that they are required to make a link between the clinical condition and 
the legal criteria on responsibility. When observations were made about the 
current law the evaluation was in terms of the factors the law fails to take into 
account in its examination of decision-making and mental states, from the 
perspective detailed in chapter two. In fact there was a persistent theme on 
educating lawyers that would seem justified in light of the lack of 
understanding identified in chapter six, and the lack of fit between the two 
perspectives. However, the arguments in chapters three and four show that the 
law uses medico-psychological terms and evidence in a very strategic and 
symbolic manner, which was supported by statements in chapter six. The law 
plainly operates flexibly with little understanding of medico-psychology and 
from the remarks in this chapter would have to be more stringent if the 
assessment of the defendant's mental state addressed the matters as outlined in 
chapter one, and the expert actually gave a professional opinion on effects of 
the diagnostic condition on responsibility and the capacity to make moral 
choices, as respondents noted that they considered the law was operating very 
generously. However, despite the reservations the interviewees accept working 
within the system and in fact there was a distinct sense that they gained 
satisfaction from being considered a good expert witness. 
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There was, as with the respondents in chapter six. an overwhelming focus on 
procedural matters and the importance of inter-professional relationships. What 
became apparent from the interviews is that there is a small pool of experts that 
enter into the legal role required of them and they enjoy the professional 
acceptance and legal approbation, although familiarity can also mean that on 
occasion they challenge legal tactics through confidence born of experience. 
However, when this is analysed in the context of the adversarial process it 
means that they serve the interests of the side for which they act by being able 
to present their evidence more adeptly in the witness box. As in chapter six, 
there were repeated references to reliance on tacit knowledge and how to be 
effective tactically, which reflect legal concerns identified in chapter six. The 
latter was particularly evident in relation to key players, especially the judge 
and jury. Thus the experts appear to embrace the legal culture (Grau 1981: 96). 
This reinforces the assertion in chapter six that the formal aspects of the law 
operate through the informal relationships, norms and practices of the court and 
practitioners. Also in previous chapters the point has been made that the law 
could not operate as it does without the co-operation of medico-psychological 
experts. The adversarial process is self-regulating as the court process brings 
together different actors with different roles and aims, although pre-court 
processes are vital to the operation of the diminished responsibility defence for 
the achievement of substantive justice (Feeley 1979: 18-9; 279). Specialised 
functions by each of the different respondents are part of a broader framework 
that acts as a restraint through common goals (Eisenstein & Jacob 1977: 10). 
Thus the nature of the relationships enables the legal system to strive to 
achieve what it considers to be just results, which are arguably locally 
developed value judgments as well as wider evaluation linked to legal norms 
and objectives, and experts do not appear to question the use made of their 
evidence. 
Conclusion 
The discussion by the medico-psychological interviewees primarily 
concentrated on their concerns about their role and particular stages of the legal 
process, rather than the substantive law. Disquiet with the legal process 
focused on their role in relation to key legal personnel and tactical issues rather 
than theoretical matters, as it did with the lawyers. A number of themes 
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emerged, such as the amount of subjectivity introduced into cases through 
personal and professional attitudes and practices by both professions. For 
instance SP said "[i]t's really quite strange, it all hangs on people. And 
subjective views". It would appear the personal characteristics of principal 
actors are important because of previous experience and ingrained bias 
(Eisenstein & Jacob: 1 0). What appears to be important is the flexibility of the 
legal system to determine the preferred outcome and the procedural tactics and 
devices that can be invoked at different stages of the process. The impact of the 
adversarial process on the presentation of expert evidence was discussed, with 
special attention paid to the impact of barrister's questioning techniques. 
Finally, the major suggestions for change centred on the need for more 
education and understanding between the respective professions, in particular 
that lawyers become more cognisant with medico-psychology, rather than 
specific legal changes, except with regard to the legal definition of 
psychopathy. It was also suggested that juries need to receive more education 
on the mental health issues in a case. Yet earlier debates within this thesis show 
that the law does not attempt to adopt the medico-psychological meaning and 
that it operates flexibly without any understanding, as the aim is to secure legal 
objectives and the expert's evidence appears to be a device within the legal 
process. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND MEDICO-
PSYCHOLOGY: CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
This thesis has examined the interaction between law and medico-psychology, 
with their contrasting discourses on the mind, in the context of assessing 
criminal responsibility, as part of the homicide defences of insanity and 
diminished responsibility. The voyage resulted in an unanticipated journey and 
destination. The desire to analyse how effectively the law incorporated medico-
psychological understandings of the mind, especially with the neuroscientific 
revolution, now seems naIve. The initial investigation started with ascertaining 
the pertinent theoretical and philosophical parameters of both disciplines, 
however, subsequent examination of reported cases and the interview evidence 
showed a lack of integration and negotiation between the two discourses. 
Chapters three and four revealed a symbolic use of medico-psychological 
discourse and meanings by the law, whilst the interviews were rarely 
concerned with any of the theoretical concepts grappled with in chapters one 
and two, rather they were pragmatic procedural discussions. Thus the chapter 
focuses on the two themes identified in the introduction. 
The first is the nature and social significance of the interaction between the 
institutions of law and medico-psychology. As identified at the outset of the 
thesis, Foucault's (1980) argument that knowledge constitutes power433 is an 
important point with respect to both disciplines as they each hold dominant 
social positions. The institutions of law and medicine have what Freundlieb 
calls 'primary' relations and their discourses in tum create relationships 
between individuals and particular social contexts, which are held to be 
'secondary' relations (1994: 165). Inherent in the debate is the need to 
recognise the significance of the content of legal and medico-psychological 
discourses for the prevailing organization and contiguity of perceptions within 
society, as institutional and cultural practices create a sense of identity with 
discourses empowering or dis-empowering individuals and groups (Sawicki 
433 See in the context of the arguments raised by Rose at al (1990) 
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1991: 22; 25_6).434 For example, it can be seen through the discussions in this 
thesis that categorizing someone as mad or bad can be employed strategically 
through medical and legal practices.435 In this context the discourses are a 
politically and ideologically important aspect of social relations, which are the 
result of particular historical antecedents, as chapter four described (Jupp & 
Norris 1993: 48-9). Chapters one, three and four highlight shifts in medico-
psychological and legal relations as a result of social changes. Thus definitions 
of individual agency, responsibility and culpability are negotiated within a 
particular framework in each individual case. This project has explored the 
normative value judgments contained within the particular frameworks of 
knowledge and the incumbent discourses and practices. However, not all the 
propositions contained within Foucault's theory outlined in the introduction are 
supported by the research undertaken as part of this thesis. 
Thus the analysis of the interaction of law and medico-psychology focuses on 
law using expert evidence symbolically through a number of controls, which 
supports particular normative, social and policy considerations. This chapter 
reviews those controls through revisiting the three levels of analysis undertaken 
to distil the main conclusions that can be drawn for the application and practice 
of law and the format of reform debates. In addition, the debate is further 
broken down into processes pertinent to the verdict and sentencing stage, as 
these raise distinct issues. 
The second aspect that is considered concerns the nature and implications of 
the practices that have developed in relation to practitioners. This discussion 
explores how the distinct professions negotiate the differences in discourse and 
perspective within the context of these legal cases. Fundamental to this is the 
routine procedural focus of practitioners in the management of cases. 
The Interaction of Law and Medico-Psychology 
General 
This thesis has explored the interests and values embedded in the operation of 
the law through the dialectic perspective. It was argued in chapter one that the 
414 Shilling (1993) illustrates this point with her discussion on power, discourse and the body. 
435 Szasz (1972) eloquently questions the way that psychological theories construct what IS tenned mental 
health and ill health, based on behaviour patterns and social actions rather than physiological factors. 
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legal recognition of the moral derogations from the objective standard of 
criminal responsibility was problematic because of the contradictory language 
and role that this generates as legal language is cognitive and factual (Norrie 
2000: 157; 180). The research has examined these issues and the compromises 
that have developed as a result of the oblique language and legal concerns 
when assessing responsibility given the need to consider public protection and 
social order, particularly because of the potential dangerousness of mentally 
disordered offenders. 
The legal rules representing the moral exceptions to the criminal standard of 
responsibility have to be balanced with the view of the mind implicit in the 
concept of criminal responsibility and legal objectives such as social order and 
public protection, and therefore the rules inherently have a limited legal focus 
and remit, reviewed in chapter one. Consequently, the philosophical and 
normative constraints underpinning the defences dealing with mental states, 
although they include medico-psychological concepts and terms, and require 
expert evidence, preclude a full consideration of matters from any other 
perspective. It transpires from this research that the acknowledgement of 
medico-psychology represents a strategic device, enabling flexibility in the 
operation of the law, with derogations from the theoretical rhetoric obscured. 
Thus whilst on the surface there may appear to be support for Foucault's 
assertions that the disciplinary society is concerned with control through the 
body, the manner in which this is undertaken is not at the expense of legal 
sovereignty. The evidence in the thesis supports Teubner's claim that law is a 
self-referential system. 
As stated previously, the debate needs to distinguish between the legal attitude 
towards medico-psychological evidence at the verdict and sentencing stage. 
The more expansive medico-psychological perspective, such as the complex 
neuroscientific explanations of decision-making are not evaluated in the same 
way when forming part of discussions about risk and punishment, as opposed 
to criminal responsibility. The contradiction exists because acknowledging the 
medico-psychological position at the verdict stage would affect the whole basis 
of criminal responsibility, whereas when the focus is on risk and dangerousness 
the concern is with criminal behaviour and the objectives of social order and 
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public protection. The relationship between the two disciplines reveals the 
importance of the social context to the interpretation and application of this 
form of science, particularly in relation to sentencing and detention decisions. 
A fundamental aspect of the analysis has been consideration of the power of 
the social institutions of law and medico-psychology to assert their particular 
perspective. Significantly, whilst law seems to use medico-psychological 
evidence symbolically, it is not autonomous because it is a social institution , 
but it has a constitutive aspect and appropriates extralegal knowledge 
(Valverde 2003: 6-7; Smart 1996). This research challenges Foucault's claims 
that medical discourse is gaining ascendancy over legal discourse (1980: 106-
7). While the law appears to use medico-psychological categories to resolve 
matters a deeper analysis shows that law utilises medico-psychological terms 
and professionals symbolically, and as a disciplinary power it does not cede 
power to other discourses.436 Teubner's assertion that law is a self-referential 
system seems more apposite because the truth of medical discourse is not 
needed, as the legal interpretation of medico-psychological terms and the lack 
of understanding on the part of legal professionals indicate. Expert evidence 
has to be related to legal criteria concerned with the mind, focusing on the 
effect so the implicit challenge to the legal view of the mind contained in the 
diagnosis and medico-psychological perspective can remain imperceptible. The 
research began by distinguishing the differences in perspectives on the mind 
and throughout the discourses remained parallel rather than intersecting. 
The law's use of knowledge from other disciplines is self-referential, but as 
Valverde states, it is site-specific knowledge (2003: 23). Therefore, claims that 
the law is self-referential are not saying that the law is homogenous; an 
analysis of a different area of law would produce a different picture of the 
constructs, categories, norms and practices. As Smart maintains "the nature of 
the law/medicine debate [varies], in some instances we may see a coalition, in 
others a conflict and we cannot assume a pattern or clear signposts which will 
point us to an inevitable future" (p.430). This thesis presents a snapshot of the 
issues currently prevailing in this particular area of law and the debates reveal 
an association that has developed between mental illness and dangerousness. 
436 See Smith (2000) 
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The fluid nature of law enables it to create from other disciplines and to shape 
the world that it claims it only adjudicates. Valverde states that "[l]egal actors 
and institutions, however, care little about epistemological purity and derive 
great benefit from being epistemologically creative" (p.26). 
The significance of legal and medical discourses for establishing norms and 
categorising individuals and groups in society has been noted. The two diverse 
disciplines are involved in cases that categorise individuals as mad or bad, but 
the legal process has developed a role for medico-psychological discourse, 
adapting it in a manner that is not immediately evident. The linking of law and 
the medico-psychological disciplines normalises and dichotomises (Foucault 
1977), but the medical evidence obscures the social and normative choices that 
underpin legal decisions. Law uses medico-psychological concepts in the 
defences, and evidence of a diagnostic label, to support and legitimise 
decisions to allocate defendants to particular legal categories. The evidence 
shows that language is not neutrally constructed or applied, highlighting the 
social construction of individual legal categories of defendant. What the 
following discussion of the judicial role, inter-professional relationships and 
legal processes does is summarise the key ways in which law both remains 
self-referential and secures legal objectives. The general overview is 
undertaken by reference to the three levels of analysis, providing an insight 
into the formulation of the Homicide Index statistics, and the evidence to 
support the assertion that Foucault's claim that medicine was in ascendance 
over law is erroneous in this context at least. 
Judges as Legis/ative Interpreters 
General 
Initial evidence that law uses medico-psychological evidence symbolically was 
provided through the analysis of the judicial interpretation placed on legislation 
and the scope of the common law rules. This followed on from the outline in 
chapter one of the legal interpretation of mens rea (intent) upholding the legal 
perspective and chapter two illustrating how limited this is in terms of 
understanding the mind and decision-making from a medico-psychological 
perspective. The latter was reinforced in chapter six by RH. a psychologist, the 
only medico-psychological interviewee to refer to mens rea, who challenged 
281 
the law's restrictive view of factors affecting decision-making, providing a 
number of examples of states of mind that can affect choices. 
Chapter three spelt out the judicial interpretations placed on the medico-
psychological terms and concepts within the two defences by means of in-
depth scrutiny of reported case law. Judicial construal of the law takes place in 
the shadow of the legal view of the mind and the overarching objectives and 
norms that pervade the criminal law. A critical factor to emerge was that judges 
receive no training in mental health issues or the mind, yet they have immense 
power to define terms and dictate how the evidence will be included. The 
matter of how up-to-date or out-of-date the law is was alluded to in the 
interviews, with SB suggesting that the law is 10 years behind scientific 
knowledge and public opinion, whereas DW claimed it is a century behind the 
times. Consequently a legal perspective is placed on the medico-psychological 
concepts and terms within the defences, which is not in line with the medico-
psychological viewpoint, with additional constraints imposed on the admission 
of evidence to secure justice in line with pertinent legal objectives concerned 
with social control and public protection. The judiciary acknowledged that 
their interpretations impose a limited legal view of medico-psychological 
concepts. Thus the test to assess the defendant's mental state has a limited 
focus, particularly in insanity, which has a very restricted cognitive focus with 
no volitional element. 
The nature of the interpretations and rules developed to determine if the 
defence tests have been satisfied have important social consequences. Chapters 
three and four identified problems and anomalies that have arisen from 
attempts to ensure a legal perspective pervades the defences. The incongruities 
are not allowed to undermine the operation of the law. The law is able to use 
expert evidence strategically as a result of the legal focus remaining on the 
effect of the condition, so the dissention between the two disciplines on the 
issue of cause is not overtly addressed. The legal concern with evaluating the 
effect of the disorder on cognition, keeps the 'mind' abstract, even though the 
conditions cited implicitly incorporate the medico-psychological perception of 
the mind. This is possible because the diagnostic conditions are being applied 
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to legal tests, for instance the mental responsibili(v of the defendant In 
diminished responsibility. 
Interestingly, the analysis revealed that the flexible operation of the law can 
result in more benevolent decisions than many medico-psychological 
practitioners would sanction from a professional view of the condition 
undermining the defendant's capacity to choose their actions. RH said that he 
knows of defendants who have escaped liability on the basis of cognitive 
impairments who should not, in his opinion, have done so. SP attributed this in 
part to the dichotomous approach of the law that results in comparisons that do 
not involve like with like. The prevailing view amongst the experts was that it 
takes a serious condition for the defendant not to be responsible for their 
actions because most diagnostic conditions do not have an impact on the choice 
of whether or not to kill. On the other hand DW views it as a positive move 
that the law has become less rigid on the conditions it accepts, citing BWS and 
Othello's syndrome as examples. He argued that if the concepts are out of date 
and are restricting the range of conditions that can be considered, then they 
need to be modified to ensure justice is served, because the issue of whether 
the defendant's responsibility is substantially diminished has to be addressed. 
This highlights very aptly the different perspective of the two professions. 
Yet BWS and Othello syndrome are also examples that the current legal 
approach masks the tensions between the two perspectives because they are 
effectively socially and emotionally based conditions not in line with the legal 
view of the mind as they reflect the perspective outlined in chapter two, 
although they seemingly emerged from the law, demonstrating the gap it has 
been possible to develop between rhetoric and practice. Again this is 
achievable because experts are required to make a judgment about the effect the 
condition had on the defendant's mental responsibility; they are addressing 
legal questions and equating their understanding of the mind to legal concepts 
of the mind and responsibility. Moreover, the work of neuroscientists such as 
Damasio, which may improve medico-psychological understanding of the 
mind and decision-making, is likely to pervade clinical practice and diagnostic 
categories, increasing the epistemological gap between the two disciplines. But 
the enhanced understanding could enter court without overtly needing to be 
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acknowledged owing to current practice simply looking at the effect of the 
condition cited. 
Critically, because the law also retains flexible control on the admission of 
evidence through ambivalent rules, determines the questions addressed. and the 
manner in which this is undertaken, there no clear indication as to what will 
succeed. Significantly, the law needs experts who are willing to enter into this 
process. Possibly the fact that neuroscience appears more like hard science 
than perhaps current medico-psychological approaches do, which the Director 
of the Scottish Forensic Institute referred to as 'so far out there' and 'art 
forms', will affect how the findings and opinion of the expert are perceived by 
lawyers, and arguably the jury, if not necessarily making it more easily 
understood. 
Psychopathy and Intoxication 
Further evidence that decisions held to affect a defendant's mental state are not 
decided in a political vacuum are provided by preceding discussions on 
psychopathy and intoxication. Criminal responsibility and moral exceptions are 
not purely philosophical and theoretical matters because of the public policy 
dimensions of the rule of law, in this context public protection and social order. 
Practitioners appreciated this with the discussions in chapter three mirrored in 
chapter six and particularly chapter seven. For example, medico-psychological 
interviewees referred to the inaccurate legislative definitions and legal 
understanding of psychopathy, and the disagreements within their profession 
on the impact psychopathy has on the capacity for choice. In particular, 
exception was taken by medico-psychologists to the legal propensity to equate 
ASPD with psychopathy, which is tied into the association of psychopathy with 
dangerous criminal conduct, with the labels evoking prejudice in judges and 
juries. Crucially as most cases do not go to trial then they are subject CPS 
rather than judicial or jury scrutiny. What seems to be important in legal terms, 
because the issue is one of potential risk, is summed up by the Judge's remark 
that a psychopath may qualify for the defence, but they can still be given a life 
sentence. 
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Similarly with intoxication, JR said that in his experience judges generally 
reject evidence on intoxication for political reasons, reflecting the discussions 
in chapter three. Again, medico-psychological opinion is divided over whether 
alcoholism should be classified as a mental disorder, with allusions to the 
possibility of genetic foundations. Comparable arguments regarding 
compulsion arise with drug addiction, which does not refer to a homogenous 
group as the tenn 'drugs' encompasses opiates to nicotine (Johns 2002; Husak 
1999). These issues highlight the tension between the differing perceptions and 
understanding of the mind most clearly; however, as the law uses medico-
psychological knowledge in a symbolic manner, and social policy factors affect 
the use and interpretation to be applied to medico-psychological discourse to 
secure legal objectives, the position on these conditions is unlikely to change. 
Judges have a crucial role in ensuring this. 
Judges as Trial Arbiters 
The position of the judiciary IS distinctive because m addition to their 
involvement with the development of substantive law they are also 
practitioners through their presence and role in court and the trial. Chapter 
three detailed the substantive legal framework that High Court judges have 
developed and chapter four examined the reasonmg, processes and rules 
affecting the admission of expert evidence, which are adaptable and wide-
ranging. Such ambiguous rules can exist because the legal criteria promote 
evidential flexibility to support the defences to ensure that expert evidence 
does not undennine or overwhelm the operation of the law. There is legal 
scepticism about the validity of evidence that comes into court. It is the 
combination of the two dimensions to the judicial role that facilitates the legal 
resolution of the tensions between the different perspectives inherent in the 
legal and medico-psychological standpoint. 
To illustrate the significance of this aspect of the judicial role one can consider 
the changes to the operation of the provocation defence introduced in the case 
of Smith [2001], outlined in chapter one, which are the result of judicial 
reasoning. The inclusion of the mental characteristics of the defendant for 
consideration with the provocation defence is an illustration of the law 
extending the use of expert evidence, despite the rhetoric about ensuring that 
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expert evidence does not overwhelm the law. Critically there are no mental 
state aspects to the provocation defence so it is a strategic innovation. and, as 
with diminished responsibility, it depends on the willingness of the expert to 
give an opinion on whether they consider there is a link between the alleged 
abnormal mental state of the defendant and particular legal criteria. It has 
introduced a sUbjective element into what was intended as an objective 
defence. Clearly this has not met with universal agreement, as the dissenting 
judgments, subsequent commentaries and the recent Law Commission (2003: 
2004) reports show. Furthermore, the practice of pleading both diminished 
responsibility and provocation has muddied the waters between the two 
defences, illustrating the incoherence that can develop as a result of taking 
legally driven strategic options in cases. Provocation has not had much time to 
develop since Smith. The discussions in chapter one and four show that Smith 
is being applied, but only appeal cases are reported. The Law Commission 
(2004) discussions on the topic suggest how they would like the issues to be 
addressed. 
Thus judges have a special place in the debates because of their hybrid role, 
developing and applying the law. They are a significant part of the backdrop to 
the formulation of cases for trial and the trial process itself. 
Inter-Professional Relationships: How the Incongruities are 
Managed 
Introduction 
The second major aspect of the analysis concerned the role of practitioners in 
applying the discourses and institutional objectives they represent. Chapters six 
and seven show the nature of the involvement of practitioners within the 
framework of interaction already discussed, demonstrating the character of the 
implementation of the legal rules. As stated at the outset of the thesis, a central 
theme throughout Foucault's theories is that the professions are sites for the 
production of knowledge, a major resource of power. Social institutions 
produce webs of meaning and types of knowledge, which result in particular 
practices. The deliberations throughout the research show that there is no 
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seamless synthesis between or within the two heterogeneous professional 
groups under consideration.437 
Interestingly, the complex debates in the early chapters were not evident in the 
interview discussions. The theoretical discussions were concerned with 
ensuring a moral outcome for those who because of their mental state at the 
time of the incident should not be held fully responsible (insanity), or only 
partially responsible (diminished responsibility) in line with the philosophical 
underpinnings of the law. In contrast, the lawyer's discussions of the 
substantive law were approached in terms of legal tactics and pragmatic 
considerations, which varied between prosecution and defence. The clinicians 
did critique the limited remit of the law but were also primarily concerned with 
their role in the context of legal procedures. 
The following overview first reflects on inter-professional understanding and 
relationships in light of the differences between the professions. There are a 
number of important observations about the nature of the professional 
relationships and the lack of inter-professional understanding that further 
illustrate the law is an autopoietic system. Secondly, the summary considers 
how the tensions are negotiated at the critical decision-making stages of the 
legal process. A major factor that is also addressed, which emerged from the 
investigation, was the routine nature of such cases, with the mechanical 
procedures fundamental to overcoming the lack of philosophical and 
theoretical interaction between the disciplines. 
Inter-Professional Understanding 
Perhaps inevitably because the disciplines have very different perceptions of 
the mind and professional concerns, and effectively the medico-psychological 
perspective is excluded from the law, with experts adapting their clinical 
viewpoint to legal criteria on mental states, the interview data revealed 
problems of understanding between the disciplines. Furthermore, again as one 
might expect, lawyers have more problems understanding the medico-
psychological material than vice versa. The legal interviewees said that they 
437 For debates on aspects of the criminal justice system see Reiner (J 994). Sanders & Young (1994) and 
Hester & Eglin (1992) for example. 
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did not really understand the experts' discourse, although continued exposure 
helped. Plainly experts are entering into the legal system and it is expected they 
will be forensic experts, although reference was also made to the importance of 
having access to supportive legal personnel with problems comprehending 
technical legal matters. SB and KR said that they found psychiatrists do not 
have problems, although JM asserted that they do not like the form of 
diminished responsibility and would like it to be reformed. 
This supports the points made in chapters three and four that the law does not 
need to understand the medico-psychological perspective to operate because it 
is using legal definitions of medico-psychological terms, whereas experts need 
some understanding of the law in order to identify which defence they think 
might be feasible in light of their clinical assessment, and to give an opinion on 
the link between their clinical diagnosis and the legal criteria. Having 
examined the importance of the expert's opinion, which is contained in the 
report's conclusions, this explains, in conjunction with the lack of legal 
understanding, the legal respondents' claims that the conclusion is the main 
part of the report. In fact it would seem from the CPS reports that the 
conclusion was the only part that would actually be of use to the courts at the 
trial stage because the preceding parts deal with a vast range of information 
that would not fit into legal considerations at the verdict stage, but would 
perhaps be taken into consideration at the point of sentencing. 
A key theme in both sets of interviews was the capacity to comprehend the 
language of the other discipline.438 Books by the other professions were said to 
be unhelpful because specialist knowledge results in technical jargon affecting 
its accessibility to anyone outside the field.439 However, as preceding 
discussions show, the onus is on the expert to adapt, which was captured by the 
comment of JM, that "any expert worth his salt will do the automatic sort of, 
conversion, into our language ... ". Even the language that the expert might 
expect to understand has a legal interpretation, which was usefully illustrated 
by DT's discussion of psychopathy. Again, established inter-professional 
relationships seemed to offer an opportunity to seek help, and case conferences 
43R The problems of professional jargon affecting communication between the disciplines were very 
evident at the Psychology and Law Edinburgh conference (2003). 
439 This was also considered to be a major issue in relation to the jury. 
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were seen as helpful by both sets of respondents in providing an opportunity 
for each profession to learn from the other, although JR believes that there is a 
lot more they can learn from one another. 
The lack of legal understanding may be explained by the fact that lawyers 
undertake no mental health training and, as shown in previous discussions, 
there is no necessity to understand anything other than the legal meaning of 
medico-psychological terms and the conclusions of reports where the focus is 
on opinions as to the effect of the diagnostic condition. Therefore, even though 
the case process involves a number of legal personnel making critical decisions 
regarding the direction of the case centred on expert involvement and eyidence 
this is not viewed as a problem. The lawyers did not appear concerned about a 
need to understand more of the medico-psychological discourse, although the 
experts did challenge this state of affairs. 
Mental health professionals need to understand the substantive legal rules to 
which they tie their clinical opinion, although the first health professional that 
is likely to be involved is the police surgeon, and they are not qualified mental 
health professionals. As chapter four explained, both medico-psychological 
professions now include forensic modules in their basic training and there are a 
number of expert witness organisations that provide additional training. 
However, most experts in this area have been practising for some time, and 
unless they have chosen to undertake specific training they will not necessarily 
have had any. For example DT, a consultant psychiatrist, admitted that she has 
had no training and has learnt as she has gone along, claiming it had not caused 
any problems. SP advocated more training to improve accuracy and the general 
standard of court reports because the fact that agreement between experts is 
difficult to achieve undermines how reliable they are seen to be. This is 
important in terms of the significance attributed to the perceptions on 
professional standing. There are two aspects to SP's claim: the training would 
be concerned with improving compliance with legal needs; and the lack of 
agreement is seen as reflecting badly on the medico-psychological profession 
when it concerns the requirement that an evaluative judgment is made about 
the fit of a mental disorder to legal criteria on responsibility. Both are 
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concerned with medico-psychological professionals complying 
effectively with legal needs to enhance views of forensic professionals. 
Inter-Professional Relationships 
more 
Another facet of the evidence generated through the research shows how 
practice reinforces the domination of the legal perspective. This is possible it 
seems from the interviews because a small pool of solicitors, barristers, and 
experts are involved in homicide cases within an area. Additionally, the pool of 
judges is restricted because they have to have a special certificate to be able to 
hear murder cases and they also work on particular circuits. The inter-
relationship of the small pool of professionals appeared key to the operation of 
the law. It seems that experience and professional relationships facilitate the 
undertaking of roles despite the divergence in perspective and discourses. 
In light of the problems with comprehending the other disciplinary discourse, 
despite the years of experience, trust was central to the working relationship, 
which appeared to be premised on an evaluation by each discipline of the 
competence of the other in helping them fulfil their role within the legal 
context. For example, lawyers evaluate experts on how tactically advantageous 
their reports usually are and their ability to withstand cross-examination. 
Critically, competence at writing good legal reports and withstanding cross-
examination does not mean that they are competent practitioners. Experts 
assess lawyers on their ability to provide clear instructions and support in 
understanding legal points. Once there is a mutual acceptance then the division 
between the disciplines seems to disappear at a practical level, if not at a 
theoretical one, as the focus becomes one of fulfilling roles and deciding on 
tactics. This focus on procedural routines might help to explain how the 
delicate moral issues are not actively addressed and the professionals avoid the 
problems that could emerge from such distinct perspectives. 
Chapters three and four showed the significance of the co-operation of the 
expert in the role that they fulfil. However, whilst experts used on a regular 
basis are at least likely to be familiar with the legal system and its 
requirements, this can be seen to have its advantages and disadvantages. For 
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example, in tenns of clinical judgments and opinion on where the line should 
be drawn on mental states excusing from responsibility. in all likelihood using 
the same set of experts leads to particular views and approaches prevailing. 
which may be those that suit legal ends, but it could be problematic if the 
expert uses radical or outmoded theories.44o Similarly. the admission of new 
fonns of evidence, such as that generated by the field of neuroscience is 
dependent on the practitioners operating in the area. But the lack of legal 
understanding of clinical matters means that the expert's claims cannot be 
cogently evaluated. The Judge stated that, as a result of having experts on both 
sides, if a theory is extreme the expert on the other side would highlight this. 
This will not be the case where there is a joint expert, as in civil cases, and 
therefore this may be a reason not to adopt this practice in the criminal law 
context, particularly as so few cases are publicly scrutinised in the case of 
diminished responsibility. But it has already been suggested that there is little 
investigation into the basis of the medico-psychological theory underpinning 
their opinions. The scope for sUbjectivity in applying clinical judgments to the 
legal criteria, as a result of experience, is likely to be infonned by what is 
legally acceptable. This may explain why experts, such as DT, claim they are 
comfortable fonning an opinion on the substantial impairment of the 
defendant's mental responsibility in line with legal objectives. The interviews 
show that expert opinion does vary and therefore the selection of experts could 
also be infonned by the ability to appreciate and support the social and 
nonnative perspective inherent in the legal frame of reference. 
There is also the matter of the impact of experience on the expert's procedural 
competence, which will be valued by the legal side that they act for. The 
expert's duty is to the court, not the side they are acting for, but they are 
familiar with the lawyers, and value being recognised as a competent forensic 
expert, so they are going to give their best for their side. The Judge remarked 
that the fact it is lucrative work means experts do the best they can for their 
side. Involvement in case conferences might also foster the feeling of being a 
team player. Value is placed on the expert's ability to perform in the witness 
box, and chapter four reviewed issues arising from the adyersarial mode of 
440 The recent controversy over Professor Meadows' evidence on cot deaths is evidence of the problems 
that can arise (Burrell & Murray 2003; James 2003; Mahendra 2002; Robins 2000). 
291 
questioning, which can be ameliorated by experienced experts. For instance DT 
considers that appearing in court is a form of gamesmanship, and both she and 
RH provide examples of ways in which they know how to handle the court 
process, furthering the cause of the side they are acting for by providing less 
opportunity for the other side to discredit their version. Thus experienced 
experts are affecting the sceptical testing of the veracity of their evidence, 
although it could also be argued that they are perhaps conveying more coherent 
or comprehensive information to the jury. 
Correspondingly there are competing interests and different ethical 
considerations between the professions inherent in their roles within the 
adversarial process. So, for example, the barrister is considered good if they 
control the evidence entering into court for both their own side and in respect 
of the expert on the other side. On the other hand experts discussed the 
importance of appearing credible and comprehensible to the jury, with SP 
specifically stating how important it was that the jury really understand the 
impact of the condition so that they make an informed decision. 
Experts in the interviews gave the impression that they like being involved in 
legal cases, citing it as interesting and important. A central aspect of job 
satisfaction was being accepted by the legal profession and taking part in a 
serious aspect of the legal process. For example, DT highlighted how she had 
progressed to doing homicide cases and during the transition had become 
irritated by being required to deal with less serious cases. Experts also judged 
their importance by being in a position where they only have to work with their 
preference in lawyers. Interestingly, there is little reference to their role in 
relation to defendants, the ethics of such cases or the ethical issues regarding 
the use of their evidence; rather they focused on how they and their 
professional evidence are treated within the legal context. Perhaps this is 
exacerbated by the adversarial emphasis on winning. An interesting matter 
might be to consider if using a new expert locally affects the dynamics of local 
practice, or whether their continued involvement is affected by their ability to 
provide what the legal system requires. 
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The Legal Process 
Introduction 
An interesting factor to emerge from the data chapters was an overwhelming 
focus on procedural routines and tactics by both sets of professionals. The 
responses to the vignette show that within this there is the opportunity for 
subjectivity through the interpretation of events, with the possibility of 
discretion in decision-making at a number of junctures, but it would seem that 
this is informed by tacit knowledge gained through experience as part of a 
small group of practitioners undertaking such work, in large part based on what 
legal category the case invokes and the processes that this sets in motion. 
With regard to the legal role importance is placed on tactical considerations 
informed by whether they act for the prosecution or defence. The defence 
discussed issues in terms of the impact the law, or possible changes, might 
have in tactical terms for the defendant. The prosecution's view, as 
representatives of the state, is suffused with scepticism towards the defendant, 
centred on the belief that someone in such a serious position will cast around 
for excuses and they need to resist any undermining of overarching legal, 
public interest, objectives. Alternatively, the medico-psychological respondents 
were focused on clinical matters, although there was considerable discussion of 
the role required in relation to the substantive legal rules and the adversarial 
process. The data relate to arguments raised in chapters three and four 
regarding legal control, both in terms of the difference in meanings attributed 
to medico-psychological matters covered by the defences, and the legal devices 
for controlling the admission of expert evidence. 
The next section briefly evaluates the practical features of the legal process 
where the two professions interact and how the tensions resulting from the 
inconsistency between the two professional perspectives are accommodated. It 
identifies the different junctures at which legal ascendancy is secured. In light 
of the small number of insanity cases, the key aspects of which have been 
discussed in chapters one and three, so the focus will be primarily on the 
operation of the diminished responsibility defence, particularly as this was the 
only defence the interviewees had dealt with and many of the procedural issues 
are applicable to both defences. 
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Pre-Court Issues 
The Police Station 
The first time that the mental state of the defendant will be considered is at the 
police station. Policemen are the first point of contact for defendants yet, as GF 
said, they have no mental health training and rely on the defence solicitor, 
although only the police can request the police surgeon. Crucially, the police 
surgeon is not a mental health specialist. The criminal lawyers, such as KR, 
said they have no training in identifying mental health issues. He thought that 
practising mental health law may help, although in light of the arguments in 
this thesis this is debatable. Reference was made to the importance of 
experience and tacit knowledge when decisions were made about whether the 
defendant required the involvement of a mental health professional. SB said 
that making decisions at the police station was the most stressful aspect of a 
case because of the lack of the structure that accompanies the rest of the case 
process. 
There is a clear lack of procedures to ensure that the defendant is adequately 
assessed, with the emphasis on the police interview. Bartlett and Sandland note 
that there are some local initiatives to improve the detection of mental illness at 
the initial stages but they are not government-led and are affected by limited 
resources (2003: 238-9). Leading counsel in the Privy Council case of Smalling 
(2001) made the argument for routine examinations when defendants are 
awaiting trial on grave capital charges and the judicial response was that it may 
be desirable but they could not tell the sovereign state how to deploy its human 
and material resources. Following this stage solicitors, and subsequently 
possibly counsel, instruct the experts in what to address in the assessment and 
reports, which preceding arguments show is centred on legal concerns rather 
than mental health matters. 
Assessment 
Again the emphasis is on the expert meeting legal requirements, although the 
interview discussions on assessment showed that the distinct perceptions 
within the two professions about the role and perspective of the other 
profession within the process, reflect tensions in the attitudes held about the 
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approach and viewpoint of the other profession. For example, experts 
expressed concern about the fact that there is often a considerable delav 
between the index offence and their being contacted to assess the state of an 
individual's mind at the time of the incident. KR conceded that it is difficult for 
experts to project back in time. Whilst lawyers consider the expert takes an 
uncritical stance to the defendant's infonnation. 
Crucially, the assessment is based on instructions from solicitors and the 
interviews showed that solicitors think in defence or prosecution tenns when 
they fonnulate them. Furthennore, it could only be legally oriented because 
lawyers have no mental health training, the defence is about legally conceived 
mental health issues, and it is the expert's conclusions in respect of legal 
criteria that is the vital element. Experts, such as SP, said that often solicitors 
give more than an inkling of what they want. DT also said that counsel's 
advice and knowing who the barrister is helps to show what the lawyers want. 
Therefore, whilst the expert will appraise the defendant's story in tenns of their 
clinical training, from the outset their involvement is also directed towards 
legal issues, which will inevitably be affected by which side they are acting for 
and perhaps by their inter-professional relationship with the lawyers involved. 
The Judge claimed that some psychiatrists are more willing than others to say 
that there is diminished responsibility, which is supported by evidence in 
previous chapters that has shown the scope and importance of individual 
subjectivity. Does this become an important factor in which a particular legal 
side favours specific experts? There is also evidence that implies that experts 
become team players, but the experts themselves intimated that, while they are 
aware of the lawyers wanting to achieve a particular outcome, they also want to 
keep their professional integrity. DT said it was essential that she could stand 
by her claims and an important aspect of this was how she considered the jury 
would react to what she is saying. It seems there is a distinction between the 
more objective clinical diagnosis and the subjective judgment of the fit 
between that and the legal criteria, which could be influenced by any number 
of factors. 
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Chapter four appraised the differences between the clinical and forensic 
medico-psychological role, noting the different ethical considerations that 
accompany diagnosis and treatment opinions. However, only the psychologist 
LC discussed idiosyncratic aspects of the forensic assessment. For instance, she 
remarked on the lack of confidentiality regarding the information, where for 
example a defendant has denied guilt to the police but admits guilt to the 
clinician, which enters into court through the report unless the solicitor chooses 
not to use it. Yet the defendant's view of their relationship with the medical 
and legal profession is likely to differ, based on experience of the different 
roles, but the clinician is part of the legal process on this occasion. LC believes 
it is important for clinicians to remember this and to ensure that the individual 
being assessed is advised in advance about the limits of confidentiality. 
The other interesting point LC made concerned the possible influence of 
professionals on the defendant's story. She asserted that it could have been 
affected by repeated exposure to legal personnel such as the police and 
solicitors, and their framing of the questions and event. Indeed, the story will 
be placed into a legal framework because the incident has to be categorised, 
just as the expert's discourse has to be framed in particular legal concepts and 
deal with specific legal criteria. Likewise, if the defendant is a recidivist they 
may be well versed in what to say to optimise the system: it may not just be 
lawyers who use tactics, as the prosecution suspects. LC also suggested that 
previous therapeutic interventions could result in the defendant's story 
becoming laced with jargon and theories. Even the initial expert assessment 
could have an impact on subsequent defence and prosecution reports. So each 
profession has a way of categorising individuals, which will influence the 
questions asked because tacit experience will guide initial judgments and this 
will frame subsequent interventions. Chapter two discussed the potential 
importance of concepts for an individual's perception of self. 
Legal scepticism towards expert evidence has been noted throughout the thesis. 
So, although reports are tactically important for lawyers their judgment of them 
is underpinned by a sceptical view of the assessment process, particularly on 
the part of the prosecution whose viewpoint inherently suspects the defendant 
is duping everyone. The legal interviews indicated an assumption that experts 
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take what the defendant says at face value because this is the nature of the 
doctor-patient relationship, and therefore they overlook matters such as the fact 
that there is a victim and the defendant has an agenda. This is even mentioned 
in the Law Commission (LC) report on partial defences (2003: 135). The Judge 
claimed that a dispassionate approach is required, which not every psychiatrist 
has. An example given by JR, a very senior psychiatrist actually confirmed this 
lack of cynicism towards the defendant. Additionally, it was suggested that 
experts are likely to be more involved because they are dealing with a person 
rather than paperwork, although this was not the impression the interviews 
gave. However, DW noted the claims that lawyers are perhaps too detached, 
but asserted that some cases are so heinous it is necessary. What this scepticism 
seems to provide is another potential legal tool to invalidate expert evidence 
that is not in line with particular legal objectives. For example, the defence do 
not have to disclose reports that are not favourable to the defendant and as AC 
revealed the prosecution can reject expert reports on the basis of public 
interest. 
But apart from the one comment by JR all the medico-psychological responses, 
including others by JR, suggested that they adopt a rigorous approach to 
assessing the defendant, which did not support the legal perspective. There was 
frequent reference to checking what the defendant says against the information 
in the depositions, which are read prior to seeing the defendant. However, there 
is an issue about how much the experts understand the content of the 
depositions because as AC, a prosecutor stated, they are not meant for experts 
and he does not expect them to review the files in the way that he himself does. 
Based on limited experience gained in this research, homicide case files are 
extensive. 
An issue that was not addressed and which seems important in the context of 
the central theme in the thesis is the possibility that the case files influence the 
expert's perceptions making them less independent, at least in terms of moral 
evaluations of the defendant and victim. Reviewing the abstract theoretical 
debates generated a detachment that was punctured on seeing the CPS case 
files. Therefore one might suspect that such matters could influence the 
expert's assessment of the applicability of possible defences to the defendant. 
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As it was, however, both sets of interviewees demonstrated an objective, 
pragmatic approach to the issues, with little sense of the moral and ethical 
issues involved in such cases. 
Critically, experts are adapting their clinical expertise to legal instructions, 
rules and roles, which calls into question their independence from the legal 
system. Diagnosis has to be linked to the defendant's mental state at the time of 
the index offence, which may have taken place a considerable time before the 
assessment takes place. Also the clinician is required to consider if it is 
possible to link their assessment to the legal rules for the defence, primarily, of 
diminished responsibility. Likewise, their decisions about appropriate 
treatment options inform judicial decisions on detention. There is an 
acceptance of this role by experienced experts and satisfaction in being a 
valued part of the legal team, without any reflection on the manner in which 
their evidence is used. Similarly, while legal scepticism is evident and provides 
a basis for challenge, it would seem that when professional relationships have 
been forged this is less likely to happen because the expert is a valued member 
of the team tactically. 
Reports 
The reports are clearly an important evidential tool. LC maintained that reports 
have changed little over the years except that they are now more likely to 
include referencing. RH believes the references are a way of assessing the 
competence of an expert, although based on the findings in this study this is 
only likely to be possible between experts, which can be conveyed to the legal 
practitioners. Providing substantiation on the format of reports as part of this 
research was hampered by the fact there was no obvious way to identify 
pertinent case files. It has been noted that lawyers are concerned with the 
effects a condition has, not the causes encompassed by the condition, and the 
expert's opinion on whether the defendant's mental responsibility was 
substantially diminished. Legal interviewees admitted that they struggled to 
understand reports but it would seem that it is unnecessary to understand how 
the expert arrived at their conclusions. It is unclear if lawyers go through the 
report and verify if there are any discrepancies between the content and the 
depositions, but this seems unlikely in view of the following remarks. Prisons 
298 
also provide a report while the defendant is on remand but none were eyident 
in the two CPS case files. 
Lawyers, such as the Judge and AC, remarked on how difficult it must be to 
decide the issue of choice and whether something constitutes a substantial 
impairment. Medico-psychological interviewees' responses indicated that it is 
necessary to follow the statute. Also, experience helps the expert to know what 
conditions the court will accept, evident in TB' s comment that he was unsure 
where to draw the line until he discovered that adjustment disorder, the most 
general personality disorder, had qualified for the defence. But deciding if a 
condition has had a substantial impact seems to be a matter of gut instinct 
based on personal and professional judgment, both of which are affected by 
working within the legal system. In terms of linking the condition to legal 
criteria, Dell found that conditions were classified with reference to different 
aetiologies, which is possibly attributable to their not being based on medico-
psychological categories (1984: 39). In addition, some reports did not 
necessarily identify which aetiology substantiates the claim that there is an 
abnormality of the mind. Chapter three shows that the courts have subsequently 
provided more definition on interpreting the aetiologies (Mackay 1999: 120) 
but this is still a legal perspective. The forensic psychiatrists in Mitchell's 
study asserted that they were not concerned with the defendant's moral or legal 
responsibility, but focused on the mental illness and personality disorder (1997: 
631). This can be seen to avoid the moral choices and ethical implications that 
follow on from their evidence, although this must be difficult when required to 
gIve an OpInIOn. 
Peay found in her study of the application of mental health law by practitioners 
that they relied on conceptual perceptions of what law "did or ought to permit 
them to do" rather than being concerned with the detail of legislation (2003: 
164). Certainly, the CPS reports viewed for this study did not contain 
rigorously substantiated recommendations, although none of them supported a 
plea of diminished responsibility to enable further comments. Mitchell's (1997) 
study found that the basis to the claims that the diminished responsibility 
defence was applicable were limited. This may be because clinicians are being 
asked to link defined clinical categories to legal criteria about mental states that 
299 
are nothing more than legal terminology, not specific states of mind. The tenn 
mental responsibility and substantially diminished are oblique tenns referring 
to the mental state of the defendant, and addressing the matter of choice, 
allowing flexibility. SP suggested more training in writing reports, and the La \\' 
Society and expert witness associations also provide recommendations. If. as 
seems to be the case, the law permits reports that do not insist on the strict legal 
requirements then experts are unlikely to change, which permits flexibility and 
subjectivity on both sides. The legal framework, practices and the inter-
professional relationships that develop mediate this. 
The responses to the vignette effectively illustrate the difference in the legal 
and medico-psychological perspectives. The experts, as one might expect from 
previous statements, took a much more stringent view of the defendant's 
mental state impacting on his responsibility for his actions than the lawyers. 
The differing perspectives point up the diverse concerns of the two professions 
and the fact that the law is undertaking a symbolic evaluation of the 
defendant's mind whereas the medico-psychologists are viewing it from a 
technical professional standpoint. This can result in the law being more 
benevolent than medico-psychologists would be, based on the interviews, and 
case reports. Chapter two shows that the medico-psychological view of the 
mind does not deny free will and the discussions on psychopathy in chapter 
three indicate that the capacity for choice is not considered to be impaired 
easily. However, for a condition to be accepted, it must have been proposed by 
at least one expert. It would seem that adopting a more accurate appraisal of 
the defendant based on medico-psychological understanding would remove 
legal control and that is the issue rather than the fundamental challenge to legal 
philosophy. 
Tactically there are a number of issues that arise with regard to the report, 
which appear unaffected by the lack of legal comprehension of the content. For 
example, on the basis of the recommendations of the report the defence need to 
advise their client and the defendant needs to instruct their solicitor. But it 
would seem from the discussions that the report is a tool. For instance. the 
defence have to decide whether or not to divulge the report, depending on 
whether it is favourable to their client. Barristers ensure that the report 
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addresses all the legal questions in a comprehensible manner because it fonns 
part of the tactical evidence. This is potentially problematic if they cannot 
understand the report but essentially the conclusion is the basis for decision-
making, even though it seems this is not always comprehensive. Barristers also 
need to formulate questions to highlight the weaknesses in the report produced 
by the other side, which requires help from their own expert. Furthennore. the 
expert's report is fundamental to decisions about accepting a diminished 
responsibility plea by the CPS to avoid a trial. Knowing the experts and 
trusting them, and therefore their conclusions, is likely to be an important 
aspect of this process, although the nebulous nature of the assertions provides 
considerable flexibility to ensure that legal objectives prevail. 
Trial or Accept the Plea 
The CPS decides if they are going to accept a plea of diminished responsibility 
or go to trial, making them gate-keepers of the operation of the defence. This 
decision is significant in a number of ways. The CPS decide that the case will 
not go to trial if the experts on both sides agree and they see no public interest 
in taking the case to trial. The decision-makers are therefore different 
depending on whether or not the case goes to trial, and if the option not to 
proceed to trial is exercised then the assessment of the expert evidence takes a 
discreet form (Feeley 1979: 27-33). The interview data from AC and 1M shows 
that the decision-making process is founded on the tacit knowledge and 
experience underpinning the prosecution perspective. What this means is that 
the conditions qualifying for the diminished responsibility defence rarely enter 
the public domain, and are therefore not subject to the judicial and public 
examination discussed in chapters three and four. This illustrates the 
importance of legal practitioners and experts, rather than judges and the jury. 
although case law forms the backdrop to decisions, which again highlights the 
importance of inter-professional relationships. Critically, those making the 
decisions are legal personnel representing state interests, and they haye no 
mental health training. Significantly, this process enhances the opportunity for 
the legal system to operate to secure moral outcomes in indiyidual cases, as 
judged ultimately by the local CPS, because it ensures legal control and 
removes the jury, who are an unknown element, from the process. It also 
reduces the role of judges in most cases, and may give rise to results they do 
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not favour, as discussed in chapter three. This alternative also fulfils the legal 
need for efficiency as trials are time consuming and costly. Thus while justice 
is associated with due process in fact much is dependent on plea-bargaining 
(Feeley: 33). 
The recurring argument that the securing of particular policies is obscured 
through legal practice is supported by the recent LC report on partial defences 
that states that the diminished responsibility subsection has 
"provided a practically convenient method for the prosecution, defence and the court, by 
agreement, to dispose of cases where nobody would wish to see the imposition of a mandatory 
life sentence. This has been achieved by a sometimes strained and sympathetic approach to the 
medical evidence and the language of the statute" (p.13). 
The Butler report also made an analogous point (para. 19.5). Similarly, in 
support of the assertion that resolving matters without going to trial is the 
preferred option, JM noted that if the experts do not agree then they are 
encouraged by the legal teams to have a meeting and see if they can produce a 
joint report. Thus, although the reports are not rigorously placing 
recommendations and opinion within a framework that links the diagnosis and 
legal criteria, and medico-psychological interviewees claim that the law should 
be more stringent about the conditions that qualify as affecting the defendant's 
responsibility, experts must be producing reports that lawyers can use flexibly 
to accept the plea of diminished responsibility. This may be attributable in 
large part to the inter-professional relationships that develop as a result of a 
small pool of people undertaking such work, experts being essentially team 
players as has been implied in previous deliberations. 
Court Issues 
Judges 
It has been noted how important the judiciary are to the development of the law 
and the impact of expert evidence. The medico-psychological interviewees' 
observations about judges were in terms of their significance to their evidence. 
For example, experts such as SP, JR and RH cited instances illustrating how 
the judge's personal and professional attitudes affect their view of theories and 
evidence, how testimony is listened to, and recorded, which informs 
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subsequent judgements. SP attributed prejudices to lack of education. RH 
stated that experts see their role as one of giving advice, and sometimes the 
court listens too little, or too much. However, there appeared to be a lot of 
respect for many judges and it was felt that repeated exposure to the experts' 
evidence has an impact unless the judge's viewpoint is entrenched. 
Nonetheless, the lawyers SB and KR, and medico-psychological respondents 
LC, TB and JR supported claims in chapters three and four referring to the fact 
that judges can avoid following expert evidence if they want to secure legal 
objectives. Correspondingly, the Judge remarked that judicial views differ on 
experts giving an opinion on the ultimate issue. 
In terms of testing the veracity of the expert the Judge said that he had never 
known an expert's qualifications to be questioned, but the matter of whether 
they have strayed from their area of expertise might arise. Also he did say that 
there can be problems ensuring that psychologists are appropriately qualified, 
and that he did not really understand psychology. This affirmed earlier 
concerns about judges understanding medico-psychology, and their preference 
for psychiatrists. The problem with relying on titles, which is a social indicator 
of seniority within a profession, is that it does not necessarily indicate 
competence, as was aptly illustrated by LC's example about a professor. The 
Judge admitted that there is a lack of judicial training in these matters but this 
was not considered to be a problem because the onus is on the competent 
expert to explain matters, and the jury make the final decision. There are a 
number of points that can be made about this assumption. First, the court is 
reliant on whom each side has instructed. Secondly, it cannot be overlooked 
that there are opportunities to control the admission of expert evidence. 
Thirdly, there is no need to understand the expert evidence for the fulfilment of 
the judicial role or for the law to operate. Finally, there is reference to the fact 
that ultimately responsibility lies with the jury, which appears to be a way in 
which all the professionals at some point relinquished responsibility. 
Barristers 
The importance of barristers and the questions they ask to the presentation of 
expert evidence was acknowledged by both sets of interviewees. For example. 
DT and RH discuss the fact that when a barrister does not understand enough 
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about the content of reports to effectively identify discrepancies he will not be 
able to discredit the report produced by the other side. It has already been 
established that frequently there is no understanding and JM and the Judge 
stated that barristers rely on their own expert in pre-court discussions and 
during the case to identify potential weaknesses. Therefore, professional 
relationships are important for this aspect of the adversarial process, as legal 
personnel are not conversant enough with medico-psychological theory to 
adequately attack its veracity. In a sense it is expert against expert, with 
lawyers controlling the process in which it occurs. There was also the assertion 
that experienced experts learn to deal with barristers' styles of questioning, 
which confirms the importance of the expert's capacity in this respect for the 
side that they act for. However, the law adopts a dichotomous approach and JR 
remarks on the way in which there is a focus on trying to obtain admissions as 
to whether something is or it is not, whereas medico-psychologists work on a 
spectrum or continuum basis using probabilities. These points give an 
indication as to why clinical competence is not that important, but being able to 
address the legal criteria and work within legal tactical constraints is. 
In chapter four it was stated that although the adversarial process is divisive 
there is essentially a professional identity that unites experts. However, what 
was evident in a number of the interviews was that psychiatry and psychology 
were critical of one another. This centred on occasions where their evidence 
had been seen as more credible than that of the expert acting for the other side 
who was from the alternative medico-psychological profession. So there is a 
division engendered amongst experts by the adversarial process, but their 
personal professional standing, as noted earlier, was clearly the most important 
matter at stake. 
The Jury 
Endeavouring to make sure the jury could understand the evidence was 
important to both professions. AC claimed it was necessary to ensure that 
juries understand that they have an important role, although there were 
concerns about the capacity of the jury to undertake the task. There appear to 
be two issues, jury comprehension and the impact of legal practices on the 
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jury's role. Again the manner in which legal discourses and control prevails is 
a central theme. 
Jury Comprehension 
With regard to understanding the law it was evident from the interviews that 
the legal concepts and normative standards were not automatically addressed, 
remaining implicit, with concern focusing on procedural processes pertinent to 
a case. The process itself is seen as ensuring that the issues are dealt with. This 
impression was supported by remarks by KR. Determining the mens rea of the 
defendant is in theory the critical issue in court, yet KR states that judges and 
barristers tend to speak in a code about mens rea and act on a gut feeling about 
whether the evidence constitutes diminished responsibility. He claims that the 
matter is not overtly discussed because tacit knowledge and gut instinct are 
critical aspects of the legal process. So, despite the concerns of JM and the 
Judge with technical requirements for directing the jury, there is support for the 
idea that professionals find it hard to appreciate what needs explaining, let 
alone how they do it, to professionals from other disciplines, or the layperson 
in the jury. Therefore, judicial directions will be given but the issues they are 
referring to may not have been obvious within the case. In addition, KR and 
AC note how difficult legal language is, with DW saying that judges tend to 
forget they have not got twelve law students before them, and therefore they 
should use 'noddy' language. The Judge and barrister both claimed the practice 
of pleading diminished responsibility and provocation together makes it even 
more difficult for the jury because each defence has a different onus and 
burden of proof, and addresses different matters.441 An additional burden is the 
requirement that the jury evaluate the defendant's behaviour against the 
reasonable man who has the same abnormal mental disorder when they have in 
all probability no experience of such a mental state. 
In terms of the expert's evidence, the legal perception ofSB and KR was that it 
is important the jury understand the expert's conclusions. However, the Judge 
expressed concern that good witnesses will have the jury believing everything 
they say, as barristers select those that are "doughty fighters", although this is 
what barristers will want from their respective experts. Furthermore, the legal 
441 See the recent LC report on partial defences (2003). 
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respondents asserted that unless experts provide an opinion on the ultimate 
issue it is a difficult link to make between the diagnostic condition and the 
legal standard on responsibility by the judge in their directions, and ultimately 
by the jury. So there is an acknowledgment that no one really understands the 
expert's evidence and having the expert's opinion ameliorates that. Moreover, 
there is a tension set up by the adversarial process and within the roles in the 
legal process whereby the focus is frequently on the experts' evidence, which 
is exacerbated by the use of expert opinion, despite frequent reference to 
ensuring it does not overwhelm the law. 
Medico-psychologists placed great emphasis on the importance of simplifying 
their evidence for the layperson in the jury, but they are not trained to do so. 
They claimed to keep the language simple and not use jargon, particularly as it 
was considered that many of the jury would not be very bright. However, the 
fact that educated professionals of long standing cannot understand technical 
factors from another discipline after repeated exposure does imply that 
intelligence is not necessarily a determining factor. There is also the question 
of whether it is possible for them to know how a layperson would react to their 
evidence so they can ensure their arguments are likely to be considered 
feasible. It would seem this level of professional objectivity might be hard to 
attain, although experience of such cases perhaps informs judgments. RH 
raised concerns about distinguishing between fact and opinion. It was also 
noted how important the judge is with regard to the jury, both for explaining 
matters through judges' directions, and if the opportunity to explain evidence is 
truncated through judicial intervention. The Judge stated that it helps if you 
simplify the evidence and put some of it in writing, and perhaps provide charts. 
He also suggests a summary of the expert's report. This is arguably helpful, but 
it could also be seen as another layer of legal control and interpretation. 
In light of the discussion so far there is always the matter of how much of the 
evidence that the jury hear is actually understood by them because they are 
having to juxtapose scientific truths, legal rules, and expectations around what 
constitutes the reasonable man. The jury have not had the benefit of 
professional training or previous exposure, which professionals inyolyed in the 
cases have, and even they, with the benefit of experience. admit to struggling 
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with the other profession's discourses. Also references were made to the 
limited intelligence of many jurors. As a result there is speculation about what 
other factors juries might take into account if they cannot comprehend the 
technical aspects of the case, as chapter six shows, and the possible impact 
prejudices against mental illness may have, discussed in chapter seven. 
Examples reflected some of the factors outlined in chapter four. Moreover, the 
Judge expressed concern that the cases are often emotional. Therefore, the 
legal respondents' recognition that the jury really struggle with the complexity 
of the legal and expert evidence, which is exacerbated by the linking of 
diminished responsibility and provocation, may be another factor that 
encourages the trend not to go to trial. However, control appears to remain with 
the legal system, whichever option is selected, with the validity of decisions 
being ostensibly supported by expert opinion either way. 
Jury Role 
It was frequently iterated that the jury are the ultimate arbiters, in what 
appeared to be a disclaimer in relation to practices by both professions for 
responsibility for the outcome of the case. The jury are given the role of 
conscience for the legal system and society, yet preceding chapters have shown 
that in practice they only fulfil this role in a small number of cases. Moreover, 
even those cases that do go before a jury are conducted in a manner that 
potentially undermines the jury's role. Technically the jury are required to 
decide the ultimate issue, as to whether the defendant's mental responsibility is 
substantially diminished. However they now hear the expert's opinion on the 
matter and are expected to decide in line with that opinion except in a limited 
number of circumstances described in chapter three. 
Yet an expert's opinion is a value judgment not a clinical one. For example, 
DT stated that her opinion is based on gut instinct, and SP noted that accuracy 
is not always forthcoming in professional judgments. It has already been 
discussed that the expert is focusing on legal definitions of terms and legal 
criteria. Furthermore, as the 1975 Butler Report noted, mental re.\ponsibility is 
not a term that is found in any other statute and it may be a moral or legal 
concept but it is not a clinical fact (1975: para. 19.5), although the Judge sa\\' it 
as a medical matter. The Butler report expressed concern that this implies the 
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ability to conform to the law can be measured, and went on to state that it 
cannot be measured scientifically, it is a matter for the jury. The extension of 
the expert's role to the provocation defence includes the expert giving an 
opinion so it is likely that the observations already made will apply to that 
defence as well. Respondents in this study accepted that they are expected to 
give their opinion, but were not necessarily happy about doing so. For example 
JR stated that he had argued with a judge on being asked to give his opinion, 
indicating that this was not his role as it was a matter for the jury, but the judge 
overruled the argument and required his opinion. JR expressed concern about 
the practice, stating that his role is not one of convicting the defendant. He 
recognizes, as did the Judge, that if an expert is plausible then the jury are 
likely to take what is said seriously, and thus experts are effectively being 
drawn into convicting people, which he suggested experts need to be cautious 
about. 
In light of the evidence to date it can be argued that experts are already viewing 
matters in line with legal requirements, so there is a measure of influence over 
the formulation of their opinions that is unlikely to be achieved in respect of 
the jury, which is why the development of the practice of experts giving an 
opinion is legally expedient. It can be seen that the jury's role has in many 
ways been usurped and they seem to serve a notional role, with references to 
their symbolic role masking the reality of the decision-making process. 
Inter-Professional Relationships, Local Values and The Routine 
Nature of Cases 
A major observation that emerged from analysing the interaction of the two 
professions through the interview data was the confirmation of earlier 
depictions that the law emasculates the medico-psychological view of the 
mind, and as a result expert evidence plays a symbolic role, helping to secure 
legal objectives. Thus the particular operation of the law obtained through 
formal legal control of the interpretation of the defences and the formulation of 
rules on the admission of evidence, is further supported by the inter-
professional relationships that develop. 
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However, it also has to be said that the theoretical and practitioners' 
discussions seem a long way apart, although the judiciary provide a link 
between the two debates. What was evident after conducting the three levels of 
analysis was the routine nature of the processing of cases, which is in stark 
contrast to the complex underpinnings to the rule of law (Silbey 1981: 22-4). It 
would appear that procedural routines mean that delicate moral issues do not 
need to be actively addressed, so professionals can avoid the inherent 
incongruities. The appraisal shows how little the tensions matter to 
practitioners overall, as the interviewees identified numerous contradictions 
between the two perspectives with little evident consternation. For example, 
there was no real concern on the part of lawyers about potential problems in 
ensuring justice arising from their lack of understanding of the experts' 
evidence. Similarly the experts did not express concern about the use that was 
made of their evidence, except for JR's reservations on the impact of giving an 
opinion on the ultimate issue. It would appear that the fact that only a small 
pool of people are involved in such cases results in particular responses 
becoming the norm in an area (Eisentein & Jacob 1977). 
It is asserted that it is difficult for professionals to step outside the matrices of 
their professional discourses (Foucault 1978: 95-7; Hollis 1994; Freundlieb 
1994: 162; 168; 174-7; Hunt & Wickham 1994: 28). The discussions in 
chapters six and seven show, along with the review contained in this chapter, 
show that the formal aspects of the law where these two distinct professions 
have to work together operate effectively through a system of infonnal 
relationships, norms and customs amongst practitioners (Church 1982: 398). 
The fact that a small pool of legal and medico-psychological professionals are 
involved in this type of work appears to develop a cohesion in the nonnative 
understanding of the application of the law, facilitating the current practices 
described in this thesis where expert testimony is an evidential tool (Church: 
401). Therefore, while the experts reveal that they do have a different 
perspective on matters their adherence to the requirements of the law, and 
concern with procedures and acceptance by the legal profession all enable the 
process to exist as it does (Grau 1981). For example, as diminished 
responsibility is primarily dealt with through accepting the plea it is possible 
that a common perception of the justice of the case based on evaluations of the 
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defendant develop within the professional work group (Hester & Eglin 1992: 
220-22). 
The focus was on professional perfonnance rather than the ethical issues 
arising from the use of the evidence in relation to assessing a defendant' s 
criminal responsibility. In fact there was little reference in any of the 
interviews to the difficult issues pertaining to this area of law: instead 
considerable attention was paid to what is required to fulfil their respectiYe 
roles within the routine procedures, because gaining professional approbation 
was deemed important. Inter-professional acceptance is also important, which 
appears to be based on evaluations of the competence of the individual from a 
professional perspective. The specialist subjectivity on the issues remains, 
which was apparent in the ambivalence about the veracity of the other 
discipline'S perspective in the interviews. 
There is also the importance of the tacit practices of individuals, and how they 
make active choices and present a version of events that removes the ambiguity 
and contradictory elements, and the importance of the way that the story is 
constructed (Taylor & White 2000: 11; Dingwall et al 2000). This reflects 
Luhmann's psychic autopoiesis (King & Piper 1995: 25-28). Consequently, 
subjectivity is introduced by the actions of individual practitioners. From a 
legal perspective this is negotiated within the framework of legal discourses, 
objectives and the adaptable legal procedures that have developed in relation to 
the defences, supported by lawyers' processes of selecting experts. In medico-
psychological tenns SUbjectivity is possible because of the spectrum nature of 
diagnostic categories being applied to obliquely defined legal mental states. 
Teubner maintained that the law is impervious to common sense and practical 
reasomng. 
However, there is the impact of the jury to consider. and whilst the ways in 
which jury decisions are restricted have been examined in this thesis the 
possible ways in which the jury can undermine legal control have also been 
identified, the Sutcliffe (1981) case being cited by a number of legal 
respondents as an example of the latter. 
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Although the sample of practitioners was not vast it pro\"ided the opportunity to 
examine how the theoretical and philosophical matters discussed in chapters 
one and two were managed. It has shown that it is important to assess 
procedural practices because of their significance in giving effect to the law, 
and because changes that can have important ramifications can occur without 
any overt declaration, or changes that are introduced can be undermined by 
practitioners' normative culture. Plainly there is the possibility for discretion as 
judgments are made about the merits of the case by both professions, but a 
consistency is clearly provided by the focus on procedural issues, which 
overlooks the philosophical and moral difficulties such cases present. 
Moreover, there is support for the assertion that law is a self-referential system, 
discussed further below, as it provides a structured framework that uses 
discourses from medico-psychology but translates it into legal meanings, which 
influences discretion and subjectivity. 
Sentencing 
The other aspect of cases where the interaction of institutional discourses has 
significant social and policy issues underpinning the categorization of 
individuals, and subsequent interventions is the sentencing stage. As chapter 
one shows, sentencing options often have profound ramifications for the 
operation of the defences, with debates on the mandatory sentence for murder 
and insanity being obvious examples. The insanity defence is rarely used in 
homicide cases because of the sentence, particularly as the diminished 
responsibility defence is available. However, people that may qualify for an 
acquittal on grounds of insanity are instead choosing to use what is only a 
partial defence, as they plead guilty to manslaughter, but at least with this there 
is discretionary sentencing, although severe sentences can be, and are imposed. 
It is perhaps in this respect that Foucault's theories on the significance of 
categorisation have the most pertinence. Chapters one and four explored the 
increasing range of provisions to secure the detention of those held to be 
dangerous and the medico-psychological involvement in this process. As with 
the assessment of responsibility, it is legal concerns that structure the debates, 
and legal control is maintained, with the judiciary once more central to the 
development of the operation of the law. In fact inter-professional relationships 
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are not as overtly significant, although it is the same small pool of experts 
providing the reports. Particular to the sentencing decisions, analysed in 
preceding chapters, are issues concerning judicial judgments as to whether to 
detain the defendant in prison or hospital. Mustill asserts that there is a 
discretionary use of the utilitarian principles of punishment, with judges 
developing personal tacit hierarchies, which are tested by the mentally 
disordered offender because of the added features of the judges' desire to be 
humane balanced with concerns about dangerousness (1998: 72). Experts are 
an integral part of the sentencing decision and it was noted in chapter four that 
the expert's role is seen as less problematic at the sentencing stage because it is 
concerned with matters of risk, dangerousness and public protection, whereas 
the verdict stage is about assessments of criminal culpability. 
Both sets of professionals had strong views on this aspect of the legal process 
and remarked on how arbitrary and subjective the courts are. For example, SP 
said that he has trouble distinguishing between those in prison and special 
hospitals, with so much depending on the judge, who mayor may not make use 
of expert reports.442 SB asserted that if the judge wants to secure an alternative 
to the one suggested by the expert then they will try and find a way. It would 
seem that both sets of interviewees feel that poor choices are made, although 
JR speculated on whether there is a lot difference either way because special 
hospitals are not necessarily the most benign institutions. 
However, as noted elsewhere, psychopaths present a particular challenge and 
the interview data indicates that neither hospitals nor prisons welcome them 
because they are difficult to manage. The interviewees' responses reflected 
their respective professional perspectives, with the legal focus on the 
provisions developed to enable law to evaluate matters in light of social issues, 
while the medico-psychologists adopted a technical view of the condition. For 
example, JM reflected legal concerns raised in chapter three about treatability 
and having to take into account public attitudes towards the condition. 
Alternatively, medico-psychological respondents referred to the law not really 
understanding the condition sufficiently to enable it to make infonned 
decisions, although JR did acknowledge the political aspects to incarceration 
442 See also Slovenko (1999) 
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decisions. He stated that the overarching responsibilities of the law to maintain 
its legitimacy and support social order and public protection objectives are 
important influences on the exercise of judicial discretion. 
Integral to the detention discussions were the potential consequences when 
individuals are released. Focus centred on the potential risk of those whose 
behaviour is controlled by taking regular medication. The topic evoked 
remarks about the problems of making accurate predictions of risk and having 
suitable provisions for those that are released, because of the need to achieve a 
balance between public protection and the individual's right to freedom. The 
Judge said that he finds reports most useful when making release decisions 
because of the issue of dangerousness. The DSPD provisions discussed in 
chapter one have introduced additional options but both sets of respondents 
expressed concerns about inadequate services in the community. Medico-
psychological professions are plainly integral to debates on risk and 
dangerousness, and research into explanations and treatment options, as 
discussed in chapter four. As such their role straddles civil and criminal 
interventions, with mental health law permitting intervention in the interests of 
others. It will be interesting to see how the DSPD options operate. 
The issue that stands out from the debates on this topic, which both sets of 
interviewees found difficult, is the association that exists between mental 
disorder, dangerousness and risk. As chapter three showed, research into these 
issues is resulting in an association between traits and criminal behaviour. 
ASPD describes behaviour that is proscribed by law, and this is usually the 
legal understanding of psychopathy. Therefore there are different ethical 
consequences to medico-psychological involvement in this aspect of the legal 
process to those associated with assessments of criminal responsibility. Whilst 
evaluating an individual's criminal responsibility is important, the significance 
at this stage is the possibility for interventionist measures to be introduced in 
respect of wider groups within society, because research on mental states is 
being linked to issues of risk and dangerousness, such as with the measures 
regarding DSPD. As chapters three and four discussed language is not neutral 
and there are significant implications for individuals in being labelled a risk 
and dangerous. 
313 
Yet as chapter two and three revealed, this is an area where the nature of 
behaviour can perhaps be revealed through the collaborative endeavours of the 
different forms of medico-psychologists coalescing around the neuroscientific 
endeavours (Adolphs 2003). There is increasing collaboration between 
disciplines under the neuroscientific banner as centres emerge within 
universities such as Cambridge and Nottingham, for example. making it 
increasingly difficult to ignore. However, this thesis highlights the importance 
of the social construction placed on this information within the context of legal 
debates on social order. 
Reform 
Introduction 
Chapter one exposed the nature of legal reform debates, many of which ha\'e 
been regularly revisited without changes subsequently being introduced.443 A 
meticulous examination of the reform proposals outlined in chapter one in light 
of the observations made throughout the thesis is not possible because of the 
limitations imposed on the length of this work, but a few general observations 
can be made. It appears that there are two matters that need to be addressed 
with regard to reform, reflecting the two principle strands to emerge from the 
thesis. The first relates to the dominance of the legal perspective resulting in 
the symbolic use of medico-psychological evidence, and the second to the 
necessity of reform debates to take into account the application of law by 
practi ti oners. 
Interaction between Law and Medico-Psychology 
The investigation into the interaction between the discourses in the cases under 
scrutiny resulted in evidence of the manner in which the law uses medico-
psychological testimony in a symbolic way. Therefore reform discussions 
about a more accurate use of medico-psychological terminology are specious if 
the current approach continues. In addition, it is important to distinguish 
between the use of experts and their explanations of the mind at the stage 
where the defendant's criminal responsibility is assessed, from their 
involvement in providing explanations to help with assessing risk and 
443 The law of murder is to be revisited in 2005 
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dangerousness at the sentencing stage. As chapter four discussed, involvement 
of experts in the former is more contentious whereas the latter is seen as more 
beneficial because of legal and social concerns about what to do with those 
who represent a danger to the public and social order. The latest proposals 
around dangerousness and detention support long-standing beliefs that law and 
psychiatry should be working together to deal with violence (Stone 1984: 152). 
The law is dichotomous so the defendant has to be allocated to a category, mad 
or bad. The issues which law examines centre on whether the action was 
voluntary and intended, which is a hard standard to apply, hence the 
diminished responsibility defence as recognition of the need for a moral 
derogation from the objective standard of responsibility in some circumstances. 
However, if the legal question in reform discussions remains focused on the 
effect of the clinical condition then law will retain all the flexible practices that 
have developed and it will remain a social rather than scientific question. 
Therefore, suggestions to change words or develop more accurate definitions, 
for instance with psychopathy, will not alter matters if legal meanings continue 
to be attributed to medico-psychological concepts and terms, and procedures 
stay the same. Although this is not to say that language is not important, as 
discussed in chapter three, the words 'abnormality' and 'disorder' have 
different connotations, which could perhaps change perceptions and 
approaches to the individuals and issues (Peay 2003: 166). So the question is 
whether the law should be reconceived, as the current pragmatic approach 
leads to anomalies, although it is debatable whether there can possibly be a 
system that is universally just when dealing with moral situations. 
Carson suggests that there should be increased co-operation, with each 
profession being critically reflexive and considering what should happen in 
practice rather than aiming for perfect tests about distinctions (2000: 37). It 
seems that the latter currently occurs, without the overarching critical 
reflection. This research suggests it is necessary to take account of the norms 
that develop at a local level through the small pool of practitioners that work on 
these cases within each area. In a sense the thesis does present a bleak picture, 
as it is hard to see an intersection of law and medico-psychology developing. 
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Essentially the law wants to avoid expert evidence overwhelming the law and 
to ensure that legal considerations prevail. As it is, as the Law Commission 
acknowledge, the law actually operates more benignly than would be 
anticipated by its strict interpretation, but the flexibility is permitted through 
legal criteria and procedures that enable discretion to be applied in pursuance 
of legal objectives and evaluations of morality. Certainly the medico-
psychological interviewees in this study and Mitchell's would not excuse as 
many as the law currently does, because, as chapter two established, there is a 
belief in free will and from a full appreciation of how the mind works it is clear 
that it takes a lot to interfere with that. Clearly there are experts who are 
fulfilling the role required and providing opinions to suit the law, although 
contested cases show that there is no universal agreement within the medico-
psychological profession, which was acknowledged by respondents. In part this 
can be explained by the fact that diagnosis is based on a spectrum approach, 
and it is being applied to legal criteria on the mind, so it is not surprising that 
there are differences of opinion. Arguably these issues are affected by the inter-
professional relationships. There is therefore, as a result of current practices, a 
lack of fidelity to 'the law', which would result in harsher judgments in 
diminished responsibility (Feeley 1979; 292). The flexibility is dependent on 
practices that develop within procedural constraints however. Whilst in chapter 
three it was stated that there are attempts to operate insanity generously, the 
operation of the defence is affected by the lack of plasticity in the sentence in 
homicide cases. 
It would seem from the deliberations in this thesis that without a 
comprehensive appreciation of the issues the suggestions by Carson (2000), 
Faigman (1999: 56), Stone (1984: 152) and the medico-psychologists in this 
study for greater co-operation between law and medico-psychology can be 
called into question. It seems necessary to consider the ways in which the 
medico-psychological discourse is used symbolically and why training for 
lawyers has been deemed unnecessary to date, even though mental health 
matters are currently being defined and dealt with by those selfsame 
individuals. Perhaps it is feared that training would cloud legal thinking. 
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Theory v. Practitioners 
The differences in perspective between legal and medico-psychological 
understanding of the mind depicted in chapters one and two show the 
theoretical, normative and moral conundrums that accompany decisions on 
how and where to draw the line on criminal responsibility if there are questions 
about the defendant's mental state. However, the application of the resulting 
legal provisions through judicial common law interpretations, and the 
procedural practices of the judiciary, barristers, solicitors and experts working 
within the legislative and common law framework are equally important. 
While the discourse of the professionals in part reflects the tensions identified 
in earlier debates the most outstanding factor is the routine nature of the roles 
as the focus is primarily on procedural and tactical concerns. Thus, as a result 
of the examination of the nature of the interaction of law and medico-
psychology within this thesis it would seem that reform debates need to 
evaluate theoretical and legislative issues, common law interpretation, 
procedural factors, and inter-professional practices. 
In support of the argument for such a comprehensive analysis to reform 
debates, it can be seen that theoretical debates focus on such factors as whether 
or not to acknowledge connections between character and action (Lacey 1988: 
74), or whether insanity should be a status or excuse defence (Mason et al 
1999: 534), while practitioners focus on procedures that can result in practices 
that undermine the legal principles informing the law.444 For example, 
practitioners made little of the legal meaning attributed to mental health terms, 
or that diminished responsibility is concerned with mental responsibility. While 
examining professional practice it is possible to lose sight of the moral debates 
the thesis started with, yet this is the way that the theoretical and moral issues 
are managed. Chapters three, four, six and seven identified how particular 
conceptual frameworks and practices sustain the legal perspective intact 
despite the involvement of the field of medico-psychology. 
It seems that there is strong support for the argument that current practice 
ensures legal control by providing flexibility through illusions, which perhaps 
444 This would fit with the neuroscientific arguments raised in chapter two, which take a more 
comprehensive approach to cognitive functions. 
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explains why the extensive reform proposals are not implemented. It would 
seem that modifications to procedures, such as sentencing options are more 
likely to have a profound impact. For example, because of the detention 
consequences with the insanity defence in homicide cases defendants who 
could perhaps receive an acquittal plead guilty to manslaughter by reason of 
diminished responsibility. Nonetheless, King and Piper have argued that 
reforms have little impact on the manner in which courts and lawyers conduct 
their business (1995: 10), which is an argument for reform debates including an 
appreciation of practices. Similarly, if tensions exist between the substantive 
and procedural considerations, the informal norms, expectations and 
procedures will affect the implementation of reforms because the formal 
aspects operate through them (Church 1982: 395-8; Silbey 1981: 22). Whilst 
judges are not neutral in the construction of the form of law and medico-
psychological involvement, the current operation of the diminished 
responsibility defence, and the compromise of medico-psychological discourse, 
could not occur without the local legal culture, and its acceptance by experts. 
The inter-professional relationship that exists between the small pool of 
professionals appears to result in shared norms and attitudinal similarities for 
the law to work so effectively (ibid.: 401-3; Grau 1981: 96). However, the local 
practices take place within the broader legal framework and despite the fact it 
can be seen that the law is operating in a benevolent manner in some respects, 
there plainly are fewer cases of diminished responsibility as well as insanity 
over the last ten years. This trend can be viewed in conjunction with increasing 
concern with dangerousness and risk, with the DSPD provisions providing an 
example of a shift towards criminalisation rather than medicalisation (Bartlett 
& Sandland 2003: 237). 
Perhaps what this thesis offers is a possibility to re-conceptualise the reform 
debate by showing the necessity to consider this area of law, and arguably 
others from the three dimensions covered. Courts regulate force and provide , 
authoritative compulsory remedies, and what has been described is the style, 
the form of adjudication that has developed in respect of this aspect of the rule 
oflaw, which is concerned with social order and public protection (Silbey: 22). 
In addition, the organised network of relationships working within the broader 
legal framework is also a critical consideration, with the personal 
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characteristics of the principal actors fonning a nonnative set of practices to 
deal with the issues (Eisenstein & Jacob 1977: 10; 30-7: 287). The judge 
occupies a unique position as developer of the law and as a practitioner. 
However, as a practitioner it would appear that the judge does not have 
complete influence, as there is a mutual dependence with the stability of 
practices, which emerged from the interviews, although the judge did 
ultimately have the potential to exercise extensive power. The fact that 
practices are not necessarily considered would account for AC's remark about 
legislation resulting in changes that are incomprehensible to practitioners and 
difficult to apply (ibid.: 307-8; Feeley: 279-80; 292). Therefore, if account is 
not taken of the attitudes and practices of those applying the law then reforms 
may be absorbed with little change in procedure because of the flexibility built 
into current practices. 
Dialectics Revisited 
The dialectic perspective is concerned with the explication of the interests and 
values embedded in the operation of the law. In particular it was argued in 
chapter one that the legal recognition of the moral derogations from the 
objective standard of criminal responsibility was problematic because of the 
contradictory language and role that this generates as legal language is 
cognitive and factual (Norrie 2000: 157; 180). This thesis has examined these 
issues and the compromises that have developed as a result of the oblique 
language and legal concerns when assessing responsibility, given the need to 
consider public protection and social order, particularly because of the 
potential dangerousness of mentally disordered offenders. The pragmatic 
operation of the law has been described, showing the symbolic use of the law 
and the practical approach of practitioners to resolving the difficulties in 
applying the law. 
The fact that the legal system is a social institution supporting particular 
nonnative standards and objectives is obscured, but the analysis throughout 
this thesis has tried to examine political and moral influences on the 
interpretation and implementation of the substantive law in this area. The 
particular legal cognitive focus on individual responsibility ignores the political 
and policy aspects underpinning the law. As a result the defendant's social 
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context, which forms a backdrop to an individual's development and their 
decision-making processes, can be overlooked. This is possible because 
attention is on the effect of the mental disorder rather than the causes it 
incorporates, ensuring the biopsychosocial perspective of medico-psychology 
is overlooked. As a result, conditions that are premised on social factors, such 
as BWS, have been accepted but the lack of overt discussion of clinical 
conditions avoids the contradictions becoming explicit, allowing the law to 
achieve in an ad hoc manner moral outcomes that are not in line with the stated 
legal position. Similarly, it is argued in this thesis, this practice is also likely to 
mean that the increasing infusion within clinical diagnostic categories of state-
of-the-art knowledge on the mind that will further contradict the legal position 
will remain unexamined. 
Chapter two highlighted that the construction of identity is a complex matter 
that requires consideration of a wide range of factors that are biological and 
social, and also asserted that the concepts available for developing a narrative 
to explain experience are important. The linking of mental disorders with 
criminal behaviour represents a significant association for those being 
categorised, although Hacking (1999) claims that individuals are not simply 
passive and a process of bio-Iooping occurs as people respond to the label 
attached. But the use of language, diagnostic conditions and the defences are 
important modes of classification. Different ethical considerations arise for 
experts depending on whether they are acting as part of the process of 
identifying conditions that affect determinations of criminal responsibility, or 
developing theories of risk and dangerousness that engender an association 
between mental disorders and criminal behaviour. 
Furthermore, the individual orientation on the defendant within cases obscures 
the associations between mental health, risk and dangerousness that pervade 
the evaluation of the defendant and their moral status, as the sentencing stage is 
integrally linked to the views on the appropriate verdict. Lawyers and experts 
referred to this in the interviews and, in fact, it is implicit in the structure of the 
defence of diminished responsibility. The provisions to deal with those held to 
be dangerous are expanding whereas the number of insanity and diminished 
responsibility cases has declined over the last decade. It would appear that the 
:no 
defences are legal devices that do not need to reflect medico-psychological 
understanding of the mind, but this has resulted in an ad hoc application of the 
law that is the subject of regular law commission reviews because of 
reservations about current practice. 
There is greater involvement between law and medico-psychology over issues 
of detention centred on matters of risk and dangerousness. However, because 
the debates on risk and dangerousness focus on behaviour that is legally 
prohibited, there is an increasing involvement of the medico-psychological 
profession in explanations of criminal behaviour. The focus has extended to 
breaches of norms rather than simply the law, as the linking of risk and 
dangerousness pervades both civil and criminal debates. This buttresses 
Foucault's argument that medical discourse, the 'truths' developed on 
normality and abnormality, obscure the social norms being supported by 
practices as the power is exercised invisibly (1977: 94-101; 187: 273-7; 298). 
Thus the subject is constituted through the relations of power (ibid: 1980: 133: 
198-9), and the manner in which this is achieved within this context has been 
examined at length through this research project. What this thesis demonstrates 
is the lack of support for Foucault's claim for the ascendancy of medicine over 
law in the disciplinary society, or the more inter-relational propositions of Hunt 
and Wickham, or Hacking, as the evidence supports the assertion that the law 
operates in an autopoietic manner, appropriating the medico-psychological 
evidence to secure particular legal objectives. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the main issues arising from the three dimensions to 
the interaction of law and medico-psychology in respect of the defences of 
insanity and diminished responsibility. The two main findings of this thesis are, 
first, that the law appears to operate without having to actually incorporate the 
medico-psychological perspective; the interaction stays symbolic in support of 
achieving legal objectives in cases. The legal interpretation of medico-
psychological terms and concepts means the expert has to apply clinical 
judgments to legal criteria, and procedures have developed to provide a 
flexibility that enables the inclusion or exclusion of expert evidence on a wide 
variety of 'legal' grounds. This challenges Foucaulfs assertion that as part of 
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the disciplinary society medical discourse would prevail over legal discourse. 
However, there is support for his idea that the medical rhetoric on normaility 
and abnormality helps obscure the social norms being supported. Secondly, the 
analysis of the interaction through the three dimensions showed that the 
conceptual and procedural considerations are difficult to reconcile and yet there 
is arguably a need to appreciate their interaction more fully if the law is to be 
more cohesive and less pragmatic. Whilst the practitioners did not discuss 
many of the theoretical issues raised in academic debates, clearly practice is 
having an effect on how particular values are being upheld. Furthermore, the 
application and operation of the law falls to a small pool of people within an 
area who are involved in these cases. SP says "[i]t's really quite strange, it all 
hangs on people. And subjective views". 
Crucially, practitioners, through focusing on procedural factors, were able to 
overlook the patent differences between the two disciplines and the conceptual 
and moral dimensions of these cases. Although both personal and professional 
perspectives inform the decision-making of professionals the evidence is that 
the procedural legal framework governs to a large extent the exercise of 
subjectivity as the adversarial process creates a tactical focus. Therefore, each 
profession undertakes their role adhering to their own objectives, although 
experts plainly have to be aware of the requirements of the legal system. 
Fundamental differences in perspective were acknowledged at times, for 
example the dissimilar understanding of psychopathy, but primarily the focus 
for professionals was on procedures and tactics, and professional acceptance, 
the wider implications inherent in cases remaining essentially unexplored. 
Fundamentally the law remains self-referential. 
Although there are only a limited number of respondents in this study the 
findings indicate that an exploration of the application of the law is a necessary 
part of the theoretical academic discussions if a full appreciation of the legal 
position is to be obtained. Whether the self-referential nature of law can be 
addressed is unclear, but being aware of the processes provides a starting point 
for reflection. Possible future research directions following up on matters 
raised in this thesis include detailed reviews of reform proposals using this 
three dimensional level of analysis in order to develop a comprehensive 
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consideration of whether matters would alter if the current practices remain 
unchanged; evaluating possibilities for a less symbolic role for expert evidence; 
conducting interviews with both professions in additional areas to verify the 
idea that the small pool of people working on homicide cases in an area has a 
significant impact; and evaluations of more expert reports to examine the 
manner in which links are, or are not made.445 In light of the importance of the 
subject-matter such research would appear to be both necessary and 
worthwhile. 
d I to further research opportunities. 
445 It would seem a system for identifying cases needs to. eve op fAt 1004 
Mackay (2004) has obtained access as part of the Law CommIssIon report 0 ugus - . 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix One 
Vignette 
Defendant 
The a c c ~ s e d d M ~ l c o l m m Dudley is aged 40 and described by those who know him 
a ~ ~ a socIall,Y ~ I t ~ d r a w n n i n d i v i d ~ a l l who when drinking is argumentatiyc and 
vIOlent, whIch IS III contrast to hIS normal quiet taciturn manner. Malcolm does 
not appear !O have any close friends, male or female, seeming only to have 
passed the tIme of day with his work colleagues. 
Employment 
Prior to his arrest he worked at a factory packing medical supplies, where 
r e c ~ n t l y y temporary workers such as Malcolm had been put on a three-day week. 
ThIS was known to have made Malcolm resentful and concerned about money. 
Malcolm has only been in his current employment for about 12 months having 
had a n ~ m b ~ r r of jobs prior to this. The reason provided for this tendency to 
change Jobs IS that Malcolm becomes convinced that he is being treated worse 
than the other workers are by his bosses. In addition he believes that it is 
because his fellow workers deliberately spread malicious rumours that affects 
how the bosses perceive him. He does not appear to trust anyone. 
Living Circumstances 
At the time of the incident Malcolm lived with Sharon and had done so for 9 
months. Prior to that he had lived at home with his parents where his leisure 
time was taken up with his obsession with World War Two (WWII). His 
mother behaved as if she was an invalid although there was no specific 
diagnosis and would only leave the house if Malcolm or his father took her out 
for a country drive. She secretly drank with Malcolm colluding in this by 
supplying the alcohol. Malcolm's father, who is ex-army, is a strict and harsh 
disciplinarian who only related on a personal level with Malcolm through the 
WWII interest. The only time that Malcolm was not a placid and conforming 
son was when he drank alcohol with his mother and then he was very 
aggressive towards his father, although Malcolm did not always recollect that 
he had had an outburst. Malcolm's mum died 15 months ago and he continued 
to live with his father for a further six months until he moved in with Sharon. 
Malcolm met Sharon through work because she is a cook in the factory canteen. 
Their relationship was a surprise and source of speculation from the outset 
because they seemed so different. Sharon is 35 years old with a 17-year-old 
daughter Lucy. Sharon's marriage had ended in divorce as a result of her cx-
husbands violence some 10 years prior to her living with t-.lalcolm. Sharon had 
not been put onto a 3-day week and Malcolm was u n h a p ~ y y that she was 
currently the primary earner in the household. Lucy. Sharon s daughter. .had 
been seeing the deceased J.D., for about 3-4 months. !'1alcolm, who dislIked 
Sharon being at all friendly towards other men, had, pnor to the fatal lllcident, 
begun to repeatedly accuse her of flirting and encouraging J.D .. These 
accusations were particularly virulent when Malcolm was drinking. Lucy thinks 
there may also have been physical violence towards her mother, in addition to 
the vitriolic verbal arguments, during the last month. 
Incident 
On the night in question Malcolm, Sharon, Lucy and J.D. had been at the pub 
having a meal to celebrate Sharon's birthday. They had all consumed alcohol 
and therefore Malcolm had become outgoing rather than withdrawn. After 
finishing the meal a number of the pub regulars had joined them at the table to 
sing Happy Birthday to Sharon. At the end of the singing J.D. gave Sharon a 
birthday kiss and on seeing this Malcolm grabbed his steak knife and stabbed 
J.D .. He then calmly seized Sharon by the wrist and apparently unaware of the 
ensuing mayhem he says, "let's go home or we will miss that program on 
WWII at 10 p.m.". He then left the pub still grasping Sharon's wrist tightly and 
started walking home oblivious to her protestations and distress. Just as they get 
home a police car pulls up and as the police officers confront him Malcolm 
seems to become aware of the state Sharon is in and looks confused. He reacts 
in a bewildered manner when officers push him against the police vehicle and 
handcuff him. The officers reported that he asked them why they were doing 
this to him and that he also asked Sharon why she was so upset after having had 
such a lovely birthday meal. When Malcolm was told that he had fatally 
stabbed J.D. he denied any knowledge of the event. 
Appendix Two 
Dear 
I am c u : r ~ ~ t l y y undertaking a PhD project centred on the mental facet of legal 
responsIbIlIty. Consequently I am analysing the legal concept of mens rea in 
homicide cases, narrowing the focus by exploring the operation and scope of 
the defences of insanity and diminished responsibility. The project considers an 
area of law that the Law Commission concedes needs reforming and with the 
current proliferation of pertinent scientific research it is a critical juncture for 
evaluating this important legal and scientific area. Whilst it would be possible 
to investigate these matters through academic publications alone I think that 
the validity of the project would be enhanced by obtaining input from the 
practitioners involved in such cases. Thus I would like to interview defence 
and prosecution lawyers, forensic psychologists and psychiatrists. A vignette 
would be supplied in advance, which would form the focus of the interview, 
thereby facilitating discussion of significant principles and procedures. To this 
end I am inquiring if you would be prepared to make an important contribution 
to a review of these issues by agreeing to be interviewed. I appreciate that your 
time is valuable but I hope that you will feel that it is worth helping with this 
project. 
I have an undergraduate and postgraduate degree in law from Warwick 
University, followed by a number of year's experience as a lecturer in law at 
Leicester University. In addition I have an MSc in psychotherapy, with some 
experience of practising as a therapist. I chose to undertake the PhD, based at 
Nottingham University, because I wanted to explore the different approaches 
and perspectives adopted towards the individual and their mental state evident 
in the legal and medico-psychological fields. In recognition of the significance 
of the issues dealt with in the project in 2001 I was awarded a three year 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Grant to support my research 
endeavours. The Institute for the Study of Genetics, Biorisks and Society 
supports such a multidisciplinary PhD because it brings together aca,demics 
from a range of disciplines. My supervisors are Professor Robert Dmgwall 
(Sociology), Dr Peter Bartlett (Law) and Dr Ellen Townsend (Psychology). 
The significance of the project is that it i ~ t e r s e c t s s law and science. 
Investigating the issues by moving b e y o n ~ ~ adoptmg a documentary focus to 
talk to the practitioners involved may crucIally, mform the debate. I hope that 
you will be able to help me in t ~ i s s matter. I WIll telephone you next week to 
discuss the possibility of an appomtment. 
Yours sincerely 
Hazel James 
MSc, LLM, BA (Hons) 
